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This thesis investigates the impact of attempts to stimulate private sector involvement and investment in 
the  urban  regeneration process,  looking  at the  case  of urban  regeneration  institutions  operating,  and 
policies implemented,  in disadvantaged areas of the city of Glasgow.  Successive governments' analyses 
of the urban problem and the perceived role of the private sector in these are critically analysed and an 
alternative advanced  The history of attempts to stimulate private sector participation in the regeneration 
process in  the USA and  UK is  discussed to  introduce the  delivery  structures  and  policies pursued  in 
Glasgow in the post war period.  A review of the economic history of the city and the characteristics of 
its  disadvantaged areas  highlight the weakness  of the city economy and  the  scale of the  regeneration 
problem.  The  key  original  fieldwork  elements  of the  thesis  investigate  the  findings  of a  survey  of 
attitudes in the private sector towards the regeneration process, the impacts of private sector participation 
in organisational structures and attempts to stimulate investment through the labour and property market. 
Further,  a  survey  of key  players  in  the  business  community  assesses  private  sector  attitudes  to  the 
regeneration process.  The research argues that the rationales for stimulating participation advanced by 
proponents are flawed.  Those concerned with organisational aspects confuse concerns over ownership 
with those of effective management. In  investment terms there are major weaknesses in the  attempt to 
adapt market failure policies  to  fundamentally redistributive issues.  Analysis of policy history shows 
that there has  been  convergence towards  a  holistic  approach  attempting to  address  both growth and 
redistributive issues and that the City of Glasgow is a good example of this.  Empirical evidence shows 
that business  opinion  is  relatively  well  informed  about the  issues  to  be  addressed  but not about the 
agencies charged with delivering policy.  Although the importance of the issues is recognised,  attitudes 
in the private sector are largely negative on the potential for additional intervention from this source to 
assist in their resolution. The impacts of participation on delivery structures are limited because a public 
sector culture and funding structure dominates, allowing private sector representatives an  input only at 
the  margins.  Attempts to  stimulate  labour  market investment have  had  positive,  but limited,  results. 
Awareness in  the private sector of these activities  is  low  and attitudes about their utility are  sceptical. 
Property  investment  through  the  housing  market  has  been  stimulated  but  this  is  complicated  by 
questionable  financial  arrangements  which  influence  analysis  of success  or  failure.  The  research 
concludes that there is  a need for realism in attempting to  stimulate private sector participation.  Urban 
regeneration  has  to  be  primarily  a  concern  for  government.  Private  sector contributions  have  to  be 
additional to this. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
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INTRODUCTION 2 
1  INTRODUCTION 
(i)  Key Research Questions 
This  thesis  investigates  the  impact  of attempts  to  stimulate  private  sector 
involvement  and  investment  in  the  urban  regeneration  process,  usmg 
developments in the city of Glasgow as  a case study. The research analyses a 
number of  inter-related issues: 
•  the  theories  underlying  the  former  government's  approach  to 
stimulating involvement and investment from the private sector in 
the regeneration process and the difficulties inherent in applying this 
to the problems of  disadvantaged areas; 
..  attitudes to private sector involvement and investment in the urban 
regeneration  process  in  the  business  community  not  currently 
involved in the process in Glasgow; 
..  the  impact  of  policies  intended  to  mcrease  private  sector 
involvement and investment on the programmes and organisational 
structures of  urban regeneration agencies in Glasgow. 
..  the  mechanics  of  attempting  to  stimulate  involvement  and 
investment from the private sector in the city. 
..  the  perceptions  of the  success  or  failure  of policies  aimed  at 
increasing involvement and investment from the private sector from 
the perspective of  the key players in the public and private sector in 
the city. 
4&  the  potential  for  increasing  private  sector  involvement  and 
investment in the urban regeneration of  the city in future. 3 
Underlying these questions is the central issue of under what conditions it is 
possible  to  stimulate  private  sector  involvement  and  investment  in  urban 
regeneration.  These questions are  important  in the field at the moment, for 
two reasons.  Firstly, it has since the early 1980s been ideologically compatible 
with  the  aims  of government,  first  Conservative  and  now  Labour,  which 
decides  what  to  finance.  Private  sector  involvement  is  increasingly  a 
prerequisite for gaining project funding.  Secondly, to date, the approach has 
had very limited success, especially in the most economically depressed local 
economies,  being  confined where  it  has  happened  to  property  development 
schemes  (Turok,  1992a).  Thus  there  is  the  potential  that if this  approach 
becomes the only rationale for intervention that the needs of depressed local 
economies will be further neglected.  The issue also sits centrally in the debate 
over whether state funded economic development finance should be  focused 
where  it  produces  the  greatest  economic  return,  or  whether  it  should  be 
directed at developing the depressed areas and sectors of the economy.  It is 
very important to  note at the outset that the purpose of this thesis  is  not to 
evaluate the success or failure of agencies at resolving urban problems.  The 
aim is  to  assess the  impacts  of attempts to  stimulate participation from  the 
private sector in these efforts. 
(ii)  Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows.  This Chapter introduces the key issues to 
be addressed before outlining the terminological definitions used in the thesis, 4 
i.e. urban regeneration', 'private sector', 'involvement', 'investment', etc.  The 
methodology  is  then  introduced,  covering  the  philosophical  approach taken 
and  the  methods  used  - the  case  study,  semi -structured  interviews  and 
questionnaires. 
Chapter 2 investigates the market failure approach to urban policy adopted by 
successive  governments and highlights the difficulties  intervention based on 
this perspective presents for the regeneration of the most disadvantaged areas. 
The final  part of the chapter presents an alternative analysis of the causes of 
persistent  geographical  concentrations  of  disadvantage,  focusing  on  the 
complex interplay of social and economic factors which can act to  lock areas 
into cycles of  decline. 
Chapter  3  investigates  the  historical  record  of attempts  to  stimulate  private 
sector  involvement  and  investment  in  the  regeneration  process.  The 
international  context,  principally  covering  the  USA  where  private  sector 
participation in urban regeneration has  a long track record, is  first discussed, 
looking at the 'growth coalition' approach in the USA from the 1940s onwards 
and the role of the private sector in this. This is followed by a brief review of 
the  1960s  'War on Poverty',  'Model  Cities',  the  Community  Development 
Block Grant and the role of the private sector in these.  Urban policy and the 
private  sector  from  the  late  1970s  to  1992  is  then  discussed,  focusing  on 
significant federal  withdrawal  from  the  cities  in  the  1980s,  the  role  of the 
Department  of Housing  and  Urban  Development  CHUD)  and  Economic 5 
Development  Administration  (EDA)  and  attempts  at  introducing  urban 
enterprise  zone  legislation.  The  analysis  is  completed  by  a  discussion  of 
current policy  debates,  including  the  Economic  Empowerment  Act  and  the 
public - private element in the Clinton administration's approach. 
This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of the  UK's and  Scotland's urban  policy 
history in relation to  the  issue.  The main areas  covered include policy pre-
1979,  including  late  1960s  Home  Office  programmes,  comprehensive 
redevelopment, the gradual shift from social to  economic analysis of problem, 
the 1977 White Paper on the Inner cities and GEAR, focusing on the  minimal 
role for the private sector.  This is followed by an analysis of  policy after 1979, 
looking  particularly  at  Urban  Development  Corporations,  Training  and 
Enterprise  Councils  and  City  Challenge.  Finally,  Chapter  3  looks  at 
Glasgow's urban policy history to illustrate how these policy shifts manifested 
themselves in the institutional structures developed and programmes pursued 
to the early 1990s. 
Chapter 4 completes the contextual research by providing information on the 
performance of  the Glasgow economy compared to that of Scotland and Great 
Britain.  It also  looks  at  the  socio-economic  structure  of the  disadvantaged 
areas of  the city and outlines the current delivery structure in the city. 6 
Chapter  5  looks  at  attitudes  in  the  city's  business  community  towards  the 
regeneration process, based on a survey of  key individuals in the city's leading 
companies. The issues covered include 
•  levels of knowledge about the activities of regeneration agencies in 
the city. 
•  opinions about the nature and effectiveness of current  regeneration 
policy in the city. 
"  reasons for their current lack of  involvement in urban regeneration 
and the potential for stimulating more involvement. 
Chapter  6  looks  at  the  impacts  of  private  sector  involvement  in  the 
organisational and policy delivery structures of urban regeneration agencies in 
Glasgow,  based  on  an  evaluation  of background  written  material,  officer 
interviews  and  private  sector  individuals  involved  in  the  structure  of the 
agenCIes. 
Chapter  7  analyses  the  effect  of policies  designed  to  develop  employment 
linkages between disadvantaged areas and the wider labour market.  The key 
issues discussed cover the form programmes take and the reasons  companies 
either participate or do not get involved in programmes.  A number of projects 
are analysed in detail to highlight the key issues. 
Chapter 8 analyses the impact of the Scottish Homes GRO Grant system, the 
major  private  sector  investment  mechanism  in  urban  regeneration 7 
programmes in disadvantaged areas of  the city.  The issues covered include an 
analysis  of the  mechanics  of the  regime,  the  rationale  for  private  sector 
developers becoming involved and the performance of  the scheme to date, with 
the  aim  of illustrating  the  practicalities  of financial  partnership.  Finally, 
Chapter  9  draws  together  the  findings  of the  theoretical,  contextual  and 
empirical  analysis  to  provide  insights  into  the  key  questions  the  thesis 
addresses. 
2.  DEFINITIONS 
Much  of  the  terminology  employed  In  this  thesis  has  commonplace 
applications and thus multiple meanings.  This section addresses this issue by 
presenting a series of more rigid definitions for the key terms used regularly 
throughout the thesis.  Particular emphasis is placed on the meaning of 'urban 
regeneration' . 
(i)  'Urban Regeneration' 
The  dictionary  definition  of 'regenerate',  the  root  of 'regeneration'  is  to 
"undergo,  or  cause  to  undergo  moral  spiritual  or  physical  renewal  or 
invigoration; to  form  or be formed again, come or bring into  existence once 
again;  to  replace  by  new  growth"  (Collins  1988).  Thus  'regeneration'  is 
concerned with changing the characteristics of an area, in this research urban 
areas, either to  replace the existing circumstances  with an approximation of 
what was there previously, or to  develop a new situation.  It is thus at once a 8 
conservative concept and a radical one depending on the context in which it is 
applied. 
The  legislative  definition of 'urban regeneration'  is  vague.  Successive  UK 
Acts of Parliament related to urban regeneration have defined it as  relating to 
resolving  the  social  and  economic  problems  of an  area  (1978  Inner  Urban 
Areas  Act).  The  1980  Local  Government,  Planning  and  Land  Act  (1980), 
which is the legislative foundation of  Urban Development Corporations, states 
that "the object of an urban development  corporation shall  be  to  secure the 
regeneration  of its  area"  (136.-(1»  The  means  to  achieving  this  are  "by 
bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of 
existing and new industry and  commerce, creating an attractive environment 
and  ensuring  that  housing  and  social  facilities  are  available  to  encourage 
people to live and work in the area" (136.- (2)). 
These  aims  have  changed  little;  the  1993  Leasehold  Reform,  Housing  and 
Urban Development Act states: "activities contributing to the regeneration of 
an urban area include in particular:  (a)  securing that land and buildings are 
brought into effective use; (b) developing, or encouraging the development of, 
existing and new industry and commerce;  (c)  creating an attractive and safe 
environment; (d) providing housing or social and recreational facilities so as to 
encourage people to  live and work in the area;  (e)  providing employment for 
people  who  live  in  the  area;  (f)  providing  training,  educational  or  health 
facilities for people who live in the area (27 - (2))". 9 
Government  bidding  guidance  for  the  Single  Regeneration  Budget  (1996) 
followed similar lines but suggested a slight shift towards more tightly defined 
economic programmes:  "the Challenge Fund supports initiatives which build 
on good practice and existing initiatives, represent value for money and meet 
one or more of the following objectives: enhance the employment prospects, 
education  and  skills  of local  people,  particularly  the  young  and  those  at  a 
disadvantage  and  promote  equality  of opportunity;  encourage  sustainable 
economic growth and wealth creation by improving the competitiveness of  the 
local economy, including support for new and existing businesses; protect and 
improve the environment and infrastructure and promote good quality design 
and  landscaping;  improve  housing  and  housing  conditions  for  local  people 
through physical improvement, better maintenance, improved management and 
greater choice and diversity; promote initiatives of  benefit to ethnic minorities; 
tackle crime and improve community safety;  enhance the quality of life and 
capacity  to  contribute  to  local  regeneration  of local  people,  including  their 
health and cultural and sports opportunities" (Department of the Environment, 
1996).  In a footnote the definition is widened further "regeneration is used as a 
shorthand  term  for  sustainable  regeneration,  economic  development  and 
industrial competitiveness" (ibid) 
In Scotland,  the Government definition is consistent with those underpinning 
English  regeneration  policy:  "a  regeneration  strategy  should  set  out  a 
comprehensive approach to regeneration of  deprived areas, which encompasses 10 
a  range  of relevant  economic  social  and  physical  issues"  (Scottish  Office, 
1996).  The factors  which make up  these  issues are  listed,  giving an insight 
into  the  policies  viewed  as  central  to  regeneration:  the  level  and  nature  of 
unemployment; household income levels; levels of educational attainment; the 
health  of  the  population;  the  need  for  crime  reduction  and  prevention 
measures;  the  scope  for  providing  constructive  activities  for  children  and 
young  people;  deprivation  amongst  particular  groups  of the  community; 
training provision and  its take up;  business activity induding business  birth 
rates;  housing  conditions;  housing  endure;  retail  and  leisure  provision;  the 
scope  for  developing  sporting  and  cultural  activities;  childcare  provision, 
particularly  in  support  of vulnerable  or  at  risk  families;  accessibility  and 
transport issues (ibid). 
F  or the purposes  of this  research,  urban regeneration will  be  defined  as  the 
programmes  pursued  by  public  agencies  in  areas  of Glasgow,  exhibiting 
concentrations of economic stress with the aim of reducing this stress.  Here 
'stress' is defined as the concentration of factors such as high and long term 
unemployment,  low  incomes  and  poor  access  to  employment  opportunities 
within  specific  areas.  In policy terms  it will  focus  more  on the  economic 
aspects of  the wide-ranging definitions discussed above, firstly since the study 
is concerned with the potential and actual impacts of private sector activity to 
alleviate these issues and secondly because a strong argument can be made that 
economic factors are key to any successful regeneration programme.  In terms 11 
of  the regeneration organisations investigated it will focus on those which have 
private sector involvement and are operating in these areas of  stress. 
(ii)  'Public' and 'Private Sector' 
The dictionary definition (Collins  1988) of 'public sector'  is  defined as  "the 
part  of a  country's  economy  which  consists  of state-owned  institutions, 
including nationalised industries and  services provided by local authorities", 
while the 'private sector' is  defined "as the part of a country's economy that 
consists of  privately owned enterprises".  For the purposes of  this research, this 
distinction is sufficient, although it should be noted that in the use of the term 
'private sector' in the thesis it will be made clear whether it is individuals from 
a  private  sector  background  or  companies  operating  in  this  sector  of the 
economy  who  are  being  referred  to.  When  the  term  'private  sector 
representative' is used, for example, this does not mean that the individual is 
speakingfor the 'private sector' (which by definition is an disparate body) but 
is rather a representative in a context where he or she is distinguished by his or 
her  background  from  other  representatives. 
representative is speaking from the private sector. 
(iii)  'Involvement' 
Thus,  a  private  sector 
The 'involvement' of  the private sector in urban regeneration in this research is 
defined  as  direct  participation  by  companies  or  individuals  in  the 
organisational structures of  the regeneration organisations under investigation. 12 
(iv)  'Investment' 
'Investment' is defined in two ways.  Firstly, as the commitment of financial 
resources by the private sector in property developments in depressed areas of 
the urban economies under investigation.  Secondly, it is defined as investment 
in the populations of these areas through the mechanisms of employment of 
local people and participation in training programmes. 
3  METHODOLOGY 
(i)  Philosophical and Theoretical Stance 
This research can be  broadly characterised as  being in the  'postpositivist'  or 
'critical realist' philosophical paradigm.  Thus, in ontological terms, "reality is 
assumed to exist but to only be imperfectly apprehendable because of  basically 
flawed  human  intellectual  mechanisms  and  the  fundamentally  intractable 
nature of  phenomena" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) 
Arising  from  this,  the  epistemological  stance  is  that  objectivism  is  a 
'regulatory ideal' but one which, in contrast with the belief of positivism, it is 
not possible to attain.  Thus subjectivism should be minimised where possible 
since  it  cannot  be  eliminated.  Throughout  this  section,  which  focuses 
principally on empirical method issues due to the fieldwork oriented nature of 
the study, the problem of  potential subjectivism is addressed. The methodology 
to  be  adopted  in  this  study  can  be  broadly  characterised  as  a  "pluralist 
evaluation"  (Smith  and  Cantley,  1985).  Conventional  evaluative  research 
makes  three  important  presumptions:  rationality  in  the  policy  process,  the 13 
experimentalist  ideal  in  social  research  and  the  existence  of consensus  in 
professional organisations (Smith and Cantley, 1985).  This kind of evaluation 
has its roots in the positivist tradition, assuming that 'truth' can be 'objectively 
captured'  by  research.  This  approach  has  limited relevance.  The  pluralist 
evaluation  approach  emphasises  the  complexity  of both  the  policy  making 
process and institutional  complexity both within and  between organisations, 
i.e:  "process will have a crucial influence upon outcome" (Means and Smith, 
1988).  In any policy process,  there  are  a series  of 'stakeholders'  involved: 
"each of these groups has a different perception of the success or failure of a 
particular policy initiative" (Lowndes and Stoker, 1992). 
This  research,  following  from  Smith and  Cantley,  will  take  account  of the 
following five principles arising from  the above.  Firstly,  the research must 
identify the major constituent groups involved in,  and affected by, the policy 
initiative.  Secondly,  data  must  be  collected  on  these  constituent  groups' 
perceptions and interpretations of 'success' in policy delivery. This must have 
a  central  place  in the  evaluation.  Thirdly,  the  study  should not  only  take 
account  of the  plurality  of the  notions  of 'success'  but  also  the  different 
groups'  strategies as they strive to  implement their own perspectives in their 
own interests.  Fourthly,  the research must then assess the  extent to which 
success (or failure) is achieved on each of the criteria described by each of the 
actors in terms of  the different meanings applied to these criteria. Thus success 
is a pluralistic notion; it is not a unitary measure. Finally, the evaluation must 
therefore adopt the constant use of as many different kinds of data as possible. 14 
This  ensures  as  far  as  possible  that  the  research  reflects  the  full  range  of 
interests, ideologies, interpretations and achievements related to  the policy, to 
provide an explanation of the processes involved and complex conclusions as 
to  the  success  or  failure  of policy  from  multiple  viewpoints  (Smith  and 
Cantley, 1985). 
Taking such an approach places the findings  closer to  probable reality than a 
straightforward positivistic  approach  could.  The  operationalisation of these 
concepts is discussed below. 
(ii)  The case study approach 
For  this  research,  a  case  study  method  will  be  adopted.  The  case  study 
approach is  valid for  this  study  for  a number of reasons.  Firstly,  the  most 
obvious reason for taking a case study approach is the area (i.e. city economy) 
and organisation/initiative focus of the study.  It is concerned with the impact 
of  private sector involvement on the organisation and output of local economic 
development/regeneration policy on depressed local economies within the city 
of Glasgow.  Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  units  of study  must  be  these 
depressed  local  economies  within the  urban  economy  and  the  regeneration 
organisations working within them.  The separate strands of investigation will 
be  combined to  produce  a  case  study  of the  performance  of private  sector 
involvement and investment in depressed areas of the city of Glasgow.  The 
specific methodologies to  be used within this  broad methodological context, 15 
principally, questionnaires and semi-structured interviewing are discussed later 
in this paper. 
(iii)  Assessing the extent of private sector involvement and investment 
This  section  is  concerned  with  an  organisational  evaluation  of the  policy 
delivery structure and the investment outcomes of  the projects and programmes 
under study.  In any project or programme there are key phases in the life cycle 
ofa policy: 
..  strategic development 
It  project and programme management 
..  investment. 
Strategic design and implementation should be  seen as  part of a  continuum 
rather than discrete  stages.  For each phase the level of involvement of the 
private sector needs to be assessed.  It should be noted that the second and third 
phases above are really part of the implementation phases of policy.  They are 
separated for this study because they represent different kinds of  involvement. 
Strategy formulation and design is concerned with how policy is made.  There 
are a number of important questions within this.  Firstly, where does the initial 
impetus for  the  strategy come from?  Who  identifies the  problem and sees  a 
need for action?  Is it the public sector or the private sector? 16 
Secondly, what is the structure of  the strategic development process?  Who do 
the  initiators  consult  and  involve?  Is  strategy  developed  in  a  partnership 
structure?  If so,  what role  do  the various partners play?  How involved are 
they?  Who is dominant? In order to answer the above, it was necessary to: find 
out who was involved in strategy development; construct interview schedules 
to  be  applied  to  those  involved  which  attempted  to  gauge  the  level  of 
involvement; build on the above by interviewing all of the key players to gain 
a deeper understanding of  the processes at work and the dominant influences in 
the initial design stages of  the strategy. 
The  second  kind  of  involvement  to  be  considered  was  programme 
management.  To  gauge the level of private sector involvement in the policy 
delivery  structure  it  was  necessary  to  discover  first  how  the  policy  was 
implemented.  This was  done  by  asking  the  following  questions:  does  one 
agency  or organisation run the  project alone and  inform the other bodies of 
progress and consult them as to any changes? Is the project delivered through a 
partnership  arrangement where  all  those  involved are  heavily involved with 
day  to  day  management?  Is  there  a  management  team  drawn  from  the 
organisations involved which runs the project? If so,  which organisations are 
represented on this team and who are the most influential? 
To  research these issues, it was necessary to  first discover the organisational 
structure  for  delivery,  and  attempt  to  measure  the  extent  of private  sector 
involvement in the process by a series of initial interviews and build on this 17 
analysis by more detailed interviewing of the key individuals involved in the 
implementation stage of  the project/programme. 
The third type of involvement considered was  investment.  This part of the 
analysis  looked  at  the  relative  investment  shares  the  various  organisations 
involved put into a project/programme.  This was principally concerned with 
the share of  public and private investment.  The direct financial contribution of 
the various actors involved was assessed by looking at the budgetary structure 
for the project/programme.  The inclusion of an estimate of 'additionality' was 
necessary to  see  if the  project/programme produced an  outcome that would 
otherwise not have occurred.  This is an essential measure of whether or not a 
project/programme  was  worthwhile.  This  was  carried  out through  detailed 
analysis  of  the  financial  aspects  of  development  projects  and  in-depth 
interviewing of  key players. 
(iv)  Assessing impacts on the nature of the regeneration process. 
The previous section was concerned with how to  analyse the actual extent of 
private sector involvement.  This section deals with the more difficult question 
of how to assess and measure the impacts this has had (if it has occurred) on 
both the way policies  are  developed and  implemented i.e.  the  nature of the 
regeneration process.  There were a number of  stages in this process. Firstly, it 
was  necessary to  select the  various projects/programmes,  then look at what 
they aim to achieve and look at their impacts. 18 
The method of  the previous section highlighted the projects/programmes where 
the private sector has had an influence.  By focusing  on these to  see which 
kinds of  policies were adopted it was possible to isolate as far as is possible the 
impact private sector involvement has had on the policy making process.  This 
allowed  assessment,  but  not  measurement.  For  this  it  was  necessary  to 
construct  a  structure  which  allowed  more  ngorous  comparisons  of  the 
components of  a policy, looking at who is involved, who is funding it and what 
it aims to do.  This is obviously closely linked with the question of the extent 
of  the involvement.  However, it moved the analysis further forward in that it 
attempted to look at actual impacts on the process. 
Finally,  by  investigating  who  the  policy  was  aimed  and  what  it  aimed  to 
achieve the study attempted to assess if policies which are not targeted directly 
at  the  interests  of the  private  sector  can  generate  any  kind  of significant 
involvement by them in the regeneration process.  Where there was a multiple 
policy  approach,  it  was  necessary  to  investigate  which  aspects  of this  the 
private sector was involved in organisationally and financially, to  find out if 
involvement  and  investment  was  only  stimulated  in  those  aspects  of the 
process which benefit it directly.  A further aspect of  this was to assess whether 
or  not the  public  sector  actors  geared  their  policies  to  this  end.  Are  they 
principally driven by the needs of the local economy or the need to  generate 
private sector investment? Are these mutually exclusive? 19 
4  STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF RESEARCH METHODS 
(i)  The case study method 
The main justification for using a multiple research tool case study approach 
was the complexity of  the issues under investigation; "the case study allows an 
investigation to  retain the  holistic and meaningful  characteristics of real  life 
events" (Yin, 1989).  In order to gain significant insights into the issue, a wide 
range of information sources had to be accessed, which required a number of 
different approaches to be adopted: "any finding or conclusion in a case study 
is  likely to  be much more  convincing and  accurate if it  is  based on several 
different sources of  information, following a corroboratory mode" (Yin, 1989). 
For example, if a questionnaire was the only method used,  there would be a 
lack of in depth analysis of the issues.  This limitation would be the same of 
any method  used  in isolation.  Perhaps the  strongest  argument  for  using  a 
variety  of  approaches  within  the  overall  case  study  method  is  the 
acknowledged  weakness  in  isolation  of all  social  and  economic  research 
methods.  U  sing a combination of methods widens the scope of the research, 
increases its depth and strengthens the validity of  the findings. 
An in depth  case  study  is  of value  on its  own,  providing  insights  into  the 
dynamics  at  work  in  a  particular  context.  However,  it  is  time  and  place 
specific to that context.  Generalisations cannot be made.  This problem was 
countered by the application of a common methodology in a number of cases 
across  the  city.  The  same  method  was  applied  allowing  comparison  of 20 
findings.  It can again be argued that this only produces generalisations from a 
larger number of specific cases but total coverage is not a practical option.  If 
strong  common trends  are  found  in a  number of cases,  or if there  is  great 
variety in the findings, a common methodology substantiates the validity of  the 
research.  The purpose is illustration of  how theoretical concepts actually work 
in a real world context rather than generalisation. 
As  with all  research methods, the  selection of what to  study  as  a  case  is  a 
subjective act on the part of the researcher.  There is  no  guarantee that those 
cases  selected  are  necessarily  representative  of the  spread  of experience  of 
regeneration.  However,  selectivity  is  an  inevitable  part  of the  research 
experience, since it is not possible to study everything.  Manageability in terms 
of scale  is  critical to  the  successful research design.  To  an  extent,  the case 
study areas were self selecting, since to have relevance to the questions being 
posed they had to be in a depressed economic situation and be the subject of 
regeneration efforts. Within this subset, i.e.  of local economies as  a whole in 
the  city  of  Glasgow,  the  selective,  subjective,  element  is  critical,  but 
unavoidable. 
The  case  study  method  can be  criticised for  its  lack  of transparency.  The 
method is heavily reliant on the researcher.  This is a question of reliability of 
findings.  This can be  addressed by ensuring that the  method is,  as  far  as  is 
possible, replicable.  That is,  the  researcher,  or  any  other,  should be  able  to 
carry  out  the  research  and  produce  a  similar  outcome;  "in principle,  other 21 
investigators can review the evidence directly and not be limited by the written 
reports" (Yin, 1989). 
This was done by detailing what was investigated, when and how.  In other 
words, records were kept of all activities carried out.  This involved keeping 
records of interviews, questionnaire returns, sources consulted, documentation 
used  and so  on,  i.e.,  the creation of  a  case  study data base.  As far  as  is 
possible,  transparency  had  to  be  maximised,  otherwise  the  results  were 
inevitably questionable. 
(ii)  Organisational Evaluation:  Qualitative Interviewing 
Evaluation of  the impact of  the need to generate private sector involvement and 
investment has had on the organisation and types of policies pursued in urban 
regeneration  was  carried  out  by  an  extensive  series  of  semi-structured 
interviews.  This section looks at the  strengths  and weaknesses of this  as  a 
technique. 
Semi-structured interviewing was  used  as  a  complementary tool to  partially 
compensate for the potential over simplification, rigidity and danger of 'false 
objectification'  of the  questionnaire.  This  followed  the  categorisation  of 
Fontana and Frey (1994) - interviews were formal, preset, but in the field and 
somewhat  directive.  At  its  most  basic,  interviewing  can  be  seen  as  "the 
development of precision, focus, reliability and validity in [a]  common social 
act - conversation" (Goode and Hatt, 1952). 22 
The  interview method is  thus  highly reliant on the  interactive  skills  of the 
interviewer  (and  interviewee).  "the  interviewer  must  perfect  a  style  of 
'interested listening', that rewards the respondent's participation but does not 
evaluate the responses" (Fontana and Frey, 1994). 
The  researcher  must  also  take  account  of the  issue  of the  respondent's 
behaviour,  particularly  in  situations  where  the  respondent  gives  a  "socially 
desirable"  (Bradburn,  1983)  response  to  please  the  interviewer  or  omits 
relevant information to hide something from the interviewer. Identification of 
this  in  a  semi-structured  interview  situation  can  be  addressed  by  asking 
supplementary questions, but how to address these problems can really only be 
learned from experience of  the interview situation. 
The  question of who  to  interview is  also  important.  In the  context of this 
research,  the  pool  of respondents  was  determined  by the  selection  of areas 
worthy  of  study  in  the  city.  Therefore,  private  sector  individuals, 
representatives of  local authorities and regeneration agencies were consulted. 
Interviewing gives a more in-depth insight into the issues under investigation. 
It can  cut  down  the  initial  bias  which  is  present  in  the  framing  of a  rigid 
questionnaire.  However, it should not necessarily be seen as a 'better' method 
than the  questionnaire  in terms  of a  lack  of subjectivity.  The  interviewer 
decides which areas to  investigate, and interprets the answers. It is  of use to look at the questionnaire as  having the major subjective element at  different 
stages  in the  research  act  - the  questionnaire  at  the  beginning  (framing  the 
questions), the interview at the end (response interpretation). There is little that 
can be done about eliminating subjectivity but it is  essential to be aware of it 
and seek to minimise it, and not overstate the claims made as to the findings. 
(iii)  Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire survey formed an integral part of  the research.  This sought to 
assess  levels  of private  sector:  knowledge  about the  regeneration process; 
attitudes  to  involvement  and  investment  in  the  urban  regeneration  process; 
potential  for  increased  participation  and  knowledge  of  current  delivery 
structures for progressing urban regeneration. 
The questions aimed at gaining insights into these issues were generated from 
in  depth  reviews  of the  relevant  literature,  previous  research  experience, 
consultations with colleagues and with practitioners working in the field.  The 
pragmatic mechanics of  design and delivery will be discussed in chapter 5. 
The issues this research addressed are  extremely complex and cannot simply 
be  dealt  with by the  administration  of a  simple  questionnaire.  Within  the 
overall method, however, this formed  only a component of the whole.  It is 
instructive to  outline the strengths and weaknesses of the questionnaire as  a 
research method, as  this allows early recognition of the problems with it and 
shows the need for a complementary but deeper analysis, which was covered 24 
by the use of semi-structured qualitative interviewing which was discussed in 
the previous section. 
The first problem with the questionnaire method is that the complexity of the 
issues demands extremely accurate questioning which is directly relevant to the 
issue being investigated: "the formulation of questions is  a much more subtle 
and frustrating task than is generally believed by those who have not attempted 
it"  (Goode  and  Hatt,  1952).  This  can  be  addressed  by  initially  learning  as 
much  as  is  possible  about the  subject  so  as  to  minimise  the  likelihood of 
important issues being neglected. 
Linked to the above problem, there is inevitably an element of subjectivity in 
the selection of questions,  since it is  the researcher who  poses the  question. 
This  can be  reduced  by  attempting,  as  far  as  is  possible,  to  frame  neutral 
questions, or at least questions which use as  little value-laden terminology as 
possible.  This was very difficult to do in the context of  this research due to the 
political sensitivity of  the issues under investigation. 
It should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  it  is  not  possible  to  produce  wholly 
objective findings through the generation of statistical raw data by the use of a 
questionnaire.  The aim was to use these findings in tandem with the outcomes 
of semi-structured interviews.  The aim of the questionnaire is not to produce 
"statistical data  ... (to  be) ... portrayed as  asocial products practically untouched 
by human hands" (Irvine, et aI, 1979).  The questions in the questionnaire were 25 
inevitably  subjective,  despite  attempts  to  mmlmlse  this.  However,  the 
information generated by the questionnaire was of use because it provided a 
simplified insight into complex questions. 
The internal design of  the questionnaire must take account of several 'common 
sense' issues.  It should not ask difficult or controversial questions at the start 
which may intimidate or alienate the respondent.  It should not be too long or 
contain  questions  at  the  end  which  require  significant  thought  as  the 
respondent  may  be  tired.  Questions  should  be  stated  in  plain  language 
wherever possible. 
All of the above were serious issues which were addressed by proceeding with 
caution.  Perhaps the  most  important  safeguard  which  was  used to  resolve 
these  problems  was  to  carry  out  an  initial  pilot  survey,  which  helped  to 
highlight  specific  problems  such  as  loaded  or  leading  questions,  irrelevant 
enquiries and missing issues. 
5  SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the research issue and the philosophical approach 
this research took.  It has illustrated that it was the best approach to take given 
the  nature  of the  research  questions,  while  acknowledging  the  unavoidable 
element of subjectivity  present  in  any  research  design.  The  discussion  of 
potential methodological problems focused principally on the need to minimise 
subjectivity  and  the  need  to  utilise  as  many  sources  and  research  tools  as 26 
possible to  overcome the  fragility  of each research method  in  isolation and 
incorporate as  many viewpoints as possible into the research.  By taking this 
approach  an  in-depth  investigation  was  carried  out  across  a  series  of case 
studies in Glasgow to  build a case study of the issues at the city level.  This 
research provides empirical evidence as to the success or failure, from a variety 
of perspectives, of policies aimed at stimulating private sector participation in 
the city.  It also provides an indication of  the potential for success or failure of 
present and future attempts to  involve the private sector in the regeneration of 
depressed local economies.  The next chapter looks at  the thinking underlying 
successive governments' approaches to resolving urban problems, argues that 
it is not relevant to the problems of  the most disadvantaged areas and  advances 
an alternative perspective on the causes of persistent disadvantage CHAPTER 2 : 
THE RATIONALE FOR STIMULATING PRIVATE SECTOR 
PARTICIPATION 
27 28 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the rationale behind the priority given in recent years 
to involving the private sector in urban regeneration policy.  The rationale for 
intervention successive governments have adopted, namely market failure, and 
the  potential  role  for  the  private  sector within this  is  then  discussed.  The 
principles of this rationale are then applied to the problems of depressed local 
economies,  highlighting  the  problems  of  this  as  the  foundation  of  a 
development  approach  in  these  areas  and  the  difficulties  of involving  the 
private sector in them.  It is argued that an alternative approach, drawing on the 
cumulative  causation  perspective,  is  a  more  convincing  explanation  of the 
forces that cause persistence of deprivation among groups and areas.  As stated 
in Chapter One, the purpose of this thesis is not to assess the performance of 
agencies at tackling urban regeneration issues- the  purpose is  to  identify the 
success  or failure  of attempts to  stimulate private  sector involvement.  This 
chapter serves to set the context for the main body of the thesis by identifying 
the analysis of the urban problem that successive governments have adopted, 
indicate weaknesses in this approach and advance an alternative explanation. 
2  THE MARKET FAILURE RATIONALE FOR INTERVENTION 
(i)  Imperfect Markets 
The most advanced approach to  regeneration policy based on the concept of 
'working with the  grain of the  market'  is  the  'market failure'  rationale  for 
intervention.  The  approach  aims  to  set  a  firm  economic  rationale  for 29 
intervention by the state.  It accepts that there are constraints other than those 
imposed by the state on the ability of individuals and companies to  advance 
themselves  economically.  This  section  will  discuss  this  approach and then 
relate  it to  the  nature  of the development process  discussed  in the  previous 
section.  Finally, its potential at a theoretical level for regenerating depressed 
local economies will be assessed. 
Market failure deals principally with the problems of the constraints imposed 
by the individualistic nature of the market system which inhibit potential for 
economIC  growth.  Individual  people  and  companies  tend  to  assess  the 
economlC  worth  of  an  action  only  in  terms  of  benefits  to  themselves. 
However, their actions have wider implications for economic growth than this 
narrow view. Market failure theories seek first to prove that the market cannot 
be totally efficient on its own for reasons which are intrinsic to the mechanism 
itself.  In other words, more economic growth can be gained if the market is 
assisted in its  operation by taking account of these wider, or 'non - market', 
benefits (Bartik,  1990).  It then attempts to  show how these problems can be 
addressed to produce an efficient economic benefit from the intervention.  The 
compatibility  of this  rationale  for  intervention  with  the  approach  taken  by 
government to delivery of  its services generally since 1979 is clear. 30 
(ii)  Public Goods, Externalities and Information Flows 
Market failures  are  caused by impediments to  the formation  or operation of 
markets.  There are  three  main impediments  according to  proponents of this 
view.  Firstly, there  is  the problem of public  goods.  These  are  goods  from 
which everyone benefits, such as national defence. These cannot be provided by 
private markets, since there can be  no  control over who  consumes the goods, 
and thus  no  profit made.  The  only  way  it  can be  done  is  if everyone  pays 
through the taxation system. 
Secondly there are externalities.  These are the side effects of production.  An 
example of a negative effect is pollution.  This causes inefficiency because it 
impedes other economic activities.  A heavily polluting factory will depress the 
local  land  market.  The  effectiveness  of the  workforce  will  be  reduced  by 
absence  and  illness.  There  is  no  market  mechanism  for  encouraging 
environmentally sensitive production, despite these costs.  Spin-off effects for 
other  industries  through  technological  developments  are  an  example  of a 
positive externality for which there is no  market mechanism to  take advantage 
(Storper, 1996). 
Thirdly,  there  is  the  problem  of imperfect  information  flows.  These  cause 
failure because opportunities that may net benefits will not be taken up because 
people  do  not  know  about  them.  For  local  economies,  externalities  and 
imperfect information flows  are the main market failures of relevance (Bartik, 31 
1990).  A series of specific market failures arise from these problems. They are 
discussed in turn below. 
(iii)  Specific Market Failures 
Firstly there is the problem of  unemployment.  Intervention is only acceptable if 
people are not able to  find  employment for  which they are  qualified and are 
willing  to  work  at  current  wage  rates.  Intervention  to  place  people  in 
employment  is  acceptable  if they  are  unemployed  according  to  the  criteria 
above (Bartik, 1990). 
Secondly  there  is  the  concept  of 'underemployment'.  Some  industries,  for 
various  reasons,  pay more  than  others  when the  qualifications  of the  labour 
force  are  the  same.  Thus  the  economy  is  not  maximising  the  skills  of the 
workforce.  Intervention to address this market failure would attempt to shift the 
industrial structure of  the area into these higher-wage industries (Bartik, 1990). 
There  are  problems  with  funding  for  training  (failure  to  invest  in  'human 
capital').  A 'human capital'  market failure  only occurs if the individual does 
not invest in their own enhancement.  This happens because individuals may 
not be able to pay for training.  It may be difficult to borrow money, because, to 
an extent, the benefits are intangible: firms may be reluctant to invest because 
of the difficulty of measuring benefits and the potential for poaching by other 
firms.  Thus, the public sector must provide this service.  The key measure of 
efficiency  is what the participants' earnings would have been if they had not 32 
gone through the training.  If the cost is  less than the benefit to the employee 
(however measured) it would be deemed efficient use of public money (Bartik, 
1990). 
In  financial  markets,  state  regulation  restricts  competition,  which  in  theory 
excludes risky investments from  support.  The absence of complete insurance 
markets restricts the amount of  risk that financial institutions are willing to take. 
Demand  for  short  term  returns  at  high  interest  rates  limits  the  kind  of 
investment  capital  markets  will  support.  Benefits  may  come  from  these 
investments, but the structure of capital markets prevents them being taken up. 
Thus,  the  public  sector  should  invest  where  projects  are  viable,  but  private 
sources are  unavailable.  It should be  noted in passing that this analysis runs 
counter to  the  concept of the private sector as  innovative,  entrepeneurial and 
risk  taking.  The  New Right  characterisation  of the  various  sectors  of the 
economy breaks down in the area of regeneration investment.  Further, there is 
a difficulty of assessing potential profitability when determining whether or not 
to  give support; government intervention may not be any better at investment 
selection than the private sector. 
The availability of information is very important in the above specific failures. 
It is also important as a market failure in its own right.  Complete information 
cannot be provided by private markets.  Where it is provided, private consumers 
may not be able to access it, evaluate it or apply it.  There is also the question of 
bias when information is provided by consultants.  Thus, the state must provide 33 
basic information to businesses which could help them to expand, assist people 
in finding employment and provide information on the available opportunities 
for training (Scottish Enterprise, 1995). 
Research and development is another key area in which market failures occur. 
Businesses tend only to  evaluate the  usefulness  of a technique or product in 
terms of the gain to  themselves.  There are  spillover effects,  however,  which 
can increase net economic benefits (Storper, 1996).  The efficiency of state R & 
D support is difficult to evaluate, but it does aim to fill the gap caused by the 
market failure. 
Another failure  caused  by  individualistic  decision  making  is  that  companies 
making expansion or location decisions do not recognise that their actions may 
have external effects.  This can have benefits for the area in which they expand 
or locate.  These are known as 'agglomeration economies'.  There are two types 
of  'non-market  agglomeration  benefits'.  Firstly,  there  are  'thick-market 
externalities'.  Specialised  industries  with  high  costs  benefit  most  from 
concentrations of related industries.  A larger market for a good makes it easier 
for buyers and sellers to  find  each other,  so  reducing costs  (Rothwell,  1989). 
Closely linked to this is the occurrence of 'human capital externalities'.  This is 
important in innovative industries.  Close proximity increases interaction and 
competition between firms (Mazzonis, 1989). 34 
Addressing the problems of market failures can lead to fiscal benefits for local 
areas.  Intervention (by  giving subsidies) can produce benefits for  the public 
sector and residents.  The cost of supporting new industries is likely to  be less 
than  the  tax  revenues  generated  from  increased  company  profits  and 
employment.  This would be most efficient when existing economic and social 
infrastructure  is  under-utilised  and  employment  went  to  unemployed  local 
people.  Efficiency would be reduced if population growth followed economic 
development  where  public  services  were  already  stretched.  This  would 
particularly be the case if households with children in-migrated;  typically they 
consume  more  public  services  than  they  pay  for  (Bartik,  1990).  This  has 
limited relevance  at the local  level,  particularly in the  UK,  where  local tax-
raising powers are limited. 
If  this rationale was applied to local economies, then the most relevant policies 
would be to address labour market problems by assisting with the training of 
the  local  population  and  provide  information  to  local  people  as  to  the 
opportunities for training and employment in the local economy.  At the same 
time, policies to provide investment incentives for those locating in the area, 
provide information as the opportunities in the area for  investment and give 
information to  local  companies  as  to  the  potential  for  expansion would  be 
implemented. 35 
3  MARKET  FAILURE  APPLIED  TO  THE  PROBLEMS  OF 
DEPRESSED LOCAL ECONOMIES. 
There  are  important problems  in  applying  this  rationale  to  depressed  local 
economies when the efficient use of public monies and the involvement of the 
private sector are key parts of policy.  Policies based on these concerns have 
been the principal means by which the private sector has become involved in 
urban  regeneration.  Property  development  approaches  have  been  heavily 
dominant in this,  especially in investment terms  (Turok,  1992).  The reason 
for this is, that when successfully applied, the rationale is compatible with the 
principal motives of the private sector.  Investment is  in their own interests. 
This leads to the conclusion that only policies which are in the interest of the 
private  sector will  lead them to  become  involved or  invest  in development 
policies.  This  has  important  implications  for  stimulating  participation  in 
depressed local economies. 
In terms  of addressing  labour  market  problems,  the  state  should  invest  in 
economically relevant training  where  the  trainee  cannot  fund  it themselves. 
The implication arising from this is that expenditure should be targeted at those 
whose training will provide the maximum economic benefit.  This investment 
would  not  necessarily  be  targeted  at  the  unemployed.  The  problem  for 
depressed local economies arising from this is that they are unlikely to have a 
population  which  will  provide  the  potential  for  the  most  efficient  use  of 
training  spending.  Thus  there  would  be  little justification under  a  market 36 
failure-type  intervention rationale for  training expenditure within these local 
economIes. 
By definition,  depressed  local  economies  tend not to  have  many companies 
which have potential for expansion.  They tend to  have very small economic 
bases,  dominated  by  local  services,  branch  plants  of larger  companies  or 
employment located outwith the local economy.  Thus business development 
and start up policies are likely to have limited relevance in these areas (Turok 
and Wannop,  1990).  This  also  links  back to  the  problem of economically 
relevant training; as the population may not be in a position to qualify for this 
economically  relevant  training,  neither  will  the  economic  base  of the  local 
economy  or  the  local  population be  in  a position  to  benefit  from  business 
infrastructure policies. 
Perhaps  the  only  policies  (if policy  was  based  only  on  a  market  failure 
rationale) which would be justifiable in relation to depressed local economies 
would be  those  related to  investment  incentives  for  companies  to  locate  in 
depressed local economies.  This would be justifiable under the criteria of the 
rationale since it would produce fiscal  benefit, especially if it utilised under-
capacity social infrastructure and local people were employed.  However, it is a 
very partial approach.  Further, in the UK's centralised taxation system, it is 
not a tenable policy option. 37 
As  the above shows, the market failure  approach to  regeneration has  limited 
relevance to  the  regeneration of depressed  local  economies.  By definition, 
they are areas where the problems have been created by the interplay of  market 
forces  and  state  economic policy.  The  logic  of the  market failure  rationale 
suggests  that  the  most  effective  form  of investment  by  the  state  is  III 
individuals,  areas  and  sectors  of the  economy  with  high  growth  potential. 
Assisting the operation of market forces in this way is likely to encourage the 
spatial differentiation of economic activity and benefit those individuals with 
the  greatest  existing  (rather  than  realisable)  potential  before  policies  are 
implemented.  Depressed  local  economies  are  unlikely  to  be  areas  of high 
growth potential  or to  have  populations  in  a position to  take  advantage  of 
economic growth. 
In the light of the above,  alternative approaches  are  thus  necessary.  Policies 
must be aimed at ensuring populations in depressed areas can begin to compete 
with  other  areas.  In  other  words,  policy  must  be  geared  at  reducing  the 
differentials  between  areas,  in  terms  of realising  the  potential  abilities  of 
populations in depressed local economies.  The aim is to break the cumulative 
cycle of decline. The principal means for doing this would be through a range 
of vocational and educational training measures with the aim of providing the 
potential  for  community  economic  empowerment.  This  would  not  create 
growth on its own.  However, this is not the aim of the policy; it aims to give 
people the  ability to  receive  a share  of the  existing wealth in the  economy. 
There  is  a  danger  in  such  an  approach that the  'blame'  for  socio-economic 38 
problems in depressed local economies will be laid at the door of the resident 
populations  of these  areas  (Hayton,  1992).  It is  not  the  case  in  the  great 
majority  of cases.  However,  regeneration  can  only  be  concerned  with 
practicalities,  not  with  changing  the  fundamental  forces  of the  economic 
system.  It can only ever have a limited effect.  In this sense, good policy is 
about maximising this effect within these constraints (Blakely, 1994).  Perhaps 
the  best way to  look  at  targeted  policies  such  as  this  in  the  current policy 
climate,  dominated as  it is  by  market type  solutions,  is  to  view them  as  an 
earlier stage in the development process of  depressed local economies. 
Returning  to  the  question  of  economiC  growth,  it  can  be  argued  that 
redistributive  policies  would  contribute  over  the  long  term  to  further 
expansion,  by raising the  skill  levels  and  ability to  contribute of significant 
sections of the population.  For this  to  work,  however,  significant economic 
growth would need to occur, possibly using market failure-type policies. 
Redistributive policies run counter to the logic ar..d priorities of  the market and 
private sector.  As discussed earlier, the great majority of policies which have 
successfully involved the private sector have been those which addressed their 
priorities, especially in land and property development.  As  has been shown, 
this brings little benefit for depressed local economies.  Policies such as these 
require major expenditure.  In the current financial climate in the public sector, 
there are  not the resources to  adequately fund  such policies.  Gaining major 
private sector expenditure would enhance the potential for success.  To achieve 39 
this,  it needs to be demonstrated that the end result will benefit the economy 
generally over the long term. 
4  AN  ALTERNATIVE  EXPLANATION  - THE  CUMULATIVE 
CAUSATION APPROACH 
The above section illustrated the difficulties of applying policies based on  a 
market based analysis  to  attempt to  resolve  the  problems  of disadvantaged 
areas.  The major problem with this is  that the market failure  approach only 
takes  account  of  inefficiently  operating  markets  as  the  explanation  for 
deprivation.  However,  this  is  an  over-simplistic  perspective.  A  more 
convincing  explanation  for  persistent concentrations  of disadvantage  has  its 
roots in the cumulative causation thesis. The cumulative causation approach to 
explaining regional growth and decline was first advanced  by Myrdal  (1957) 
with further refinements by Kaldor (1957,  1970), Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) 
and McCombie and Thirlwall (1993).  McCombie and Thirlwall (1993) argue 
that  "once  a  region  obtains  a  growth  advantage,  it  will  tend  to  sustain 
it ....  making it difficult for other regions to establish those activities which give 
the favoured region its growth advantage". In contrast to the equilibrium nature 
of  neo-classical  analysis  the  cumulative  causation  theory  captures  a 
disequilibrium view of the regional growth process.  This approach has been 
adapted to  the urban level to  explain the  dynamics of persistent deprivation, 
suggesting that a  self -reinforcing cycle  of decline  can emerge  which locks 
areas in to poor performance. This process is discussed below. 40 
The  rise  of long  term  unemployment  caused  by  structural  change  in  the 
economy  has  been  one  of  the  main  catalysts  for  the  development  of 
concentrations of disadvantage (European Commission, 1993). The collapse of 
manufacturing  employment  in  Glasgow  led  to  increases  in  long  term 
unemployment as  large  numbers  of unskilled  and  semi-skilled  manual jobs 
disappeared.  At  the  same  time,  the  jobs  which  replaced  these  were 
increasingly  unskilled,  low  paid  and  part  time.  There  was  also  a  gender 
element  to  this.  Sectors  which  collapsed  largely  employed  males,  while 
growing sectors employed more females as female wage rates were lower and 
they were less unionised. 
As noted above, in addition to  labour market changes, for the working poor, 
the structure of taxation systems can act to  penalise them when they increase 
their  income  as,  when  it  reaches  a  certain  level,  they  may  be  taxed  more 
heavily, which can lead to them actually being worse off.  This is known as the 
poverty trap.  Also,  the  structure  of benefits  systems  can lock people  into 
unemployment.  As these groups tend to be low skilled, they are likely to only 
be able to access jobs with low pay.  This is known as the unemployment trap -
possible  income  in work is  likely  to  be  less  than that  received  on benefits 
(OECD,1997).  Moving into work acts against people's economic self interest. 
The growth in the numbers of single parents has also been a major factor in the 
rise  of concentrations  of disadvantage.  In  addition  to  the  poverty  and 
unemployment trap, single parents are further prevented from taking up work 41 
because  of the  costs  of child-care  while  they  are  at  work  (McGregor  and 
McConnachie, 1995). In addition to all the above problems, ethnic groups and 
disabled people may also have to contend with discrimination in attempting to 
gain employment. 
A  major problem which  can be  faced  by  households  completely  reliant  on 
benefits is the effect one member of the household gaining work can have on 
the benefit entitlement of other members of the family.  Benefit systems tend 
to treat the household as a single earning entity.  Therefore household income 
is taken into account in any benefit calculation, with the result that one person 
gaining  work  can  reduce  the  benefit  entitlement  of other  adults  in  the 
household.  The more adults in the household, the greater the problem. 
The above details the dynamics which lead to  persistent disadvantage for these 
groups.  The key point from the perspective of  this thesis is that concentrations 
of  these groups have been found to emerge. These concentrations develop for a 
range of reasons - poor people may only be able to  afford to  live  in certain 
areas  or  they  may  be  discriminated  against  on  ethnic  grounds  when  they 
attempt to locate in some areas.  Secondly, public housing allocation policies 
can encourage concentrations of people with similar characteristics and those 
with  the  worst  problems  concentrate  in  the  worst  housing  (Darner  and 
Madigan, 1974). Thirdly, areas which previously had not been suffering socio-
economic  problems  but  were  hit  by  increased  unemployment  caused  by 42 
structural readjustment can develop major problems. For these reasons, those 
with 'problems' may be disproportionately represented in certain areas. 
Once these concentrations are in place, a dynamic of cumulative decline can 
set in.  People have low incomes, therefore local service provision, which is 
likely to  be already low,  declines further.  The environment of these areas is 
likely to be poor due to lack of ownership of these areas - lack of facilities for 
young people in particular can lead to  increased vandalism.  Local authorities 
may  not  have  the  finances  or  the  management  capacity  to  maintain  these 
estates,  therefore  the  area  declines  further.  Vacant  housing  provides  an 
environment for criminality such as substance abuse. 
These estates gain a reputation for being 'problem' areas.  Only those with the 
lowest  incomes  move  into  these  areas  and  social  housing  policies  lead  to 
'problem' tenants being housed there.  Further,  residents may be discriminated 
against in the labour market as  they are  labelled as  residents of a  'problem' 
area, with the result that labour market exclusion becomes further entrenched. 
A further result of labelling is that people in these areas become introverted, 
staying  in their  own  areas,  thus  becoming  further  isolated  from  the  world 
outside (McGregor and McConnachie, 1995). 
These problems can cross generations, with young people brought up in these 
circumstances having no  experience of work and being discriminated against 
because of their place of residence.  Large  groups of young  people  coming 43 
from this environment can lead to poor educational attainment as there is no 
apparent  incentive  to  work  at  gaining  an  education.  Public  resources  for 
dealing  with young  people  with problems  may  be  insufficient to  overcome 
these difficulties. 
In summary, a combination of socio-economic forces,  such as  the growth of 
long term unemployment, the structure of  tax and benefit systems and changes 
in family structure have caused concentrations of  disadvantage amongst groups 
in society.  For a variety of reasons these groups have become concentrated in 
spatial terms.  The factors that encourage these concentrations act to reinforce 
one another and can act to lock areas into cycles of  decline. 
5  CONCLUSION 
In  conclusion,  the  market  failure  rationale  for  intervention  to  attempt 
regeneration  compatible  with  successive  governments'  perspectives  is 
problematic when applied to disadvantaged areas.  Investment in these areas is 
not  an  efficient  use  of resources  within  the  theory.  A  more  convincing 
alternative  perspective  on persistent deprivation is  the  cumulative  causation 
approach,  which  illustrates  the  complex  interplay  of social  and  economic 
forces  which  can  lock  areas  into  disadvantage.  However,  market-led 
perspectives  have  dominated  successive  governments'  interpretation  of the 
'urban  problem'  since  the  late  1970s.  Subsequent  chapters  look  at  the 
development  of policy  in  the  USA,  where  many  of the  above  ideas  about 
private sector participation in the regeneration process originated.  The policy 44 
history of  the UK is also discussed in detail to illustrate how attempts to apply 
these  concepts  impacted  on  UK  urban  policy.  An  examination  of how 
Glasgow's urban policy  fits  with these  ideas  and  a  discussion  of the  city's 
economic performance completes the contextual analysis. 45 
CHAPTER 3: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONTEXT 46 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 analysed the theoretical rationale underlying attempts to  stimulate 
private sector involvement and investment in the urban regeneration process. 
This  chapter  continues  the  contextual  research  element  of the  thesis  by 
detailing  the  historical  record  of  attempts  to  generate  private  sector 
participation by looking at the experience of the USA, which is the source of 
many of these  concepts,  and  the  UK.  Finally,  the  urban  policy  history  of 
Glasgow to  the present day is  introduced.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
illustrate how,  in the USA and UK in the  1990s, there has been a degree of 
convergence in urban policy directed towards the resolution of  the problems of 
disadvantaged areas. The history of Glasgow is a good example of these shifts 
in policy, moving from a concern with the physical aspects of  the regeneration 
process, then engaging with the private sector to exploit opportunities available 
in the city,  and in recent years  moving towards  a balanced approach,  while 
attempting  to  stimulate  private  sector  participation  in the  resolution  of the 
problems of  disadvantaged areas. 
2.  THE USA EXPERIENCE 
(i)  Introduction 
The main purpose of  this section is to review recent developments in US urban 
economic development policy aimed at stimulating private sector involvement 
and investment in depressed local economies.  A brief discussion of the urban 
policy experience since the late 1960s will set the context for the main part of 
the section.  The principal focus of this introductory section is  on the finding 47 
that the  dominance  of pro-growth approaches  in  American urban  economic 
development  policy  has  had  the  result  that  the  major  private  sector  input 
achieved has  had  limited  success  both  spatially  and  in  terms  of those  who 
benefit,  due  to  its  reliance  on  'trickle-down'  theories  of the  development 
process. 
Recent debates on US urban economic development policy are then reviewed 
to highlight current US  thinking, based on the experience of past approaches. 
The  general  findings  of this  debate  are  that  a new  focus  on education and 
training,  usmg  community  based  delivery  mechanisms,  based  on 
communitarian thinking (Avineri and De Shalit, 1989) , is necessary to achieve 
sustainable  local  economic  development,  as  the  dominant  incentive-based 
approach  does  not  tackle  structural  problems.  The  actions  of the  Clinton 
administration are compared with the recommendations of the above debate to 
assess their potential for success.  The finding is that the new federal approach 
bears  significant  similarities  to  the  VIews  of  the  supporters  of 
communitarianism, but that it also has much in common with past approaches. 
(ii)  US Post-War Urban Policy Experience 
Urban policy in the USA was dominated by pro-growth development policies, 
based on the assumption that 'what's good for business is  good for the city'. 
Since the 1950s, urban programmes originally intended to finance low-income 
housing provision and other socio-economic development ends were steered by 
pro-growth coalitions of business interests and city governments.  This form of 48 
development  was  almost  exclusively  concentrated  In central  city  property, 
infrastructure  and  prestige  project  development.  Redistribution  to  the 
disadvantaged was left to  the process of 'trickle down'.  The result was often 
spectacular  development  in  previously  run  down  areas.  There  are  many 
examples;  Pittsburgh's  Golden  Triangle  (1950s),  downtown  Chicago  (1950s 
onwards) and Baltimore's Festival Market and Harborplace (1970s and 1980s), 
to name three over the years.  This form of development was conceptualised by 
Molotch (1976)  as  the  'growth machine'  approach,  where  business  interests 
manipulate  a  compliant  public  sector  to  further  their  own  interests  by 
extemalising their private costs into the public sphere. 
Attempts  were  made  under  the  Johnson  administration's  'Great  Society' 
programmes  of the  1960s  to  redress  the  balance  by  attempting  to  produce 
redistributive as well as pure growth outcomes.  The Special Impact Program, 
which targeted training and social spending at the most depressed urban areas, 
the  Community Development Block Grant (CDBG),  which provided federal 
funding for housing and social programmes and 'Model Cities', an attempt to 
harness public-private partnerships to  achieve balanced growth, were the key 
urban policy instruments.  They met with limited success in either achieving 
balanced growth or private sector investment.  The urban riots of  the late 1960s 
stimulated a brief flurry of private sector initiatives, principally in training and 
job placement, but this enthusiasm soon waned.  However, in the period from 
the  mid  1960s  to  the  late  1970s,  relative  urban  poverty  began  to  decline, 
suggesting that these programmes had some positive effect.  It should also be 49 
noted  that  throughout  this  period,  pro-growth  policies  continued  m  to  be 
important (Bamekov, et ai, 1989). 
In the late  1970s, the Carter administration launched the Urban Development 
Action Grant (UDAG).  This could be seen as legitimising the concepts of  pro-
growth, trickle-down development, by providing bridging finance to minimise 
risk for investors.  This was the only urban policy pursued with any enthusiasm 
by the anti-interventionist Reagan and Bush administrations.  Federal training, 
housing and social  spending was successively cut throughout the  1980s and 
early 1990s.  The only other urban policy development of  the 1980s apart from 
the activities of  growth coalition developers was the succession of  unsuccessful 
attempts to introduce federal  enterprise zone legislation.  However, by 1992, 
39 states had their own enterprise zone schemes.  It is significant that as federal 
spending was cut back throughout the  1980s and city and state governments 
were unable or unwilling to fill the gap, urban poverty again began to increase 
(Boyle,  1993).  This  experience  has  informed  recent  debates,  which  are 
discussed below. 
(iii)  Recent Debates in US Urban Regeneration Policy 
As  the  above  section  showed,  US  urban  economic  development  policy 
attempting to involve the private sector foundered when attempts were made to 
stimulate investment in inner city neighbourhoods with the aim of creating the 
link, in terms of local employment and economic activity, between them and 
the wider city economy.  The reasons for this are clear.  Private sector interests, 50 
driven principally by the need to generate profits, viewed these areas as a risky 
investment.  In the debate in the USA as to how to address the linked problems 
of how to  improve  the  access  of residents  of deprived  areas  to  economic 
opportunities  and how to  stimulate  a  local  market  economy,  there  are  two 
distinct strands which can be identified.  These can be roughly characterised as 
'public' and 'private'. 
The public solution is to target major spending on education and training into 
depressed  urban  neighbourhoods  from  federal,  state  and  city  governments. 
This  involves  policies  such  as  increased  funding  for  the  'Head  Start' 
educational  programmes  for  disadvantaged  under-5s,  concentration  on  mid-
school age children where performance falls off, widening of  the existing Jobs 
Corps  programmes  targeted  at  the  hard  core  youth  unemployed  and  the 
expansion of training programmes currently provided under the Job Training 
Partnership Act. 
At the same time, proponents of this view argue that the  highly fragmented 
taxation and spending structure of US local government should be reformed to 
incorporate a redistributive element, principally through creating links whereby 
the downtown is taxed to  be spent in the depressed neighbourhoods (Wolman 
et aI,  1992).  A linked taxation structure exists in some cities in the USA, most 
notably the  Minneapolis-St Paul  conurbation.  This  is  a long  term strategy, 
aimed at  equipping areas,  and,  most importantly, their populations, with the 51 
necessary abilities to compete in the city economy, while using income from a 
redistributive urban tax structure to initiate physical improvements. 
The  'private'  solution  is  the  dominant  approach  currently  in use  (Bumier, 
1992).  The concept is  to  introduce incentive packages to  encourage private 
sector investment in depressed areas,  with the aim of reducing, or removing, 
the risk to profitability by offsetting the potentially higher costs of locating in 
such an area through subsidies.  The principal mechanism which has been used 
to achieve this in the past has been manipulation of  the tax structure.  State and 
municipal Enterprise Zones are the most advanced example of this, although 
tax exemptions and credits are common throughout the USA (Bumier, 1992). 
Such approaches have been heavily criticised  as a "costly welfare grant to the 
private sector" (Harrison and Kanter,  1978).  Wolman (1988) questioned why 
such incentives continue to be offered by places when it has been shown they 
have little effect on development outcomes.  UDAG subsidies could be seen as 
a further case in point.  Most state and local EZ schemes, have, like UDAG, 
been targeted towards property - based development.  There is  an  extensive 
literature,  based  on  the  UK  and  US  experience,  that  shows  while  major 
physical improvements can be achieved for the benefit of the urban economy 
as a whole, such development does not forge significant linkages into the local 
economy,  either  at  the  construction  stage  or  when  a  business  becomes 
operational (Healey, 1992).  Another important issue is that such subsidies may 
produce short term relocation, but not competitiveness and productivity gains, 
which are necessary for sustained additional economic growth. 52 
The  critics have  a strong case  against such an  approach being  adopted as  a 
solution  to  the  problems  still  experienced  after  decades  of attempts  using 
similar  methods.  Some  recommend  that  the  federal  government  should 
"legislate dollar for dollar reductions in infrastructure grants to  state and local 
governments for any and all tax concessions granted to  businesses and firms" 
(Wolman et aI, 1992). 
There are,  however, important qualifications to this argument which must be 
taken note of.  In the highly competitive US economy, those areas that are at a 
disadvantage do need incentives of some kind since they are, by definition, at a 
major  competitive  disadvantage.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  the 
uncoordinated  structure  of economic  development  policy,  where  virtually 
every state has  incentive programmes  for  businesses  to  locate,  is  taken into 
account (Burnier, 1992).  There is an argument for federal legislation to abolish 
this competitive system (Wolman et ai,  1992), but the federal, anti - centralist 
nature  of US  government,  especially  at  present,  makes  this  an  unlikely 
proposition.  Evidence  for  this  includes  the  anti-Washington  presidential 
campaigns of both President Clinton and Perot in 1992, and the Gingrich-led 
House  of Representatives.  Therefore  in this  context,  it would  appear  that 
incentives  remain  crucial,  despite  their  limited  effect  and  acknowledged 
weakness, particularly their short termism and failure to  deal  with structural 
causes.  This is especially the case when US firms are still highly influenced by 
the economics of least cost production in terms of inputs and location costs 53 
(Doeringer, Terkla, 1992).  In this context, the debate centres around what kind 
of incentives should be offered, not whether or not there should be incentives. 
The  final  part  of this  section  looks  at  the  approach  taken  by  the  Clinton 
administration to this issue. 
(iv)  Community  Development  Corporations  and  the  Economic 
Empowerment Act 
CDCs originated in the in the grass roots community activism of  the late 1960s 
and  1970s.  The  central concept was  that "poor communities could promote 
local economic self-determination along with political empowerment" (Anglin, 
Holcomb,  1992).  The  Great  Society  programmes  of the  1960s  under  the 
Johnson  administration  provided  necessary  funding  and  encouragement  for 
these  agencies,  especially through the  Special Impact Program of the  Equal 
Opportunity Act, which was targeted at the most depressed areas.  Through the 
1970s  and  1980s,  as  federal  government  disinvested  in  the  cities  (Boyle, 
Barnekov, Rich,  1989), the CDCs declined in importance while remaining the 
only regeneration agencies specifically targeted at benefiting the residents of 
depressed  areas.  What  federal  funding  there  was  for  cities was  channelled 
principally through UDAG, as the Community Development Block Grant and 
other HUD programmes were cut back. 
CDCs again came to the fore as a result of the Clinton administration's stated 
commitment to  a  'communitarian'  approach to  economic  and  social  policy, 
based on the concepts of reciprocity or 'rights and responsibilities'.  This has 54 
been  developed  most  clearly  in  the  Department  of Housing  and  Urban 
Development (HUD).  Secretary  of State  Henry  Cisneros  (1993)  enunciated 
five principles of commitment which federal government will aim to  develop 
through its urban policy.  These are to:  community; family;  economic lift for 
those living in depressed areas; balancing individual rights and responsibilities 
and reducing spatial and racial segregation (Cisneros, summarised in Stanfield, 
1993).  These  principles  have  remained  common  to  the  Clinton 
administration's urban policy (HUD, 1997). 
The  central  plank of the  Clinton  administration's  approach to  urban  policy 
under the was Economic Empowerment Act (1993) was the repackaging of the 
federal  enterprise  zone  concept  which  both  the  Reagan  and  Bush 
administrations attempted to enact throughout the 1980s.  There are two parts 
to the Act;  ten 'Economic Empowerment Zones', six of  which are in the cities, 
in  areas  with  a  population  of not  more  than  200  000  and  one  hundred 
'Enterprise Communities', sixty - five of  which are in cities.  $4.1 billion in tax 
incentives were committed over five years (Congressional Quarterly Handbook 
of American Government, 1994).  Empowerment Zones are where most of the 
federal  funds  were concentrated, but "both [zones and  communities]  look to 
develop new urban partnerships with the legislation encouraging private sector 
contributions (through tax credits) to  CDCs" (Boyle,  1993).  The aim was to 
promote  "employment  of,  and  business  opportunities  for,  low  - mcome 
individuals who are residents of  the operational area" (Boyle, 1993). 55 
The idea was to encourage private sector investment in depressed areas in both 
property and employment.  This was especially the case in the Empowerment 
Zones.  The majority of incentives are targeted at improving the operation of 
the labour market:  the proposed act "stresses  tax credits for education and 
training"  (Congressional  Quarterly  Handbook  of  American  Government, 
1994).  These labour incentives for employers are the Employer Wage Credit, 
which  is  a  "tax  credit  on  employee  wages  to  all  employers  within  an 
empowerment  zone"  (Congressional  Quarterly  Handbook  of  American 
Government,1994).  This is a credit of 25% on the first $20,000 of wages per 
employee, and would apply to both new and existing employees who live and 
work in the zone.  In addition to  this the Targeted Job Tax Credit was made 
available to  businesses that hire labour from  within the zone.  The company 
itself need not be located in the zone.  This tax credit amounts to 40% tax relief 
on the first $6000  of each employee's wages, and is available for one year.  In 
total, $3 billion was committed to this in the ten empowerment zones out of  the 
overall $4.1  billion proposal (Congressional Quarterly Handbook of American 
Government,  1994).  This  meant on average  that $1.8  billion in tax credits 
were  to  be  directed  at  improving  the  operation  of six  urban  local  labour 
markets, $0.3 billion in each zone. 
On the capital investment side, which is  the area more commonly associated 
with enterprise zones in the  UK,  $1.1  billion in tax  credits  were  proposed. 
These were available for investments in tangible property in zones and for low 
income housing investment.  In addition, there were provisions for increased 56 
property  expensmg  write-off  against  tax  and  accelerated  depreciation  for 
capital investment.  To qualify for these, employers must have at least 33% of 
their workforce living in the zone.  The 'empowerment' concept in the above 
can  be  interpreted  as  giving  local  people  more  control  over their  lives  by 
gaining employment.  There were further provisions in the Act aimed at local 
resident empowerment.  For example, training credits were made available to 
residents. 
While economic incentives to encourage private sector investment are central 
to the proposal, a number of  federal spending programmes are also included, in 
recognition of the fact that problems cannot be  solved simply by tax breaks. 
These  programmes  are  administered  through  'Enterprise  Grants'  to  the 
communities.  CDCs playa central role in their delivery.  The grants cover a 
number  of areas.  Firstly,  they  are  aimed  at  improving  the  delivery  of 
government services  locally.  Funding is  provided for  further  assistance  for 
residents  seeking  employment,  in  the  form  of training,  job  search  and 
placement programmes.  Loan  funds  were  set  up  for  small  businesses  and 
community businesses.  Business support and training programmes such as the 
above sought to  use public funds  in ways which will lever private matching 
support.  There were  also  a series of social programmes proposed under the 
Act, providing funding for child care, education and training. 
The Act sought to approach problems, especially in the Empowerment Zones, 
by taking a broad based approach which sought to  deal  with economic  and 57 
social  issues through a  combination of federal  tax  incentives  aimed both at 
capital investment and the improvement of  the operation of the labour market, 
while also focusing public spending on these areas directly, using CDCs as  a 
conduit for this.  Despite the small scale of the Act (at the maximum covering 
l.2  million  people)  and  its  'experimental'  status  (Congressional  Quarterly 
Handbook of American Government,  1994),  it marked a  signally more pro-
active and targeted approach to urban policy by the Clinton administration than 
was  the  case  in  the  1980s.  The  Act  emphasised  that  to  stimulate  any 
significant  private  sector  investment  in  the  targeted  communities,  it  was 
necessary to provide incentives for them to redirect their investment policies to 
these  areas.  In  the  1997  'State  of the  Cities'  Report  (HUD,  1997)  these 
principles  were  re-affirmed:  "Rather  than  work  against  the  market  ... 
empowerment says  we  must use  market incentives  and  norms  to  create  the 
healthy, mainstream communities all Americans desire"  (HUD,  1997).  From 
this statement, it is clear that under the mechanisms of the current legislation, 
private  sector involvement and  investment  is  regarded  as  a key  element of 
policy targeted at the regeneration of  disadvantaged areas of  American cities. 
(v)  Summary 
This  section has  reviewed how US  urban policy in recent years  has  moved 
towards  a focus  on disadvantaged  neighbourhoods  within cities.  There has 
been  a  recognition  that  disadvantaged  areas  benefited  little  from  previous 
approaches  to  urban  regeneration  under  the  pro  growth,  private  sector 
dominated agenda.  The current federal flagship  scheme also recognises that, 58 
for successful regeneration, the development of external linkages to markets is 
critical.  This  is  being  achieved  through  flexible  tax  incentive  systems  to 
encourage  employer  involvement.  This  combination  of  a  focus  on 
neighbourhoods and developing  external  links  following  a realisation of the 
limits of a growth oriented approach has, as  Part 4 of this chapter will show, 
much in common with the recent urban policy history of Glasgow.  Part 4 will 
also illustrate that, currently, the Glasgow approach has many similarities, but 
some important differences, to the current US model. 
3.  THE UK EXPERIENCE 
(i) Policy Before 1979; The Beginning of a Private Sector Role 
UK urban policy originated in the late 1960s, with the inception of the Urban 
Aid  Programme  (Darwin,  1990).  There  was  a  recognition  that  post  war 
regional policy did not address inner city problems. Regional policy provided 
relocation incentives for companies, often to  move out of central urban areas. 
Further,  the  environment  of inner  city  areas,  coping  with  the  decline  of 
traditional  industries,  made  them  unattractive  investment  locations.  (Turok, 
1987).  A  senes  of  reports,  for  example,  Plowden  (1967)  and 
Cullingworth(1969),  fears  over  racial  tensions  and  the  results  of the  1966 
sample census illustrated that deprivation remained acute  in the inner cities. 
Government reacted to this with education programmes in 1968 and a system 
of  local authority grants. 59 
Between 1969 and  1973, the Community Development Projects (CDPs) were 
set up to research the problems of  urban areas. One of  these was in Scotland (in 
Paisley).  The  Home  Office ran the  programme because the  problems  were 
seen  as  fundamentally  social,  due  to  the  contemporary  popularity  of the 
'culture of poverty'  thesis  (Lewis,  1966).  This  meant that  the  "two  biggest 
problems of the inner city, poor housing and unemployment, failed to qualify 
for  assistance" (Balchin and Bull,  1987).  The  findings  of the  CDPs  did not 
concur  with  this  view,  representing  the  first  real  acknowledgement  that 
economic, not social factors were the prime cause of  deprivation. 
The CDP reports also placed emphasis on the structural nature of many of the 
problems.  This represented a much deeper analysis of the issue than had been 
carried out previously.  In Scotland,  the SDA was set up in 1975, as a result 
both of  this recognition and the recommendation of  the West Central Scotland 
Plan for  a regional  development agency to  address  the  continued  failure  of 
policy to address the area's problems (Wannop and Smith, 1985). 
In 1976 responsibility for urban affairs was  transferred to  the Department of 
the  Environment  at  UK level,  in  recognition  of the  centrality  of economic 
factors  in understanding deprivation.  The  1977  White  Paper,  'Policy for  the 
Inner Cities' was published, giving official recognition that the "decline in the 
economic fortunes  in the inner areas lies  at the heart of the problem" (DoE, 
1977).  It also  called for  "a new and  closer form  of collaboration  .... between 
government and the private sector" (DoE,  1977).  The outcome was the 1978 60 
Inner  Urban  Areas  Act,  which  stated  that  "partnership  was  central  to 
regeneration" (Bamekov et ai,  1989).  A role for the private sector began to be 
envisaged,  but the Act  itself only  prescribed public  sector,  principally  local 
authority-led, solutions. 
By  1979, then,  the analysis had switched from  social to  economic problems 
and the private sector and the market had moved from a position first of not 
being considered,  then to  culpability for  the problems  to  that of a potential 
catalyst for improvement. In 1979, the Conservative Party came to power on a 
radical  right  wing  manifesto.  It was  dedicated  to  breaking  the  post  war 
consensus, blaming corporatism and socialism for the problems of the British 
economy  and  recommending  free  market  solutions  - the  view  was  that 
"government has a limited capacity to do good, but a great capacity to do harm, 
not least by distorting or interfering with the 'natural' working of society and 
the market economy" (Kavanagh, D.  1985). 
(ii)  Changes After 1979 
The Thatcher government approach to economic development policy diverged 
significantly from its predecessors. The same legislation was used, but with a 
different interpretation; "the partnership between central and local government 
was reinterpreted as a partnership between central government and the private 
sector" (Bamekov et aI,  1989).  This thread ran through most urban policies in 
the  1980s,  such  as  the  introduction  of Urban  Development  Corporations, 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)  and City Challenge. 61 
Basing their approach on a New Right ideology (Walters, 1986), policy makers 
attempted to reform the way the public sector delivered services.  According to 
this view, in the past, nationalised industries and the public sector bureaucracy 
operated on different criteria to  those of the private sector.  The driving force 
of efficiency, the profit motive, is not present in the public sector, especially in 
monopoly services.  At its  most  basic,  from  this  perspective,  in the  private 
sector, owners and employees have an incentive to work hard.  If they do  not 
they lose their business or their job.  The lack of  this threat in the public sector 
leads to  industrial and organisational inefficiency and complacency, draining 
the economy of  wealth (Friedman, 1962). 
The policy prescription arising from this view is  that the scale of the public 
sector  should  be  reduced,  and  that  the  remaining  public  sector  should  be 
inculcated with the  'private  sector'  incentives  of efficiency  in delivery  and 
organisation.  In most local government services (and increasingly in central 
government  departments)  the  former  government  introduced  compulsory 
competitive  tendering  (CCT).  Internal  markets  were  created  within  local 
government,  with  different  departments  buying  services  from  one  another. 
Local government increasingly acted as a regulator of private sector operators 
carrying out contracts for them.  This  concept (with some variation) has  also 
been introduced into the health service (OECD, 1995). 62 
The  mm  was  to  promote  efficiency  in  servlce  delivery,  chiefly  through 
schemes  such  as  performance  related  pay,  contract  employment,  part  time 
employment and the  realisation  of assets,  such as  land  holdings.  Often the 
result has been a confusion between effectiveness (how well does the service 
work?)  and  efficiency  (can  it  be  delivered  at  less  cost?).  Increasingly, 
efficiency  has  become  dominant  in  assessments.  An example  in  the  local 
economic  development  field  is  the  Scottish  Enterprise  Output  Monitoring 
Framework (Scottish Enterprise, 1996).  Whatever the success or failure of the 
approach, the former government consistently sought to reduce the scale of  the 
public  sector's  directly  delivered  services  through  privatisation  and  CCT, 
while attempting to  instil a private ethos in the remaining public sector. The 
efficiency  orientated  approach  has  had  important  impacts  on  urban 
regeneration policy, both in the way agencies are  organised and the policies 
that are pursued. 
Consultation  with  the  private  sector  as  to  what  to  do  and  how to  deliver 
policies  has  become  more  and  more  important.  The  introduction  of the 
concept  of  'partnership'  between  the  public  and  private  sectors  in 
organisational  terms  has  been  the  mam  mechanism  for  this  (Mackintosh, 
1992).  A  senes  of consultative  bodies  have  been  set  up  to  articulate  the 
interests  of  the  business  community  at  both  national  and  local  level. 
Government has made 'partnership' a legal requirement in some development 
organisations.  Examples  would  be  the  introduction of Urban Development 
Corporations, the insistence that there was a private sector element represented 63 
in the  submission of City  Challenge  bids  in England and  the  TEC  training 
system, for which private sector involvement is mandatory.  On other projects 
it  has  been  on  a  more  voluntaristic  basis,  for  example,  in  integrated  local 
regeneration partnerships.  The  dynamics  of partnership will be  discussed in 
more  detail  in  later  parts  of this  thesis,  since  they  are  central  to  the 
organisational impacts which this study is concerned with. 
The funding of urban regeneration has also been reformed.  Many programmes 
now have to demonstrate that a private sector element is present in the funding 
of  projects, either while the project is being carried out or will be committed at 
a  set  point  in  the  future  (Scottish  Office,  1996).  The  introduction  of 
competition between agencies for public funding  in the hope of encouraging 
efficiency and innovation has become more and more common. An emphasis 
on the efficiency of policy delivery, particularly the introduction of 'value for 
money' estimates has been a central part of  this.  Being able to demonstrate the 
efficiency of an agency has become crucial, since, increasingly, allocations are 
made on the basis of the previous year's performance.  In this sense, efficiency 
can be seen as the ability to spend the whole budget and to deliver more output 
for less resource. 
The  attempted  marginalisation  of local  government  in  urban  regeneration 
throughout the  1980s and early  1990s  has  been an  important feature  of the 
recent history of urban regeneration policy.  This was justified by the former 
government based on their view that local government is the most inefficient 64 
of all branches of the public sector, principally because it delivers most of the 
state's services (Paddison,  1987).  It could be  argued that government in the 
period  1979-97  viewed  local  government  as  an  unnecessary  extra  layer  of 
government  which  interferes  with  the  efficient  operation  of the  economy, 
especially through the  land use planning system (Thomley,  1990).  In recent 
years,  however,  there  have  been  significant  moves  back  towards  involving 
local authorities more in economic development; examples include the Single 
Regeneration  Budget  system  in  England  (DoE,  1996)  discussed  in  later 
sections of  this chapter. 
From  the  above  discussion  it  can  be  seen  that  the  former  governments' 
attempts  to  apply  the  ideas  arising  from  'New  Right'  philosophy  to  the 
organisation of the public sector generally and to economic development have 
had important impacts.  The private sector has  been physically co-opted into 
agencies which are publicly funded.  Priority has been given to projects with a 
private  sector funding  component.  There  has  been an attempt to  introduce 
'private' incentive systems of  competition and efficiency into the public sector. 
There has been a redefinition of the aims of policy to some degree also, with 
the meeting of  the needs of the private sector increasingly seen as a key aim of 
policy  (Scottish  Enterprise,  1995).  The  effects  of this  approach  on Urban 
Development  Corporations,  Training  and  Enterprise  Councils  and  the  City 
Challenge initiative are  discussed below,  while the impacts  on Glasgow are 
analysed in the next section. 65 
Urban  Development  Corporations  were  set  up  under  the  1980  Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act.  Their responsibilities were to: 
•  achieve regeneration by bringing land and buildings back into use 
•  encourage the development of  existing and new industry and commerce 
•  create an attractive environment 
•  ensure that housing and social facilities are available. 
UDCs were managed by private sector dominated boards.  Local authorities 
were largely excluded from the process, with planning powers for UDC areas 
given to these new bodies.  The main aim behind UDCs was that they would 
act  as  catalysts  providing  a  framework  within  which the  prime  agency  for 
urban regeneration - the private sector - would thrive.  UDCs pursued a market 
oriented  approach,  concentrating  on  reclamation  and  servicing  to  allow 
development  by  the  private  sector.  Between  1989  and  1994  there  was  a 
marked shift in funding towards the  UDCs  at the  expense of the rest of the 
Urban  Programme:  UDCs'  share  of the  combined  Urban  ProgrammelUDC 
budget  rose  from  49%  to  77%  1989-94  (Department  of the  Environment, 
1994).  To  March 1994, the  12  English UDCs received around  £3  billion in 
grant-in-aid from Central Government.  According to the DoE, this levered in 
£1 0.2 billion of private investment.  This investment led to the creation of, or 
relocation to UDC areas of, around 140,000 jobs.  2,400 hectares of land were 
reclaimed and 27,000 housing units were built.  The last UDCs are projected to 
wind up  by  1998.  A specific problem is  that depending  on where they are 
located and when they were begun some UDCs are much more successful than 66 
others, particularly at levering in private sector investment.  For example, the 
London Docklands DC benefited from the property boom in the South East in 
the  mid  1980s,  levering  in  a  claimed  £8bn  of private  investment  1981-91 
(Imrie and Thomas,  1993), while Merseyside DC  attracted very little private 
sector investment  because  of the  depressed  local  conditions.  The  property 
crash  at  the  end  of the  1980s  badly  affected  the  later  UDCs  (Imrie  and 
Thomas, 1993) 
In many  UDC  areas,  speculative  office  development was  the  norm.  Local 
people could not get jobs in them, except at catering and cleaning levels.  A 
further issue is accountability.  In early years UDCs did not consult with local 
authorities  and  local  people:  this  caused  major  problems,  especially  in 
London. 
There are 81  TECs in England and Wales.  They are 'private sector led' training 
companies.  They were set up  in  1990/91  they were concerned with training 
and business development (mainly through the Enterprise Allowance Scheme 
and Local Initiative Fund); 95% of  their budget was accounted for by adult and 
youth national training programmes.  This was  reduced as  TECs moved to  a 
funding system known as 'output-related funding' (ORF).  As originally set up, 
the  TEC  system  had  extremely  circumscribed  autonomy.  Questions  were 
asked as  to the nature of the private sector involvement.  It was  supposed to 
make  training  more  economically  relevant;  however,  many  commentators 
noted that the effect was to  give the  private  sector responsibility, at least at 67 
board level, for the local delivery of national programmes, often renamed to 
give  a  local  flavour  (Meager,  1991).  There  were  also  arguments  that  the 
hoped-for innovatory nature of the system was at odds with the predominant 
organisational culture in the TECs.  Most employees were DfEE civil servants, 
with a background in public administration rather than the private sector. 
City Challenge was set up in 1991, drawing on a reallocation of  resources from 
other inner city programmes. It was  a competitive process  involving the  57 
Inner City Urban Programme eligible local authorities.  Most City Challenge 
bids were based on an 'arms-length' company set up by local authorities with 
substantial private sector representation on the board. Local authorities bid for 
funds based on a five year plan, demonstrating potential private sector leverage 
and a delivery partnership between local authorities, the private sector and the 
wider community (de  Groot,  1992).  City Challenge was  in many ways the 
model for the competitive system central to  the  Single Regeneration Budget 
system  discussed  below.  It also  pioneered  the  arms-length  company  as  a 
delivery mechanism in England. 
There  are  obvious  organisational  differences  for  each of the  above,  but the 
ideological  underpinning  and  policy  prescription  was  similar;  expenditure 
controlled  at  local  level  by  private  sector-led  consortia,  tight  expenditure 
constraints by central government, a belief in supply-side (principally property-
led) solutions, emasculation of the local authority role and most importantly, 
"an economic diagnosis of  the urban problem" (Bamekov et aI, 1989). 68 
Following on from the City Challenge experiment, in 1994, spending on urban 
regeneration in England was reformed.  Previously there were 20 programmes 
administered  by  five  departments  (Environment,  Education,  Trade  and 
Industry,  Employment  and  Transport).  The  budgets  of  regeneration 
programmes  were  combined  into  a  Single  Regeneration  Budget  (SRB)  of 
around  £lAbn.  Local  partnerships  bid  for  funding  for  area  regeneration. 
These  local  partnerships  involve  local  authorities,  TECs,  the  private  and 
voluntary sectors and the local communities. The system had the potential for a 
more  strategic,  integrated  approach  to  be  taken  at  both  regional  and  local 
levels.  Further, the SRB system seems to have taken a more pragmatic role to 
the involvement of the private sector, viewing it as  only one key player in  a 
partnership. 
(iii) Summary 
Urban policy in England has gone through a process similar to the USA since 
the early 1980s of actively working to stimulate private sector participation in 
the delivery and management of agencies.  These agencies largely delivered 
property based programmes geared to the interests of the private sector based 
on a belief that benefits would trickle down to the most disadvantaged.  TECs 
led to a partial 'privatisation' of public training finance, with the explicit aim 
of making the training system more relevant to the needs of the private sector. 
In the early 1990s policy shifted, with a realisation that a more broad based 
approach in organisational terms, focusing  on disadvantaged neighbourhoods 69 
was critical to  addressing the problems of these areas.  Part 4 of this chapter 
will  illustrate  how  Glasgow  is  a  good  example  of these  macro  shifts  in 
government policy. 
4.  GLASGOW'S URBAN REGENERATION POLICY HISTORY 
Previous sections of this  chapter outlined the  major trends  in organisational 
and policy terms in the USA and England towards a greater perceived role for 
the private sector.  This  final  section looks  at the impacts of these  'macro' 
policy shifts on the city of Glasgow, before concluding with a discussion of  the 
current delivery mechanisms in the city. 
(i)  1950-75 
In the 1950s, the city authorities  began a programme of slum clearance known 
as the  'Comprehensive Development Area'  programme targeted at the worst 
areas  of the  city.  In  tandem  with  this,  the  city  began  a  major  building 
programme  at  four  locations  on  the  edge  of  the  city  in  Drumchapel, 
Castlemilk,  Easterhouse and Pollok. 
These schemes were intended to house the people displaced by the clearance 
programme who  were not involved in the  overspill programme.  While the 
housing was, initially at least, of a much higher standard than the inner city 
properties demolished, there was little thought given to providing a transport 
infrastructure,  schools  or  other  services:  there  was  little  thought  given  to 
developing a community infrastructure (Keating, 1988). 70 
While the peripheral estate construction programme was being driven forward, 
modem high density housing was being developed in the areas cleared by the 
CDA programme,  again with the  aim  of retaining the  city's population.  In 
1960 the city's Development Plan expanded the CDA programme to cover 29 
areas of  the inner city over the period 1960-80 (Wannop, 1987). 
In summary,  the  three  strands  of policy  by  1960  and  which  dominated the 
development  approach  of the  city  and  region  until  the  mid  1970s  were 
deconcentrating  population from  Glasgow through  the  overspill  programme 
and  dispersing  the  inner  city  population  through  the  CDA  and  peripheral 
estates programme.  Finally,  there  was  a programme  geared at constructing 
high density housing in the CDAs for the population not covered by the above. 
The policy was based on population projections which under-estimated the rate 
of 'natural' population dispersal from the city.  Policy exacerbated the decline 
of the city's population.  Movement under overspill agreements accounted for 
25% of the 25,000 departures from the city each year in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Keating,  1988).  The outcome of this planned and  'spontaneous' population 
dispersal was that, by the 1970s the city's population was declining extremely 
rapidly and there was an over supply of poor quality housing (both new and 
old).  Further, there were large areas of  derelict land as the clearance part of  the 
CDA programme moved faster than the construction element.  Concentrations 
of social and economic deprivation developed on the periphery of the city  as 71 
the inner city poor were moved to the periphery of the city with little done to 
improve their socio-economic standing. 
It is also important to  note that in the period 1945  to  the 1970s, the emphasis 
was  on physical redevelopment.  There was  little  attention paid to  the  direct 
economic development of the city.  Where there was a policy, it was largely 
concerned with removing manufacturing from  the  city.  Little  was  done  on 
modernising  the  industrial  infrastructure,  which  was  largely  built  in  the 
Victorian period.  The  city  entered the  1970s  with an antiquated  industrial 
infrastructure as a result (Firn, 1985) 
The  clearance  programme  had  another  unforeseen  effect  on  the  economlC 
structure of the city: many small enterprises lost their premises and folded as 
they did not have the capital to relocate. In the peripheral estates there was no 
provision for  businesses as  the trend in planning was to  separate residential 
land use  from  commercial  and  industrial  land use  (Pacione,  1995).  In this 
period,  no  role  was  given  or perceived for  the  private  sector,  either  in the 
delivery of  policy or in investment terms. 
(ii)  The 1970s 
(a)  Changing priorities 
In  the  early  1970s  there  was  a  growmg  realisation  that  the  overspill  and 
clearance programmes were not achieving their aims:  it could be argued that 
they were in fact exacerbating them.  The  1974 West Central Scotland Plan 72 
called for a re-evaluation of policy: it called for  a new focus on the problems 
of Glasgow.  A number of key policy outcomes for Glasgow arose from this 
process.  The  New  Towns  programme  was  abandoned  in  1976  with  the 
cancellation of the  Stonehouse project:  resources  were  to  be  targeted  at the 
inner city at the expense of areas outwith Glasgow: dispersal policies were in 
effect  reversed.  The  Comprehensive  Development  Area  programme  was 
halted in 1976 and the SDA, an agency with a specific economic development 
remit was involved for the first time in trying to address Glasgow's problems. 
Finally, a regional council was introduced with redistributive taxation powers 
which could be used to target assistance on the metropolitan core of  the region. 
In this period, regeneration policy in the city, in line with thinking at UK level, 
still conceptualised the issues as ones which could be addressed through public 
sector driven, planning and physical redevelopment programmes.  There was 
no role perceived for the private sector. 
(b)  Addressing the inner city 
In 1976, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Project was set up.  This was the 
first  major inner  city  regeneration project  in  Britain.  Although the  GEAR 
project 1976-87 was targeted at only a part of the city, it is instructive to look 
at the approach taken as  it forms  a bridge between the policies adopted up to 
1976 and the 1980s and 1990s.  The objective of the project was to:  "bring 
about,  in  a  co-ordinated  way,  the  comprehensive  social,  economic  and 
environmental regeneration of  the East End" (Wannop, 1990). 73 
The  great  majority  of  expenditure  went  on  housing  improvements  and 
environmental improvements.  Economic development expenditure was geared 
largely to  providing factory  space for  small to  medium sized industry.  Less 
concern was  paid to  attempting  to  retain  major employers  or  to  providing 
'soft' services such as  business advice for existing companies. Again, private 
sector participation was minimal in the process. 
(iii)  The 1980s 
(aJ  The Council's Strategic Shift 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4,  Glasgow entered the  1980s 
with a series of massive, and worsening problems: 
•  rapid population decline. 
•  employment decline as the manufacturing base went into freefall. 
•  high overall, and high long term, unemployment. 
•  infrastructure obsolescence. 
•  poor housing quality despite the major investment committed to  it 
over the preceding decades. 
The scale of the problems and the lack of a coherent response to  addressing 
these issues led to a feeling of  'malaise' in the city, a sense that the problems 
seemed  insurmountable  at  times.  Coupled  with  this,  there  was  a  lack  of 
understanding as  to  how to  address the  issues.  However,  the  city council's 
new administration which came to power in 1980 attempted to  bring a fresh 
approach.  The key elements of  the approach taken by the city authorities at the 74 
time were firstly, that the council should be proactive. The private sector did 
not have a monopoly on entrepreneurial ideas and dynamism: the council could 
be innovative and risk taking.  Secondly, the local authority adopted the view 
that public-private partnership was the best way forward for the mutual benefit 
of the various constituencies of the city.  Finally,  there was a redefinition of 
the  perceived role of the public sector:  it should not only  be  as  a  service 
provider,  but  also  as  an  'enabler',  creating  the  conditions  or  climate  for 
development  and  an  active  partner  to  assist  development  (Glasgow  City 
Council, 1996). 
This pragmatic, opportunistic approach by the council led to  the  'Glasgow's 
Miles Better' campaign, a marketing drive, initially 50% funded by the city's 
business  community,  to  boost the  image  of the  city  in the  eyes  of both its 
residents  and  equally  importantly the  wider audience.  This  represented the 
first real attempt by public agencies to  work co-operatively with the private 
sector to attempt to progress regeneration (Keating, 1988). 
It is important to note the extent of Glasgow's poor image: in the press the city 
almost always received negative publicity; Glasgow was  "the worst corner of 
Britain" in the eyes of the national press (Observer 1978).  The city was (for 
good reason) perceived externally as violent, dirty, depressing and poor. 
The  'Miles Better' campaign can be seen in retrospect as an important first step 
in the  'reinvention of Glasgow':  while the problems of high unemployment, 75 
poor housing  and  health were  not  solved,  the  city  did have  some  positive 
aspects to it and sought to build on these.  The major growth in tourist numbers 
in the 1980s and 90s, relative to growth in Scotland, serves as a proxy indicator 
of  the impact of  the policy in changing perceptions ofthe city (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1:  Volume and Value of Overseas Tourism to Glasgow and Scotland: 1984-1995 
Glasgow  Scotland 
Year  Trips  Bednights  Expenditure  Trips  Bednights  Expenditure 
1995 Prices  1995 Prices 
1984  200,000  1.5m  55m  1,220,000  12.0m  462m 
1986  260,000  1.9m  76m  1,260,000  12.8m  546m 
1988  320,000  2.3m  92m  1,360,000  13.3m  542m 
1990  450,000  3.2m  134m  1,600,000  15.9m  674m 
1992  460,000  3.3m  109m  1,800,000  18.4m  666m 
1994  490,000  2.7m  151m  1,770,000  17.7m  793m 
1995  510,000  3.5m  155m  1,960,000  20.2m  865m 
% Change  + 155  +133  +180  +61  +68  +87 
1984-95 
Source:  Central Statistical Office International Passenger Survey 
NB:  defmitions are as follows: 
1.  A  Tourist Trip  is  defmed  as  a  stay  of between  1 and  60  nights  away  from  home  for 
holidays,  visits  to  friends  or  relatives,  business/conference  purposes  or any  other purpose 
except such activities as boarding education or semi-permanent employment. 
2.  Tourist Bednights are those spent away from home using any type of accommodation, or in 
transit, on a tourist trip (as above). 
3.  Tourist Expenditure is  spending incurred whilst away from home on a tourist trip and on 
advance payments for such items as fares and accommodation. 76 
(U)  Glasgow Action 
The key development in terms of stimulating private sector participation in the 
city in this period was the creation of Glasgow Action by the  SDA in 1985. 
This organisation was set up as a public-private partnership, largely funded by 
the SDA but composed of representatives of both public and private sectors, 
who were intended not as  project controllers but as  'guardians of the vision' 
(Glasgow Action,  1991). The key to  generating business involvement was to 
focus on the people, rather than the business: Glasgow Action did not ask for 
financial  contributions,  but for  key  businessmen's time,  and  found  this  was 
successful. 
The  mm  was  to  gIVe  the  business  community  a  stake  in  the  activities  of 
Glasgow Action:  it was  a cumulative process  of getting  more  involvement. 
Key players became involved early and gave the initiative some legitimacy: it 
was seen as a way for the agencies to gain access into the business community 
to  broaden the scope of their activities  and pool  intellectual resources  in an 
attempt to resolve the city centre's problems (Glasgow Action, 1991). 
Glasgow  Action's  key  priorities  were  to  focus  on  developing  the  servIce 
economy  of the  city.  Attention was  targeted  on the  city  centre.  A  study 
carried out by McKinsey for the SDA in 1983/84 identified a potential spiral of 
decline for the city centre economy (Figure 3.2). 77 
Figure 3.2:  Glasgow: the potential spiral of decline identified by McKinsey 
Increasing unemployment 
Declining infrastructure  Low demand for services 
fiT 
Few visitors  Declining business base 
~ 
Poor image 
Source: Glasgow Action, 1991 
The  key  problems  identified  as  undermining  the  servIce  economy's 
performance  were  low  local  demand  for  business  and  consumer  servIces 
(McKinsey/SDA,  1985).  The  agencIes  involved  in  the  development of the 
Glasgow Action plan argued that the performance of  the city centre was key to 
the performance of  the rest of  the city and the region: "by concentrating on the 
nerve centres of  the city, the fire may start to bum  ..... the centre has to catch the 
imagination.  If not, then nothing matters.  It (the city)  is just a car without 
ignition" (McKinsey/SDA, 1985) 78 
To  try  and  achieve  this  aim  of stimulating  dynamism  m  the  city  centre, 
Glasgow action identified four key aims: 
•  Make  Glasgow  more  attractive  as  a  business  base,  mainly  by 
developing  better  communications  between  the  business  community 
and public agencies. 
•  Make  Glasgow  more  attractive  to  people  by  encouragmg  inward 
investment, getting people to stay in Glasgow and attracting visitors 
•  Create an entrepreneurial environment: targeted at services. 
•  Promoting  Glasgow  both  to  residents  and  key  investment  decision 
makers outside the city. 
Glasgow  Action  and  the  marketing  drive  succeeded  in  stimulating  private 
sector participation but it can be argued that this succeeded because policy was 
targeted at opportunity driven aims and appealed to the business community's 
self interest.  Boyle (1988) argues that Glasgow Action was the closest the UK 
came to having a US-style growth coalition. 
(c)  Financial partnership 
In addition to the council and SDA shift in attitude in the early 1980s, a further 
important change in policy in the early 1980s which affected the development 
approach  taken in Glasgow was  the  relaxation  of controls  on  public  sector 
agencies  giving grants directly to  private sector companies by  the Thatcher 
government. The most important of  these was the grant regime known as LEG-79 
UP  (Local  Enterprise  Grant  for  Urban  Projects)  modelled  on  the  UDAG 
system introduced under the Carter Administration in the USA in the 1970s. 
LEG-UP allowed genuine joint ventures to  be undertaken between the public 
and private sectors.  The grant acted as a subsidy to  developers to  reduce the 
risk of development,  the  intention being  that the  risk was  brought down to 
acceptable market levels.  The benefit was mutual:  the investing agency saw a 
project  carried  out  in  an  area  it  wanted  to  see  development  occur  and  the 
developer gained an asset that otherwise would have proved an unacceptable 
risk. 
(d)  Addressing Disadvantage 
While the high profile marketing and city centre redevelopment programmes 
were  going  on,  there  were  also  a  number  of initiatives,  led  by  Strathclyde 
Regional  Council and the  city's District Council,  which tried to  address the 
continuing problems of  poverty and multiple social deprivation in the city.  An 
area-based approach dominated policy in this period. 
Until  1986,  with  the  launch  of the  joint  Easterhouse  and  Drurnchapel 
Initiatives,  the  two  local  authorities  largely  pursued  their  own  area-based 
strategies.  These new integrated initiatives on the peripheral estates had the 
aims  of  improving  service  provlSlon  In  the  estates,  creating  jobs  and 
regenerating  the  local  economy  while  involving  the  local  community  In 
attempting to meet their long and short term aspirations. 80 
The strategies were intended to be both social and economic.  In fact, the focus 
was primarily on social aspects.  The chief economic development agency, the 
SDA, was primarily concerned with prestige projects in the city centre in this 
period.  Little  investment went  into  the  estates:  there  was  some  community 
business  development,  but  this  had  only  marginal  impacts.  Further 
developments  such  as  the  Govan  Initiative  (1986)  and  the  Castlemilk 
Partnership  (1988)  tried to  take  an integrated approach to  area regeneration, 
with some limited success.  This period represented the beginning of attempts 
to stimulate private sector involvement in institutions and policies targeted at 
redressing  disadvantage:  private  sector  directors  were  co-opted  on  to  the 
boards first of Govan and then in the Castlemilk Partnership structure. 
(e)  Summary 
The shift in attitude of the city council, the creation of Glasgow Action and the 
introduction  of mechanisms  like  LEG-UP  and  environmental  improvement 
grants represented a major shift in the  way  agencies  involved in Glasgow's 
development approached the economic development and regeneration process. 
The key changes were, firstly,  a shift in focus to opportunities rather than the 
focus on housing and physical development-led, problem-oriented policies that 
characterised policy in the period  1945-80.  These  continued but were  given 
less emphasis.  Secondly, there was a realisation by the public sector agencies 
that the scale of  the problem at the city scale was such that they could not, and 
should  not,  be  tackled  by  public  agencies  alone.  Thirdly,  there  was  a 81 
determination to pursue a strategy that sold Glasgow positively and attempted 
to  develop  a business-friendly culture  in the  public authorities.  The  public 
agencies repositioned themselves as  enablers.  Finally,  there was a focus  for 
the first time on the service sector and the needs of  business. 
The  city centre development strategy,  and the  culture and tourism strategies 
pursued in tandem with it, highlighted  that a lot could be achieved if  resources 
were targeted on a relatively small area.  It also illustrated that if  policies were 
adopted which were targeted at  the requirements of the business community 
then  significant  progress  could  be  made  and  involvement  and  investment 
stimulated. An argument can be made that the city was lucky in the mid 1980s 
in that things were so  bad that there was a unity in adversity which, matched 
with  the  delivery  capacity  in  the  city  and  a  determination  to  address  the 
problems led to advances.  The city developed a 'collaborative advantage'. 
Until  the  late  1980s,  programmes  targeted  at  attempting  to  resolve  the 
problems of disadvantaged areas remained focused almost exclusively on the 
social, housing and environmental aspects of the development process.  One 
critical  element,  economic  development,  remained  a  small  part  of  area 
programmes.  By the end of  the 1980s, however, there were the beginnings of a 
recognition  that  economics  needed  as  much  attention  as  housing, 
environmental  improvement  and  social  problems.  Further,  there  was  a 
recognition that private  sector  involvement  and  investment would  be  much 82 
harder to  stimulate  in  areas  of disadvantage  than it had  been in city  centre 
development-driven strategy. 
(iv)  The 1990s. 
A  number of institutional  changes  have  occurred  in  the  1990s  which  have 
affected  both  the  programmes  that  have  been  pursued  and  how  policy  is 
delivered.  These were: 
•  the  merger  of the  SDA  and  TA  to  form  the  Scottish  Enterprise 
Network, giving Glasgow a major new agency; 
lit  the growth in importance of Scottish Homes as a player in regeneration; 
•  the formation of  the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance; 
lit  the development of  a network of  local initiatives. 
(aJ  Glasgow Development Agency 
The merger of the SDA with the Training Agency to  form Scottish Enterprise 
had important impacts on the city.  The  intention was to  merge training and 
economic  development  functions.  The  reform  was  largely  carried  out  for 
ideological reasons.  The SDA was seen as a remnant of 1970s corporatism by 
the Thatcher government.  Despite its  survival following the  1987 review of 
the Agency (IDS,  1987), which at the time was seen as the beginning of the 
end  of the  agency,  it  was  operating  in  a  hostile  ideological  environment, 
coming particularly from central government and the CBI in Scotland (Moore, 
1989)  Thirteen local  enterprise  companies  (LECs)  were  formed,  headed by 
private  sector  dominated  boards  to  make  its  operations  more  ideologically 83 
compatible  with  the  non-interventionist  ideology  (if not  practice)  of the 
government.  At the same time, there was a strong argument advanced that to 
pursue an integrated approach to development, training and other development 
budgets should be jointly delivered. 
In  Glasgow,  Glasgow Action private  sector members  provided most  of the 
board: Glasgow Action itself was merged into the new Glasgow Development 
Agency.  As  aLEC, GDA  is  bound by the  seven strategic  objectives  of the 
Scottish Enterprise Network Strategy in what it can and cannot do.  These are, 
firstly,  direct  services  to  businesses,  covering  existing  and  new businesses, 
inward investment and exports.  Secondly,  the  GDA has to  address  indirect 
factor  conditions.  These  are  skills  and  knowledge,  the  physical  business 
infrastructure and improving access to opportunity for disadvantaged groups. 
GDA's  current  strategy,  published  in  1995,  is  entitled  'Making  a  Great 
European City'.  Its mission statement is:  "the GDA is the principal agent of 
economic development within an alliance seeking to make Glasgow one of  the 
great cities of Europe.  We  are  seeking to  achieve this for the benefit of the 
people and businesses  of Glasgow and  in that process  to  become  generally 
recognised  as  one  of the  best  economic  development  organisations"  (GDA, 
1995). 84 
GDA seeks to  focus  on the  development of the city's businesses within the 
framework of the  SE  strategic framework,  while taking account of the city's 
distinctive features. Its four strategic priorities are 
..  improving the  output,  employment,  productivity  and  performance  of 
the  company  base  and  maximising  the  contribution  of the  city's 
distinctive assets; 
..  extending  opportunity  to  the  people  of the  regeneration  areas  and 
bringing derelict land back into use. 
The agency has attempted to focus its priorities more on the business base over 
recent years.  This is due, at least in part, to the strategic shift at national level. 
(b)  City Council 
The city council's economic development strategy, which built on the 
programmes pursued in the 1980s,  had six objectives: 
..  supporting local business and attracting new business 
•  service sector and infrastructure development 
..  area development and providing supporting the disadvantaged 
(Glasgow City Council, 1990) 
The council's objectives have remained fairly consistent over the 1990s. The 
Economic and Industrial Development Committee of  the City Council, in its 
1996 Annual Report states the council's 'Economic Action Programmes' as: 
..  developing the business base  the workforce and infrastructure 
•  promoting equality of  opportunity and area regeneration 85 
•  promoting the city's metropolitan assets. 
There has been some move into more human resource-oriented policies but the 
broad thrusts of  policy are largely similar. 
(c) Scottish Homes 
Scottish  Homes  was  set  up  in  1989,  following  the  merger  of the  Scottish 
Special Housing Association (SSHA) and the Housing Corporation in Scotland 
(HCiS).  It is an arms length public agency with significant delegated powers. 
Its main roles are the funding of housing associations and the management of 
local authority housing transfers either to housing associations or to  Scottish 
Homes  direct  management.  It  is  also  concerned  with  promoting  home 
ownership  in  disadvantaged  areas  through  the  Grant  for  Rent  and  Owner-
Occupation (GRO) regime which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8.  The 
agency  operates  through  a  network  of district  offices  accountable  to  the 
Edinburgh headquarters, which are in tum accountable to the Scottish Office 
Environment Department.  Scottish Homes' priorities  in Glasgow are: 
•  contributing to improved quality in housing and its management; 
•  promoting  the  development  of a  more  diverse  rented  sector  and 
promoting home ownership; 
•  making  an  effective  contribution  to  community  regeneration 
strategies, assisting people with special housing needs and reducing 
homelessness. 
(Scottish Homes, 1994) 86 
(d)  Glasgow Regeneration Alliance 
The  Glasgow  Regeneration  Alliance  was  launched  in  1993.  This  is  a 
partnership  between  the  GDA,  the  now  abolished  Strathclyde  Regional 
Council,  the  District  Council  and  Scottish  Homes.  The  Alliance  aimed  to 
address the problems of disadvantage that were  still in evidence in the  city, 
although  parts  of  it,  particularly  the  city  centre,  had  undergone  a 
transformation.  The Alliance's 1993  strategy document argued that the city's 
remaining immense problems threatened to undermine its recovery.  Further, in 
an echo of  the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan, the document stated that: "the 
city is  a key agent in the economic regeneration of Scotland.  If Glasgow is 
successful  internationally,  the  Scottish  economy  will  benefit;  if Glasgow 
declines, the country's economic regeneration will be made more difficult". 
In order to  try and achieve this,  the  Alliance partners developed a series  of 
strategic objectives which aimed at improving the city's environment and its 
social, physical and  economic performance,  both for the resident population 
and to improve the city's competitiveness.  These cover similar ground to the 
council and GDA strategic objectives aimed at reducing disadvantage: 
•  retaining  population  by  improving  housing  and  the  general 
environment; 
•  bringing disadvantaged areas into the mainstream of  city life; 
•  developing the skills of  the population; 87 
•  maintaining the momentum of city centre development as the driver of 
economIC  development  in  the  city  (Glasgow  Regeneration  Alliance, 
1993). 
(e)  The Development of  Integrated Local Initiatives 
As  noted above,  in both the  USA and  England in the late  1980s  and  early 
1990s,  localised,  broad  based partnership  approaches  to  the  regeneration of 
depressed areas within urban economies began to be adopted in recognition of 
the fact that the dominant approach to regeneration in the past, focused heavily 
on the physical aspects of the process, had had partial success at  best.  These 
initiatives sought to take a more integrated approach to regeneration, focusing 
on economic and social issues as well as physical renewal.  This approach was 
pioneered in Glasgow. The first integrated initiative in the UK was launched in 
the Govan area of Glasgow in  1986 by the  SDA and  local authorities,  with 
private sector representation on its board.  This was followed in 1988 by the 
launch of the Scottish Office Partnership Initiatives (Scottish Office, 1988) in 
four  peripheral  estates:  Castlemilk  (Glasgow),  Ferguslie  Park  (Paisley), 
Whitfield (Dundee) and Wester Hailes (Edinburgh).  These built on the Govan 
model  by  incorporating  the  Scottish  Office,  Scottish  Business  in  the 
Community  and  Scottish  Homes  into  the  structure  in  an  attempt to  take  a 
holistic approach to  area regeneration.  In these, the Scottish Office expected 
the private sector to  play a key role, although it was not clearly defined: "the 
government look at the private sector to continue to regenerate urban areas ... 
where necessary in close partnership with the public sector" (Scottish Office, 88 
1988).  Glasgow  now  has  a  network  of local  initiatives  based  on  these 
premIses.  A  network  of eight  local  development  organisations,  set  up 
following the basic structure of  the Govan Initiative, has been set up to deliver 
social  and  economic  regeneration  programmes.  In  each  of these,  there  is 
private sector representation on the boards. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the experience of attempt to stimulate private sector 
involvement in the  urban regeneration process  in the  USA  and  UK,  before 
movmg  on  to  discuss  the  City  of Glasgow's  urban  policy  history.  The 
stimulation  of  private  sector  involvement  and  investment  in  the  urban 
regeneration process has  a long history in the USA, while in the UK, the first 
real drive to stimulate participation came only after 1979.  Secondly, there has 
been a shift in the USA towards the approach which currently dominates UK 
urban policy,  i.e.  a balance  between  addressing opportunity and need,  with 
attempts  to  stimulate  private  sector  participation  across  the  spectrum  of 
policies. 
In the  UK in the  1980s  an  attempt  was  made  to  refocus  urban  policy  on 
opportunity.  there was a shift away from the social policies of the  1960s and 
1970s: The growth of Urban Development Corporations was the most graphic 
institutional example.  This drive was  only partially successful.  In the  1990s 
there has been a shift back towards addressing urban problems, leading to  the 89 
balanced  approach  now  being  attempted,  l.e.  addressing  both  growth  and 
redistributive issues. 
There is thus a strong case to support the contention that there is now a degree 
of convergence  in  UK and  US  urban  policy,  focused  around public-private 
partnership, both organisationally and in resource terms.  Mechanisms such as 
Empowerment Zones,  SRB  initiatives and  integrated local  initiatives are  the 
institutional  manifestation  of  these  attempts  to  solve  the  problems  of 
disadvantaged urban areas.  The key difference between the UK and the USA 
is the manipulation of the  taxation system in the  USA to  encourage private 
sector participation.  However, the private sector role is viewed as  critical to 
the success of  these initiatives. 
Glasgow is a good example of these shifts in urban policy.  In the period up to 
the  early  1980s,  its  urban  policy  was  heavily  oriented  towards  physical 
redevelopment based on the then current analysis of the issues.  In the 1980s, 
the city moved towards a focus on stimulating what opportunities existed at the 
time and engaged with the private sector to  progress this.  In the 1990s, there 
has been a continued attempt to carry out polices such as this, combined with a 
renewed focus  on issues of disadvantage.  The institutional structures put in 
place to  deliver these policies have  emphasised partnership with the private 
sector  both  in  terms  of co-opting  private  representation  into  institutional 
structures  and  attempting to  stimulate  investment in the  process.  The  next 
chapter looks in more detail at the context these agencies were operating in and 90 
describes the funding  structures for  urban policy  in the  city at  the  time  the 
research was carried out. 91 
CHAPTER 4: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND DELIVERY 
STRUCTURES FOR REGENERATION POLICY 92 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  concludes  the  contextual  research  element  of the  thesis  by 
introducing the socio-economic conditions at city wide and local area level and 
the  organisational  structures  in  place  in  Glasgow for  the  delivery  of urban 
policy in Glasgow at the  time  of the  research.  In the  first  section,  a  brief 
economic history of the city in the decade 1981-1991  is presented to illustrate 
the  major  structural  re-adjustment  and  declining  performance  of the  city 
compared  to  Scotland  and  Great  Britain.  Secondly,  the  socio-economic 
structure of  the city in disadvantaged areas targeted by urban policy in the city 
is analysed to illustrate the scale and concentration of the problems in the city 
leading up to the period in which the research was carried out (1993-96).  This 
is followed by  a discussion of  the complex delivery structures in the city. 
It should be noted at the outset of this chapter that, as stated in Chapter 1, the 
aim of this research is not to  assess the success or failure of these agencies at 
redressing disadvantage, but to evaluate the results of attempting to involve the 
private sector in the process.  Therefore, detailed statistical analysis of social 
and economic change in these areas would not be appropriate.  Such analysis is 
beyond the scope of this  research and would not address the key questions. 
For these reasons,  a 'snapshot'  of the  social and economic characteristics of 
these areas is sufficient. 93 
2  GLASGOW- ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1981-1991 
This  section  presents  a  brief review  of the  main  trends  in  the  Glasgow 
economy between  1981  and  1991.  The  statistics analysed cover population 
change, employment change, employment change by sector, self employment 
trends  and  economic  activity rates.  In all  cases,  Glasgow's performance  is 
compared against that of Scotland  and  Great  Britain to  show how the  city 
performed below the average of  the regional and GB economies. 
(i) Population Change 1981-1991 
Population change in a city or region is an indicator of  its economic health as it 
shows how successful  or otherwise it  is  at  attracting  and retaining people;  a 
city with a strong economy and good quality of life is more likely to  have a 
stable  or growing population than  one  with economic  problems.  Figure  4.1 
shows that over the decade  1981-91  in which the British population grew by 
2.5%, Glasgow lost an average of  around 9,000 people per year, nearly 12% of 
its 1981 population, over the decade. 94 
Figure 4.1:  Population Change, Glasgow, Scotland, Great Britain 1981-1991 
1981 (0005)  1991 (0005)  1981-91 
% change 
Glasgow  755.4  666.8  -11.7 
Scotland  5,035.0  4,999.0  -0.7 
Great Britain  53,556.0  54,889.0  +2.5 
Source: Census of  Population 1981, 1991, 
Note:  Glasgow defined as local authority district 
(ii) Total employment change 1981-91 
Figure  4.2  shows  the  employment  trends  in  Glasgow,  Scotland  and  Great 
Britain in the decade 1981-91.  Over the period, Glasgow lost 16% of its 1981 
total employment, over 62, 000 jobs.  At the same time, total employment in 
Scotland increased by 105, 000 (5.5%), while at the British level, employment 
increased by 373,000 (1.8%). Almost all of Glasgow's decline in employment 
was concentrated in manufacturing.  59, 000 jobs were lost in this sector, 45% 
of all manufacturing jobs, accounting for 95% of total job loss.  At the same 
time,  in Scotland,  manufacturing  employment was  also  declining  with  166, 
000 jobs lost, representing 24.5% of the 1981  total.  There was a 30% decline 
in manufacturing employment in Great Britain as a whole over the period. 95 
In the service sector, Glasgow lost 9, 000 jobs over the period.  At the Scottish 
level,  there  was  significant  growth  in  service  sector  employment  of almost 
16% on the 1981 total, representing 191, 000 jobs.  In Great Britain as a whole, 
service employment increased by  15%  1981-1991, adding almost  1.9  million 
jobs. 
The  critical  message  in  this  table  is  that,  in  Glasgow,  manufacturing 
employment declined greatly, but service sector employment did not increase 
in  absolute  terms  to  compensate  for  this  loss  as  happened  in  Scotland  and 
Great  Britain.  At  1991,  Glasgow had  a  weak:  economy,  with  a  declining 
manufacturing sector and a stagnant service sector. Figure 4.2: Sectoral Change,  Glasgow, Scotland, Great Britain, 1981-1991. 
Number  %  of1981  Number 
(0005)  total  (0005) 
Glasgow 
Manuf  131.2  32.9  7l.9 
Services  262.1  65.7  261.0 
Other  5.2  l.3  3.3 
Total  398.6  100.0  336.2 
Scotland 
Manuf  676.8  35.6  511.0 
Services  1214.6  64.0  1405.9 
Other  73.2  3.8  86.9 
Total  1898.7  100.0  2003.8 
Great 
Britain 
Manuf  7426.0  35.3  5165.7 
Services  12956.6  6l.5  14885.0 
Other  679.4  3.2  668.6 
Total  21062.0  100.0  20689.3 
Note: Glasgow defined as local authority district 
Source: Census of  Employment 
(iii)  Self Employment 1981-1991 
%  of 1991  %  change 
total  1981-1991 
2l.3  -45.2 
77.6  -0.4 
0.9  -36.5 
100.0  -15.7 
25.5  -24.5 
70.2  +15.7 
4.3  +18.0 
100.0  +5.5 
25.0  -30.4 
71.9  +14.8 
3.2  -15.8 
100.0  100.0 
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Self employment is often used as a proxy indicator of  the economic health and 
entrepreneurial capacity of an economy.  Almost 4, 000 more people were self 97 
employed in Glasgow in 1991  than in  1981,  a 29% increase over the period 
(Figure 4.3).  Glasgow lagged behind the Scottish and GB performance on this 
indicator: self employment increased by 39% and 43% respectively.  It is also 
important to note the low level of  self employment in the city.  Less than 5% of 
the labour force were self employed in Glasgow in 1991, compared with 10.6% 
in Scotland and 14.9% in Britain at the same time. 
Figure 4.3:  Self Employment: Glasgow, Scotland, Great Britain 1981-1991 
1981 
Glasgow  12.7 
Scotland  1536.7 
Great Britain  2147.5 
Note:  Glasgow defined as local authonty dIstrICt. 
Source: Census of  Population, 1981, 1991. 
(iv)  Economic Activity Rates 
1991  %  change 
16.3  +28.7 
2131.0  +38.7 
3078.4  +43.3 
Total  economic  activity  rates  declined  in  Glasgow  and  Scotland  1981-91, 
while they remained stable at the  UK level  (Figure 4.4).  Within this,  male 
economic activity rates dropped in all cases, by 9.7% in Glasgow, compared to 
a  national  drop  of 5%.  Female  economic  activity  rates  also  declined  in 98 
Glasgow.  At the Scottish and Great Britain scale, there were increases of  2.8% 
and 4.4% respectively. 
Figure 4.4:  Total Economic Activity Rates 1981 and 1991 
1981  1991 
Glasgow  60.5  54.4 
Scotland  61.7  60.4 
Great Britain  61.0  61.0 
Note:  Glasgow defined as local authorzty dlstrzct 
Source:  Census 
(v) Registered Unemployment 1983-1991. 
Over the period 1983-91, total unemployment in Glasgow fell by 24, 700 
(-33.5%.  The number of  unemployed people in Scotland fell by 109,000 
(-33.5%).  For Great Britain, unemployment over the period fell by 727,000 
(-26%).  These figures show that unemployment in the city actually fell faster 
in percentage terms than the national average (Figure 4.5). 99 
Figure 4.5: Index oftotaI unemployment, Glasgow, Scotland, Great Britain, 1983-1991, 
numbers unemployed, 1983=100. 
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3  SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF REGENERATION AREAS 
(i) Introduction 
Figure 4.6  presents a detailed picture of the disadvantaged areas covered by 
the  eight  regeneration  cities.  Five  indicators  are  presented.  Firstly,  the 
population of the areas covered by the initiatives is given to indicate the scale 
of the  areas.  Secondly,  economic  inactivity  rates  (the  permanently  sick, 
students  and  retired  people)  and  the  percentage  of the  economically  active 
population who were unemployed at the time of the census are given.  Taken 
together, these give an indication of the size of the non-working population. 100 
The percentage of public sector housing (housing association, local authority 
and Scottish Homes) in the total stock is  given to  indicate the  single tenure 
nature of these areas.  Finally, the number of households in the target areas 
headed by a lone parent, an indicator commonly assumed to be an indicator of 
disadvantage, is given. 
(ii)  Castlemilk 
One of the city's four peripheral estates, located in the south of the city, the 
area had a population of 17,500 (2.7% of the city total) in 1991, with 95% of 
the residents living in social housing.  Over half the population over the age of 
16  were economically inactive (2.8% of the city total) and 33% of those who 
were  economically  active  were  unemployed,  almost  4%  of  the  city's 
unemployed.  The area had 6% of  the city's lone parent families. 
(iii)  Drumcnapel 
This is  another peripheral  estate in the  north west of the  city.  There  were 
around 12,000 residents in the area in 1991, 1.8% of  the city's total, with over 
half  of  these  economically  inactive  (2%  of  the  Glasgow  total).  The 
unemployment  rate  calculated  as  a  percentage  of the  economically  active 
resident population was over 25%, 1.9% of  the city total and the area had over 
500 lone parent households, 2.6% of  the city totaL 101 
(iv)  East End 
The East End of the city is a much larger area than the above, with over 57, 
000 residents, 9% of the city's population.  Housing tenure was more diverse 
than the peripheral estates, with only two thirds of housing rented from public 
sector agencies. Almost half the population were economically inactive (7% of 
the city total), and around a quarter of  those who were active were unemployed 
(12% of  the city total).  The area had 10% ofthe city's lone parent families. 
(e)  Glasgow North 
The  Glasgow  North  area  to  the  north  of the  city  centre  IS  the  largest 
regeneration area in population terms, with almost 67, 000 residents (10.5% of 
the city total), just over half of  whom were economically inactive, representing 
12%  of the  city  totaL  Over  a  quarter,  28%,  of the  economically  active 
population were  out of work  (14%  of the  city total).  Again the  area  was 
dominated  by  social  housing,  which  accounted  for  81 %  of the  total  stock. 
Over 3000 households were headed by one parent, 15% ofthe city total. 
(vi) Greater Easterhouse 
This peripheral estate in the east of the city had a 1991  population of around 
39,  000  (6%  of the  city  total).  Almost  half of these  were  economically 
inactive, with around one third of the economically active unemployed.  Social 
housing accounted for  almost 90% of the total housing stock and there were 
over 2,500 single parent households, 13% of  the city totaL 102 
(vii) Govan 
This inner city area in the south of the city had a 1991  population of around 
27,  000, 4% of the city total.  Economic inactivity rates were not as  high as 
other  areas  at  45%,  4%  of economically  inactive  in  the  city.  24%  of 
economically people were unemployed.  As with the East End, social housing 
tenure was lower than in the peripheral estate at around two thirds of the total 
stock.  There were over 1, 000 lone parent families, 5.5% of  the city total. 
(vii)  Gorbals 
This  is  the  smallest regeneration area in the  city,  with a  population of just 
under 9,000 residents in 1991, 1.4% of the city's population. Almost 55% of 
residents were  economically inactive and of the  economically active,  almost 
40% were out of work, 24% of the city total.  Almost all (93%) of  the housing 
stock  was  social  housing  for  rent,  reflecting  the  area's  history  of 
comprehensive redevelopment.  There were also 500 lone parent families in the 
city, 2.3% of  the city total. 
(ix) Pollok 
The fourth of Glasgow's peripheral estates,  located in the  south west of the 
city,  Pollok had a  19912 population of over 39,  000,  almost 9% of the city 
totaL  44% of adults were economically inactive, just above the city average. 
Of those who were economically active, 23% were unemployed.  73% of the 
housing stock was public sector-owned and there were almost 1800 lone parent 
families, 9% of  the city total. 103 
Figure 4.7: Socio-Economic Indicators of Regeneration Areas, Glasgow, 1991. 
Population  Economically  Unemployed 
Inactive (%)  (%) 
Castlemilk  17525 (2.7)  52.3 (2.8)  33.5 (3.8) 
East End  48.0 (6.8)  24.3 (11.7) 
57240 (9.1) 
Glasgow  66695 (10.5)  50.3 (II.  7)  28.1  (14.0) 
North 
Greater  38914 (6.2)  46.8 (5.6)  32.9(9.1) 
Easterhouse 
Govan  26534 (4.2)  45.3 (4.1)  23.8 (5.1) 
Gorbals  54.7 (1.8)  38.1 (2.4) 
8813 (1.4) 
Pollok  39207 (6.2)  44.1  (5.6)  23.4 (7.2) 
Drumchapel  11592 (1.8)  52.5 (2.0)  23.4 (1.9) 
GLASGOW  630, 766  45.6  19.1 
Note:figures In brackets represent share ojGlasgow total 
Source: Census ojPopulation, 1991. 
(x)  Summary 
Housing- %  Lone Parents 
Public sector 
95.2  1215 (6.0) 
66.8  2048 (10.1) 
81.4  3051 (15.1) 
86.9  2609 (12.9) 
66.9  1105 (5.5) 
93.4  458 (2.3) 
72.9  1782 (8.8) 
78.7  526 (2.6) 
56.6  20215 
In summary,  these  figures  present a picture of areas  cover 42% of the  city 
population which had, at the time of  the 1991  Census: 
•  low levels of economic activity, with 43% of  the city total; 104 
«I  high unemployment among those who are economically active (56% 
of  the city total); 
«I  high levels of  social housing; 
•  large numbers of  single parents, with 63% of  the city totaL 
The next section looks  at the  regeneration agencies  charged with redressing 
these problems. 
4  CURRENT DELIVERY STRUCTURES 
The  current  delivery  structure is  set out  in  Figure  4.8  below.  The  Scottish 
Office plays  a central  role,  through  its  approval  of funding  for  the  Scottish 
Enterprise  network,  Scottish  Homes  and  the  local  authorities  and  its 
membership of  the Strathclyde European partnership.  The Scottish Office sets 
the framework within European and national government guidelines.  Scottish 
Enterprise National guides the direction of the local enterprise companies, in 
this  case  Glasgow  Development  Agency  (GDA),  which  in  turn influences 
Glasgow Opportunities, the local  enterprise trust,  while the  local authorities 
and GDA form the context for the operation of the eight local initiatives in the 
city.  Scottish Homes is  included because it is  a major player in the physical 
regeneration of the  city  housing  stock;  it  is  also  a  member of the  Gorbals 
Initiative. 105 
Figure 4.8: Glasgow Urban Regeneration Funding And Policy Delivery Mechanisms 
European Commission 
1 
Central Government 
1 
Scottish Office 
Scottish Enterprise National 
1 
Scottish Homes 
Strathclyde European Partnership 
r  l  j  L 
Glasgow Development Agency  Glasgow City 
Council 
1 
Glasgow Opportunities 
Castlemilk Economic Development Agency, Drumchapel Opportunities, East End 
Partnership, Glasgow North, Gorbals Initiative, Govan Initiative, Greater Easterhouse 
Development Company, New Horizons. 
Note  1:  Strathclyde European Partnership is  composed of representatives from the European Commission, Scottish 
Office, Scottish Enterprise, the LECs and local authorities covered by the fonner jurisdiction of Strathclyde Regional 
Council.  In  theory  partners  have  equal  influence,  but  the  key  committees  are  chaired  by  Scottish  Office 
representatives. 
Note 2: Glasgow Regeneration Alliance is not included in this diagram because at the time of writing, there was no 
fonnal institutional structure in place.  The lead partners are GOA, GCC, SRC (before it was abolished) and Scottish 
Homes. 
Note 2: Agencies highlighted in bold text have private sector representation on their board of  directors. 106 
Total  expenditure  within  the  city  on  economIC  development  and  urban 
regeneration is difficult to identify.  Figure 4.9 illustrates the expenditure ofthe 
city wide agencies in Glasgow between 1993  and 1996, the period covered by 
the research. It is important to note that the figures are for total expenditure in 
the whole city on economic development as  well  as  regeneration.  Glasgow 
City  Council  spent  f21.4m  over  the  period  on  economic  and  industrial 
development, Glasgow Development Agency f186m, the council spent f15m 
and Scottish Homes almost £300m. 
Figure  4.9:  Expenditure  on  Economic  Development  and  Urban  Regeneration 
Programmes, Glasgow 1993-1996. 
1993/94  1994/95  1995/96 
Glasgow City Council  6.3  7.3  7.8 
Strathclyde Regional Council  7.8  7.2  7.1 
Glasgow Development Agency  61.5  60.0  66.3 
Scottish Homes  99.9  98.3  99.8 
TOTAL  175.5  172.8  181.0 
Source: AgencIes 
The importance of funding from the local enterprise company network through 
GDA,  other Scottish Office funded programmes via local authorities through 
the Urban Programme and also European funding  is  shown by the budget of 107 
one  of the  local  initiatives  summarised  in  Figures  4.10  and  4.11  below. 
Glasgow  Development  Agency  was  the  dominant  core  funding  agency, 
providing 40.6% of the company's core costs, while the local authorities each 
provided around 29.0% of these.  There was also a token contribution from the 
private sector, which amounted to 0.8% of  the company's costs. 
Figure  4.10:  East End  Partnership:  percentage  share  of core  management  costs  by 
agency 
Agency  Core Management  % share 
(£) 
Strathclyde Regional Council  104000  29.1 
Glasgow Development Agency  145000  40.6 
Glasgow City Council  105000  29.4 
Private Sector  3000  0.8 
TOTAL CORE MANAGEMENT INCOME  357000  100.0 
Source: adapted from East End Partnership Limited, Draft Business Plan 1994/5, appendix 3 
The former Strathclyde Regional Council was the key funder in terms of the 
projects  the  company  carries  out,  providing  51.0%.  of  project  income. 
Glasgow  Development  Agency  provided  26.6%  of  project  income,  a 
significantly smaller share than it provides for core operating costs.  Glasgow 
City  Council  also  provides  a significantly  smaller share  for  projects than  it 
does for core costs (29.4% and 22.3% respectively).  The private sector did not 
contribute anything towards the costs of  project implementation. 108 
Figure 4.11: East End Partnership: percentage share of project costs by agency 
Agency  Projects (£)  0/0 share 
Strathdyde Regional Council  171  500  51.0 
Glasgow Development Agency  89500  26.6 
Glasgow City Council  75000  22.3 
Private Sector  0  0.0 
TOTAL PROJECT INCOME  336000  100.0 
Source: adaptedfrom East End Partnership Limited, Draft Business Plan 199415,  appendix 3 
5  SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown how the Glasgow economy performed over the decade 
prior to the commencement of this research.  At the city level, manufacturing 
collapse supplemented by a stagnant service sector caused a shrinking labour 
market in the city.  Within the city, concentrations of deprivation covering over 
40% oft he  city's population were described, with the  key characteristics of 
these areas being high unemployment, low economic activity,  high levels of 
social housing and large numbers of lone  parent families.  The  institutional 
structures put in place to  address these issues were also  outlined, illustrating 
the  complexity  of the  funding  structures  and  the  large  number  of agencies 
which have private sector representation within them.  As was noted in Chapter 
3,  within  disadvantaged  areas,  the  local  initiatives  attempt  to  pursue  an 109 
integrated range of social and economic policies and stimulate privates sector 
participation in their delivery.  The next chapter introduces the first element of 
the original research carried out for this study, an in depth survey of attitudes 
in the city's business community towards the regeneration process. CHAPTERS: 
ATTITUDES IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY 
TOWARDS THE REGENERATION PROCESS 
110 III 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Most research on private sector participation in the urban regeneration process 
in the past has focused on  public sector attitudes to the stimulation of private 
sector  involvement  and  investment  and  existing  public  sector  regimes  and 
institutional structures to encourage participation by the private sector.  Where 
there has been any analysis of private sector attitudes and experiences, it has 
tended  to  be  confined  to  those  individuals  or  companies  who  are  already 
involved in the process.  This has left a major gap in current research, namely 
an  investigation  of the  interests,  attitudes  and  perceptions  of those  in  the 
private sector who are not currently involved in the process.  This chapter aims 
to redress this, by looking at the views of the wider, uninvolved private sector 
in the City of Glasgow. 
The first section of the chapter introduces  the method adopted for the survey, 
detailing the rationale for the approach taken to gathering the data, the kinds of 
companies targeted and the analytical approach adopted. The first set of  results 
reported look at the characteristics of the sample, looking at the employment 
position  of respondents,  the  sector  the  companies  operated  in,  where  the 
companies were owned and their age. Secondly, awareness amongst the sample 
of the  current  delivery  structures  for  urban  policy  in  Glasgow  is  analysed, 
followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  results  found  when  respondents  were 
questioned  on  their  knowledge  of,  and  attitudes  to,  the  various  policy 
components of the urban regeneration process, with the aim of developing a 112 
baseline picture of awareness of the approaches being taken to resolving urban 
problems in the city. 
The  core  part  of  the  chapter  investigates  the  levels  of  private  sector 
participation in the regeneration process amongst the sample and analyses the 
results  of  responses  to  possible  methods  of  increasing  private  sector 
involvement and investment in the regeneration process.  The final part of the 
chapter brings together the findings of the survey and draws some preliminary 
conclusions.  The  underlying  reasoning  for  the  questions  asked,  the  sources 
used,  a copy of the  questionnaire and a detailed discussion of the  statistical 
anal ysis carried out are discussed in Appendices 4, 5, 6 and 7 at the end of the 
thesis. 
2  METHODOLOGY 
In order to meet the aims of  this part of  the research, a number of  key decisions 
were taken regarding sample selection: 
•  senior executives and managers were targeted; 
..  larger companies were selected; 
•  within this, a random sample was gathered; 
•  detailed statistical analysis  of  the results was carried out. 
This approach is justified below. 113 
(i)  Senior ExecutiveslManagers 
The intention behind this selection process was to attempt to ensure that, as far 
as was possible, a 'corporate view' was obtained.  Senior management are, by 
definition,  in  a  position  to  take  an  overview  of a  company's  operations, 
external  relations  and  strategic  direction.  Further,  they  are  key  influencing 
elements on these. 
Accessing  companies  further  down  their  internal  hierarchies  would  have 
increased  the  likelihood  of getting  a  personal  view unrepresentative  of the 
company perspective.  In reality, of course, all respondents would be likely to 
impose their personal views on the issue.  However, noting the above, there is 
a greater likelihood of personal and corporate views  corresponding if senior 
management is the target group. 
(ii)  Random Sample of Large Companies 
There are three aspects to the rationale for taking this approach.  Firstly, on a 
practical level, larger companies are more easy to target.  The 'private sector' 
is a disparate entity.  There are few easy access routes into it.  Targeting the 
most visible companies (i.e.  the largest) in a city's corporate base simplifies 
the task.  It should be noted that there is a flaw in this methodological approach 
- only the perspective of larger companies is gained.  What is often viewed as 114 
the  most  dynamic  part  of the  economy,  the  small  and  medium  enterprise 
sector,  is  not  extensively  covered  by  this  survey.  However,  the  survey  is 
intended to  capture a flavour of private sector attitudes rather than provide a 
comprehensive,  definitive,  statement  of  the  private  sector's  stance  on 
regeneration issues. 
One  other  possible  way  of getting  around  the  access  issue  which  was 
considered was to use public agencies or the local Chamber of Commerce as 
an initial route into the private sector.  However, it was felt that there was a 
potential  problem  in  this  approach:  that  a  sample  gathered  in  this  fashion 
would be skewed towards those companies already involved in some way in 
either regeneration or broader urban governance issues. 
As a result of this decision,  it was decided to target a random sample of the 
city's major companies to try and gauge the attitudes of a spectrum of opinion 
amongst  influential  players  in  Glasgow's  business  community.  A  final 
important point to  note is that,  even with a random sample, given the target 
group and the subject matter, there would be a degree of self selection amongst 
the sample who responded. 
(iv) Statistical analysis 
Three forms of statistical analysis were carried out on the data, using the SPSS 
statistical  analysis  programme,  version  8.0.  Firstly,  for  all  of the  data, 
frequencies of response to the various options are reported.  Secondly, where 115 
appropriate, chi square tests were run on the data. The chi square test is used to 
determine  whether a  set  of frequencies  is  significantly  different  from  those 
expected  under the  null  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  relationship  (Rose  and 
Sullivan,  1993).  In other words, chi square tests the hypothesis that the row 
and column variables are independent, without indicating strength or direction 
of the relationship.  The chi square test results determine whether or not there 
is  a significant difference between the observed and expected frequencies  in 
the  data  set.  The  cut  off point  for  significance  was  taken  as  the  95% 
confidence level.  What this means is  that any result which is  reported below 
this  level,  i.e.  less than 0.05,  highlights  a significant difference between the 
expected  and  observed  frequencies  in  the  row  and  column  independent 
variables.  Any  value  above  0.05  means  that the  test  cannot reject the  null 
hypothesis, i.e., that there are no significant differences. 
The third statistical method adopted took  the analysis further by looking at the 
effect  of a  'bundle'  of background  variables  together  on  the  response  to 
specific  questions  by  carrying  out  logistic  regression  analyses.  Logistic 
regression is a stronger test of significance than the chi square test because it 
indicates  both  the  significance  of differences  in  response  and  shows  the 
direction of  the relationship. 
Throughout the chapter, all frequencies are reported.  To maintain the flow of 
the chapter, chi square and regression results are shown in the text only where 116 
a  significant result was  obtained.  The  results  of all  chi  square  and logistic 
regression analyses run are presented in Appendix 6. 
3  SAMPLE BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
(i)  Respondents' Employment 
As Figure 5.1  shows, the aim of targeting senior management in the private 
sector was met successfully.  All respondents were in positions of authority 
within  their  respective  companies.  Almost  two  thirds  were  managing 
directors, while a further 12% were either chairmen or chief executives of  their 
companies.  All the remaining 25% held senior departmental directorships or 
co-ordinating roles within their organisations. 
Figure 5.1: Position of Respondents in Companies 
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(ii)  Sector 
Figure 5.2 shows the broad sectoral breakdown of the sample.  In relation to 
the economic structure of the city,  manufacturing and construction are over-
represented, while services are under-represented: in employment terms, in the 
Glasgow travel-to-work  area,  service  employment  accounts  for  78%  of all 
employment,  manufacturing  for  14%  and  construction  for  6%  (Source: 
NOMIS,  1995  Census  of Employment).  However,  against  this,  it  can  be 
argued that the sample provides a cross sectoral spread of  opinion. 
Figure 5.2: Sectoral Breakdown of Responding Companies 
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(iii) Number of Employees 
Figure  5.3  tends  to  confirm  the  findings  of Figure  5.2:  that  the  sample 
companies are in the medium to  large category.  25% of the companies had 118 
less than 50  employees, with only 8.3% of the total employing less than 10 
people.  55% of responding companies employed 50-499 people,  split fairly 
evenly between the 50-99 category (25%) and the 100-499 category (30%).  It 
should be noted that the sample is not highly skewed to very large companies: 
only  5%  of the  sample  (3  companies)  employed  more  than  1,000  people. 
Further, 50% of  the sample employed less than 100 people each. 
Figure 5.3: Employment in Responding Companies 
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(iv)  Ownership 
The  largest  category  of location of ownership  in Figure  5.4  is  the  City  of 
Glasgow:  19  companies, almost one third of the sample, were owned within 
the  city.  The  next  largest  category  was  Scottish  ownership  - 25%  of the 
sample.  Thus, in total, over half of  the companies were Glasgow - or Scottish-
owned.  Of the  remainder,  14  were  UK-owned:  the  other  companies  were 119 
categorised as 'other' forms of ownership mainly because they were plcs listed 
on the stock market.  By definition, their ownership is not tied to  a specific 
geographical area.  One company was a mutual assurance society, owned by its 
members.  Four companies were foreign owned;  two  Japanese,  one  German 
and one Finnish. 
Figure 5.4: Location of  Ownership of Responding Companies 
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(v)  Age of Company 
Figure  5.5  reports  the  age  structure  of the  sample.  The  great majority,  46 
companies, had been in the city for more than 20  years.  Only ten companies 
had been in Glasgow for less than ten years.  The age structure gives a similar 
profile: 43 companies were more than twenty years old, 26 of  these being more 
than 50 years old. 120 
Figure 55: Age of Responding Companies 
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4.  AWARENESS OF CURRENT DELIVERY STRUCTURES 
(i)  Awareness of Agencies 
Figure  5.6  reports  respondents'  awareness  of  the  vanous  economIC 
development agencies in the city.  An interesting picture emerges.  95% of the 
sample had heard of Glasgow Development Agency and 87% were aware of 
the  city's Enterprise  Trust,  Glasgow  Opportunities.  A  smaller  proportion, 
70%,  were  aware  of the  existence  of the  other  city  wide  agency  with  an 
economic development remit, the City Council's Economic Regeneration Unit. 
A mixed picture emerges from the sample's awareness of  the city's eight local 
initiatives.  82%  had  heard  of the  Govan  Initiative,  perhaps  reflecting  this 
agency's  longevity.  Small  majorities  were  aware  of CEDA  and  East End 
Partnership  (55%  and  52%  respectively).  There  was  a  50/50  split  on 
awareness  of the  Greater  Easterhouse  Development  Company.  A  large 121 
minority,  47%,  had  heard  of the  Gorbals  Initiative,  while  68%  and  83% 
respectively  were  not  aware  of the  existence  of Glasgow  North  and  New 
Horizons.  Only  17% of the sample had heard of the Glasgow Regeneration 
Alliance. 
Figure 5.6: Awareness of Urban Regeneration Agencies 
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Chi square tests for  significance revealed few  statistically significant results, 
suggesting homogeneity of  response in the sample.  The significant tests which 
did emerge showed that employment size impacted on awareness of Castlemilk 
Economic  Development  Agency  (p=O.Ol),  while  location  of  ownership 122 
produced  a  significant  difference  III  awareness  of New  Horizons  (p.O.03) 
(Figures  4.7 and 4.8 ). 
Figure 5.7: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of Castlemilk 
Economic Development Agency?' 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  51.5  52.0  n=58, p=O.OI  , df=l 
No  48.5  48.0 
n=number o/respondents, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Figure 5.8:  Chi square test  results for  response to question  'have you  heard of  New 
Horizons?' 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  30.0  32.7  n=59 , p=0.03 , df=l 
No  70.0  67.3 
n=number o/respondents, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Logistic regression analysis revealed five significant predictors of  response: 
It  the  'sector'  variable  on  awareness  of Glasgow  City  Council's 
activities,  with  service  sector  companies  more  likely  to  answer 
positively; 
•  the  'age  of  company'  variable  on  awareness  of  Glasgow 
Opportunities,  with  younger  companies  more  likely  to  answer 
positively; 
It  the'  sector' variable on awareness of East End Partnership Limited, 
with service companies more likely to be aware of  the agency 123 
cp  the  'employment  size'  variable  on  awareness  of  the  Glasgow 
Regeneration Alliance, with larger companies more likely to answer 
positively 
•  the  'age  of company'  variable  on  awareness  of the  Glasgow 
Regeneration  Alliance,  with  older  companies  likely  to  be  more 
aware  (Figure 5.9). 
Full results are reported in Appendix 6. 124 
Figure 5.9: Significant Results from Logistic Regression Analysis 
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Constant  -1.81  1.48  0.22 125 
Figure 5.9 (continued) 
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(ii)  Awareness of Activities 
Figure  5.10  presents  a  picture  of awareness  of the  activities  of Glasgow's 
various economic development agencies.  82%, 78% of the total, of those who 126 
knew about GDA claimed knowledge of the agency's activities.  Of  those who 
were  aware  of Glasgow Opportunities,  65%  (57%  of all  respondents)  knew 
anything about what it did.  61% (55% of the total survey) of those claiming 
awareness of  the local initiatives' activities had knowledge of  their role.  A low 
36%  (25%  of all  respondents)  who  knew  about  Glasgow  City  Council 
Economic Regeneration Unit had any  awareness of their role.  Finally, only 
two  of the  ten  respondents  who  had  heard  of the  Glasgow  Regeneration 
Alliance knew anything  about  its  activities  - this  represents  only  3%  of all 
respondents. 
Figure 5.10: Awareness of Activities of Urban Regeneration Agencies 
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Note:  Only those respondents who had heard of  the agencies were asked these 
questions. 
Note:  Local Initiatives are:  Castlemilk Economic Development Agency, Greater Easterhouse 
Development Company, Gorbals Initiative, Govan Initiative, Glasgow North Ltd, East 
End Partnership, Drumchapel Opportunities, New Horizons. 127 
Figure  5.11  provides  an  indication  of respondents'  VIews  on  the  mam 
responsibilities of  the agencies.  For GDA, a range of  policies were given fairly 
equal prominence.  These were, in order of importance (defined as the number 
of  times they were mentioned by respondents) 
e  training (23 responses) 
e  helping companies grow (22) 
e  business start up (20) 
$  environmental improvement (19) 
•  property development (17) 
A  small  number  of respondents  (6)  suggested  GDA  was  concerned  with 
employment  advocacy.  There  were  far  fewer  responses  detailing  the  City 
Council  Economic  Regeneration  Unit's  activities.  None  of the  categories 
gained  a  response  in  double  figures.  The  most  common  answer  was 
environmental  improvement  (nine  responses)  followed  by  housing  (eight), 
business  start  up  and  helping  companies  grow  (seven each).  For Glasgow 
Opportunities, business start up (16 responses) and training (15) dominated the 
answers given by respondents.  finally, in the view of participants, training (26 
responses)  and  employment  advocacy  (16)  were  the  key  roles  of the  local 
initiatives,  followed  by  property  development  and  business  start  up  (11 
responses each) and environmental improvement (10 responses). Figure 5.11: Awareness of Main Responsibilities of Urban Regeneration 
Agencies 
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Note:  A number of respondents gave more than one  answer.  Only these respondents who 
knew of  the activities of  the agencies were asked these questions. 
Figures are given in absolute numbers. 
Note: Local Initiatives are:  Castlemilk Economic Development Agency, Greater Easterhouse 
Development Company, Gorbals Initiative, Govan Initiative, Glasgow North 
Ltd, East End Partnership, Drumchapel Opportunities, New Horizons. 
(iii)  Summary 
This survey of awareness  of agencies  in the  city  has  shown that city wide 
agencies are fairly well known in the city business community, with the local 129 
initiatives'  profile  largely  affected  by  their age,  with  Govan  Initiative  well 
known  and  the  younger  smaller  agencies  less  so.  Chi  square  tests  for 
significance revealed few statistically significant results.  The significant tests 
which did emerge  showed that employment  size  impacted  on  awareness  of 
Castlemilk  Economic  Development  Agency  (p=O.Ol),  while  location  of 
ownership  produced a  significant  difference  in  awareness  of New Horizons 
(p=0.03). 
Logistic regression analysis  revealed  five  significant predictors of response: 
sector on awareness of Glasgow City Council's activities, with service sector 
companies more likely to answer positively; age of company on awareness of 
Glasgow  Opportunities,  with  younger  companies  more  likely  to  answer 
positively; sector on awareness of East End Partnership Limited,  with service 
companies more likely to be aware of  the agency and finally, employment size 
on awareness  of the  Glasgow Regeneration Alliance,  with larger companies 
and those in the manufacturing and construction sector more likely to  answer 
positively. 
In terms of awareness of activities of the agencies, most of those who knew 
about GDA claimed knowledge of  what the agency did, while two thirds knew 
of Glasgow  Opportunities'  activities  and  60%  knew  about  what  the  local 
initiatives did.  Only one third of those who knew about Glasgow City Council 
Economic Regeneration Unit knew anything about what they did, while only 
20%  knew anything  of the  Glasgow  Regeneration  Alliances'  activities.  In 130 
terms of what the agencies actually do,  there  was a fairly  close fit  between 
perceptions and reality. 
5.  KNOWLEDGE  OF,  AND  ATTITUDES  TO,  THE 
REGENERATION  PROCESS 
(i)  Components of Policy 
Figure  5.12  gives  an  insight  into  the  oplmons  of  respondents  on  the 
components of  urban regeneration policy.  A fairly consistent pattern emerges; 
75-80%  of respondents  view  regeneration  policy  as  currently  constituted 
having economic, social and physical/environmental aspects embedded within 
it.  The results are fairly  consistent, although slightly less of the sample felt 
urban regeneration policy was an economic policy: 25% of the total argued it 
was  not,  as  opposed to  18%  who  felt  social  policy was  not an  element of 
current policy and 20% who felt it was not a physical or environmental policy. 
Most of those who felt that policy contained elements of all three aspects of 
policy argued that it was a common sense approach to take.  Resolving social 
problems was not possible without addressing economic issues, while physical 
and environmental policy, if pursued, would have social effects in improving 
health and  welfare.  Improving  social  elements  of the  issues  could  lead to 
fewer  physical  and  environmental  problems  due,  for  example,  to  reduced 
vandalism.  Economic lift would also  address physical problems.  The lower 
numbers who viewed policy as  having economic elements perhaps reflects a 
continuing  perception  that  urban  regeneration  is  about  resolving  social 131 
problems through intervention: a view also held until relatively recently in the 
public sector. 
As  might  be  expected,  gIven  the  consistency  of responses  regarding  the 
components  of policy  documented  above,  a  large  majority  of the  sample 
argued that the components of policy were interlinked.  Figure 5.12 shows that 
88% of  respondents saw linkage between the elements of  policy.  This suggests 
that the realisation in the public  sector in recent years  that the  resolution of 
major urban problems requires  a multiple policy,  co-ordinated approach has 
widespread support amongst this sample.  This finding suggests that there are 
the beginnings of a consensus across both public and private sectors that a co-
ordinated, holistic approach to urban regeneration is essential for success. 
Figure 5.12: Perspectives on Elements of Urban Regeneration Policy 
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(ii)  Are the Goals of Policy Achievable? 
The  most  obvious,  and  important,  finding  from  Figure  5.13  is  that 70%  of 
respondents do  not know whether the current goals of regeneration policy are 
achievable, suggesting that the majority of company representatives know very 
little about the aims of policy.  Of those who did express a definite opinion, 
22% of the total sample felt that the current goals of policy were achievable, 
and 8% felt they were not.  This leads to several possible conclusions.  Firstly, 
that  there  is  very  low  awareness  in  the  business  community  about  what 
agencies are trying to do.  Secondly, agencies may not be clearly articulating 
their policy  goals  to  the  private  sector,  despite  their  stated  commitment to 
partnership with the  private  sector.  The  complexity of the  issues may also 
cause problems with the articulation of  these goals in comprehensible terms to 
a non-expert audience.  A further possible reason underlying these findings is 
that there is  awareness in the business community about the goals of policy, 
but respondents were unsure as  to  their prospects for success.  However, this 
was not a commonly expressed view. Figure 5.13: Perspectives on Regeneration Policy Achieving Aims 
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(iii)  Relative Importance of Urban Regeneration Policy 
70 
Figure  5.14  presents  a  complex  picture  of respondents'  perceptions  of the 
relative  importance  of urban  regeneration  policies.  On  the  first  element, 
'training unemployed people', only 5% felt it was unimportant and 15% were 
neutral  on  its  importance.  Of the  remaining  80%  who  thought  it  was 
important, 40% of  these thought it was a critical aspect of regeneration policy. 
Opinions  on the  necessity  of improving  social  housing  followed  a  similar 
pattern.  Only two respondents felt it was unimportant and 17% were neutral 
on this.  Again,  80% of respondents  felt  improving  social  housing  was  an 
important  or very  important  issue,  with  38% of these  regarding  it  as  very 
important.  On the policy of  assisting unemployed people to find jobs, only one 
respondent felt this to be important, with 13% neutraL  85% regarded this as 
important to some degree, with 41 % of  these arguing it was very important. A 134 
more  mixed  picture  emerges  m  attitudes  to  providing  housing  for  owner 
occupation in disadvantaged areas.  13% of the sample felt it was unimportant 
for regeneration, while 35% gave a neutral response.  Of the 52% who felt it 
was important, only 35% of these, 13% of the total sample, felt it to be a very 
important element of  policy. 
On the issue  of developing  local  services  in disadvantaged areas,  there was 
again  strong  support  for  the  policy.  Only  7%  of respondents  felt  it  was 
unimportant, but a significant 25% gave a neutral response.  Of the remaining 
68% of the  sample,  36% of these felt  this  was  a key  issue for  regeneration 
policy.  Perhaps surprisingly, given that the study is based on perceptions of 
the  business  community,  13%  of the  sample  thought  start-up  and  other 
business support in disadvantaged areas was an unimportant element in policy. 
12% were neutral on its relevance.  75% of the sample felt it was important, 
with 49% of  these, 35% of  the total sample, arguing it was very important. 
The  same  proportion  as  felt  start  ups  were  unimportant,  13%,  felt  that 
providing premises to encourage relocation to disadvantaged areas was not an 
important issue.  Almost one  quarter had a neutral  opinion on this.  Of the 
remaining two thirds who thought it was an important issue, only one quarter 
felt it was very important for the regeneration of disadvantaged areas.  On the 
issue  of improving roads  and  other transport access  to  disadvantaged  areas, 
12% thought it was unimportant and almost one quarter (23%)  were neutral. 135 
63% felt it was important or very important, with 39% of this group arguing 
these access issues were very important. 
30% of  the sample were either neutral or felt support for successful businesses 
was  an  important  element  of policy.  39%  of this  group  felt  it  to  be 
unimportant.  Of the remaining 70% who felt it was important, 39% argued it 
was a key issue. Views on the need to  target investment at already successful 
areas of the city to  maintain momentum were less positive than the case for 
business support.  13% of  the sample felt it was unimportant, with 22% taking 
a neutral position.  40% and 22% of all respondents respectively took the view 
that this was an important or very important policy concern, with 35% viewing 
it as critical. 
On the issue of helping  employees  to  develop  their skills,  22%  of the  total 
sample argued that this was not an appropriate target for regeneration policy, 
with a further 22% positing a neutral response.  Of  the remaining 57% who felt 
it was an important or very important issue,  38% felt  it was very important, 
representing  22%  of  the  total  sample.  Developing  and  improving  the 
environment of the central area of the city was felt to be very unimportant by 
3% of respondents and unimportant by 8%.  23% were neutral.  Of the 65% 
who felt it to  be important, 39% argued it was  a very important element of 
regeneration policy. 
22% of the total sample indicated that, in their opinion, working at improving 
the transport and communications infrastructure of the city centre was not an 136 
important policy priority.  20% were neutral on this issue.  Of the  57% who 
thought it was  an important policy,  53%  indicated  it  was  a very  important 
priority. On the issue of improving health to achieve the ends of regeneration 
policy,  very  few  of the  sample,  7%,  thought  it  was  unimportant  or  very 
unimportant.  28% were neutral as to health policy's relevance to regeneration, 
while  of those  who  thought  it  was  important,  31 %  thought  it  was  a  high 
priority. The final element of  policy on which respondents were asked to give a 
view was 'improving educational standards'.  On this, only one respondent felt 
it was not important and 10% were neutral.  Thus, 88% of the sample thought 
education was an important element of regeneration strategy.  42% of these, 
37% of  the total sample, felt it was very important. Figure 5.14: Perspectives on the Importance of Policies 
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(iv)  Most Important Element of Policy 
As  the  discussion  of Figure  5.14  illustrated,  a  significant  majority  felt  to 
greater or lesser degrees that each of the policies advanced as  components of 
the urban regeneration policy matrix were important.  Figure 5.15 ranks these 
policies  in  order  of importance  according  to  respondents'  answers  to  their 
views  on  the  most  important  factor  to  be  addressed.  Education  (20%  of 
respondents) was regarded as  the most important policy, closely followed by 
assisting start ups and other business development in disadvantaged areas, with 
18% of respondents viewing this as key to regeneration.  The same proportion 
viewed social housing in the same way.  On each of  the remaining options, less 
than five respondents viewed these as the most important element of policy to 
be tackled.  On two options, developing local services in, and improving road 
and transport access  to,  disadvantaged areas,  no  respondents  felt  these  were 
critical factors to be addressed in policy. Figure 5.15: Perspectives On The Most Important Aspect of Policy 
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(v)  Summary 
Most of the  respondents  argued  that  urban  regeneration  policy  had  social, 
economic, and physical/environmental aspects and that these were interlinked. 
This  suggests  support  for  the  co-ordinated  approach  currently  being  taken. 
However,  almost three  quarters  of the  sample  did  not  know if policy  was 
achievable,  suggesting a lack of awareness of the goals of policy - agencies 
may not be getting the message across.  In terms of the relative importance of 
policy, there was broad support across the sample for the options offered, with 
policies  focused  on  support  for  disadvantaged  areas  gaining  the  strongest 
positive  response.  When  asked  what  the  most  important  policies  were, 
respondents focused on education, housing and business support issues. 
6  PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE 
REGENERATION PROCESS 
(i)  Can  the  private  sector  make  a  positive  contribution  to  the 
regeneration process? 
A significant majority, 78%, of respondents felt that the private sector could 
make a distinctive contribution to the regeneration process (Figure 5.16)  The 
most common reasons that were given were in the main concerned with the 
commercial expertise that individuals and/or private companies could bring to 
the regeneration process.  Practical expertise,  such as  accountancy,  financial 
and project management could be contributed.  Several respondents felt that 
business  community  involvement  would  bring  realism  to  the  regeneration 
process in terms of being more attuned to  the demands of the labour market 141 
and wider economy.  The  public  sector has  the  social  policy expertise:  the 
private sector could feed in know-how to the economic aspects of  policy. 
There was an acknowledgement that there is a need for partnership between the 
public and private sectors.  Most respondents who mentioned this argued that 
the public sector had to  take a lead.  Companies had to  concentrate on their 
core business.  Anything they could do to assist the regeneration process had to 
be  secondary to  this.  Another positive input the private  sector could make 
which was  mentioned  by  a number of respondents  was  the  resource  issue: 
financial partnership between the public and private sectors would allow tight 
resources to  be  spread further,  allowing both a wider range of project to  be 
progressed and the risks to be spread. The other area that was highlighted was 
the  contribution the  private  sector  could  make  through their  core  economic 
activities.  It was  argued  that the  private  sector  is  the  source  of economic 
growth.  Investment  and  employment  would  form  the  basis  of sustained 
regeneration in disadvantaged areas. 
The principal reasons given by those respondents who argued that the private 
sector could not make a distinctive contribution was that it was not their role. 
There was no discernible short term economic return.  Also, there was a feeling 
that  it was  the  public  sector's problem.  Linked  to  this,  some  respondents 
argued that the business community did not have the expertise to  contribute 
usefully: their mind set was opportunity, not problem, driven. 80 
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Figure 5.16: Potential of the Private Sector to Make A Distinctive Contribution to 
the Regeneration Process 
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A series of  chi-square tests were carried out to assess whether a company's size 
in terms of employee numbers, age, sector, location of  ownership and length of 
residence in the city had any effect on the views of  respondents on the potential 
of the  private  sector to  make  a  distinctive  contribution to  the  regeneration 
process. No statistically significant results were obtained, with 'p' values on 
the chi square tests ranging from 0.3  to  1.5.  Logistic regression revealed that 
none of the background variables were significant predictors of response. Full 
results of  the statistical analysis are reported in Appendix 6. 
(ii) Is Private Sector Involvement Necessary for Successful Regeneration? 
Figure 5.17 shows that a slightly smaller proportion of respondents, 70%, felt 
that private sector involvement was a prerequisite of successful regeneration 
than thought the private sector could make a distinctive contribution.  Taking 
the findings  of Figure 5.16  and  5.17  together,  70%  of those who  thought a 143 
distinctive  contribution could be  made  by  the  private  sector thought  it  was 
necessary  for  success.  A  similar proportion,  69%,  of those  who  thought a 
distinctive  contribution  could  not  be  made  thought  it  was  necessary  for 
success.  Similar reasons to these given in response whether or not the private 
sector could make a distinctive contribution were advanced by respondents to 
the issue of  the necessity of  involvement, namely that: the private sector brings 
commercial acumen and pragmatism to  the process;  the private sector is the 
key to economic growth; public-private partnership is necessary both for policy 
relevance and to maximise resources committed to the regeneration process. 
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Figure 5.17: Perspectives on the Necessity of Private Sector Involvement for 
Successful Regeneration 
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As with the data presented in Figure 5.16,  chi-square significance tests were 
carried out on the data.  The findings were, again, that most of the contextual 
variables  seemed  to  have  little  effect  in  terms  of producing  statistically 144 
significant differences.  However, one test, looking at the relationship between 
location of ownership and response to this question, gave a 'p' value of 0.02, 
suggesting a significant difference between the responses of those companies 
owned in Glasgow and those owned outwith the city (Figure 5.18).  Logistic 
regression  analysis  revealed  that  none  of the  independent  variables  were 
significant predictors of  response. Full results are reported in Appendix 6. 
Figure 5.18: Chi square test results for response to question: 'Do you feel that private 
sector participation is a necessary prerequisite of successful urban regeneration  7' 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Necessary (%)  68.4  70.0  n=59, p=0.02, df=l 
Not necessary (%)  31.6  30.0 
Notes: n= number a/respondents, p= Pearson ChI square value, d/= degrees a/freedom. 
(iii) Levels of  Involvement in the Regeneration Process 
Figure  5.19  shows  that  the  great  majority,  78%  of respondents,  were  not 
involved  in  the  urban  regeneration  process  in  any  way.  Looking  at  this 
important finding in conjunction with those reported in Figures 5.12 and 5.15: 
•  of  the  47  that  said  the  private  sector  can  bring  a  distinctive 
contribution, only 21 % were involved in any way. 
CD  of  the 13 that said private sector involvement doesn 'f bring a distinctive 
contribution, only 3 were involved in any way. 
..  of the 42 that said private sector participation is necessary for success, 
11 were involved in any way. 
•  of the  18  that  said  private  sector  involvement  IS  not necessary  for 
success, only 2 were involved in any way. Figure 5.19: Levels of Involvement in the Urban Regeneration Process 
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When  the  contextual  variables  were  assessed  for  statistical  significance  in 
terms of causing variation in response, no  significant differences were found, 
again  suggesting  a  consistency  of response  across  the  sample:  on the  chi-
square test 'p' values ranged from 0.28  to  1.18.  Logistic regression analysis 
revealed  no  significant  results.  Full  results  of the  statistical  analysis  are 
reported in Appendix 6. 
Although the intention of the survey was to  look at the attitudes and opinions 
of companies not involved in the regeneration process, the random nature of 
the  sample meant it was  likely that  some  companies who  were  involved in 
regeneration  would  be  identified  (Figure  5.20).  Of the  small  number  of 
respondents that were involved in any way,  property investment dominated. 
The  next  most  important  form  of involvement  was  board  membership  of regeneration  organisations,  with  31 %  participating  by  this  means. 
companies were involved through the mechanisms of  either: 
It  business support group membership 
II  sponsorship or association with regeneration activities 
II  employing trainees from disadvantaged areas. 
Finally, one respondent noted participation through secondment of  staff. 
Figure 5.20: Methods of  Involvement in the Regeneration Process 
Targeted purchase of  goods 
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for jobs 
Secondment of staff to a 
regeneration organisation 
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Property investment 
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Note:  Some respondents had more than one form of involvement. 
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Figure  5.21  lists  the  reasons  gIven  by  the  47  respondents  who  were  not 
involved in any way in the urban regeneration process.  It is important to note 147 
that more than one response was often given, thus there were  108  responses 
from the 47 companies consulted.  By far the largest response given was that 
company had never been asked to  become involved (35  responses).  The next 
biggest reason advanced was  that there would be  no  financial  benefit to  the 
company from  involvement:  23  people  gave  this  response.  16  respondents 
argued that it was not the place of the private sector to  be  involved, while 9 
were  not  interested  in  the  regeneration  process.  A  small  number  of 
respondents felt their views would not be taken account of. 
Figure 5.21: Reasons Given for Lack of Involvement in the Regeneration Process 
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Note:  A number of  respondents gave more than one response: 108 in total were received. 148 
A  slightly  different  picture  emerged  when  compames  were  asked  the  most 
important reasons  for  their lack of involvement  in the  regeneration  process 
(Figure 5.22).  36.2% of  respondents felt there would be no financial benefit to 
the company.  This response was given almost twice as often as the next most 
common reasons given, namely, that the company had never been asked and it 
was not felt appropriate that the private sector should be involved (19% each). 
Figure 5.22: Most Important Reason for Lack of Involvement in the 
Urban Regeneration Process - uninvolved companies 
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to 
The com pany is  not interested 
The company would gain little 
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Note:  A number of  respondents gave more than one response. 
(iv) Options for Stimulating Increased Involvement 
Figure 5.23 shows that, on the options suggested which could lead to increased 
involvement, there were  significant barriers to  raising participation levels in 
the companies consulted. It is important to note that respondents were asked to 
give responses they felt reflected the private sector, rather than their company. 
48%  felt  that  a  request  for  involvement  was  either  unimportant  or  very 
unimportant.  22%  were  neutral;  only  31 %  felt  that  being  asked  for 149 
involvement would be important or very important.  Of  these, 28% rated this as 
a very important factor in stimulating involvement. 
Similar proportions  argued  that  more  involvement  could  be  forthcoming  if 
finances  and staff time could be  spared.  47% felt this was not an important 
issue;  7%  felt  it to  be very  unimportant.  25% viewed this  issue as  neither 
important nor unimportant.  Of the 21 % who  felt  it was  an important issue, 
only 18% of these rated it as very important.  A more positive picture emerged 
when responding companies were asked if  more publicity could stimulate more 
involvement: 30% thought this was unimportant and 27% were neutral.  42% 
felt it was either important or very important; 40% of  this group viewed it is as 
very  important.  A  largely  similar  pattern  emerged  in  response  to  the 
secondment  question,  the  mam  difference  being  that  a  smaller  proportion, 
15%, rated a need for secondment as very important. A maj ority of respondents 
(58%) felt that the company having a positive influence on the process was not 
an important issue.  Of  the 25% who thought it was important, only 27% felt it 
could be very important in raising levels of  private sector involvement. Figure 5.23: Possible Ways to Increase Private Sector Involvement above Current 
Levels 
If it was felt the company would I-------or-J 
have a positive influence 
If there was a need to develop 1------------,..-----1 
staff through secondment 
If more positive publicity was 1------------,..--1 
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A  senes  of chi-square  tests  were  carried  out to  assess  the  influence  of the 
contextual  variables  (employment  SIze,  sector,  location  of ownership  and 
length of residence)  on the responses to  these statements. Recoded variables 
were used to obtain valid chi square tests as tests on the original breakdown of 
response were invalidated by the small size of the sample. On all five options, 
no  statistically  significant  difference  was  observed.  Logistic  regression 
analysis revealed one significant predictor of response on the 20 tests run. The 
employment size test found a significant result with a value of 0.01, suggesting 151 
that  size  of company  was  a  significant  predictor  of response,  with  larger 
companies more likely to give a positive response to the question of companies 
having  a positive  influence  on the  regeneration process  making  them more 
likely to be involved (Figure 5.24).  Full results are reported in Appendix 6. 
Figure 5.24: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if it was felt the company would have a positive influence' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.68  0.72  0.35 
Employment Size  -2.19  0.87  0.01 
Location of  -0.12  0.18  0.54 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.19  0.73  0.80 
Constant  0.82  1.68  0.63 
(v) Options for Stimulating Increased Investment 
As the  discussion of the findings  on possible ways to  increase involvement 
above  current  levels  showed,  there  are  major  barriers  in  the  view  of the 
respondents.  A  similar pattern  emerges  on  analysis  of Figure  5.25,  which 
looks at possible ways to  increase private sector investment.  As with Figure 
5.23, respondents were asked to give what they saw as a private sector, rather 
than  a  company  perspective.  While  the  proportions  of those  who  felt  the 
options were important or unimportant remained broadly similar, the strength 152 
of feeling  that they were  very unimportant was  greater.  In the  first  option, 
provision of  financial incentives for property development, 18% of  respondents 
felt this was very unimportant in terms of increasing private sector investment. 
Overall, 47% felt this was unimportant with 18% neutral.  35% thought it was 
an important factor which could increase investment, but only 14% felt it to be 
very  important.  The  response  to  the  proposition that provision  of financial 
relocation incentives could bring more investment was less negative than the 
above.  38% of respondents felt this was unimportant: within this, 26% felt it 
was  very unimportant.  Of the  38%  who  felt  it  was  an  important issue  In 
increasing investment, 26% of  these felt it was very important. 
37%  of respondents  argued  that  provIsIOn  of secure  premIses  with  good 
infrastructure in disadvantaged areas was not an important issue for increasing 
investment:  32%  felt  it  was  very  unimportant.  Only  30%  felt  it  was  an 
important issue.  Of these, only 6% of these thought it was very important.  A 
majority of respondents, 52%, viewed the provision of financial incentives for 
trainees as unimportant.  32% of  these felt it was very unimportant.  Only 20% 
argued this could be important in increasing private sector investment through 
the  labour market:  within this  group,  only  one  respondent  felt  it  was  very 
important.  The  final  option,  increased  quality  of potential  trainees  and/or 
employees to recruit produced a similar pattern to the above.  49% felt it was 
unimportant  and  32%  of these  argued  it was  a  very  unimportant  factor  in 
potentially  increasing  private  sector  investment.  Again,  20%  felt  it  was 
potentially important but no respondents felt it was very important. Figure 5.25: Possible Ways to Increase Private Sector Investment above Current 
Levels 
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Chi square analysis revealed no  statistically significant results, while logistic 
regression  analysis  revealed  three  significant  predictors  of response.  The 
ownership variable on the question of provision of premises in disadvantaged 
areas  revealed that Glasgow owned companies were more  likely to  respond 
positively.  On  provision  of financial  incentives  to  recruit  trainees  service 
companies were more likely respond positively.  The sector variable was again 
a significant predictor on the issue of quality of  trainees to recruit, with service 154 
companies again more likely to respond positively (Figures 5.26 to 5.28).  Full 
results are reported in Appendix 6. 
Figure  5.26:  Results  of  Logistic  Regression  Analysis  of  Background  Variables  on 
Response to  Question:  'How might companies  become  involved/more  involved  in  the 
urban  regeneration  process? - if there were available,  secure premises  with  back up 
infrastructure' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  1.2  0.67  0.06 
Employment Size  -1.1  0.69  0.09 
Location of  0.46  0.21  0.03 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.17  0.69  0.08 
Constant  -3.1  l.78  0.08 155 
Figure  5.27:  Results  of  Logistic  Regression  Analysis  of  Background  Variables  on 
Response  to  Question:  'How might companies  become  involved/more  involved  in  the 
urban regeneration process? - if there were financial incentives to take on trainees from 
regeneration areas' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  1.90  0.88  0.02 
Employment Size  0.77  0.79  0.33 
Location of  0.54  0.29  0.06 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.56  0.76  0.94 
Constant  7.97  2.77  0.04 
Figure 5.28: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if quality trainees were available to recruit in regeneration 
areas' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  2.8  1.11  0.01 
Employment Size  -0.34  0.79  0.67 
Location of  0.09  0.21  0.68 
ownership 
Age of  Company  1.37  0.80  0.09 
Constant  -8.03  2.79  0.04 156 
(vi)  Summary 
In summary, a large majority of respondents felt the private sector could make 
a  distinctive  contribution to  the  regeneration  process,  with the  main  inputs 
quoted  as  commercial  acumen,  assisting  the  market  relevance  of policy, 
financial  contributions  and  contributing  to  economic  growth  through  core 
business activities.  Given the size of the majority answering positively, it is 
unsurprising that although some variations within the sample were observed, 
the  chi  square  and  logistic  regressIOn  analysis  produced  no  statistically 
significant results. 
On the issue of whether private sector involvement was necessary for success, 
a large majority of the  sample agreed,  again citing commercial abilities,  the 
role  of the  private  sector  as  wealth  creator  and  the  need  for  a  partnership 
approach  to  ensure  policy  relevance.  Statistical  analysis  revealed  one 
significant chi  square  result,  with  companies  owned  outside  Glasgow more 
likely  to  respond  positively.  However,  the  logistic  regression  analysis 
suggested this was not a good predictor of  response. 
Almost four fifths of the sample were not involved in the regeneration process 
in any way.  Those who were mainly involved through property investment, 
with  board  representation  a  distinct  second.  Reasons  given  for  lack  of 
involvement revealed that the main reason was that companies had never been 157 
asked to become involved. However, the most important reason given was that 
there was no financial incentive to participate. 
Analysis  of the  responses  to  options  for  increased  involvement  revealed  a 
fairly  consistent pattern of lack of support for  these  suggestions.  Statistical 
analysis  revealed  some  variations,  but  none  of  these  were  statistically 
significant  on  the  chi  square  tests.  However,  one  background  variable, 
employment size, did emerge as a statistically significant predictor of  response 
on the set of  logistic regression tests carried out. 
Analysis of  the options for increasing investment in the process revealed major 
barriers  to  increased  financial  commitment  to  regeneration  aims,  with 
responses  revealing  greater  opposition  to  investment  than  the  involvement 
options.  Chi square analysis revealed no  statistically significant variations in 
the data, suggesting homogeneity of  response.  Logistic regression analysis did 
reveal  three  significant predictors:  location of ownership  on the  question of 
provision of premises in disadvantaged areas, with Glasgow owned companies 
more  likely to  give  a positive response;  the  sector variable  on provision of 
financial incentives to recruit trainees, with service companies more likely to 
answer positively;  and  the  sector variable  again  on the  issue  of quality  of 
trainees  to  recruit,  with  service  companies  again  more  likely  to  respond 
positively. 158 
The overall picture this analysis presents is that the private sector respondents 
feel there is a need for business participation to ensure success, but that it is not 
the role of  their company to do this.  The options offered for increasing private 
sector involvement and investment received a largely negative response. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has analysed the findings of a survey of Glasgow companies on 
their  attitudes  to,  and  knowledge  of,  the  urban  regeneration  process.  The 
findings are important because they give an indication of the position held on 
these  issues  by  key  decision  makers  in  the  city  business  community,  as 
Glasgow's top 200 companies were targeted for the survey.  This concluding 
section draws together the findings analysed in previous sections. 
The first  section of the  survey  provided an  interesting picture of awareness 
levels in the business community of the agencies involved in delivering urban 
regeneration policy in Glasgow.  Virtually all respondents had heard of GDA 
and  GO,  but  30%  were  not  aware  of the  existence  of the  City  Council's 
Economic Regeneration Unit.  A mixed picture emerged in awareness of the 
local  initiatives.  Part of this is  possibly due to  the  difference  in age  of the 
various initiatives, but may also reflect differing emphasis given to publicising 
activities and also  the scale of activities undertaken by the initiatives.  Very 
few respondents had heard of the city's 'flagship' Regeneration Alliance.  This 
implies problems for the Alliance if it is to achieve its aim of creating a multi-159 
sectoral partnership to  progress regeneration.  Statistical analysis showed that 
significant variations  were  observed  on  chi  square  tests  of the  influence  of 
employment size on awareness of Castlemilk Economic Development Agency 
and  Govan  Initiative  and  location  of ownership  on  knowledge  of New 
Horizons.  Logistic regression analysis showed that the 'sector' variable was a 
significant predictor of response on awareness of  the City Council's Economic 
Regeneration  Unit  and  East  End  Partnership  Limited,  with  service  sector 
companies more aware, that younger companies could be expected to  be more 
aware of Glasgow Opportunities and larger companies to be more aware of  the 
Glasgow Regeneration Alliance. 
In terms of awareness of  what the agencies actually do, as might be expected, a 
lower proportion of  respondents than knew about the agencies knew what they 
did.  Over three quarters of the sample claimed knowledge of GDA activities, 
while a majority knew what GO  does.  However,  only a quarter of the  total 
sample  knew what the  City  Council's  regeneration  role  was  and  only  two 
respondents  were  aware  of the  role  of the  Regeneration Alliance.  Finally, 
awareness of the most important role of each of the agencies broadly matched 
their actual remit, suggesting that the small number who claimed knowledge of 
agency activities had a fairly clear idea of  what they did. 
A large majority of the sample felt that urban regeneration policy has social, 
economic  and  physical/environmental  elements.  Further,  a  very  similar 
number of respondents argued that these elements of policy were interlinked. 160 
This  suggests  that  the  concept  of the  complexity  of urban  regeneration  as 
expressed through the commitment of public agencies to a holistic approach to 
the resolution of  urban problems has widespread support. 
The survey results also indicate that there is a lack of awareness in the business 
community about the goals of urban regeneration policy.  70% of the sample 
did not know whether the aims of policy were achievable.  The main reason 
given by respondents was that they did not know what the aims of  policy were. 
One possible reason for this is that the commitment of agencies in recent years 
to  a  holistic  approach  to  regeneration  may  have  militated  against  clear 
articulation  of the  goals  of  policy.  Another possible  explanation  for  this 
finding is a lack of interest in the business community about current attempts 
to stimulate the regeneration of the city.  Other findings in the survey tend to 
support this line of  reasoning. 
Detailed  analysis  of the  business  community's  opmIOns  on  the  relative 
importance of policies commonly asserted to be part of a holistic regeneration 
process at both the small area and city level provides a number of interesting 
findings.  Perhaps the most important is the consistency of results across the 
range of policies.  All of them were regarded by a majority of respondents as 
important or very important.  Only the issues of 'providing housing for owner 
occupation in disadvantaged areas', 'helping those in work develop their skills' 
and  developing the  transport  and  communications  infrastructure  of the  city 161 
centre'  were felt  to  be  important or very important by  less than 60%  of the 
sample. 
Those  policies  which  have  formed  the  core  of attempts  to  stimulate  the 
regeneration of disadvantaged areas in recent years were felt to  be important 
elements of public policy.  There  were  significant majorities who  rated  the 
following important or very important: 
•  improving educational standards (88% of  all respondents). 
..  improving social housing (85%). 
It  assisting unemployed people to find jobs (85%). 
It  training unemployed people (80%). 
It  delivering start up  and  other business  support in disadvantaged areas 
(75%). 
It  improving health (65%). 
CD  improving transport access to disadvantaged areas (63%). 
It  providing quality premises to encourage relocation (63%). 
Ironically,  providing  housing  for  owner  occupation,  the  policy  which,  as 
Chapter 8 will illustrate, has stimulated the main private sector investment in 
the city's disadvantaged areas,  was rated the least important element of policy 
on average by respondents.  Those polices viewed as most important form the 
core of current local initiative support for the regeneration of disadvantaged 
areas of the city.  The business community's perspective, on the findings of 
this sample at least, seem to concur with the public sector view. 162 
Policies  which were  targeted  at  more  successful  areas  of the  city  economy 
received  less  widespread  support  than  those  geared  towards  improving  the 
performance  of  disadvantaged  areas.  Only  policies  aimed  at  assisting 
successful  companies  to  develop  and  grow  further  were  rated  as  either 
important or very important by more than two thirds of the sample, although 
more  than  50%  returns  were  gained  by  every  other  policy.  The  relative 
weightings of  support for these policies suggest that, for the respondents to this 
survey at least, that opportunity driven polices receive less support than those 
directly targeted at problem resolution.  Findings on the ratings  of the most 
important policy confirm this view. 
Another important finding was that three-quarters of the respondents felt that 
private sector participation could bring an  additional,  unique contribution to 
the regeneration process.  Responses focused around the commercial expertise 
and  problem  solving  skills  used  in  core  business  activities  and  also  the 
additional resources that could be generated through financial partnership.  The 
fact that policy could not succeed in a vacuum in a market economy was also 
highlighted.  Those who did not feel involvement would bring unique benefits 
argued it was not the role of  the private sector to become involved and, in any 
case, they would struggle to bring relevant skills.  Detailed statistical analysis 
illustrated the consistency of response in the sample to these issues, with chi 
square  tests  and  logistic  regression  analysis  revealing  no  statistically 
significant difference in response on the issue of  the potential distinctiveness of 163 
the  private  sector  contribution.  On  the  Issue  of whether  private  sector 
involvement  was  a  necessity  for  success,  statistical  analysis  revealed  one 
significant  difference  in  the  chi  square  tests,  but  the  regression  analysis 
suggested that background variables were not good predictors of  response. 
Perhaps the key finding  of the survey was that 78% of the total sample were 
not  involved  in  any  way  in  the  regeneration  process.  This  is  especially 
interesting  when  looked  at  in  conjunction  with  the  findings  above  that 
significant majorities regarded private sector participation as  bringing unique 
benefits and being key to  success.  It would appear that it is  felt the private 
sector should ideally be involved, but that, in the main, it was not the role of 
the  companies  the  respondents  represented.  Again,  contextual  variables 
analysed  by  chi  square  and  logistic  regression  analysis  did  not  appear  to 
influence the response. 
Looking  at  the  reasons  gIven  for  lack  of involvement  in  the  regeneration 
process provides further insights into the underlying thinking behind the above 
responses.  A  third  of respondents  had  never  been  asked  to  participate, 
suggesting that public agencies'  stated commitment to  seeking private sector 
participation could  be  more  vigorously  pursued,  as  the  sampled  companies 
were drawn from the key players in the city business community.  However, 
the most important reason given for not being involved was that there would be 
no  financial  benefit  to  the  company.  Agencies  attempting  to  increase 
participation thus have  a major barrier to overcome. 164 
The  difficulties  of  stimulating  further  private  sector  involvement  and 
investment above current levels were highlighted in the lack of enthusiasm for 
potential policies to increase participation.  Looking first at the possible ways 
to  increase  involvement,  none  of the  options  offered  to  respondents  were 
supported  by  a  majority,  i.e.  were  likely  to  lead to  increased  involvement. 
Almost half the sample felt that if  participation was requested, it would not be 
forthcoming,  while  a majority felt  that  even if time  and resources  could  be 
spared, involvement would not occur.  Positive publicity and staff development 
through  secondment  were  more  strongly  supported,  but  positive  responses 
were still in the minority: these final results suggest that if agencies appeal to 
companies'  self interest,  they may have  more  success.  Almost 60%  of the 
sample felt that even if the private sector were to have a positive influence on 
the regeneration process, this would not act as an inducement to become more 
involved.  Finally, on four of the five options, around a quarter of the sample 
expressed no opinion.  What these responses suggest is that, even if  there were 
positive reasons for companies to become involved, and there were no resource 
barriers, there would still be resistance to participation.  Analysis of possible 
differences on company background produced only one statistically significant 
result, with employment size acting as  a significant predictor of response on 
the issue of involvement bringing positive results, with larger companies more 
likely  to  become  involved  in  the  process  if this  were  the  case.  Overall, 
however, the statistical analysis suggested consistency across the sample. 165 
A  similar pattern to  the  above  emerged when respondents  were  questioned 
about possible ways to  stimulate increased investment.  None of the options 
received  majority  support.  The  responses  were  less  supportive  than of the 
involvement options, in that very few respondents regarded the options as very 
important issues in stimulating private sector regeneration investment.  These 
findings suggest that agencies seeking to increase the scale of investment face 
major barriers.  Of particular concern is the lack of support for the options of 
stimulating  investment  through  active  labour  market  policies.  Chi  square 
analysis  of  responses  revealed  no  statistically  significant  differences  in 
response. However,  regression analysis revealed some statistically significant 
variations,  with Glasgow owned companies likely to  be  more positive about 
investing if suitable premises were available in regeneration area, and service 
companies  more  likely  to  be  positive  about  recruiting  trainees  from 
disadvantaged  areas  if financial  incentives  were  available  and  also  about 
employing people from regeneration areas if  they were of suitable quality .. 
In conclusion,  the key findings of the survey were that, firstly,  awareness of 
the existence and activities of the city's regeneration agencies varies greatly. 
Respondents  supported the concept of holistic regeneration,  but there was  a 
lack  of understanding  as  to  the  achievability  of policy.  All  regeneration 
policies were viewed as  important to varying degrees and policies targeted at 
disadvantaged areas were viewed as  more important than opportunity driven 
policy.  Respondents  felt  that  the  private  sector  can  make  an  important 166 
additional contribution to  regeneration and that private sector participation is 
necessary for success.  Most of the sample were not involved in regeneration 
policy in  any  way  - although participation is  key  to  success,  it  is  someone 
else's job to  deliver  on  this.  There  is  resistance  to  policies  which  could 
increase both involvement and investment. Above aU,  what the findings of the 
survey  suggest is  that the  respondents  are  fairly  aware  of the  key  issues  in 
terms  of what needs  to  be  done,  but either are  not in  a position to  become 
involved or do not have the inclination to do so. The following chapters look at 
three areas of policy which have been the subject of much effort to  stimulate 
private sector participation, namely, involvement on the boards of  regeneration 
companies and attracting investment through the labour and housing markets. 167 
CHAPTER 6: 
IMPACTS OF ATTEMPTS TO STIMULATE PRIVATE 
SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN REGENERATION ORGANISATIONS 168 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of  this chapter is to analyse the impacts of private sector involvement 
through  the  mechanism  of  representation  on  the  boards  of  Glasgow 
regeneration agencies.  The  agencies investigated for  this study are  shown in 
Figure 6.1.  This chapter is based on a series of twenty background interviews 
with chief executives and other senior officers of the agencies relating to more 
general  aspects  of the  issue  of private  sector  involvement  in  the  urban 
regeneration process.  This was followed up by a further twenty-one interviews 
with  private  and  public  sector  directors  and  chief  executives  focused 
specifically on the impacts  of board representation.  In addition,  a range  of 
both published  material  and  unpublished  business  plans  of the  agenCIes  IS 
drawn on. 
Figure 6.1 - Agencies with private sector representation investigated in 
survey 
Coverage  Agency 
City wide agencies  Glasgow Development Agency (GDA) 
Glasgow Opportunities Enterprise Trust 
Local Initiatives  Glasgow North 
Gorbals Initiative 
Govan Initiative 
Greater Easterhouse Development Company 
Castlemilk Economic Development Agency 
East End Partnership 
Note 1:  one  local  initiative,  Drumchapel  Opportunities,  did not wish  to  take  part in  this 
survey. 
Note 2:  In addition to these agencies, consultations were carried out with Glasgow City 
Council, Strathclyde Regional Council, Scottish Enterprise National and Scottish 
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It is important to  note at the outset that all of the companies investigated for 
this survey are registered as  private companies.  The local initiatives and the 
enterprise trust also have charitable status.  However, they are almost entirely 
publicly funded.  In this study the local enterprise company (GDA) and the 
local initiatives are dealt with as  'arms - length' private companies, i.e., they 
are  independent  in  law  but  heavily  influenced  by  the  public  sector.  The 
enterprise trust is dealt with as a private company, but one which is dependent 
on the public sector funders through contractual relationships. 
The  chapter will  first  discuss  the  background,  rationales  for,  and  routes  to, 
involvement of non executive private sector directors.  This will be followed 
by  a  discussion  of  the  decision-making  structures  of  the  regeneration 
companies under investigation and the place of non-executive directors from 
the private sector within this.  The amount of time given by directors and the 
feasibility and desirability of more meetings within formal  structures is then 
assessed.  The  core  of the  chapter will  look  at  theoretical  perspectives  on 
strategic  development,  followed  by  an  analysis  of  the  private  sector 
contribution to  strategic issues in the agencies, based on fieldwork evidence. 
This is then compared with the theoretical perspectives.  An investigation into 
the private sector input into  management issues follows  this,  again based on 
fieldwork evidence.  Other impacts not covered by these broad headings are 
then  discussed  before  an  overall  assessment  of the  input  of private  sector 
directors  is  carried  out.  It should  be  noted that  due  to  the  need to  ensure 170 
confidentiality,  respondents  are  only  identified  by  the  organisation  they 
represent. 
2  THE  BACKGROUND  OF,  ROUTES  TO,  AND  RATIONALES 
FOR,  INVOLVEMENT  OF  PRIVATE  SECTOR 
REPRESENTATIVES 
(i)  Introduction 
This  section  investigates  how and  why  individuals  from  the  private  sector 
became involved on the boards of regeneration companies.  The rationale from 
a government perspective is briefly discussed.  The commercial backgrounds 
of serving directors are then discussed  This is followed by an analysis of the 
paths by which directors became involved, which leads into an investigation of 
why  they  became  involved  and  what  they  have  gained  from  it  from  the 
perspective  of both the  private  sector  representatives  themselves  and  chief 
executives. 
(ii)  Why involve the private sector? 
The underlying  rationale  for  encouraging  private  sector  involvement  in the 
process of  urban regeneration was explored in detail in Chapter 2.  Principally, 
it was  driven by  successive  Conservative  governments'  ideologically  based 
presumption that  the  business  community  was  well  placed  to  solve  urban 
problems  in partnership  with the public  sector.  Government acknowledged 
that intervention by the public sector was necessary,  but only where market 
failures were identified.  A subset of this agenda was to encourage a 'private' 171 
ethos  in  the  public  sector,  based  on  commercial  methods  of programme 
delivery, with an emphasis on efficiency and demonstrable value for  money. 
Glasgow's local  initiatives,  Local  Enterprise  Company  and Enterprise  Trust 
have  been  shaped  by  this  political  context.  Involvement  of non  executive 
directors from the private sector in these organisations is another aspect of  this 
process.  In addition to the impact of government direction, there is  a near -
consensus  (partially  shaped  by  this  government  encouragement)  amongst 
regeneration  professionals  that  successful  regeneration  must  be  holistic  and 
participative and that the private sector must playa role in this. 
(iii)  Backgrounds of private sector representatives 
Figure  6.2  shows  that  private  sector  representatives  on  the  boards  of the 
companies investigated tended to be male and middle aged.  Of  the 35 directors 
identified, only two were women and only one was under 40.  On average they 
had spent more than three years on the boards of the companies; the longest 
being six years (two directors), the shortest nine months.  It is difficult to read 
anything into this, since most of the companies had, at the time of the survey 
only been running  since  1990/91  or  after.  Only  two,  Govan  Initiative  and 
Glasgow Opportunities Enterprise Trust, predate 1991. 172 
Figure 6.2 - Private sector representatives - background details 
Number of  regeneration companies  8 
Number of  private sector directors  35 
A verage tenure  3 years 4 months 
Average age  52* 
Youngest  32* 
Oldest  67* 
Number of  males  33 (94%) 
Number of  females  2 (6%) 
Sources: Fzeldwork zntervzews,  Companzes House records. 
The companies which private sector directors come from are shown in Figure 
6.3, along with their core business where possible.  Where the information was 
available, the number of employees is shown to give an indication of  their size. 173 
Figure 6.3:  Private sector representatives - company backgrounds 
Company  Core business  Employees 
Whyte and Mackay  Whisky production  811 
United Distillers*  Whisky production  404 
Gray Dunn and Co.  Biscuit manufacture  480 
Matthew Algie and Co.  Tea and coffee merchants  74 
Marks and Spencer  Retailing  n/a 
Cruden Estates Ltd  Housing Construction  40 
Wimpey Homes  Housing Construction  nla 
Crouch Hogg Waterman  Consulting Civil Engineers  143 
Thorburn Holdings  Structural/civil engineering  453 
Young and Gault  Architects  9 
Scotlander PIc  Software development  n/a 
IBM UK Ltd  Sotware consultancy/servicing  90 
Scottish Mutual  Insurance/Assurance  504 
National Savings(l)  Banking  2680 
Trustee Savings Bank  Banking  n/a 
Hardie Caldwell  Accountants  33 
Neptune Fabrication  Steel Fabrication  13 
Walker Precision Engineers  Electronic/electrical  55 
engineering 
Howarth Switchgear  Switchgear manufacture  24 
Skylight International  Roof light manufacture  n/a 
Barrowfield Leather Co  Specialist  industrial  leather  20 
goods 
Pilkington Optronics  Defence contractors  708 
Hussmann Refrigeration Ltd  Display freezer manufacturers  450 
Soapworks Ltd  Soap manufacture  124 
Pointer Alarms Ltd  Alarm designlinstallation  85 
Borglas Laminated  Double glazing manufacturer  80 
Fry's Metals  Metal suppliers  nla 
Daily Record/Sunday Mail  Newspaper publisher  821 
Caledonian Publishing  Newspaper publisher  967 
Radio Clyde Ltd  Broadcasting  nla 
ScotBiC  Economic Development  n/a 
Semple Fraser  nla  n/a 
*Unzted Distillers have two representatives on different boards 
(i)  National Savings Bank is  a public sector organisation  but is  included because it  is  not 
directly involved in urban regeneration issues. 
Note: 32 companies are listed.  For two of  the 35 directors, no company information was 
listed.  See also note on United Distillers. 
Sources: Fieldwork evidence, Companies House records, Metropolitan Glasgow 1995, 174 
Of the  twenty-three  companIes  for  which  employment  figures  (as  a  proxy 
indicator of size) were available, the smallest, Young and Gault architects, had 
nine  employees,  while  the  largest,  National  Savings,  had  2680  employees. 
This gives an average size of 363  employees.  The majority of companies are 
mainly medium to  large:  three  companies  had less  than twenty employees, 
three had 20-50 employees, seven had 50 - 250 employees, five had 500-1  000 
employees  and  one  had  more  than  1  000.  In  terms  of the  sectors  they 
represent,  fifteen  are  manufacturers,  ranging  from  food  and  drink  to  heavy 
engineering.  Five  are  in  construction  - related  industries.  Four are  in  the 
financial services sector.  Three media companies, two software consultancies, 
a major retailer and an economic development organisation make up the rest. 
(iv)  Routes to involvement 
There were a number of routes identified to  becoming directors on the boards 
of regeneration  companies.  Taking  up  directorships  as  a  result  of being 
involved with the regeneration companies in other activities was mentioned by 
several private sector directors; "at the time I was  involved as the chairman of 
the Business Support Group.  I was seen as  the natural candidate to join the 
company  as  they  wanted  private  sector  representation  and  I  was  already 
involved  in  the  area"(Organisation  A):  taking  on the  chairmanship  of the 
regeneration company was seen as  a logical step.  Another was involved in a 
major  construction project within  a  local  initiative's jurisdiction:  "we were 
working in the area.  I think it was just a natural progression" (Organisation B). 175 
A director of  the enterprise trust had got involved initially with the company in 
sorting  out  its  accounts;  "we  were  involved  in producing  the  management 
accounts.  I was happy to get involved on the board when asked" (Organisation 
C).  One chairman of  a local initiative company, whose involvement in the area 
predated the company being set up, had initially got interested in regeneration 
through Scottish Business in the Community and had been disillusioned by this 
organisation's  lack  of hands-on  involvement.  A  like  minded  individual 
encouraged  him  to  attend  a  meeting  in  a  peripheral  estate;  "I  went to  the 
meeting,  it was  a  shambles,  no-one  was  controlling  the  chair,  no-one  was 
controlling the meeting.  It was a group of  people all with very good intent, but 
we weren't getting anywhere.  You get sucked in.  Before you know it you're 
sitting in the chair.  That was how it started.  Nothing magic about a feeling of 
the heart or  anything  else"  (Organisation D).  In the  case  of this  individual 
there was no conscious decision to become heavily involved; it developed from 
an initial interest, he  was frustrated by the lack of progress once involved so 
became more heavily involved using his skills as  a co-ordinator of meetings. 
Other  directors  became  involved  because  they  were  sought  out  by  chief 
executives of  regeneration companies once they were up and running or invited 
to  participate by the agencies involved in setting the  companies up.  These 
examples illustrate the ad hoc nature of  directors' paths to involvement. 176 
(v)  Rationales for Involvement 
(aJ  Social responsibility 
The  motive  of  'social  responsibility',  of  'putting  something  back'  was 
mentioned by a number of respondents; "the bottom line is that we're one of 
the biggest employers in the area so we might as well be involved in anything 
that's happening in the area in terms of regeneration; it'll be good for the area 
and it must be good for the company as well because the employees live in the 
area" (Organisation E).  Other directors stated similar reasons: "as a company 
we feel we want to be  involved and help as  much as  we can within the local 
community" (Organisation B);  "the company located in the area to  show its 
commitment; membership of  the board was an extension of  that" (Organisation 
D).  This cannot be viewed solely as an altruistic notion.  It helps the image of 
the companies concerned to be seen as 'good corporate citizens'.  One director 
of a  local  initiative  stated  "there's the  PR side;  it  lets  people  see  we  are 
committed  to  getting  involved  with  the  community.  That  is  a  benefit" 
(Organisation  B).  Directors  also  cited  a  personal  commitment  to  social 
responsibility as  a motive for  becoming involved;  in other words, they were 
not involved simply because their company encouraged such involvement but 
because  they  personally  wanted  to  be.  It  could  be  argued  that  such 
involvement when encouraged by an employer could assist them in their own 
advancement within the company, so their motives cannot be read as  entirely 
altruistic.  This obviously does not apply to those directors who ran their own 
companies.  Their motives tended to be those of social responsibility. 177 
(b)  Personal development 
Two  private  sector  directors  felt  that  involvement  as  directors  aided  their 
personal  development;  "I  like  the  chance  of having  the  opportunity  to  be 
involved  and  if it  increases  any  of my  personal  knowledge,  skills  and 
experience,  so  be  it"  (Organisation  D).  Another  felt  it  had  broadened  his 
experience and knowledge of the public sector: "it's been enlightening just to 
see what funds are available for funding activities in the local community.  It's 
also been enlightening to  see the enthusiasm that prevails from those who are 
involved"  (Organisation  B).  A  director  of a  local  initiative  with  a  heavy 
involvement  in  Scottish  Business  in  the  Community  acknowledged  that 
director involvement should be a two way process in his opinion: "one of the 
reasons for getting involved on these boards on a voluntary basis is not just to 
be 'putting something back' and all that good stuff, but I also believe that the 
directors should get something out of it...  in terms of personal development, 
broadening their experience  and  ability  to  handle  issues"  (Organisation D). 
These factors may have a positive benefit on career development. 
(c)  Patronage andfinancial gain 
A  director  of the  enterprise  trust  felt  that  there  were  three  reasons  why 
individuals  from  the  private  sector became  involved on the boards of these 
companies; "there are those who genuinely want to do their bit.  They're going 
to give their time and they're going to give it for free".  This motive relates to 
social responsibility.  He  continued; "you'll get those who  are  in it for what 
they can get out of  it, any contacts for their own business, and thirdly you'll get 178 
those who are in it for what they can get in the way of gongs and their CV s" 
(Organisation C).  This view was mirrored by a senior executive of the local 
enterprise  company  talking  in  general  about  the  reasons  people  from  the 
private sector become involved; "there is no  doubt some of them are  in there 
because  of this  patronage  system  we  have  in  Britain;  the  OBEs,  CBEs, 
knighthoods  and  there  is  no  doubt  some  people  are  in  it  for  that;  services 
rendered and they will be recognised.  That's the cynical view  ... the other view 
is that they genuinely want to contribute ... they've got to a certain level in their 
own business and  they  have  time  to  put a little  back in  and  I think whilst 
people  would say that (  i.e.  those  who  are  involved) ... there  is  also  enough 
substance to  believe in some cases that it is  true.  And then there's the third 
reason, they're in it for what they can get out of  it.  If  you're on the inside of  an 
organisation giving out money, then you can see what's happening ... they may 
think 'we may as well be on the inside', see what's for personal gain.  I'm not 
speaking about my own board here in relation to this at all" (Organisation F). 
A chief executive of  a local initiative noted that "some private sector members, 
by and  large  are  on the  board to  put it on their cv.  There's two  or three 
despite potential financial exposure and responsibilities under the Companies 
Act who just don't tum up" (Organisation G).  The same chief executive also 
noted that "I'm sure  they  (all  board members,  including the private sector 
representatives) do have the interests of the company at heart, but I'm inclined 
to  feel  that they have their own interests  at heart as  well"  (Organisation G). 
Such  is  the  sensitive  nature  of this  issue  that  no  concrete  examples  were 179 
advanced by any respondents so  it is  not possible to  further investigate these 
aspects of  involvement other than state that a number of  respondents suggested 
they  were  reasons  why  private  sector  representatives  become  involved  in 
regeneration companies. 
(vi)  Summary 
This  section  has  discussed  the  rationale  for  involving  the  private  sector  in 
urban regeneration from the perspective of both government and regeneration 
professionals.  It has  also  shown that in Glasgow,  those individuals who  do 
become  involved from  the  private  sector tend  to  be  male,  middle-aged and 
come  from  large  companies.  In the  main part of this  section,  a number of 
reasons were advanced by interviewees for becoming involved in the work of 
the regeneration companies investigated.  Some directorships were taken up as 
an  extension of involvement  in  other  areas  of the  regeneration  companies' 
activities.  Other directors simply became involved because they were invited 
by  the  companies  to  do  so.  There  are  two  inter-related  rationales  which 
underpin most of  the responses of  those consulted to varying degrees.  The first 
of these is the attitude of the employing company to  its relationship with the 
community  in  which  it  is  located,  i.e.,  'social  responsibility'.  The  second 
reason advanced was the personal attitudes of the directors to the work of the 
regeneration  companies,  i.e.  the  level  to  which  they  'bought  in'  to  their 
employers'  corporate  responsibility  policy.  Several  respondents  felt  that 
directors became involved as a means of personal development.  A number of 
respondents also noted that some may get involved for personal gain, both in 180 
terms of patronage and finance,  but due to the nature of the issue there is  no 
hard evidence. 
3  ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMPANIES AND THE 
ROLE  OF,  AND  TIME  GIVEN  BY,  NON-EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTORS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(i)  Internal structure 
This  section  firstly  describes  the  internal  organisational  structures  of the 
companies under investigation and the  role  of the non-executive  director in 
these structures.  It then investigates the amount of time given by the private 
sector representatives to  the work of the regeneration companies investigated 
in terms both of the  number of board and  subcommittee meetings held and 
through informal contact.  This is followed by a discussion of  whether it would 
be  feasible  or  of benefit  to  the  companies  to  have  more  regular  formal 
involvement. 
Internally, the companies'  structures generally follow a common pattern.  In 
the local enterprise company, for  example, there is  a board of non-executive 
directors, the majority of  whom come from the private sector.  The role of the 
non-executive  director  is  discussed  in more  detail  in the  following  section. 
The chief executive reports to the board and is responsible for overseeing the 
operation of the company.  Beneath the chief executive is an executive team 
with responsibility  for  specific  areas  such  as  property  development,  human 
resources and so on.  In the enterprise trust there is a similar structure.  In the 181 
local  initiatives,  there  is  some  variation  depending  on the  remit  they  have. 
Some,  such as  the  East End Partnership,  have  a social  remit as  well as  one 
related  to  urban  economic  regeneration,  while  others  are  more  geared  to 
economic aspects of the regeneration process.  The basic internal structure of 
all the companies investigated, however, is  that of a non-executive board, an 
executive  team  led  by  the  chief executive,  with  delegated  project  teams 
working under the executive.  This is shown in Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4: Basic organisational structure of regeneration companies investigated 
BOARD 
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(ii)  The role of the non-executive director 
This section discusses the expected role of a non - executive director within the 
organisational  structure and policy context outlined above.  As  noted in the 
introduction and illustrated above, although the companies under investigation 182 
are legally private entities, they occupy the middle ground between the public 
and  private  sectors.  Thus  the  role  of a  non-executive  director  is  slightly 
different  in  these  companies  than  it  would  be  in  a  conventional  private 
company.  In  essence,  it  is  likely  to  be  more  circumscribed,  due  to  the 
influence  of public  sector  urban  regeneration  priorities  though  the  funding 
mechanisms.  This  discussion  is  based  on  Scottish Enterprise's  'Guide  for 
Board  Members'  (second  edition,  May  1995).  This  is  useful  because  it 
outlines  the  role  within  organisations  which  operate  under  public  sector 
constraints but are in law independent.  Although this is intended to apply only 
to  Local  Enterprise  Company  boards  the  general  principles  are  equally 
applicable to the local initiatives and enterprise trust. 
Within the  company,  the  role  of the  non  executive  director  is  to  act  as  an 
external advisor and scrutineer of company activities.  The intention is to bring 
an  'outsider's' viewpoint to  the  board,  while  making the  management more 
accountable  to  its  shareholders  (Houston  and  Lewis,  1992).  Without 
independent non executive directors the executives of the company would, in 
effect, be monitoring their own performance (Jenkins, 1992). 
In law the  board  is  the  company.  It has  the  final  approval  on  decisions. 
Executive and non executive directors have the same responsibilities.  The law 
does not recognise the distinction between the two (Jenkins, 1992).  The board 
is  expected to  provide leadership,  set the  direction of the  company, monitor 
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viewpoint to  the  table  and  act  as  an  ambassador for  the  company  (Scottish 
Enterprise, 1995).  The duties of  directors under Common Law are to act in the 
best interests of the company, not abuse the position of  trust (s)he is in and use 
his/her  skills  with reasonable  care  (Houston  and  Lewis,  1992).  Under  the 
Insolvency Act  1986,  directors  are required to  recognise  when the  company 
can no longer avoid insolvency and use the appropriate skills (s)he has to take 
action and protect the interests of creditors.  The  penalties for  not  so  doing 
include a possible requirement to  contribute to  the  settlement of outstanding 
debts and disqualification from directorships for two to fifteen years subject to 
negligence being proved (Houston, Lewis, 1992).  It is thus not a position to be 
taken lightly. 
To successfully fill the expected role, participation in strategic development is 
important:  "the  chairman  (and  board)  should  have  prime  responsibility  for 
strategic thinking" (Cadbury, 1992).  Within this the non executive director is 
expected to playa key role.  Detachment from day to day management should 
assist strategic thinking: "it is a prime contribution of  a non - executive director 
to help his executive directors think like directors rather than managers so that 
the company operates according to  a thought out policy" (Jenkins, 1992).  To 
do this, the non executive director should have some knowledge of  the subject: 
"one of  the key requirements for effectiveness in the role is for the candidate to 
understand what he  is  entering and to  have done his homework thoroughly" 
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(iii)  Time given by private sector representatives 
(a)  Average time 
The  amount of time  given  by  directors  to  the  companies  was  estimated by 
those interviewed to vary from half an hour to 28  hours a month on average. 
The others fell  within this range with a mean figure of around  12  and a half 
hours per month.  These should be taken as rough approximations rather than 
definitive figures, as the amount of time given will vary from month to month 
depending  on  the  stage  of the  business  planning  cycle  and  whether  the 
companies are involved in areas private sector representatives have expertise in 
and are asked to contribute.  The performance of the regeneration company is 
also  a factor.  If it is  in trouble there is likely to  be more involvement from 
active  private  sector  board  members.  This  discussion  does  not  take  into 
account the quality of  the time given by representatives.  This is analysed later 
in the chapter. 
(b)  Frequency and length of  board meetings 
There were some variations in the frequency and length of board meetings in 
the organisations consulted.  The Local Enterprise Company full board meets 
monthly  and  meetings  range  in  length  from  two  and  a  half to  four  hours, 
depending on the issues to  be discussed.  The enterprise trust meets quarterly 
and meetings last between forty-five minutes and one and a half hours. In one 
local  initiative  board  meetings  are  every  six  weeks.  Another  four  meet 
quarterly, while one meets every two months.  Meetings last in the range of 
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sector directors, the length of the meetings will vary according to  the issues 
being discussed. Also, the length of  the meetings does not illustrate the quality 
of  the board meetings or the level of input of  the private sector representatives. 
These are  dependent upon the ability of the executive team to  prepare board 
papers in advance, the willingness of  the representatives to read and understand 
them  and  the  ability  of whoever  is  chairing  the  meeting  to  control  it 
effectively.  It is also dependent upon the ability of the executive team to agree 
as much of the agenda as  is  possible with the various parties so  that motions 
can be agreed at the meeting with little need for the decisions to  be  approved 
requiring  detailed  discussion  when  the  full  board  meets,  although this  may 
occasionally be necessary. 
(c)  Are more regular meetings necessary? 
Virtually all the respondents felt there was no need to have more regular board 
meetings  than  there  were  at  the  time  of  the  study.  Private  sector 
representatives felt that the companies were running well and had confidence 
in the chief executives: "the reason you can feel relaxed is because you have a 
competent chief executive in charge.  Its as  simple as that" (Organisation B). 
Another director stated "the chief executive gives me confidence because he is 
a highly experienced and competent manager who can manage people and that 
is so often missing in these initiatives" (Organisation D).  The only reason that 
more  regular  meetings  would  be  necessary  or  bring  benefits  was  if the 
company was in financial trouble or if the board lost confidence in the ability 
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his/her delegated authority.  Otherwise it would simply be meeting for the sake 
of meeting  which  would  in  themselves  cause  operational  problems.  One 
director  noted  that  "with  more  meetings  you  get  more  bureaucracy" 
(Organisation  D).  This  view  was  backed  up  by  a  local  initiative  chief 
executive:  "what you don't want to  do  is  fall  into the local  authority trap of 
feeding cornrnittees  .. .if we could justify more regular meetings we would (but) 
there's normally something like fifteen to twenty items on our agenda and that 
takes  a  bit  of  feeding,  getting  papers  ready  for  that  kind  of  agenda" 
(Organisation H).  More meetings would lead to  more paperwork.  Another 
chief  executive  agreed;  "we'd  spend  our  time  writing  papers  for  the 
board  ... rather than doing the job" (Organisation A). 
Also, the nature of the development process is by nature long term, so there is 
little  value  in  reporting  weekly,  for  example,  on  the  progress  of training 
programmes, business start up  loans or construction projects as they will take 
time to  produce significant results.  Thus according to  a local initiative chief 
executive the "issue is  of meaningful reporting of information.  Quarterly is 
adequate" (Organisation D).  Another chief executive agreed; "a lot of  what we 
do  are year long projects, two years or more.  I don't see there would be any 
great benefit in reporting more frequently" (Organisation A). 
(d)  Are more regular meetingsfeasible? 
Closely linked to the above, there was a mixed response to the issue of  whether 
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motivated by the fact that private sector representatives serve as  directors of 
these companies on a part time, voluntary basis; "non executive directors have 
full  time jobs, so  full  board meetings are difficult to  convene" (Organisation 
G).  Inevitably, their duties to the regeneration companies take second place to 
the demands of their employer or company.  Most chief executives felt that it 
would be possible to  get enough directors together to form a quorum (i.e. the 
legally required number) to  take decisions if necessary, but that more regular 
full board meetings would cause attendance problems.  It presented a problem 
to  private  sector  representatives:  "I  just  couldn't  afford  any  more  time" 
(Organisation G);  "I don't think I would have the time.  The initiative don't 
pay my  wages"  (Organisation B),  while  another  stated:  "its  about  all  I  can 
afford in terms oftime  ... my mortgage is paid by my employer and we've got a 
lot of  work here" (Organisation D).  This suggests that while it may be possible 
to get enough directors present to hold a full board meeting more regularly that 
it would lead to  a diminished input from the private sector representatives if 
the requirements of  board representation placed heavier demands on their time. 
4  STRATEGY 
(i)  Introduction 
Non  executive  directors,  III theory,  are  expected  to  have  an  input  to  the 
strategies of the organisations which they  serve.  This  section discusses  the 
actual impact of private sector directors on the strategies of the  regeneration 
companies under investigation.  'Strategy'  is  first  defined and  differentiated 
from day to day management.  Various perspectives on how strategies develop 188 
are advanced.  It should be noted that it is important to take a detailed look at 
theoretical perspectives on strategic development for two reasons.  Firstly, this 
is intended to be a key contribution of the non-executive director.  Secondly, a 
theoretical  grounding  allows  a  deeper  analysis  of  the  decision-making 
dynamics of the  companies under investigation.  The level  of private sector 
input is assessed and the relevance of  the different perspectives is considered in 
the concluding part of  this section. 
(ii)  Defining 'strategy' 
To discuss 'strategy' meaningfully it is first necessary to define the term.  It is 
perhaps best to  view it as  a part of "planning the long term future ... strategic 
planning is the second part of corporate planning" (Argenti, J., 1980).  Strategy 
is  "concerned  with  the  long  term  direction  and  scope  of an  organisation" 
(Faulkner, D., Johnson, G.,  1992).  A strategy is the framework an organisation 
devises  to  attempt  to  reach  a  set  goal;  "the  policies  and  plans  which  a 
management chooses to realise the objectives it has set (or has been given) for 
its  organisation"  (Child,  1980).  According  to  Steele  (1992),  a  strategic 
decision  is  "rare  ... non-routine ... comparatively  novel...it  is  likely  to  set 
precedents for  future  decisions  .. .it  commits  substantial resources  .. .it  sets  off 
'waves' of lesser decisions and so  is  comparatively organisation-wide in its 
consequences" (Steele,  1992).  Therefore a strategy is a central aspect of any 
company's activities.  It seeks to  set the direction in which a company will 
move and outline the broad measures  needed to  achieve  these targets.  The 
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decisions take place within the company.  Strategy's key difference from "day 
to  day  management  is  that  it  is  concerned  with  issues  affecting  the 
fundamentals of  the business" (Faulkner and Johnson, 1992).  How a company 
is to be managed will form part of the strategy, but this is very different from 
every decision related to the operation of the company being viewed as  a part 
of  the strategy. 
(iii)  Perspectives on. strategy developmen.t 
Having defined what strategy is, it is necessary to consider how it is made at a 
conceptual level before how strategy is actually developed in the regeneration 
companies  is  considered  in  detail.  Strategy  development  is  an  extremely 
complex process.  There is a wide-ranging literature focusing on the impacts of 
specific  factors  such  as  the  impacts  of the  external  environment  on  an 
organisation,  the  level  of external  control,  the  balance  of power  within  an 
organisation, the decision being made, the 'product' involved and so on.  The 
literature can be broadly divided into, firstly,  'formal' approaches which view 
the  strategic  planning  process  as  an  objective  tool  which  allows  rational 
selection of the best strategy (for example, see Argenti, 1980).  This contrasts 
with the 'informal' or subjectivist view (for example, Mintzberg, 1994) which 
places  emphasis  on the  social,  cultural  and  political  aspects  of the  decision 
making  process.  It is  beyond the  scope  of this  study to  investigate  such a 
varied field of literature in detail.  Therefore this section follows a review of 
explanations of strategy formulation carried out by Bailey and Johnson (1992) 
in  which  'six perspectives  on  the  process  have  been  defined'  (Bailey  and 190 
Johnson,  1992), based on their own fieldwork research and  a review of the 
literature. 
(a)  Strategic planning 
The  first  perspective  identified  IS  the  'traditional'  strategic  planning 
perspective.  This  argues  that  the  development  of strategy  is  a  "distinctly 
intentional process involving a logical, rational, planned approach  ... through the 
application of appropriate  analytical  techniques,  the  'right'  decision  can  be 
taken" (Bailey and Johnson, 1992).  A leading advocate of such an approach is 
Argenti (1980) who summarises the process as follows "decisions are taken by 
exammmg  the  company's  strategic  situation  m  its  totality  .. .it  IS 
tackled  ... systematically through a through a checklist of factors  affecting the 
company strategically  and  at  the  end  of this  long  difficult  process  a  set  of 
strategic questions comes out.  These are then subjected to  a number of tests 
and evaluations, and if they pass they are  adopted and put into  action - and 
carefully monitored" (Argenti, 1980).  This provides a useful linear method of 
conceptualising the process of strategic development, by indicating a series of 
steps to be taken.  However, it does not take account of "the less  'objective' 
aspects of the organisation and their critical influence" (Bailey and Johnson, 
1992). 
(b)  Logical incrementalism 
A  second explanation is  based on  the  work of Lindblom (1959),  known as 
strategy-building  through  "successive  limited  comparisons"  (Bailey  and 191 
Johnson,  1992)  or  'logical  incrementalism'.  This  view  argues  that  logical 
rational planning as described above was unrealistic as it assumed the strategist 
was in a position to  know all  options and accurately forecast the  future.  In 
addition the 'rational' view takes no note of conflicting views and values in an 
organisation.  In the view of Lindblom and others who advance this approach 
"strategic  choice  takes  place  by  comparing  options  against  each  other  and 
considering which would give the best outcome and be possible to implement" 
(Bailey and Johnson, 1992).  This more fluid view of the process "does not see 
strategic management in terms of a neat, sequential model; rather the system is 
seen to be cyclical.  It encompasses feedback loops to previous phases where 
the  problem  or  solution  may  be  redefined  or  reformulated"  (Bailey  and 
Johnson,  1992).  This  pragmatic  approach  ensures  that  the  strategy  is 
continually refined and updated as circumstances change, rather than laid down 
as  'tablets  of stone'  at  the  beginning  of the  process.  It is  perhaps  best 
characterised as an 'adaptive' method of strategy formulation. 
(c)  Cultural perspectives 
A third perspective on strategy is the cultural perspective (Bailey and Johnson, 
1992).  This investigates the role that organisational culture plays in strategy 
formulation.  It is necessary to step back from the organisation first and look at 
the cultural context in which the organisation operates; the national culture and 
attitudes within an industry as  well  as  the  organisation's culture.  Managers 
will be influenced by these frames of  reference in their choice of  strategies.  An 
alternative way to  look at this 'cultural' input into strategic development is to 192 
look at it as an 'ideology' of management, where the culture of an organisation 
is affected by "the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared 
by organisations, that operate unconsciously and define in a basic  'taken for 
granted' fashion the organisation's view of itself and its environment" (Schein, 
1985).  This  is  known  as  the  'organisational  paradigm'  ;  this  is  likely  to 
contain within it "the beliefs which managers talk about in their day to  day 
lives .. jt is also likely it will contain assumptions which are rarely talked about, 
are not considered problematic and about which managers are unlikely to  be 
consciously explicit" (Bailey and Johnson, 1992).  Basically, an organisational 
paradigm  arises  from  a  set  of  beliefs,  based  on  managers'  (and  the 
organisations')  history  as  to  what  is  good  practice.  The  strategy  of the 
organisation will  reflect the  interplay of its  culture and the belief system of 
management. 
(d)  Visionary perspectives 
A  fourth  perspective  is  the  'visionary'  perspective.  This  is  a  more 
individualistic explanation of strategy formulation in that it develops from  a 
vision which is "initially and primarily associated with an individual" (Bailey 
and  Johnson,  1992).  This  vision may  originate  from  the  intuitive  problem 
solving  capacity of an  individual  or group.  It may  also  originate  from the 
ability  of an  individual  to  forecast  the  future  shape  of an  organisation. 
Managers may have 'gut feelings' about the future which translate into strategy 
based on their knowledge and experience.  This 'visionary' quality may arise 
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another context to  the new organisation to  which they have been appointed" 
(Bailey and Johnson,  1992).  in terms  of the  'cultural'  explanation outlined 
above,  the  new  executive  applies  their  'organisational  paradigm'  to  the 
organisation  which  may  operate  on  very  different  principles  and  this 
represents  a radical  departure;  "what was  normal  and  obvious  to  them was 
often seen as  new and visionary to the organisation they moved into" (Bailey 
and Johnson, 1992).  It is important to note that vision alone will not  lead to a 
strategy being adopted - it requires the support of the organisation to which it 
is applied if  it is to have success. 
(e)  Political perspectives 
A  fifth  view  on  how  strategy  is  formulated  is  the  'political'  perspective. 
Organisations  have  important  political  forces  operating  within  them  which 
influence the  direction an  organisation may take.  Different viewpoints  and 
varying levels of power within organisations lead to disagreements which are 
"likely to be resolved through processes of  bargaining, negotiation and perhaps 
edict;  with  the  result  that  goals  and  objectives,  strategic  issues  and  even 
strategies  are  derived from  this  political process  and not from  an  analytical 
neutral assessment and choice" (Bailey and Johnson, 1992). 
These  influences  are  both internal  and  external.  The  level  of influence  of 
'stakeholders': "any group or individual who  can affect or is  affected by the 
achievement of the organisation's objectives" (Freeman,  1984) in many cases 
is  "conditional upon the organisation's dependency upon these  groups  for  a 194 
resource  and the  potential  difficulty  of replacing  the  present  stakeholder as 
source of that resource"  (Bailey  and  Johnson,  1992).  A  key  factor  in this 
analysis  is  control  over  information.  Information  when  controlled  by  one 
group may lead to  "strategic decisions ... taken based on information distorted 
by the  preferences  of the  information providers  rather  than  on  information 
which is  politically neutral"  (Bailey and  Johnson,  1992).  It is  important to 
note  in  this  context  that  "general  management,  and  specifically  the  chief 
executive,  have  more  influence  on  average  than  any  single 
source  ... they  ... mostly  keep  the  balance  of power  internally  tilted  in  their 
favour" (Hickson et aI,  1986).  The basic point of  this view is that the strategic 
process  operates  in  a  political  environment  which  shapes  the  key  issues 
identified  and  the  methods  of addressing  them;  "strategy  will  finally  be 
adopted because it is  acceptable to both those interest groups influencing the 
decision-making process and those who must implement the strategy and not 
solely because it fulfils any objective criteria" (Bailey and Johnson, 1992) 
(f)  The natural selection perspective 
The  'natural  selection'  perspective  on  strategic  development  argues  that 
strategies are  largely determined by the  outside environment;  "factors in the 
environment  impinge  on the  organisation  in  such  a  way  as  to  select  and 
encourage the adoption of  organisational structures and activities which best fit 
that  environment  ... external  constraints  operate  to  prescribe  strategies  and 
sharply limit the role organisational members play in their selection" (Aldrich, 
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does  not mean there  is  no  strategic  change  within  organisations  unless  the 
environment changes; different methods of adapting to  this environment may 
be adopted and successful ones retained as strategy. 
(g)  The influence of  the  'decision-type' 
An alternative explanation is advanced by Hickson et al  (1986) who focus on 
the decision process itself.  They emphasise the 'complexity and politicality' of 
the factors surrounding decision-making.  Three types of decision process are 
identified.  They emphasise that "by no  means  does  every  case of decision-
making fall into one or other of  these modes, but they are the only pronounced 
pattern found"  (Hickson et aI,  1986).  This underlines the complexity of the 
interplay of factors associated with strategic decision making.  The Hickson et 
al  typology  divides  decision  processes  into  three  types  depending  on  the 
complexity and politicality of the issue.  The first is  'vortex-sporadic' which 
are 'both sufficiently complex in problems and political in interests to generate 
a vortex into which all are swept'.  These are "high risk situations (that) bring 
out the latent conflicts between interest groups" (Hickson et aI,  1986).  These 
are  fundamental  problems.  The  second mode  concerns  decisions  which are 
less  complex and  political;  "though they  are  unusual  and  strategic,  and  not 
routine,  are  comparatively  tractable ... they  can  be  handled  in  more  fluid 
fashion" (Hickson et ai, 1986).  This type of strategic decision is referred to as 
'tractable-fluid'; they are strategic issues of a lower order and controversy than 
the dealt with in a vortex-sporadic process.  The final type of decision process 
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political and can be handled in a routine, non-controversial manner.  Hickson 
et al also emphasise that there 'is no such thing as vortex-sporadic, tractable-
fluid  or familiar-constricted  organisations'.  The  key  point is  that  decision 
processes vary according to the type of decision to be made; "it is the nature of 
what  is  under  discussion  that  creates  greater  or  lesser  complexity  or 
politicality" (Hickson et aI,  1986). 
(h)  Summary 
This section has outlined a series of explanations of  the key factors in strategic 
development.  These  are  not  intended  to  be  models.  Rather  they  place 
emphasis on elements which are likely to be present in most organisations but 
are of more or less importance in different types of organisations at different 
times and in different contexts.  The following  section analyses the input of 
private sector representatives to strategic issues in the regeneration companies 
investigated  for  this  study.  This  is  followed  by  an  examination  of the 
relevance of  the perspectives identified in this section to the strategic aspects of 
these agencies' operation. 
(iii)  Fieldwork evidence 
(a)  Introduction 
This  section  takes  the  following  structure.  Firstly,  private  sector 
representatives' input into major strategic decisions is analysed, followed by a 
discussion  of their  input  within  the  strategic  framework.  This  leads  into 
analysis  of the  knowledge  levels  of private  sector  representatives  about 197 
strategic  Issues.  The  issue  of whether  or  not  there  is  a  private  sector 
perspective on urban regeneration  strategy  which  differs  from  that of other 
constituent  groups  is  then  investigated  before  the  empirical  findings  are 
analysed with reference to theoretical perspectives on strategic development. 
(b)  Input into major strategic decisions 
Major strategic decisions are heavily influenced by the priorities of  the funding 
agencIes.  This  view,  that  strategy  is  tied  to  the  funding  framework,  was 
subscribed  to  by  most  chief executives.  "I  generally  find  that  the  private 
sector,  when faced  with some  local  authority edict will  go  with it.  They'll 
agree that after all, these people are elected by the community and the council 
has  made  certain decisions,  so  who  are  we  to  say  we  don't agree  with it?" 
(Organisation D).  Another chief executive stated that, in relation to  strategic 
issues "at the end of  the day its what the funders want.  (The board) really have 
to take a lead from that.  Its recognised that who pays the piper calls the tune. 
(At incorporation)  it was made clear that the members of  the company would 
be the  funders.  The  community  and  business representatives  would not  be 
members, they would be co-opted, so  at the end of the day they (the funders) 
can do what they want.  That was non-negotiable ... you could argue that that's 
hardly  partnership,  but  I  think  its  just  an  accurate  reflection  of what  the 
position is"  (Organisation B).  Another  felt  that "at the  end of the  day  the 
views of the funders are paramount and the priorities they develop inevitably 
shape  the  sort  of things  we  can  and  cannot  do"  (Organisation  G).  This 
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private sector can't get you influence in local authority terms.  Only the elected 
members can,  so  you have to  keep  close to them  .. jt is  very, very,  important 
because we're publicly funded.  We  get nil income from  the  private sector" 
(Organisation H).  This  recognition that the  local  initiatives  are  tied  to  the 
priorities of the funding  agencies at higher levels means that the officers of 
these initiatives must work closely with the representatives of these agencies 
on their boards, whether they be councillors or officers, either on the board or 
more informally through regular contact.  From the perspective of most of the 
chief executives consulted, the impact of private sector representatives through 
the board membership mechanism on major strategic decisions is very limited. 
One chief executive felt that his private sector representatives did have some 
input  into  strategic  direction;  "The private  sector  as  board  members  do  sit 
down and contribute importantly to  strategic development" (Organisation E). 
The reason for  this difference in viewpoint may be that the overall  strategic 
framework  is  viewed  by  this  respondent  as  a  given  part  of the  operating 
environment and any influence any board member or executive officer could 
have would have to be within this.  This view can be justified by reference to 
the fact that the operating environment is the same for all the local initiatives, 
i.e.  none of them operate completely independently of the funding  agencies 
higher in the hierarchy.  Some local initiatives have  begun to move towards 
self  generation  of  income  to  reduce  this  dependence  through  property 
development.  However, this aspect of the local initiatives' development is still 
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agencIes.  The views of private sector representatives themselves on this issue, 
discussed below, confirms the view that  they do  not have a major influence 
over strategic direction.  The influence of private board members on strategy 
within this framework is discussed later in this section. 
Board members with a private sector background agreed that they had little 
influence over the major strategic direction of the local initiatives.  "We are 
kidding  ourselves  if we  think  that  we  can  really  be  involved  because  the 
strategy is made much higher up.  The strategy comes from Brussels and the 
Scottish Office" (Organisation B).  According to a former private sector board 
member "we never had much influence over strategy.  It is made higher up. 
The public sector funders drive it" (Organisation E).  Another board member 
stated  "in essence,  yes,  it  is  driven  by  the  funders.  If there  are  no  funds, 
legitimately you can't do  it"  (Organisation B).  A  local  initiative  chairman 
stated that  "the strategy is  dictated by  budget restrictions.  I have as  much 
influence within that as I could expect" (Organisation A).  Most private sector 
representatives  accepted  this  situation  since  the  local  agencies  are  publicly 
funded and must therefore follow the priorities of the public sector agencies 
higher in the hierarchy.  However,  one  chairman of a local initiative with a 
private  sector  background  felt  that this  lack  of input  into  strategy  was  one 
reason why there was in his opinion little interest from the business community 
in getting involved with the agency - "because of  the enforced agenda dictated 
by the  public  authorities,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  get  any  private  sector 
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(c)  Influence within the strategic framework 
Where private sector representatives are potentially able to  make an input to 
strategy, i.e.  within the constraints of the  strategic framework these agencies 
operate  in  at  both city  wide  and  local  level,  the  process  is  driven  by  the 
executive officers of the companies and the funding  agencies rather than the 
private representatives on the board.  In most cases, the executive team work 
up  a draft  business plan which is  presented to  the  board for  discussion and 
comment.  These  comments  are  noted  and  where  possible,  within  the 
constraints  of  the  funding  framework,  taken  into  account;  "if  a 
recommendation put forward by the industry representatives is such that it fits 
with the funding requirements, then it is listened to.  If  it can't be funded, then 
the answer is no" (Organisation B).  The impact  of  the private sector members 
within this  depends  on  the  attitude  of the  chief executive  and  the  funding 
agencies - "It (the  business plan)  is put up as a draft.  The actual fabric of the 
stuff isn't  changed  that  much,  but  it's tweaked  .. .I'n  never  allow  them  to 
influence it.  It tends to  be  me that does  it and it tends to  be public  sector 
driven, I've got to be honest" (Organisation H). 
The views of the chairman of this initiative confirmed that this was the case; 
"the public authorities still look upon it as a power thing: we pay the money 
therefore  we  have  the  power.  We're not  giving  money  to  you to  develop 
anything,  we'll always  have  the  last  word"  (Organisation  H).  Other  local 
initiatives  take  a  broader  approach,  "the way  in  which  we  develop  our 201 
strategy is inclusive.  We have an independent facilitator who works with small 
groups of eight at a time ... we have not only the board, but stakeholders such as 
the  GDA,  the  councils,  the  management  team  (involved) ... groups  of staff 
would  get  involved  in  that  as  well"  (Organisation  E).  The  other  local 
initiatives tend to fall  between these two extremes; " we  (the  executive team) 
do a lot of  the initial work, then the draft goes to the board  ... this year they (the 
board)  delegated three directors to  work with me to  finalise  it as they were 
happy  with  the  general  direction"  (Organisation  A).  The  private  sector 
chairman of another local initiative summarised the process well from a board 
perspective;  'the strategy was well debated and discussed when it was first put 
down.  Now the chief executive and his team have the responsibility to think 
about what is right for the area and the updating of the strategy" (Organisation 
D). 
In  the  city's  enterprise  trust,  the  board  had  little  or  no  input  to  strategy. 
According to one director, "the board, by and large, and I include myself, just 
sit there  like  a bunch of dummies  and that's it"  (Organisation C)  while the 
senior officer admitted "there have  been various  strategic  decisions  where I 
have just reported back (to  the  board)  afterwards;  such as  'should we  go  to 
Europe  for  funding?'  I  really  don't think  that  would  matter  to  the  board" 
(Organisation C).  In the local enterprise company, the executive team drives 
the  strategy within the  confines  of the  Scottish Enterprise  framework  while 
consulting with the board as  to  the general direction.  According to  a senior 202 
officer "our board as a whole would not get involved in the detail of strategic 
development" (Organisation F). 
(d)  Knowledge levels of  private sector representatives 
A further reason for  the  marginal  contribution of directors  from  the  private 
sector to  strategic issues is  for most of them, their limited knowledge of the 
way that the public sector generally,  and regeneration agencies in particular, 
operate.  This was acknowledged by most of the private sector directors and 
the chief executives  consulted.  A  Local  Enterprise  Company senior officer 
stated that "the private sector, as a generalisation because there are exceptions, 
have problems with strategy for an economic development organisation.  It is 
complex, it is multiproduct, it is  not driven by bottom line ... by its  nature its 
longer term than within a normal commercial company" (Organisation F).  A 
local initiative chief executive felt that the private sector had problems with 
political  realities;  "the  private  sector have  a lot  of difficulty  understanding, 
because they tend to look at problems in a cold commercial, light, which in an 
ideal world I'd like to  do  as  well, but its not an ideal world; there's a lot of 
political crap flying about that you have to take into account in an organisation 
like this" (Organisation A). 
From a private sector perspective, one director admitted that, in discussions on 
strategy, "I'm lost in there to be honest.  Every other person on the board is 
involved locally in the area, whereas I'm not.  In strategy terms, people from 
the  GDA,  the  city  council,  the  regional  council  know,  they're  drawing  the 203 
picture" (Organisation B).  A director from the same initiative felt that "we're 
not steeped in the  day to  day activity of the running of the initiative  as  the 
councillors  may  be,  the  GDA  or  representatives  from  local  government" 
(Organisation B).  Another director stated that" I don't know whether I would 
have the expertise to  give them enough direction, to  be honest" (Organisation 
E).  It should be  noted that the key point here is  not that the private sector 
representatives are prevented (in most cases) from having a say in discussions 
on strategic issues, but that they are not able, due to their different background, 
to contribute greatly because the agencies are driven by the spending priorities 
of the public sector.  Apart from  one,  all  chief executives were in favour of 
increased private sector input to strategy, but the key issue is  the quality and 
relevance  of that  input  - "where  our job involves  responding  to  the  needs 
among others ... of the private sector, then it seems to me only sensible that the 
private  sector  should  have  a  say  in  how that  energy  should  be  deployed" 
(Organisation E).  Some respondents identified a lack of willingness from the 
private sector to  get too  heavily involved in strategic discussions "what I'm 
looking for  them (the board) to be more involved in is to give me the strategic 
direction we  as  a company should be  going  in"  (Organisation D).  A board 
member of the same initiative from the private sector admitted this  was the 
case "we're certainly not excluded from having a say.  I think in common with 
many of these initiatives we actually don't drive it enough.  There's a reserve 
from the private sector.  They feel  somewhat out of their comfort zone when 
looking at strategic direction" (Organisation D).  This suggests that there is not 
enough strategic involvement from the private sector from the point of  view of 204 
these individuals in this initiative at least.  Other respondents also  identified 
this reticence; one chief executive stated that in preparing the company's first 
five  year strategy "I want to  have board involvement.  It remains to  be  seen 
how  much  they  want  to  have  and  whether  they  take  up  the  opportunity" 
(Organisation A).  This  seems to  stem from  a  lack of time  to  get involved 
which is a problem across all the (potential) inputs of the private sector board 
members.  Other  reasons  include  the  lack  of understanding  from  which 
reluctance  flows  and  also  satisfaction  with  the  direction  of the  companies 
concerned - "what they are pursuing at the moment I'm quite at ease with.  I 
think the activity they are involved in is what industry would be looking for' 
(Organisation B). A chairman of a local initiative felt that "what we ended up 
with was a sensible and realistic strategy for the company" (Organisation D). 
(e)  A  'private sector perspective '? 
One  final  aspect  of this  issue  which  requires  discussion  is  whether  or not 
private  sector  representatives  bring  a  different  perspective  to  strategy 
formulation, i.e. is there a 'private sector view' which differs from that of other 
parties in strategic discussions?  From the evidence of this study,  it appears 
that there are  significant variations.  It would be an oversimplification to say 
that there is a definitive 'private sector view'.  The individual characteristics of 
private sector representatives prevent that,  but there  is  a broad difference in 
perspective which can be identified.  Concerns with financial implications of 
projects  and  a  more  short  term  perspective  were  mentioned  by  both  chief 
executives and private sector representatives - "they're much more into short 205 
term, tangible projects that produce fairly immediate results, rather than longer 
term visionary projects" (Organisation H). 
The  chairman of the  same  initiative felt that long term  strategy formulation 
was of little value; "the strategy remains the same strategy it was twenty years 
ago.  From the private sector side, I've tried to say I want to measure the worth 
of the company.  Do something; give us a project that's shorter term that you 
can be measured on" (Organisation H).  Another local initiative chairman from 
the  private  sector  was  also  more  oriented  to  the  short  term,  based  on  his 
commercial background; "I have a time limit on most of my work.  I have to 
get something  delivered  within  a timescale  and  within  a  cost.  That  is  the 
private sector.  The public sector possibly have a cost which is more fudged 
than  the  private  sector...they  tend  to  have  a  slightly  longer  aspect" 
(Organisation  D).  This  concern  with  finance  was  mentioned  by  most 
respondents.  The following quotes further illustrate this "they tend to be less 
technical  in terms  of economic  development  ... they  would  tend  to  use  their 
particular expertise and that tends to be about stuff like 'is this going to pay'. 
They're just very practical about it" (Organisation E).  This view is mirrored 
by a private sector director, illustrating that the background of directors shapes 
their contribution; "its a different cultural bringing  .. .! am involved in budgets, 
overheads,  watching  the  money"  (Organisation  D).  From  the  evidence 
presented  above,  it can  be  seen  that  the  perspective  of the  private  sector 
representative does differ. 206 
(f)  Analysis 
Private sector representatives have a marginal effect on the strategies pursued 
by the  city's urban regeneration agencies  in which they are  involved.  The 
chief reason for this is that the major strategic priorities for agencies involved 
in working at the local level, or in the case of Glasgow Development Agency 
and Glasgow Opportunities at the city wide scale, must be adopted within the 
framework  laid  down  by  the  Scottish  Office  through  the  route  of either 
Scottish Enterprise National or the local authorities.  Strategy at the local or 
city wide scale must fit with these frameworks or they will not receive funding. 
This limits the original or innovative input that not only board representatives 
from the private sector and other backgrounds can have, but also the input of 
executive officers to  strategy.  This is  not to  say that strategy at all levels is 
determined by Scottish Office priorities, but it is the key formative influence to 
the urban regeneration strategies adopted in the city.  There is  local input to 
strategy, but it is chiefly a matter of emphasis on the different components of 
the framework which leads to variations.  Any input they do have must fit with 
the funding framework.  This, together with their lack of detailed knowledge, 
time and willingness to get involved constrains the level of  their contribution. 
Looking  at  these  findings  in the  context  of the  strategic  models  advanced 
earlier in this chapter, firstly it is  clear that, according to the prescriptions of 
the  rational planning model advanced by Argenti (1985),  strategy would be 
developed  in  the  process  discussed  above  following  a  realisation  of the 
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strategic question would be how to best bid for funds to maximise the impacts 
on  the  problems  specific  to  the  area  and  then  how  to  progress  funded 
programmes once this is  in place.  In theory there is nothing to  stop a local 
initiative  from  developing  a  strategy  which  is  a radical  departure  from  the 
priorities of funding agencies.  However, there would be little value in doing 
this because without funding it would not be realisable. 
The above is an over-rigid characterisation of  the process.  The public funding 
system is  more  flexible  than the  above  suggests.  Funding  agencies  have  a 
responsibility to spend their budgets.  If  they do not then their allocation in the 
next financial year is  likely to  be  cut as they have been unable to spend their 
full  allocation.  In Scotland,  unlike the  TEC  system in England and  Wales, 
surpluses  generated  through  underspending  are  still  taken  into  account  in 
spending assessments  for public agencies.  The  implication of this  is  that if 
there  is  an underspend projected halfway through the  year then budgets  for 
companies funded by these agencies may be increased.  Conversely, if there is 
an overspend, monies may disappear. 
The priorities for regeneration companies are likely to change over time as they 
progress their strategy and meet targets. Further, the key issues to be addressed 
in the local economy may change swiftly as  it is by definition a fluid system 
and thus difficult to forecast.  In other words, an 'adaptive' method of strategy 
formulation is necessary.  Feedbacks need to be incorporated into the strategic 
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'strategy' as  defined in this chapter becomes meaningless due to this rapidly 
changing  system.  Further,  given  the  dominance  of public  sector  spending 
cycles and strategic guidelines in local strategy, it is open to question what role 
the  private  sector  director  can  usefully  play  in  this  system  of strategic 
development. 
The cultural perspective on strategy development as applied to the regeneration 
companies  under  investigation  provides  an  interesting  insight.  The 
predominant culture which influences strategy is,  because of the  hierarchical 
strategic framework, still largely informed by a public sector mindset.  This is 
most evident in the monitoring and accountability mechanisms that are in place 
to ensure that expenditure is committed according to  the rules and regulations 
related to  acceptable practice.  These  are  critical  because  they  are  the  only 
mechanism to  ensure  propriety  as  they  are  not  directly  accountable  locally 
through any electoral system.  The attitudes of the chief executives are critical 
in this.  There was little evidence from this study and related research that they 
act  as  stereotypical public sector managers.  They could be  characterised as 
more innovative and commercially oriented than this.  Other related research 
discussed  later in this  chapter provides  evidence that non executive  private 
sector directors have aided chief executives to think more 'privately' where the 
chief executive  has  been willing  to  utilise  their  expertise.  Other than this 
indirect  influence  on  the  attitude  of executive  officers,  the  private  sector 
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largely formed by the agencies that set them up in line with government policy. 
As with strategy this is likely to be the key influencing factor. 
Further,  these  are  private  compames.  The  aim  of setting  them  up  was  to 
produce  a  more  innovative,  locally  based  approach  to  urban  regeneration. 
Looking  at  the  compames  from  this  perspective  gives  an  insight  into  the 
tensions inherent in the structures for  regeneration when the  stated aim is  to 
produce local solutions but control funding through strategic guidelines.  There 
is a further cross cutting tension in that these companies have to  conform to 
public sector regulations but are  also  expected to  act like a private company 
and conform to  company law.  At present, they are much closer to  the public 
than the private sectors. 
As  a  result  of the  limited  role  for  innovation  in  strategy  that  the  funding 
structure  imposes,  the  visionary  perspective  is  the  least  relevant  of the 
perspectives on strategic development discussed in this paper.  One aspect of it 
which is  of interest  is  the  idea of an  individual  importing  experience  from 
another organisation and being viewed as  an original thinker.  There is  little 
evidence that this has happened to any great degree in terms of strategy.  The 
private sector non executive director might be  expected to  have a  'visionary 
perspective'  in  strategic  thinking  due  to  their  different  organisational 
background.  There  is  some  evidence  that  this  different  perspective  exists, 
principally in a concern for costs and short term outputs, but it can be argued 
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to the dominance of external factors and their lack of knowledge of both how 
the public sector works and how the regeneration process is carried out. 
The  'political'  perspective  is  highly  relevant  to  the  strategic  development 
process as a whole in the regeneration companies.  The strategic framework is 
shaped by the political environment.  Government ideology is a key influence 
on the methods adopted to pursue the goal of regeneration and,  crucially, on 
the resources committed to  it.  Further, if the companies under investigation 
are viewed as part of the public sector regeneration structure, ranging from the 
Europeaninationallevel to the local level, then their influence in the bargaining 
structure which leads to the development of the overall strategic framework in 
which they  operate  is  limited.  They  are  on the  bottom rung  of the  power 
hierarchy.  This is why they have so little potential for innovation in strategy. 
Within  the strategic framework at local level there are  also  varying levels of 
power.  The  chief executives,  their teams,  and the  representatives  from  the 
funding agencies on the boards have control over the information that is passed 
to the board and thus in the decisions that are made.  Representatives from the 
funding agencies have additional power in that they are  often the individuals 
who  have  a  major  say  in  funding  allocations  decided  by  their  employing 
agency.  In  this  internal  hierarchy,  chairpersons  with  a  private  sector 
background  are  likely  to  be  well  informed but information will  be  largely 
channelled  through  the  chief executive.  Other  private  sector  directors  are 
likely to be even more dependent on the chief executive. 211 
Further, all private sector directors are disadvantaged as  stakeholders because 
they bring no  resources to  the company other than their expertise.  Thus  aU 
directors  who  are  not  employed  by  the  funding  agencies  (this  includes 
voluntary sector and community representatives as well as those with a private 
sector background) unless they are exceptionally aware of the issues involved 
or  politically  powerful  through  their  networks  are  likely  to  be  the  least 
influential stakeholders in any of the organisations and thus those whose views 
carry least weight.  The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that this is 
the case. 
Looking at the above processes in terms of  the  'natural selection perspective' , 
in the case of the LEC,  outside influences in the form of Scotland-wide, UK 
and  European  policy  priorities  set  the  strategic  framework.  For  the  local 
initiatives and the enterprise trust, the LEC and local authorities add a further 
layer in the hierarchy of strategic development.  The strategy adopted at the 
local  or  city  wide  scale  will  be  a  'best fit'  with the  external  environment. 
Viewed  from  this  perspective,  because  of the  greater  knowledge  of public 
sector officials and directors, directors with a private sector origin should have 
(and do have) little substantive input because it is not their area of  expertise. 
In terms  of Hickson et  aI's  (1986)  'decision type'  analysis  of the  strategic 
process,  it is  clear that from  the  evidence  presented in this  section that the 
'vortex-sporadic' decision type is rare in the regeneration companies.  Vortex-212 
sporadic decisions are only likely to come about in the case of incompetence in 
management leading to  a breakdown in communication with the board and a 
failure  to  deliver  programmes  according  to  the  agreed  strategy.  In  this 
situation everything, not just strategy, would be under review.  In Glasgow to 
date (1996), this has happened in three out of  the eight local companies and in 
each case the funding  agencies have taken a dominant lead role.  The most 
common decision type in the companies is the least complex and political of 
the Hickson typology; the 'familiar - constricted' decision.  This is because the 
strategy is  largely determined by factors  outwith the control of the company 
and they are unlikely to be changed by pressure from the local level. 
The  various  perspectives on strategic  development all  give  insights  into  the 
strategic  development  process  in  the  regeneration  companies.  There  are 
multiple influences on the process.  The most important conceptual tools are 
the  natural  selection perspective  and  the  political  perspectives.  Strategy  is 
largely influenced by outside factors  and decisions tend to be made by those 
with  the  most  influence  through  the  funding  structure.  As  strategy  is  so 
heavily  affected  by  external  factors,  decisions  at  the  local  level  tend to  be 
routine  and  non-controversial.  Private  sector  non  executive  directors  have 
little power to influence these decisions. 213 
5  COMPANY MANAGEMENT - PRIVATE SECTOR INPUT 
(i)  Introduction 
Company management is a second key area the board has influence on through 
approval of business plans of agencies.  This section investigates the impact 
board members from the private sector have on this.  There are a number of 
avenues through which private sector representatives have an input to  the day 
to  day  running  of the  companies.  These  are  both formally  structured  and 
informal.  The first and most obvious is the role of the board in approving the 
business  plan  of the  agencies  concerned.  Within  this  overall  framework, 
directors with a private sector background sit on subcommittees of the board 
which deal with specific aspects of  the companies' operation, such as financial 
management and personnel  issues.  The  third route  by  which private  sector 
directors have a say is in support for  key staff.  Finally, private sector directors 
have an input through informal contacts with officers of the company where 
their  expertise  is  sought  in  relation  to  specific  issues  they  may  have  a 
competence in.  Each of  these is analysed below to assess the level of influence 
private sector directors have over the day to day running of  companies. 
(ii)  Business plan approval 
The approval process for  the management policy aspects of the business plan 
follows a similar pattern to that identified in the discussion of the input of the 
private  sector directors  in the  previous  section.  Directors  from  the  private 
sector have an input, but the level of that input is constrained by the priorities 
of the public sector agencies who  set the companies up.  Private sector,  and 214 
other, directors must operate within the guidelines laid down by the funding 
agencies in order to ensure financial propriety.  This means, in effect, that the 
directors  have  an input  at  the  margins,  i.e.,  they  contribute  to  setting  up  a 
system which complies with these  demands.  The enterprise trust is  slightly 
different in that it was not originally set up by the public sector.  However, the 
programmes  it  delivers  are  overwhelmingly  funded  through  public  sector 
mechanisms, principally the local enterprise company, so  there is also a need 
for  it  to  follow  these  guidelines.  The  terms  of reference  and  operating 
guidelines for the local enterprise company were laid down at the inception of 
the  Scottish  Enterprise  network.  Therefore,  as  with  input  to  strategy,  the 
potential input of directors from  a private sector background to  management 
issues is necessarily limited by the operating environment. 
Once the operational management aspects of  the business plan are approved by 
the board, responsibility for the effective running of  the company rests with the 
chief executive, the views of  two local initiative chief executives confirm this: 
"run of the mill management and administration is  dealt with by myself and 
members of staff' (Organisation H); "my job is to make it happen.  They (the 
board) agree the resources.  It is up to me and my team to go and secure those 
necessary resources" (Organisation E). 
The boards of  these companies are unlikely to have a major hands on role if  the 
company is running well.  If problems arise, however, they can have a major 
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director played a major role in resolving the problems; "when the company hit 
problems last year, he of all board members was able to  bring the breadth of 
knowledge  necessary  to  carry  the  company  through.  When  the  occasion 
demanded, he really did pull the stops out" (Organisation G). 
(iii)  Subcommittees and other means of support for key staff 
Once the  business plan,  incorporating strategic  and  operational management 
issues  is  approved,  board  members,  including  those  with  a  private  sector 
background, play an overseeing role to  ensure,  in conjunction with the chief 
executive, that the company is  being effectively run within the constraints of 
approved  delegated authority.  The  main  structured way  this  happens  other 
than formal board meetings is through subcommittees of the full board which 
convene to deal with issues such as financial and personnel management.  Of 
the agencies consulted, five of  the six local initiatives have some form of  board 
subcommittee  on  which  private  sector  and  board  members  may  serve 
according  to  their  ability  to  make  a  contribution.  The  Local  Enterprise 
Company has an audit subcommittee with private sector representation.  The 
enterprise  trust  has  no  subcommittees,  reflecting  the  lack  of direct  board 
involvement by formal structured means in this organisation. 
In the  view of the chief executives consulted,  subcommittees are  a valuable 
means of  involving private sector directors; " they (the subcommittees) will do 
the  detailed  scrutiny  ... which  takes  the  pressure  off  full  board  meetings" 216 
(Organisation A).  The key reason for this was that it involved directors in the 
preparation of the agenda for full board meetings.  The board acts in the main 
as  a reporting body for the chief executive.  However,  board representatives 
also  contribute  to  this  agenda  setting,  making  an  input  to  this  reporting 
mechanism.  The  more  informal  atmosphere  of  these  subcommittees 
encouraged a greater input from  private  sector representatives; they act as  a 
forum "that gives all the board members an opportunity to  find out more on a 
far more informal basis about what the company is doing" (Organisation B). 
By definition, these subcommittees are  involved in detailed issues concerned 
with the running of the companies rather than regeneration issues as  such.  In 
most cases this is the area of  expertise of  the private sector.  These agencies are 
'arms-length' private companies;  they have to  comply with company law as 
well as the demands of  the public sector funders.  Chief executives felt that this 
aspect  of  the  operation  of  the  companies  was  where  private  sector 
representatives  could  bring  their  skills  to  bear  for  the  benefit  of  the 
organisation and also  assist them,  as  most of them come  from  public sector 
backgrounds  and  have  little  experience  of commercial  law.  One  chief 
executive  said of the  chairman:  "  we  use  his  skills  in that he's a chartered 
accountant  to  trade  and  therefore  he's  very  important  in  the  finance 
subcommittee and at the board in terms of being the director who understands 
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Another area in which private sector representatives have an input into the way 
these companies are run is in the appointment of in some cases, and continuing 
support for  in all  cases,  key  staff in the  organisation,  particularly the  chief 
executive both through personnel and finance subcommittees and, if  necessary, 
the full board.  This input is again constrained by the priorities of the funding 
agencies.  In the end, their views carry the most weight.  This  is  not to  say 
private  sector  directors  have  no  say,  however.  In  the  case  of the  local 
initiatives, the level of involvement that directors from the private sector have 
in this  process  depends  to  an  extent  on how  long  they  have  been  actively 
involved  in  regeneration  issues  in  the  areas  of the  city  in  which  these 
companies now operate.  Those whose involvement either predated this form 
of regeneration company or were involved in the setting up of the companies 
had an input to  initial appointments in the local initiatives.  A private sector 
chairman noted "a committee of four of us,  SDA, the council, the region and 
myself conceived the  various elements  of the  company  ... we went through a 
whole interview process (to  select the chief  executive).  Once this was done I 
sat down with him and agreed the management structure" (Organisation D). 
Private sector directors  also  give guidance to  the chief executive on staffing 
issues  once  the  companies  were  up  and  running  through  involvement  on 
personnel  and  management  committees:  "we're  always  looking  at  internal 
management structures" (Organisation E).  This director felt that his input was 
different from that of the public sector people involved in this.  He felt they 
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in the organisation while he tended to  look at it from the opposite viewpoint, 
i.e.  to  decide  the  management  structure  and  then  find  the  people  to  fill  it. 
Another private sector chairman also identified this tendency to accommodate 
the weaknesses of staff.  He was  not willing to  accept this and successfully 
pushed for their removal - " a lot of the full  time business advisor jobs were 
people who'd been made redundant looking for a cushy number.  I've made it 
quite  plain  that  as  long  as  that  situation  exists  there  will  be  no  progress 
whatsoever.  You need younger, more committed people to  go  in there.  We 
managed to  get a couple of  them bumped out a few weeks ago" (Organisation 
H).  One  major  example  of private  sector  influence  over  personnel  and 
management issues in a local initiative was a management review instituted at 
the instruction of  the board.  This led to the removal of the management team. 
They  were  replaced  by  staff who  the  board,  including  the  private  sector 
chairman, had a major say in the appointment of;  in the opinion of a director 
from the public sector "that was a clear demonstration that the board was aware 
of the  shortcomings  in the  company  and  wished to  do  something  about  it" 
(Organisation A). 
This potential power is  also  present in the local enterprise company through 
the audit committee.  A senior officer of  the agency noted that "it is chaired by 
the deputy chairman and has two other board members on it.  They can call on 
any information" (Organisation F).  The same senior officer viewed this as the 
most important contribution of the private sector representatives; "if you were 
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have at the back of your mind that they (the  audit committee ) will  have  a 
chance to see everything then I think you might allow yourself some latitude 
that you're not really entitled to.  So  that kind of control is  quite important" 
(Organisation F).  If the audit committee of the company is  dissatisfied with 
the way senior management is running the company through inspection of its 
finances and management systems it can recommend their removal to the full 
board, and if  approved, to Scottish Enterprise National. 
These  examples  show  the  centrality  of the  relationship  between  the  chief 
executive  and  directors.  If it  breaks  down  the  directors  have  powerful 
sanctions at their disposal should they wish to use them.  In this the views of 
public sector representatives  are  more important than those of private sector 
representatives at local initiative level.  At LEe level, the potential powers of 
private sector directors are considerable.  This check on the chief executive is a 
very important dimension to  the issue of how much influence private sector 
directors  have.  Their opinions  on other staffing  issues  can  also,  in certain 
circumstances  and  given the  support  of public  sector  representatives,  carry 
significant influence. 
(iv)  Informal contacts 
Another  way  private  sector  directors  have  an  input  to  the  operational 
management aspects of the companies under investigation is through informal 
contact with the chief executives.  This varies from company to company.  The 
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consult the expertise of private sector representatives.  It is  also dependent on 
the  private  sector  representatives  having  the  relevant  expertise.  As  with 
subcommittees,  the  main  area  of company  affairs  in  which  consultation  is 
sought is  in relation to  legal and accounting practices.  Personnel issues were 
another common area of regular informal consultation.  A senior officer of the 
local enterprise company stated that he  would not hesitate to  consult with his 
chairman: "if I was genuinely having a problem with a member of staff...we' d 
talk and I've learnt a lot about how to  handle situations" (Organisation F).  A 
director of a local initiative indicated his expertise was often sought; "the chief 
executive will phone me up  purely and simply because of the job that I do, 
personnel  matters  and  so  on  (and)  ask  for  advice"  (Organisation  B).  The 
rationale behind this process is well summarised by the following quote from a 
chief executive of a local  initiative "this organisation is  an employer in the 
same way that they (private  companies)  are  and the  issues  they have  about 
employing staff here are exactly the same (here)  as  they have" (Organisation 
A).  This  informal  aspect  of  private  sector  input  outwith  the  formal 
subcommittee structure was mentioned by several chief executives as  having 
had a positive effect in assisting the operating culture of the companies.  They 
have  been  encouraged,  within  the  constraints  of public  accountability,  to 
operate  in  a  more  streamlined,  'entrepreneurial'  manner  compared  to 
traditional  public sector methods  of operation.  Chief executives have  been 
chosen for these posts because of  their potential to act in this way, but having a 
private sector resource to  consult on a one to  one basis when necessary was 
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One chief executive stated "one of my deficiencies is that I don't come from a 
private  sector  background  and  I've  got  to  sometimes  get  out  of the  local 
authority mindset.  He (the  chairman) has been helpful in that" (Organisation 
H).  A director of another local initiative illustrates this is  common: "he (the 
chief  executive) is not slow in coming forward to seek advice from myself and 
others from industry" (Organisation B). 
(v)  Summary 
The  level  of input to  the  operational  aspects  of the  company,  as  with  the 
private sector contribution to  strategy, is dependent on the individual qualities 
of private sector representatives, their time and willingness to get involved, as 
well  as the willingness of the chief executive to try and generate significant 
involvement and his or her ability to run the company to the satisfaction of  the 
board  within  the  constraints  of the  operating  guidelines  laid  down  by  the 
funding agencies.  This section has shown that the main input of private sector 
representatives to the management of  the companies under investigation comes 
outside the full board, formally through subcommittees, in support for key staff 
and through informal contact.  This input can be important. 
It should be noted that increased levels  of formal  and informal consultation 
with  private  sector  and  other  directors  may  not  necessarily  be  a  positive 
indicator of  the health of the company.  Directors may have a major input into 
a company's affairs when there are major problems, while director satisfaction 
with the way a company is  run may lead to  a minimal input in this area,  as 222 
illustrated by the following quotes from private senior directors: "I'm involved 
as much as is necessary and as much as much as the guy that runs it needs it" 
(Organisation B); "If you're good at your job as  chairman, you get the right 
man in place and the right structure in place.  They would tend to use you less 
because they're competent in the job you've given them.  You are going to be 
used when there's a problem, when advice is required" (Organisation D). 
It is the quality of advice, rather than the quantity or regularity of consultation 
which is of value.  The key point is that the resource is available if necessary 
and if the chief executive wants, or needs, to make use of it.  If there was no 
private sector representation on the boards of these companies, external advice 
would have to be sought.  It is impossible to pin down the exact value of this 
aspect of private sector input,  but it is  definitely perceived as  an additional 
resource by those involved. 
6  OTHER pruv  ATE SECTOR INPUTS 
(i)  Networks 
Most respondents mentioned that having  private  sector board representation 
within the companies can be useful in that directors can act as  an access point 
into the business network by using their contacts to  advance the case of the 
regeneration companies.  For example, one local initiative chairman contacted 
a company who the initiative was trying to get to take on trainees from their 
client base.  The chairman contacted the company first and smoothed the path 
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the issue.  Other interviewees related similar instances of advances being made 
on behalf of local initiatives.  One  director whose initiative was  involved in 
assisting with recruitment for a major retail chain had business links with the 
company his initiative was targeting:  "they are one of my company's biggest 
customers.  There  is  an  element  that  they  like  my  involvement  with  the 
initiative and I know the chairman well.  You get a knock on effect from that, 
not commercially, but its useful" (Organisation E). 
A chief executive of  another local initiative stated that "what you really need is 
the ability to  access certain individuals or organisations.  He  (the  chairman) 
can  readily  pick  up  the  phone  and  talk  to  them  at  the  highest  level" 
(Organisation D).  The same chief executive noted that another of his private 
sector  board  members  had  access  into  the  public  sector  network:  "he  has 
tremendous ability to meet and discuss problems at the highest level, certainly 
in the Scottish Office and his chairman is on the board of Scottish Enterprise" 
(Organisation D).  This aspect of the contribution of private sector directors 
represents an  additional route into the business world, which is  increasingly 
important  given  the  increased  policy  emphasis  on  working  closely  with 
companies  to  achieve  regeneration.  This  is  not to  say  that without private 
sector representation on  their boards these companies would not be able  to 
access the private sector and put their case,  but it can open doors  at higher 
levels in organisations that might otherwise be barred or take much longer to 
access.  The  ability  to  contribute  this  function  is  dependent  on  the 
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mentioned  by  chief executives  or  themselves  stated  that  they  utilised  their 
networks for the benefit of the regeneration companies were from larger, well 
established businesses and tended to be older. 
In essence this  contribution is  a part of the  regeneration companies  gaining 
credibility with the wider private sector.  Several private sector directors noted 
that the companies are  still viewed as  public agencies  with all  the attendant 
private  sector  suspicion  of their  activities.  Having  direct  private  sector 
involvement through board membership is one way in which credibility can be 
built up  over time through the  use  of business  networks,  in addition to  the 
kudos  gained  by  having  them  involved  at  all.  This  aspect  of  board 
representation is clearly additional.  It is impossible to assess its impact beyond 
this because it is, by its nature, intangible.  What is  clear is that a number of 
interviewees  felt  it was  important  at  times.  If there  was  no  private  sector 
representation then this resource would not be available. 
(ii)  Contribution to independence 
A final impact that several respondents noted private sector directors had is one 
of the most important, especially for the local initiatives.  This relates to  the 
level of independence of these companies.  As has already been stated in this 
chapter,  the  local  initiatives  are  heavily  constrained by the  priorities  of the 
funding agencies.  However, they are not completely dictated to.  The level of 
autonomy  varies  between  the  local  initiatives,  depending  largely  on  the 
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of time  they  have  had  to  build  up  a  track  record.  Private  sector  board 
representatives playa lesser, though still important role in this.  The reason for 
this is that the private sector directors are not employed by any of the funding 
agencies.  They serve  on a voluntary basis and can act more  independently; 
"they  don't  have  to  be  there,  so  they're  not  safeguarding  anything" 
(Organisation  B).  They  are  not  beholden  to  the  priorities  of the  funding 
agencies in the way that directors from the local authority and the LEe may be 
when they serve on local initiatives.  Although they serve as  individuals it is 
difficult for them to put the interests of the local initiative before those of  their 
employing organisation if there is  a clash.  A local initiative chief executive 
noted that: "quite often there is a perception amongst public sector nominees  ... 
(that)  they come here to represent their organisation as  opposed to becoming 
director with responsibility for  making  decisions  in the best interests  of the 
company  .. (they  should  be)  making  decisions  on  the  company's  behalf as 
opposed to wearing the hat of  their employing organisation. That's always very 
difficult to grasp in this sort of  structure" (Organisation A). 
Private sector directors do not have these split loyalties and a number of chief 
executives viewed this as  an important aspect of the  support role of private 
sector directors.  A related aspect of this area of input from the private sector 
representatives  who  have  an  active  involvement,  which  links  back to  their 
influence on the operating culture of the companies discussed earlier,  is their 
understanding of the responsibilities of non executive directors of a company: 
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personal liability expected as non-executive directors of a limited company  .. .I 
take  time  to  explain  to  them  that  they  are  there  as  individuals,  not  as 
representatives" (Organisation A).  This was viewed by the chief executive of 
this local initiative as an important contribution.  The view that private sector 
participation assists autonomy  was also  expressed by a senior officer of the 
enterprise trust:  "a lot of what we  do  with the  private  sector is  ensure  our 
independence  .. .ifI felt we were being unfairly manipulated or dealt with by the 
LEC I would activate the private sector board and  sponsors in Glasgow and 
reason with the LEC as  to  how they are treating us.  I think the  fact that the 
weight  of the  private  sector  is  there  helps  us  to  maintain  our  distance" 
(Organisation C). 
A number of  respondents noted that if  there were only representatives from the 
public sector on the boards of these companies, a public sector culture would 
dominate more than it does: "they (private sector directors) are very good in 
terms of  not wanting us to be an offshoot of the local authorities.  They're very 
good at complaining, nit-picking. Its things like that that are really important" 
(Organisation B).  Another chief executive stated: "I do take the view that if it 
was only elected members, I would imagine that the company would be much 
less entrepreneuriai...it would be much more about consultation  .. jt would be a 
quite  different  animal  than  is  the  case  with  the  private  sector  involved" 
(Organisation E).  There  is  a cultural  difference  between these  organisations 
and  other  publicly-funded  programmes.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  the 
government drive to  instil these  attitudes in regeneration agencies combined 227 
with  the  qualities  of  the  chief  executives,  but  private  sector  board 
representation has had an influence by virtue of their lack of accountability to 
the funding  agencies.  This  independence,  where board members are  active, 
acts to assist these companies in keeping the funding agencies at arms length to 
an extent, i.e., working within the constraints but not being dictated to. 
7  CONCLUSIONS 
There are a large number of factors which affect the impact that private sector 
representation has had.  These have been looked at in detail in relation to  the 
private  sector  input  to  strategy,  operational  management,  the  culture  of the 
companies,  the  contribution  of  business  networking  and  the  effect  on 
organisations' level of  independence. 
The method of selection of private sector representatives to  sit as  directors is 
an important factor in the potential input they can make.  At the beginning of 
the  drive  to  involve the  private  sector,  there  was  a tendency to  target  large 
companies, principally to generate credibility in the business community; "the 
people  we  had  (in  the  past)  brought  credibility.  You  were  talking  about 
musclemen and the politicians would take the view that if you're getting chief 
executives from major companies (to sit on the board) then that was a credible 
organisation" (Organisation E). This is  still a factor, but there is now more of 
an attitude, especially in the local initiatives consulted for this study, that they 
will only seek to involve people who can make a positive contribution.  A chief 
executive stated:  "we have a space on the board for a private sector member. 228 
We're looking to try and recruit a locally based company but we haven't found 
one  that's  appropriate  at  this  stage"  (Organisation  A).  Previously,  little 
thought seems to have been to why the companies were seeking to involve the 
private sector.  If there was no clear idea of what the companies were seeking 
then  this  is  likely  to  have  affected  the  contribution  private  representatives 
could make,  as  they were only involved on a part time basis.  Now there  is 
evidence that chief executives are more carefully choosing who  sits on their 
boards and are also making clear that they expect a contribution to be made; "I 
want them to  bring  something to  the table.  Otherwise,  all  they're doing  is 
providing  more  lines  on  the  statutory  accounts"  (Organisation  G).  This 
approach, rather than a vague notion 'that it would be good to get the private 
sector  involved'  is  likely  to  produce  a  more  positive  input  by  targeting 
interested  individuals  who  are  willing  to  give  time  to  make  a  contribution 
which matches the requirements of the company.  From the perspective of the 
private sector representatives consulted for this study, this approach seems to 
have worked,  as  they  do  make  a  contribution within heavy  constraints  and 
would not sit on the boards if  they felt they had little input. 
In theory a  key part of the role of a non executive director is to have a major 
influence over a company's strategic direction.  This chapter has illustrated that 
private sector non-executive directors are not fulfilling this role for a number 
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Firstly and most importantly, the strategic framework at local level is shaped 
by the funding priorities of actors higher in the hierarchical structure of urban 
regeneration policy.  Secondly,  private  sector directors  are  disadvantaged as 
stakeholders  because their  opinions  are  not backed up  by  financial  powers. 
Further,  they  lack  the  knowledge  necessary  to  understand  the  regeneration 
process fully and to manipulate the funding system to maximise local benefits. 
Strategic  development  at  the  local  level  is  a  'best  fit'  with  an  external 
environment dominated by a public sector culture, a culture with which private 
sector  directors  are  unfamiliar.  Thus,  the  contribution to  this  aspect of the 
expected role is tokenistic. 
If the  intention  is  to  genuinely  involve  private  sector  non-executives  m 
strategic development current structures must be  reformed.  Firstly, private 
sector individuals must familiarise  themselves  with the  fundamentals  of the 
regeneration  process  to  make  a  worthwhile  contribution.  More  local  level 
input is  necessary to  give private sector directors a say.  This would require 
more autonomy being granted by agencies higher in the hierarchy.  However, a 
balance  needs  to  be  struck  between  autonomy  and  accountability.  The 
bureaucratic  system  currently  in  place  is  the  only  real  accountability 
mechanism.  Another approach to gain  autonomy would be self generation of 
income by  local companies.  Some have begun to  do  this  through property 
development.  However, this is  a long term option and it is unlikely that the 
companies  will  become  fully  independent  because  of the  nature  of their 
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private sector in the current policy climate.  It illustrates the contradiction in 
current  government  approaches.  As  it  stands  currently,  one  government 
policy,  the  drive  to  involve  the  private  sector  in  the  development  of 
regeneration strategy, is being undermined by another, stringent controls over 
local  spending  through  hierarchical  and  bureaucratic  strategic,  funding  and 
monitoring  systems.  The  outcome  in  strategic  terms  is  that,  tokenism 
predominates over practical contribution. 
The  input  private  sector  representatives  can  have  is  dependent  upon  the 
personalities involved within the structures laid down for the operation of  these 
companies.  The  attitude  of the  chief executives  is  a key  factor.  They  are 
involved in the day to  day operation of the company and are in a position to 
identify areas within the company where a private sector director could make a 
positive impact.  Directors from the private sector are necessarily distant from 
the company because they serve on a part-time, voluntary basis.  They do  not 
have the time  and knowledge,  as  discussed earlier in this  chapter,  to  easily 
identify areas where they can make a contribution.  Evidence from this survey 
shows  that  where  this  has  been  done,  directors  are  usually  willing  to  co-
operate.  If chief executives are not willing or able to utilise board members as 
a resource, then involvement is  likely to be minimal, as this statement from a 
chief executive about his predecessors illustrates: "people that were involved in 
senior management came from the public sector and therefore were not happy 
in their own minds how to  handle private sector members and what to  draw 
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For private sector directors to make a positive contribution, there has to  be a 
constructive relationship between them and directors from other backgrounds, 
particularly elected representatives.  Building a relationship of mutual trust and 
a  willingness  to  compromise  between  the  various  parties  is  vital.  Those 
directors  from  the  private  sector who  had  been involved for  many years  in 
regeneration issues  indicated that this trust was  paramount and  took a  long 
time to  achieve:  "when you go  into  it for  the  first time,  nobody trusts  each 
other.  This is the problem in the early days.  Nobody trusted the private sector. 
'Why was 1 there, what was 1 getting out of it? There was tremendous distrust 
on both sides.  You had to break that down" (Organisation D).  Public sector 
representatives no  longer viewed them with suspicion as  to  their motives for 
becoming involved.  In one local initiative, which at the time of this study had 
only been running for eighteen months, this trust was absent: "really what they 
(the  councillors)  want  is  just  a  token  private  involvement...none  of the 
councillors have the slightest interest in economic issues ... the people who vote 
for  them  are  interested  in  local  service  provision"  (Organisation  H).  The 
private sector chairman felt he had little input despite the view expressed by 
the chief executive that he had used him as a resource; the chairman felt he had 
little input of value:  "1  spend maybe two to three days a month, sometimes a 
bit more.  I would feel that was enough if it was quality time (but  ) two and a 
half of the days  are  wasted on rubbish"  (Organisation H).  Support for  this 
view is  backed up  by  the  chief executive's  admission that he  had to  work 
closely  with  the  public  sector  representatives;  their  attitude  towards  the 232 
chairman  effectively  meant  that  he  was  further  excluded  from  making  a 
contribution in addition to the constraints laid down by the funding agencies. 
F  or this mutual relationship to be built there is also a need for the private sector 
directors to accept that the companies are driven by public sector priorities and 
that any contribution they make is within this constraint.  The evidence from 
this survey suggests that where this has happened they can make useful inputs. 
On the whole, directors from the private sector are not interested in taking a 
greater role: private sector directors "really have to take a lead from them (the 
public sector representatives on the board)  .. .ifthey had more input I think they 
would need to be satisfied that they weren't being seen to take the thing over" 
(Organisation B).  This reduces the potential for conflicts arising. 
This building of trust and co-operation between individuals assists input from 
the private sector by generating for them a sense of  ownership and involvement 
in the company, rather than them being involved on the boards as ideologically 
correct tokens.  Its effectiveness is dependent on the ability and willingness of 
the  individuals to  work within the  given  structures  to  make  a useful  input, 
making it work in a co-operative way to  achieve a balance of opinions from 
various perspectives which contribute to the running of the company.  From 
the evidence presented in this chapter, this has been achieved with varied and 
limited  degrees of success in Glasgow. CHAPTER 7: 
IMPACTS OF ATTEMPTS TO STIMULATE 
PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT THROUGH 
THE LABOUR MARKET 234 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  recent  years  there  has  been an  increased  focus  on  assisting  residents  of 
disadvantaged areas to more successfully access the labour market.  There are a 
wide  range  of programmes:  this  chapter will  discuss  those  initiatives  which 
seek to  directly involve the private sector.  It will not look at the perfonuance 
of mainstream programmes such as  Training for Work or Skillseekers.  There 
are three reasons for this.  In practical tenus it would be beyond the scope of 
the  study.  Secondly,  the  research  is  concerned  with  more  specialised 
initiatives  to  stimulate  increased  recruitment  from  disadvantaged  areas  by 
employers.  Finally, mainstream programmes are  available nationally.  They 
are not targeted specifically at disadvantaged areas, although they will be more 
common in these areas due to high local unemployment. 
The chapter will take the following structure: 
"  the rationale for these initiatives will be investigated. 
•  the structure and process of the various initiatives will be  discussed 
with an emphasis on flexible recruitment programmes. 
•  general  employer  attitudes  in  Glasgow  to  employment  advocacy, 
focusing on awareness of the agencies and programmes available, the 
role  of training  and the  importance of quality  will  be  investigated, 
based on survey evidence. 
•  three  cases  of Glasgow  local  initiatives  working  with  individual 
companies will be analysed to  highlight the issues  discussed in the 
previous sections in practical examples. The chapter draws on information from a number of sources: 
o  face to face interviews with senior officers in local initiatives 
o  face to face interviews with employers 
•  a telephone survey of  employers 
o  secondary evaluations. 
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The overall aim of this chapter is to provide insights into what has been done 
to  attempt to  overcome  labour market disadvantage  in the  city  by  engaging 
with employers to encourage recruitment. 
2  THE RATIONALE FOR TARGETED EMPLOYMENT 
PROGRAMMES 
Targeted  employment  programmes  to  encourage  employers  to  recruit 
employees  from  disadvantaged  areas  are  a  key  aspect  of the  activities  of 
Glasgow's local initiatives.  These programmes are best viewed as an element 
of  a continuum of support to assist residents of  these areas to access the labour 
market. 
The  underlying  rationale  for  pursumg  programmes  to  assist  clients  into 
employment is  based on the premise that without extra support these people 
will not be able to access the city's labour market.  A key reason for this is that 
employers'  recruitment procedures may mitigate against employing residents 
of these areas due to  discriminatory 'labelling'.  Secondly, residents may not 236 
have  the  necessary  jobsearch  skills  to  allow  them  to  gam  employment. 
Thirdly,  disadvantaged  areas  are  by  their  nature  places  where  there  are 
concentrations of unemployment.  This can isolate people from the  'word of 
mouth' networks that are often important in gaining employment, particularly 
at the lower end of the skills spectrum (McArthur,  1993).  Fourthly, personal 
confidence and morale may be  low and skills  outdated following  prolonged 
periods of  unemployment. 
The  above  issues  are  all  part  of what  is  now  commonly  termed  'social 
exclusion'  (European Commission,  1993).  An alternative  way  of looking  at 
this  issue  is  to  view  disadvantaged  areas  as  exhibiting  'labour  market 
insularity'.  People may not want to work outside the estate in which they live 
due to a strong sense of community.  There may also be  a feeling of unity in 
adversity, i.e. the development of a 'ghetto mentality'.  Active labour market 
policies seek to break this down. 
Assisting people from disadvantaged areas to gain access to the labour market 
has pragmatic advantages for  local initiatives.  By definition, the city labour 
market has many more jobs and vacancies than the local labour market could 
ever have.  Assisting people to access this greatly enlarges the pool of potential 
employment opportunities.  Further, although some commentators have argued 
(Webster, 1996) that labour market exclusion could be overcome by attracting 
employers  to  locate  close  to  disadvantaged  areas,  the  assumption  that 237 
proximity will maximise local employment gains is over-simplistic (McGregor 
and McConnachie, 1995). 
Another  pragmatic  rationale  is  that  by  integrating  residents  into  the  wider 
labour  market,  employment  amongst  residents  is  diversified.  The  local 
economy thus becomes less dependent upon 'shocks' such as a large employer 
closing in the locality.  There are thus valid reasons underlying the approach 
taken by local initiatives in the city to assist clients to access the labour market 
more effectively.  The place of targeted employment programmes within the 
range  of training  and  employment  schemes  provided  by  local  initiatives  IS 
discussed below. 
3  THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF TARGETED 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES 
The  discussion  above  highlighted  the  underlying  concepts  informing  the 
development of  targeted employment initiatives.  The programmes of  the city's 
local  initiatives  geared  aimed  at  improving  residents'  access  to  the  labour 
market are best understood as  a 'step-wise' process, with each step bringing 
clients closer to  labour market entry.  The final  stage, which this chapter is 
concerned with, is actually getting a job.  The process of preparation for labour 
market entry has four broad elements: 
•  stage 1: pre labour market entry 
•  stage 2: preparation for training 
•  stage 3: vocational training 238 
CD  stage 4:labour market access assistance. 
All four stages are about enhancing the employability of  the initiatives' clients, 
a process which is deemed necessary for the reasons discussed above.  Stage 1 
programmes  seek  to  overcome  problems  caused  early  in  people's  lives. 
Unemployment across several generations can lead to a lack of working adults 
in the family and locality.  This can reinforce the problems caused by social 
exclusion discussed above and lead to  truancy and under-achievement in the 
pre-16 education system.  Initiatives have worked to develop positive attitudes 
to the world of  work. 
Stage  2  involves  working  to  develop  people's  self confidence  and  morale 
through  confidence  building  courses,  counselling  sessions  and  mentoring. 
Programmes  such as  these  aim  to  increase  clients'  self worth to  encourage 
them that they have the potential to participate in training course and move into 
employment (Turok, 1992b). 
Providing appropriate vocational training programmes is the next key step for 
agencies.  Resourcing for these comes through mainstream programmes such 
as  Training for  Work, Skill seekers and the European Social Fund.  The latter 
gives  initiatives  some flexibility  in the  design and  delivery of programmes. 
McGregor et  aI's (1997)  review of training  programmes  identified five  key 
elements  of  good  practice  in  training  schemes  geared  at  enhancing 
employability: III  relevance to perceived employer demands 
CI  qualification oriented training 
e  take account of  the personal development needs of  trainees 
CI  provide job search assistance post qualification 
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•  develop labour market links through work experience programmes 
The above elements of the employment access assistance system delivered by 
local initiatives are intended to get people to a position of  job readiness.  The 
next section discusses employer's attitudes to these issues. 
4  EMPLOYER ATTITUDES TO EMPLOYMENT ADVOCACY 
This section draws on an original survey of 60 key companies in Glasgow  on 
their attitudes to the urban regeneration process.  The results of  the survey were 
reported more fully in chapter 5 of the thesis.  However, it is instructive in the 
context  of this  chapter  to  look  at  the  responses  given  by  the  sample  to 
questions about: 
•  awareness  III  the  business  community  of  agencies  delivering 
employment advocacy programmes in the city. 
•  the importance of  training and employment search assistance. 
III  the  role  of training  in  recruitment  programmes  and  employers' 
attitudes to this. 
•  the  importance  of quality  potential  employees  being  available  to 
recruit in disadvantaged areas. 
Each of  these issues is discussed below. 240 
i)  Awareness in the business community of agencies delivering 
employment advocacy programmes 
The key agencies delivering job search and recruitment assistance programmes 
in the city are the network of  local initiatives.  The first stage for these agencies 
in gaining the  co-operation of employers  is  to  develop  an awareness  in the 
business  community of their  existence.  Figure  7.1  reports  the  response  of 
employers  when  asked  if they  knew  the  various  local  initiatives  were 
operating.  A  broad  spread  of results  was  obtained,  ranging  from  82%  of 
respondents  being  aware  of the  existence  of the  Govan  Initiative  to  17% 
knowing about New Horizons.  It is important to  note that the length of time 
agencies  have  been  in  operation is  likely  to  be  an  important  issue  in this. 
Govan Initiative has been running since 1986, while New Horizons only began 
operation in  1994.  However,  this  is  not  the  only  reason  for  variations  in 
awareness: the other initiatives had been in operation for five to seven years at 
the time of the survey.  Finally it is  important to note that only one initiative, 
Govan, had been heard of by more than 60% of the sample.  Four of the eight 
initiatives were unknown to more than  half the respondents. 241 
Figure 7.1: Employers' Awareness of Local Initiatives 
Agency  Percentage of Respondents A  ware of Agency 
Govan Initiative (1986)  81.7 
Castlemilk  Economic  Development  Agency  55.0 
(1989) 
East End Partnership (1993)  51.7 
Greater  Easterhouse  Development  Company  50.0 
(1991) 
Gorbals Initiative (1992)  46.7 
Drumchapel Opportunities (1991)  31.7 
Glasgow North (1992)  30.0 
New Horizons (1994)  16.7 
Figure  7.2  moves  the  analysis  of awareness  further  forward  by  looking  at 
knowledge of activities of the local initiatives.  61 % of those who knew about 
the  local  initiatives knew something about what they  did.  Only  those  who 
knew about one or more of the local initiatives were asked this question:  12% 
of the  sample did not know of the existence of any  of the initiatives.  This 
means that of the total sample, 47% did not know anything about the activities 
of the local initiatives.  The findings of this survey suggest initiatives have a 
major  task  in  raising  basic  awareness  of their  activities  in  the  business 
community. 
Figure 7.2: Awareness Of Activities of Glasgow Local Initiatives 
A  ware of Activities  Response 
Yes: 
Number  32 
Percentage  61 
No: 
Number  21 
Percentage  39 242 
Those respondents who knew about the activities of the agencies were asked 
what they thought the main responsibilities of  the local initiatives were.  Figure 
7.3  shows  that  a  spread  of policies  were  mentioned.  Those  most  often 
mentioned, training (27% of all mentioned) and employment advocacy (17%) 
match the core activities of  the these agencies.  However, they are low figures. 
Less than half the total sample were  aware that training was  a core activity 
while just over a quarter knew employment advocacy was a key concern of the 
local initiatives. 
Figure 7.3: Perceptions of Main Responsibilities of Glasgow Local 
Initiatives 
Number  Percentage of total 
Training  26  27.3 
Housing  4  4.2 
Environmental Improvement  10  10.5 
Employment Advocacy  16  16.8 
Property development  11  11.6 
Business Start Up  11  11.6 
Helping Companies Grow  7  7.4 
Other  6  6.3 
Total  95  100.0 
ii)  The importance of training and employment search assistance 
As part of  the survey, respondents were asked to rate the importance of a range 
of  urban regeneration policies.  Two of  these were 
III  training unemployed people 243 
III  assisting unemployed people to find jobs. 
Figure  7.4  and  7.5  report  the  results  of this,  highlighting  the  fact  that 
employers rate these issues as very important.  80% felt training was important 
or  very  important,  while  85%  felt  jobsearch  assistance  and  employment 
advocacy to be very important. 
Figure 7.4: Attitudes of Employers to Training Unemployed People 
Response category  Percentage rating 
Very important  32 
Important  48 
Neither important nor unimportant  15 
Unimportant  5 
Very unimportant  0 
Figure 7.5: Attitudes of Employers to Assisting Unemployed People to Find Jobs 
Response category  Percentage rating 
Very important  35 
Important  50 
Neither important nor unimportant  12 
Unimportant  2 
Very unimportant  0 
iii)  Employers' attitudes to the role of  financial incentives for training 
and recruitment 
Employers  were  asked  as  part  of the  survey  if the  prOVISIOn  of financial 
incentives to recruit trainees from disadvantaged areas could increase the level 
of private sector investment in the labour market aspects of the regeneration 
process.  Figure  7.6  suggests  that  this  was  not  rated  as  important  by 244 
respondents.  Only  20%  saw  it  as  either  important  or  very  important. 
Participants mainly argued that the quality of trainees was the key element in 
any recruitment decision. 
Figure  7.6:  Attitudes  Towards  the  Role  of  Financial  Incentives  for  Training  To 
Encourage More Private Sector Investment in the Regeneration Process 
Response category  Percentage rating 
Very important  2 
Important  18 
Neither important nor unimportant  25 
Unimportant  35 
Very unimportant  17 
On the issue of whether improvements in the quality of the available labour 
force  through training  and  other job readiness  preparation would encourage 
employers to recruit more people from disadvantaged areas, the response was 
again unsupportive  (Figure  7.7).  The  key  reason given was  that  it  did  not 
matter where the person lived as  long as they could do  the job.  This implies 
respondents  felt  that  that  either residents  of these  areas  already  have  these 
skills,  or if equipped with them  will  be  able  to  compete  effectively  in the 
labour market,  However, the results also cast doubt on the level of support in 
the business community for  these initiatives.  Large numbers of respondents 
rated their activities as unimportant. 245 
Figure  7.7:  Attitudes  Towards  Improving  the  Quality  of  the  Labour  Force  in 
Disadvantaged Areas to Encourage More Private Sector investment in the Regeneration 
Process 
Response category  Percentage rating 
Very important  0 
Important  20 
Neither important nor unimportant  33 
Unimportant  32 
Very unimportant  15 
iv)  Summary 
This  section  has  provided  insights  into  private  sector  attitudes  about 
employment advocacy policies.  It has shown that awareness of  local initiatives 
is not high in the business community and that understanding of their role is 
low.  The  core  policies  of tackling  unemployment  through  training  and 
employment search assistance were felt to be very important by respondents. 
However, there is something of a contradiction in responses in that when asked 
if  proactive  polices  would  increase  private  sector  commitment  to  the 
regeneration process, it was felt that they were unlikely to achieve this.  This 
suggests that the companies consulted do  not feel  that redressing the  labour 
market problems of disadvantaged areas is part of their role.  On the findings 
of this survey, local initiatives,  and the policy community generally,  have a 
major task in convincing the business community to participate. 246 
5.  EXAMPLES OF RECRUITMENT PROGRAMMES 
Local initiatives in Glasgow are increasingly involved in trying to  encourage 
employers  to  recruit  from  their  case-load.  This  section  will  look  at  three 
examples in the city which illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of current 
practice.  The  cases  were  chosen because they  firstly  emerged as  examples 
worthy of further  investigation from  the  original  qualitative research on the 
general aspects of private sector involvement and investment.  Secondly, they 
were  in  three  sectors:  construction,  retail,  nursing  care  assistance,  which 
residents  of disadvantaged  areas  were,  in  realistic  terms,  likely  to  have  a 
chance of gaining jobs.  This section will take the following structure:  Firstly, 
the examples of  construction,  retailing and nursing care  assistance will  be 
looked at in detail.  This is followed by a discussion which will draw together 
the key issues raised in each example. 
(i)  Employment in Construction 
Housing  investment,  both  for  sale  and  social  renting  accounts  for  a  large 
proportion of the  resources  committed  to  regenerating  the  city's  depressed 
areas, as Chapter 8 discusses in detail.  In the past, a wide range of initiatives 
have attempted to maximise local job gains from this investment, with limited 
success:  a  survey  by  McGregor  et  al  (1995)  of 15  projects  found  that: 
relatively small numbers of local people were employed in projects relative to 
the  level  of resources  committed  to  housing  development  or  improvement. 247 
Further,  the  rapid  pace  of change  in  the  industry  makes  it  difficult  for 
unemployed people to train to keep their skills relevant. 
This section looks at an example of  an attempt by a local initiative to use major 
housing investment in its area to stimulate local employment gains. 
The  project  was  set  up  III  1992  as  a  pilot  project  to  try  and  maXlmise 
employment in a major construction project being carried out in the locality. 
The aims were to: 
•  get local people into jobs on the project. 
•  equip local people with the skills to compete for construction jobs. 
GI  assist  local  people  into  employment  in  the  construction  industry 
generally. 
From  the  beginning,  the  project  took  a  pragmatic  approach,  trying  to  get 
people into jobs at  the  lower end of the  skills  spectrum as  there  are  major 
barriers  to  skilled  construction  employment.  The  project  was  based  in  a 
Jobcentre in the area. A construction industry specialist, with a background in 
civil  engineering,  site  agency,  small  works  management  and  construction 
training management was appointed to  co-ordinate the project.  The industry 
knowledge of the project co-ordinator was a key element in the operation of 
the project.  The benefits accrued from this were that: the co-ordinator had a 
detailed knowledge of  the requirements of contractors: this increased the speed 
at which enquiries could be turned round.  Further, he could communicate in 248 
the  language  of the  industry:  this  built  credibility  with  contractors  and  the 
clients looking for a job. 
The  projects'  basic  structure  was  simple:  a database  of local  residents  with 
construction related  basic  labouring  or semi-skilled abilities  was  developed. 
When  construction  vacancies  came  into  the  Jobcentre,  the  database  was 
searched to try and match clients' skills against the vacancy. 
An interesting  part of the  project  was  the  approach taken  to  working  with 
employers.  According to the project co-ordinator: "we haven't demanded ten 
apprenticeships,  we've said,  what would you like us  to  do?  If we  demand 
things, the first ten through the door get the jobs - they may not be the right 
people.  Ifwe look at what the contractor's looking for and try and match (with 
the client base).  We put the right person in, they (the contractors) come back 
for  more,  they insist on their subbies  coming through  and  its  a really  nice, 
friendly working relationship.  Everybody gets what they want". 
Consultations with employers (and the fact that they made regular use of the 
service)  suggested that they were much happier with this  flexible  approach. 
The project manager usually short-listed a number of potential candidates who 
fitted  the  job  description  and  sent  them  to  the  contractor  to  assess.  On 
occasion,  however,  when the  situation required,  the  project sent  along  who 
they thought was the right person.  In effect, it acted as a recruitment agency in 
some cases. 249 
The key points to  note from this are that firstly, there was a commitment to a 
co-operative,  rather than a  confrontational  approach.  Secondly,  the  project 
attempted to find the best person for the job; there was an emphasis on quality 
rather than simple throughput. Finally, there was an understanding that to build 
credibility with employers, the project has to deliver on commitments 
The above required a highly flexible  approach.  Flexibility was  to  be a key 
element where the project has been successful.  This carries through into the 
second element of  the initiative: training.  Again, a personalised approach, this 
time to the unemployed client as  opposed to  the contractor was favoured.  It 
was  felt  that  this  made  the  training  more  relevant  and  encouraged  more 
commitment from the trainee.  The following example given by the project co-
ordinator illustrates why this approach was favoured wherever possible:  "We 
pay for the course.  He has to pay something.  The object is to get him into jobs 
where he  should be.  We  pay £500,  £600 for  the course.  He's earning that 
much money in a week.  (It) gets him off the social security and its profitable, 
it makes sense."  This flexible approach did not always match with the way 
funding mechanisms were structured.  This caused some problems. 
The  initiative  also  carried  out  more  conventional  training  courses  III 
conjunction with a local college and construction companies.  Trainees spent 
six weeks at college and six weeks on site.  At the time of the research (July 
1995), 40% oftrainees completing the course had entered employment. 250 
A final important point to  note from this example is  that the project did not 
seek to  be local area (or contract) specific.  This short-termism has been an 
important  criticism  of  construction  employment  initiatives  in  the  past 
(McGregor  et  aI,  1995).  The  project  sought  as  much  as  possible  to  get 
contractors to retain their clients when they move on to another contract.  The 
key  to  this  was  to  provide  contractors  with  employees  of the  quality  they 
reqmre. 
In summary, the key points to take from this example to attempting to develop 
employer participation in recruitment from disadvantaged areas are: 
•  understanding of  employer needs can increase recruitment. 
•  a project co-ordinator with specialist knowledge assists co-operative 
working with employers and can build credibility and trust. 
GIl  customisation and flexibility on the part of the public agency are key 
to getting employers to participate. 
This project shows that some gains can be made if public agencies have the 
institutional capacity to act in this way. 
(ii)  Employment in Retail 
This example looks at the experience of a local initiative working closely to 
assist a major discount retail warehouse chain developing a store in their area 
to recruit their workforce.  The Initiative's original contact with the company 
involved an approach to offer them Training for Work places which they were 251 
entitled  to  as  inward  investors.  At  this  meeting  it  became  clear  that  the 
company had not got the service they wanted from  the Employment Service 
when setting up  their recruitment programme.  The Initiative discussed what 
they could offer: the company agreed to let them assist in recruitment. 
At this stage, a problem arose which caused difficulties later in the recruitment 
process.  The  jobs  had  already  been  advertised  and  3,500  people  applied. 
According to  the Initiative,  the  advertisement was  not worded to  attract the 
calibre  of staff the  company  wanted.  This  caused  difficulties  because  the 
shortlisting  was  done  from  paper  applications.  Many  people  over-sold 
themselves  on  paper,  so  a  lot  of interviewing  time  was  wasted  by  the 
company's senior management.  The Initiative's involvement with this aspect 
of the  process  was  limited  to  administrative  support  and  free  provision of 
office space. 
The company interviewed 1200 people in a two week period in the Initiative's 
offices.  This  provision  of space  represented  a  major  cost  saving  for  the 
company.  The manager of the company estimated that the provision of this 
resource saved them at least a week's interviewing time. 
The  second  important  role  the  Initiative  played  in  the  process  was  as  a 
'gatekeeper' or recruitment filter.  As noted above, this was a service that the 
Employment  Service  had  declined  to  offer  the  company.  Although  the 
company interviewed in the  'conventional' way without screening, they  also 252 
agreed to interview people put forward for interview by the Initiative.  Of the 
250 recommended, 78 got jobs in the warehouse.  It is not possible to say how 
many would have  got jobs without the  intervention of the Initiative and the 
development of a good working relationship between the two  organisations, 
but a senior company manager felt that" on average the Initiative's recruits 
were better than those who came from the newspaper adverts". 
The  company  found  the  fact  that  the  Initiative  only  offered  them  250 
prospective  candidates from their database  suggested to  them that there had 
been a genuine process of selection going on- it was not a token gesture.  The 
manager  involved  in  recruitment found  that  the  people  put forward  by the 
Initiative were job ready and had the right skills.  Further,  some had been on 
work placements and all  showed a willingness to  work, an attitude which the 
company  felt  was  critical.  The  company's  satisfaction  with  the  Initiative's 
performance  was  illustrated  by the  fact  that  it  had  asked  it  to  assist  it  in 
recruiting for its Liverpool store by advising a local initiative there. 
The Initiative found this project to be successful for two main reasons.  Firstly, 
a major employment development was occurring in their area.  This sounds an 
obvious statement, but it is important: it provided them with the opportunity to 
assist people into employment who they had worked to get ready for the labour 
market.  Programmes to  develop job readiness within a client based are very 
important, but of limited end value if  there is not demand in the labour market. 
The  second  key  element  in  success  was  the  attitude  of the  employer:  the 253 
company  was  very  clear  about  the  staff they  wanted  and  the  service  they 
desired from the Initiative.  According to the Initiative's project manager, this 
case may be the exception rather than the rule:  "most of the trouble comes 
from the employer not knowing exactly what they want.  They're often very 
loose and non-specific.  We  need them to  know what it is they want  ..... you 
need them to play their part". 
A  final  important point to  note  from  this  example  is  that agencies  need  to 
continually work to keep their profile high in the business community.  When 
the  company arrived in the  area they had no  knowledge  of the  services the 
Initiative could offer - they only found out by chance.  This is  a critical first 
step in employment advocacy: the agency cannot act as  a bridge between the 
employer and the unemployed client if  there is no awareness of  their existence. 
Part of  this is due to a reluctance in the business community to use the services 
or acknowledge their existence: according to the project manager:  "despite all 
the advertising, there's a lot of people in the business community who  don't 
know what we do or care about it". 
This inertia is a major barrier for agencies involved in this kind of work.  The 
Initiative  had  benefited  from  this  project  in  terms  of publicity,  since  the 
company were so  pleased with the service they were advocating its use in the 
business community. 254 
In summary, what this example shows is that: 
III  the background work that local initiatives do  in bringing people up to 
the level  of being  ready  for  employment plays  a  critical  role  when 
there is potential employment available. 
III  the  flexibility  and  pace  at  which  the  Initiative  responded  to  the 
company's needs made an important difference to  the process - the 
Initiative delivered what it said it would at the right timescale. 
III  the employer had very detailed job specifications which assisted the 
Initiative to match these requirements to their client base. 
III  agencies  need  to  continually  work  at  keeping  their  profile  high  to 
encourage employers to make use of  their services. 
(iii)  Nursing Care Assistance 
A  Glasgow  local  initiative  was  initially  approached  by  a  nursmg  home 
company requesting  assistance  to  find  a suitable  property  in the  area.  The 
initiative offered its recruitment services.  The company was keen to involve 
the  Employment  Service,  but was  also  initially  keen  to  use  the  Initiative's 
services, specifically its screening service. 
In response to this, the initiative carried out a mailshot of 1,000 clients on its 
database  it  considered  potentially  suitable.  250  people  attended  initial 
screening  meetings.  They  were  given  a  Job  Centre  application  form  and 
Initiative assistance in completing it.  The forms  were then passed on to  the 
employer, stamped by the Initiative to indicate they had been screened. 255 
However, in parallel with this, the vacancies were advertised by the company. 
The  managing  director  of  the  company  decided  to  interview  everyone 
individually who applied for the job, including those screened by the Initiative. 
The job was advertised in the 10bcentre and re-advertised several times when 
the manager was not satisfied with the applicants.  In all,  over 2,000 people 
were interviewed over 3 and a half  months for the 115 jobs available. 
This  approach caused  major problems.  The  Initiative  had to  be  constantly 
updated  by  the  Employment  Service  to  find  out  whether  the  jobs  were 
available.  Clients  were  given  the  impression that the  jobs were  available. 
Sometimes  they  were  not:  as  a  result,  the  Initiative  looked  incompetent. 
Further, the Employment Service were unhappy with the company's 'abuse of 
hospitality'.  Free interview facilities were used for three and a half months.  It 
had been expected that they would only be taken up for a few days.  Also, the 
time invested by the Initiative in pre-selecting and screening clients was  not 
worthwhile:  there  was  no  indication  that  the  company  took  note  of their 
recommendations. 
In tandem with the recruitment programme, the Initiative also set up a course at 
a local  college for  a group  of 15  clients.  Following consultations with the 
employer,  two  NVQ  Level 2 modules  formed  the  core  of a  39  day  course, 
focusing on  providing a grounding in the care ethos,  personal development 
and  developing  interview  skills.  12  people  completed  the  course.  No 256 
interview guarantee was given by the employer.  In the event, four people got 
jobs with the employer. 
The  Initiative  spent  £12,000  on  the  screenmg  programme  and  vocational 
training  course,  with a single figure  outcome in employment for  its  clients. 
According to the Initiative manager "normally, we'd be looking at 30-40 jobs 
for that outlay".  This case illustrates well the possible pitfalls of  this approach. 
The key points to take from this example are: 
s  communication  is  central  to  a  successful  relationship  between  the 
employer  and  public  agencies.  On  the  limited  evidence  presented 
here, there was  no  clear understanding from any of the parties what 
each expected of  the other. 
s  a  screening  process  by  a  public  agency  can  only  ever  be  a 
'guesstimate' of what the employers want.  Recruitment depends on a 
large  number  of unquantifiable  factors.  One  way  to  increase  the 
chances  of  success  would  be  to  research  the  company  more 
effectively. 
e  developing  targeted  training  courses  IS  not  enough:  it  cannot  be 
assumed that it will lead to  employment gains even if the employer 
has an input into its development. 
This example illustrates the difficulties public agencies can experience when 
they either misread the employer's requirements  or the employer's demands 
change:  it is  not  an  equal  relationship  between  the  public  agency  and  the 257 
employer - agencies are dependent on employers making clear what they want 
and committing themselves to the process. 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has looked in detail at the programmes pursued by local initiatives 
to attempt to engage with employers to overcome labour market disadvantage. 
It  has  drawn  on  the  findings  of both  quantitative  and  qualitative  original 
research to  provide  important insights  into  the  difficult process  of assisting 
people into employment. 
Analysis  of awareness  levels  of the  local  initiatives  from  the  survey  of 
companies found they are low, with an understanding of what they actually do 
even lower.  Those respondents  who  claimed they did know what the  local 
initiatives did correctly targeted training and employment advocacy issues as 
the key  area of local  initiative responsibility,  but not in any  great numbers. 
These  issues  were  also  rated  as  highly  important  components  of urban 
regeneration  policy  by  respondents.  However,  there  was  some  scepticism 
expressed as  to  whether the development of proactive policies such as  these 
would increase levels of private sector participation in regeneration through the 
labour market. 
The  case  studies  provided  a  senes  of findings  about  the  practicalities  of 
working  in  partnership  to  pursue  such  policies.  The  construction  project 
illustrated that specialist knowledge, an understanding of  employers' needs and 258 
flexibility  are  key  to  developing  credibility  and  trust,  which  is  essential  to 
effective partnership working.  The retailing example highlighted the need for 
agencies to  keep  a high profile in the business community, work flexibly  at 
high  speed  and  deliver  on  time.  It also  showed  that  preparation  for  job 
readiness  is  a  key  element  of the  work  of local  initiatives.  Finally  it 
demonstrated  how  clarity  of demand  from  the  employer  can  assist  local 
initiatives  to  support  employers'  recruitment  processes.  The  nursing  care 
example  highlighted the  key  role  of communication between employer and 
initiative, the fact that candidate screening is essentially a speculative process 
and that even customised training does not automatically lead to  employment 
gains for clients.  The key elements of success, from these examples, seem to 
be: 
..  communication and clarity of  goals and objectives on both sides. 
..  flexibility on the part of  the public agency. 
•  consistent delivery by the agency on commitments. 
In conclusion, it is clear that developing linkages with employers to encourage 
client recruitment presents  major challenges to  urban regeneration agencies. 
These activities are rated as  very  important by the business community, yet 
there  is  scepticism  as  to  their  potential  for  redressing  disadvantage  in the 
labour market.  The review of examples illustrated that agencies need to work 
hard,  firstly  to  convince  employers  to  participate  and  ,  secondly,  deliver 
satisfactorily within tight timescales.  Overall, there are some positive lessons 259 
to be drawn from the research analysed here, but there are also major barriers 
preventing private sector investment. CHAPTERS: 
IMPACTS OF ATTEMPTS TO STIMULATE INVESTMENT 
THROUGH THE HOUSING MARKET 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the main attempt to generate investment 
from  the  private  sector  in  depressed  areas  of Glasgow.  The  example  in 
question is the Scottish Homes 'Grant for Rent or Owner Occupation', or GRO 
Grant.  The aim of this grant mechanism is to  stimulate investment in housing 
for sale or rent by private sector developers in social housing dominated estates 
through the provision of deficit financing.  It is thus an important example of a 
'market failure'  approach to  urban regeneration, the rationale for  which was 
discussed in detail  in Chapter 2.  The  chapter takes the following  structure. 
Firstly  the  role  of Scottish  Homes  will  be  outlined.  This  leads  into  a 
discussion of  the agency's strategy to illustrate the place ofGRO Grant in this. 
A key part of this is a discussion of the underlying rationale for GRO Grant. 
The  mechanism  and  the  appraisal  and  monitoring  procedures  will  then  be 
described  and  the  performance  of the  scheme  between  1990  and  1993  in 
Glasgow,  the latest date  for  which comprehensive published information is 
available,  summarised.  It  should  be  noted  that  to  ensure  confidentiality, 
quoted  respondents  are  identified  only  in  terms  of the  organisations  they 
represent. 
The remainder of  the chapter deals with the attitudes of senior Scottish Homes 
staff and private sector developers towards GRO Grant and its impacts, relating 
these back to the issues outlined in previous sections.  This chapter is based on 
a series of eleven interviews carried out between June and August  1995.  It 
also  draws  on,  where relevant,  the findings  of twenty  interviews with chief 262 
executives  and  other  senior  officers  of urban  regeneration  organisations  III 
Glasgow  related  to  the  more  general  issues  surrounding  the  generation  of 
private sector investment in depressed areas of  the city. 
2  SCOTTISH HOMES' ROLE AND THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
OFGROGRANT 
This  section outlines the  role  of Scottish Homes  and discusses the strategic 
priorities  of the  agency  with the  aim  of illustrating  where  the  GRO  Grant 
mechanism  fits  into  this  as  a  means  of stimulating  housing  development 
investment from the private sector in depressed areas of  the city. 
Scottish  Homes  was  set  up  in  1989,  when  the  Scottish  Special  Housing 
Association and the Housing Corporation in Scotland were merged to form the 
new  body.  It  is  an  arms  length  public  agency  with  significant  delegated 
powers.  Its primary functions are the funding of housing associations and the 
management of local authority housing transfers either to housing associations 
or to Scottish Homes direct management.  Scottish Homes operates through a 
network of district offices accountable to  the Edinburgh headquarters, which 
are in turn accountable to the Scottish Office Environment Department.  GRO 
powers were first awarded in 1990.  It accounts for  around 10  - 15% of the 
total budget;  over 80% of the total is  accounted for  by Housing Association 
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In their  1994 District Plan, which details  agency strategy in the city  1994  -
1997, Scottish Homes (Glasgow City) (SH (GC»),  identify how they intend to 
address  the  agency's  six  key  national  housing  priorities.  These  are  listed 
below in Figure 8.1, followed by SH (GC)'s response to  this in the Glasgow 
context. 
Figure 8.1 - Scottish Homes: National Strategic Housing Priorities. 
(i)  contributing to improved quality in housing and its management 
(ii)  promoting the development of  a more diverse rented sector 
(iii)  promoting home ownership 
(iv)  making an effective contribution to community regeneration strategies 
(v)  assisting those with particular housing needs 
(vi)  making an effective contribution to the reduction of  homeless  ness 
Source: Scottish Homes,  Glasgow City District Plan 1994 - 1997, p.  5 (1994) 
SH  (GC)  chooses  to  focus  on  (iv)  'making  an  effective  contribution  to 
community  regeneration  strategies'  as  its  overall  aim  for  its  investment. 
Housing investment is to be co - ordinated with the spending of other agencies 
under  the  umbrella  of the  Glasgow  Regeneration  Alliance  (GRA).  The 
rationale for this,  as  stated in the District Plan,  is  that Glasgow has  areas  of 
concentrated multiple deprivation,  of which poor housing  is  a major aspect; 
"there is a strong correlation between socio - economic indicators and housing 
conditions  ... the  most  disadvantaged  people  live  in  the  worst  housing 
conditions" (SH (GC) District Plan,  1994).  Nowhere in the document is the 
term  'community  regeneration'  explicitly  defined,  but  its  meaning  can  be 264 
inferred from the agency's commitment to  "a multi - agency, comprehensive 
approach in selected areas" (ibid) and  the agency's commitment to the GRA, 
the key principles of which are that "all action will be integrated and involve 
many functions.  It will tackle  social,  economic  and physical problems  and 
involve  the  public  and  private  sectors"  (Glasgow  Regeneration  Alliance, 
1993).  Within its overall priority of assisting  'community regeneration', SH 
(GC)  lists  a series of  'local objectives'  or priorities within this.  These  are 
shown in Figure 8.2 below. 
Figure 8.2 - Scottish Homes (Glasgow City) Local Objectives 
Overall aim - PROMOTE COMMUNITY REGENERA nON 
Local objectives 
(i)  improve housing quality and condition 
(ii)  creating greater variety of  house size and type 
(iii)  promoting tenure choice 
(iv)  meeting shortfalls in special needs provision 
(v)  contributing to reductions in homelessness 
(vi)  contributing  to  improvements  III  environmental/employment/social 
opportunities 
Source: Scottish Homes,  Glasgow City District Plan 1994 - 1997, p. 5 (1994) 
It is  worth  noting  that  the  'local  objectives'  are  virtually  identical  to  the 
national  objectives  outlined  above  in  Figure  8.2  with  the  addition  of (vi) 
'contributing  to  improvements  m  environmental/employment/social 
opportunities'.  This means that, in addition to its core housing activities, SH 
(GC)  will  seek  to  integrate  these  activities  with  those  of other  agencies. 265 
Looking more closely at SH (GC) strategy and where GRO Grant fits into this 
picture,  Figure  8.3  contains  the  excerpts  from  the  SH  (GC)  strategy  where 
GRO  is  mentioned.  It is  clear  that  the  key  strategic  contribution  GRO  is 
expected to make is in enabling home ownership and housing for market rent 
(note:  market  rent  development  has  not  occurred  on  any  scale),  thus 
contributing  to  the  strategic  aims  of promoting  tenure  change,  while  also 
improving  housing  quality.  Both  of these  impacts  thus  contribute  to  the 
overall aim of  community regeneration. 
Figure 8.3: GRO in the context of Scottish Homes (Glasgow City) strategy 
National Objectives  Glasgow Objectives  Location  Action/Strategy 
Enabling 
ownership 
home  Promoting 
change 
tenure  Peripheral estates  GRO to developers 
-creating new markets 
- middle  market  home 
ownership 
Diversifying the  rented  Promoting  tenure 
sector  change 
Community 
regeneration 
Improving 
quality 
management 
- market rent 
Glasgow's overall aim 
housing  - creating  greater 
and  variety  of  house  and 
type 
- improved quality and 
conditions 
Selected  locations  ill 
city and  at  later stages 
of regeneration in outer 
estate  (subsidy  not 
necessarily required) 
-selected  GRO- for  market  rent 
neighbourhoods  within  (limited  and  market 
priority estates  testing)  m  emerging 
-own houses areas 
neighbourhoods  or 
adjacent  established 
- selected  inner  city  ones  in Inner City 
areas 
-All  priority  areas  -
especially  in  eight 
Regeneration  Alliance 
areas 
In  eight  Regeneration 
Alliance  areas  and 
other  priority  areas  -
but  more  especially  in 
peripheral estates 
GRO  for  owner 
occupation  influencing 
and  contributing  to 
local strategies 
GRO  for  owner 
occupation  to  respond 
to  local  demand  for  a 
variety  of  sizes  and 
prices  and  to  ensure 
consistent high quality 
Source: Scottish Homes,  Glasgow City District Plan 1994 - 1997, p.  25 -26 (1994) 266 
At  this  stage  it  IS  necessary  to  explore  why  the  stimulation  of owner  -
occupation  is  seen  by  government  to  be  a  contribution  to  community 
regeneration.  To do this, it is necessary to take account of the wider political 
context  discussed  in  detail  earlier  in this  thesis.  Since  1979,  government 
housing policy has been aimed at increasing levels of owner occupation.  The 
principal reason for  this  was  an  ideologically  - based government  desire  to 
increase  individual  choice  in  the  housing  market.  This  combined  with  an 
antipathy to social housing which, according to this view, restricted this choice 
and distorted, or eliminated completely, local housing markets.  The principal 
means by which this policy was pursued was through strict controls on local 
authority  housing  expenditure  through  successive  reductions  in  grant, 
combined with 'right to buy' legislation which allowed local authority tenants 
to purchase their homes while preventing local authorities from re  - investing 
the receipts in housing.  In addition, incentives to encourage home - ownership, 
such  as  increased  mortgage  tax  relief and  the  loosening  of restrictions  on 
mortgage lending, were introduced.  GRO grants are part of this policy; it is  a 
"low  cost  home  ownership  scheme  which  subsidises  the  production  of 
additional new housing for  owner occupation"  (Scottish Homes,  1994).  In 
1994,  Scottish  Homes  stated  that  "the  Government  has  indicated  that  the 
promotion of  home ownership remains the main priority of its housing policy" 
(ibid).  This aspect of the policy is stated in one of the two aims of GRO grant 
policy, which are: 
•  to  widen  the  choice  of housing  available  to  individuals  wishing  to 
become owner occupiers 267 
"  to contribute to the regeneration of  run down areas. 
Returning to the question of how stimulating home ownership contributes to 
regeneration,  Scottish Homes  state that the  "extending choice  scenario  will 
frequently be central to the aim of promoting regeneration  ... the lack of tenure 
and other housing choices is commonly regarded as a defining feature of areas 
requiring  large  scale  regeneration investment"  (ibid).  Within this,  Scottish 
Homes  list  five  objectives  of  GRO  which  in  their  view  contribute  to 
regeneration.  These are listed in Figure 8.4 below. 
Figure 8.4 - Project objectives of GRO Grant 
(i)  providing housing for sale as part of a strategy which involves a range of 
agencies and types of  regeneration activity. 
(ii)  improvement and/or replacement of  existing poor quality housing stock 
(iii)  attracting future private sector investment in owner occupied housing, 
either with or without public subsidy, which would not occur without the of 
GROgrants as a pump - priming mechanism 
(iv)  bringing derelict land into use 
(v)  retaining  or  attracting  higher  earning  households  to  areas  which  are 
characterised by low levels of economic activity and/or low wages 
Source: Scottish Homes (J 994) GRO grants for the provision of  owner occupied housing, p.9 
The  relative  importance  of these  in  the  VIew,  of Scottish  Homes  staff in 
relation to  urban GRO  projects  is  shown in Figure  8.5.  It is  clear that the 
stimulation of home ownership through the GRO  mechanism is viewed as  a 268 
key part of the Scottish Homes contribution to area regeneration by extending 
tenure choice 
Figure 8.5 - GRO Grant - Project Objective (Urban Projects) 
Objective  % of units (urban projects) 
Contribute to multi - agency/activity area regeneration  72 
Introduce owner-occupation housing to an area of  mono tenure  63 
Increase supply in priority area with low owner-occupier base  56 
Attract higher earners to the area  48 
Generate private sector activity in addition to the project  40 
Increase supply of  owner-occupied housing at market value  35 
Improvement of  poor quality housing  32 
Bring derelict land into use  27 
.. 
Source: Scottish Homes (1994) ORO grants for the prOVISIOn of  owner occupied housing-
monitoring review report, p.21 
through  subsidising  the  creation  of,  or  support  for  existing,  local  housing 
markets.  This contributes to  area regeneration by improving the quality and 
range of the housing stock and environment in the hope of attracting higher 
income households into  the area,  thus  stimulating local demand for  services 
through increased local disposable income which will in time lead to  further 
private sector investment in local services in response to this demand. 
The logic of the rationale suggests that it is seen as one key component of the 
'virtuous cycle' of regeneration, in that it attracts people with higher incomes 
to  the area or retains households with higher incomes in the area.  Thus the 
logic  is  that  an  area  will  only  become  regenerated  if it  has  a  significant 
proportion  of home  ownership  because  this  is  taken  as  indicative  of the 
availability of higher disposable incomes.  The potential of people  living  in 269 
rented  accommodation  to  have  higher  incomes  is  apparently  discounted  if 
viewed  in  this  way.  Thus,  an  argument  can  be  made  that  a  fundamental 
premise of  regeneration policy in connection with GRO is that homeowners are 
preferable to  people living in social rented accommodation in an area if the 
purpose is to regenerate that local economy.  This negative view of the utility 
of  social  housing  fits  well  with  the  former  government's  underlying 
government ideology, if not with actual policy,  which is  exemplified by the 
agency's  principal  role  as  a  provider  and  enabler  of social  housing.  This 
section has shown that the GRO mechanism is  both ideologically compatible 
with government policy at the wider levels of encouraging increased consumer 
choice while its underlying rationale is  grounded in antipathy towards social 
housing. 
3  GRO TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
This  section  investigates  the  procedures  of  the  GRO  regIme,  focusing 
particularly on the issues of eligibility, grant levels and the monitoring by SH 
of  developer expenditure. 
(i)  Eligibility 
In terms  of eligibility,  projects  must first  demonstrate  that the  applicant  is 
eligible to receive grant from Scottish Homes.  It is open only to private sector 
development companies, building societies and housing trusts for moderate or 270 
low cost housing.  Housing  associations  and  local  authorities  are  ineligible. 
Further, any companies associated with local authorities are not encouraged to 
apply  (Scottish  Homes,  1995).  The  project  must  "contribute  to  the 
achievement  of  our  (Scottish  Homes)  strategic  national/local  investment 
objectives" (ibid).  It must meet the "detailed project appraisal criteria" (ibid). 
These  are  discussed  in  detail  later  in  this  section.  GRO  applications  are 
encouraged in SH 'approved areas for investment' (AAIs).  These are the four 
Scottish Urban Partnership areas, in which grants of  up to 40% of project costs 
can  be  claimed,  Smaller  Urban  Regeneration  Initiatives  (SURIs),  Housing 
Action Areas  (HAAs)  and  "additional urban and  rural  priority areas  agreed 
with the  Scottish Office"  in  each of which  grant  of up  to  30%  of eligible 
project  costs  is  available  (ibid).  Glasgow's  priority  areas  for  housing 
investment, i.e. those in which GRO applications are encouraged, are shown in 
Figure  8.6  overleaf.  Although  location  within  an  AAI  is  encouraged, 
according  to  Scottish  Homes  "it does  not  in  itself guarantee  that  we  will 
support  a  particular  project"  (ibid).  Applications  outwith  AAIs  will  be 
considered, but they require detailed case by case consideration and approval 
from the Scottish Office.  Finally on this aspect of GRO eligibility, the 'market 
failure' aspects of  the regime are again emphasised: "AAI designation will be 
withdrawn when Scottish Homes considers that markets have been established 
which are self sustaining or do not otherwise require continuing support in the 
form of GRO Grant subsidy" (ibid). Figure 8.6 - Glasgow: Priority Areas For Housing Investment 
a)  Older Urban Neighbourhoods 
Dumbarton Road Corridor 
Maryhill Corridor 
SpringburnJPossilpark* 
East End* 
Govan* 
Gorbals* 
South Side 
b)  Priority Estates 
Drumchapel* 
Roystonhill 
Greater Easterhouse* 
Castlemilk*t 
PolloklPriesthilllNitshill/Damley (Greater Pollok)* 
*GRA Priority Areas 
tScotlish Office Partnership Area 
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Note: Projected total expenditure by Scottish Homes in the eight GRA priority areas 1994-97 
is over £200m. 
Source - SH Glasgow City District Plan 1994-97, p. 34 
(ii)  Assessment of GRO applications 
(aJ  Competitive selection 
As  with  any  policy  underpinned  by  a  market  failure  rationale,  GRO 
expenditure is expected to  attempt to achieve  'value for money' (VFM), i.e., 
the  maximum impact at  least  cost.  Scottish Homes'  preferred approach to 
demonstrating  VFM  is  a  two  stage  open  competition  between  developers 
where possible:  "Scottish Homes will promote a two  stage selection process 
where  such  an approach  is  feasible  and  appropriate"  (ibid).  This  process 272 
involves  an  invitation  by  Scottish  Homes  to  developers  to  make  an  initial 
declaration of interest.  From this pool a number of developers are invited to 
produce detailed costed proposals, working to a development brief provided by 
Scottish Homes.  These are then subjected to detailed appraisal. 
F  or this approach to be pursued, the owner of the site must agree the site is to 
be  used  for  housing  development  and  be  willing  to  sell  to  the  selected 
developer.  In the case of Glasgow, competitions have virtually all taken place 
of  local authority owned sites (source: interview with Scottish Homes official). 
It is likely that this approach is only feasible on publicly owned sites, as it is 
difficult to  imagine  a  development company  opening  up  a  site  it  owned to 
competitive selection.  Thus Scottish Homes or other public agencies need to 
acquire  the  site  first.  Scottish  Homes  acknowledge  this;  "to  maximise 
opportunities for competitive selection,  Scottish Homes will use compulsory 
purchase powers  to  acquire  land"  (ibid).  Where there  is  an application for 
GRO from a developer who  already owns the site, then Scottish Homes will 
still consider the application - it may be subjected to more detailed scrutiny at 
the application appraisal stage.  The opinions of key actors on the competitive 
aspects of  the GRO regime are discussed in detail later in the chapter.  Scottish 
Homes' appraisal methods are discussed below. 273 
(b)  Appraisal 
The key part of the  developer selection process,  and those  where  there  is  a 
single developer, is the appraisal of submissions.  There are four components 
to the appraisal: 
•  the company and market assessment 
•  the actual building proposals 
•  grant requirement and financial appraisal 
The criteria for  each are summarised in Figure 8.7.  For the purposes of this 
study, the key aspects are market assessment, grant requirement and financial 
appraisal.  Building proposals are discussed only where they impact on these. 
The  'company'  criterion  is  an  assessment  of the  applicant's  eligibility  to 
receive  GRO  and  ability  to  successfully  deliver  the  project.  The  market 
assessment criterion is  firstly  concerned that the  proposal  fits  with Scottish 
Homes'  national  and  local  strategic  priorities,  i.e.,  will  provide  low  cost 
housing  for  sale  to  assist  community  regeneration  through  tenure 
diversification.  Second, this aspect of the appraisal involves an evaluation of 
whether there is  latent demand in the area for  housing of the type and cost 
which  is  to  be  supplied  by  the  successful  applicant.  The  ability  of the 
development to  sell  once  completed is  a further  key test of VFM.  Further, 
additionality  must  be  taken  into  account.  If the  development  is  likely  to 
displace  the  construction of housing  which  is  not  grant  aided  or affect  the 
success  of other grant aided housing  developments  in the  local  market,  the 
development will not be grant aided by  Scottish Homes, provided they have 
read the market correctly. Figure 8.7: Scottish Homes: Appraisal Criteria, GRO Grant Applications 
THE COMPANY 
II  financial standing 
..  access to non GRO finance 
II  development track record 
MARKET ASSESSMENT 
II  relevance of  objectives to Scottish Homes strategy 
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..  relationship  of  house  type  to  local  market,  socio-economic 
conditions, housing strategy 
..  scale of  demand and profile of  client target group 
..  relationship  of proposed selling  prices  to  local  sales  prices  and 
comparable areas 
..  marketing proposals 
..  potential displacement effects 
BUILDING PROPOSALS 
II  capital costs value for money 
..  subcontracting follows Scottish Homes competition policy 
..  quality housing of  proven design 
..  local authority and other statutory requirements fulfilled 
..  NHBC accreditation of  development 
..  meets terms of  competition development brief 
..  high standards of  architecture, external and internal 
..  provision compatible with market assessment 
..  construction programme feasible 
..  any additional criteria satisfied 
GRANT REQUIREMENTS AND FINANCIAL APPRAISAL 
..  project cash flow feasible 
•  net present value of  project 
•  amount of  grant sought 
II  internal rate of  return 
Source: GRO Grant Guidance Note,  Scottish Homes,  1995, p. 20-24 275 
Market assessment also  requires the building proposals to  be investigated on 
grounds of  type and quality to enable assessment of  their market position.  This 
discussion  again  illustrates,  as  shown  in  previous  sections,  the  concern  of 
Scottish Homes to  assist in the  creation of,  or improve the operation of,  the 
market  rather  than  undermine  it  through  the  GRO  mechanism.  Further 
evidence of  this is the final aspect of  the appraisal, financial appraisal, which is 
discussed in detail below. 
Financial appraisal is important because it determines the level of grant that is 
paid  out  by  Scottish  Homes  to  enable  a  development  to  proceed.  The 
discounted cash flow (DCF) method is used by SH.  It is a more sophisticated 
development appraisal tool than the  'traditional'  evaluation method,  residual 
valuation, which treats costs as evenly spread across a project's lifetime.  DCF 
allows for "an irregular pattern of cost, giving a more explicit presentation of 
the flow of expenditure and a more accurate assessment of  the cost of interest" 
(Cadman and Austin Crowe, 1994).  It is thus a more realistic approach given 
that costs in a development project are not spread evenly and can be heavily 
affected by when payment is made and income generated; it "highlights the 
need to  delay payment as  much as possible and bring forward receipts where 
possible and advantageous" (ibid). 
The basic methodology of DCF is to  assess "the present values of a project's 
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timing  of income  and  expenditure .... all  project  costs  and  sales  income  are 
profiled  m  present  day  values  without  allowance  for  inflation"  (Scottish 
Homes,  1995).  These values are arrived at by applying a rate of return (i.e., 
profit)  needed by  the  developer to  make  the  scheme  work,  to  the  cost and 
income  projections.  The  aim  is  to  match  costs  with  sales  income  while 
allowing for a built in profit in the calculation.  This thus gives a project a 'net 
present value'.  The net present value in a feasible project should be zero,  i.e., 
costs plus profit match income.  To be eligible for grant, costs plus acceptable 
profit must exceed this  income figure.  In such a case the net present value 
would be negative and "grant required should then be added to  achieve a net 
present  value  of zero'  (ibid).  For  example,  if costs  plus  profit  exceeded 
income  by £500, 000, than a grant of £500, 000 would be given to achieve a 
net present value of  zero. 
For GRO applications to be successful, the internal rate of  return (i.e. the profit 
made by the developer) should be in the range of 8-12%.  This figure is set for 
Scottish Homes by the Treasury via the Scottish Office (ibid).  Applicants must 
justify their required IRR in relation to the risk attached to the project.  Further, 
any  GRO  approval  has  a  clawback arrangement  which will  be  activated  if 
surplus  income  is  generated  by  the  developer;  this  is  defined  as  "income 
accruing  to  the  project  from  sales  in  excess  of the  level  of sales  receipts 
assumed  at  grant  approval  stage"  (ibid).  If sales  income  is  less  than that 
assumed  at  approval  of the  grant then these  losses  must  be  carried  by the 
developer.  There are a number of  minor exceptions to these general principles, 277 
but the key point is that Scottish Homes do  not seek to  remove risk from the 
development.  These issues are discussed further later in this chapter as  they 
are an important aspect of  the operation ofthe GRO regime. 
(e) Approval 
There  are  three  levels  of delegated  authority  for  approvmg  GRO  Grant 
payment to  developers.  Grants  of less  than £500  000  can  be  approved  by 
Scottish Homes District Offices.  Those applications which are outwith AAIs 
and under £100  000  can also  be  approved locally, unless they are  'novel or 
contentious',  in  which  case  they  must  be  referred  to  the  Scottish  Office 
Environment Department (SOED).  This clause applies to any grant which may 
be deemed 'novel or contentious'.  Grants between £500 000 and £2m can be 
approved by the SOED.  Anything over this needs Treasury approval.  Some 
grants in AAIs  of under £500  000  may be  referred to  the  Scottish Office if 
"project costs met by public subsidy exceed the target leverage rate  for  the 
area concerned" (ibid), i.e.,  they are over 40% in Partnership Areas or 30% in 
AAIs or other areas. 
(d)  Post-approval monitoring 
This key aspect of evaluating whether the work is actually done as specified in 
the application relies largely on self-monitoring by the developer through the 
submission of progress  reports,  which are  combined with requests  for  grant 
payments.  These should be submitted "no more frequently than monthly and 
no  less frequently than quarterly" (ibid).  In addition to this self monitoring, 278 
where there is  subcontracting "any works or services not provided direct by 
the grant applicant may require to be substantiated with the appropriate works 
certificate,  fee  invoices  etc."  (ibid,  emphasis  added).  Further,  if it  is  the 
applicant who  is  doing the  work direct,  then "Scottish Homes may wish to 
appoint independent consultants to verify that the works and costs certified are 
reasonable"  (ibid, emphasis added).  Also  "Scottish Homes ...  may  wish to 
inspect  progress  on  site ... subject  to  reasonable  notice  being  given" (ibid, 
emphasis added).  The emphasis is added to illustrate that Scottish Homes rely 
largely  on  developer  self monitoring  during  the  project's  duration.  The 
vagueness  of these  statements  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the  rest  of the 
document's rigid definition of  terms and conditions. 
After the  project  is  complete,  a post  completion  assessment  is  carried  out. 
Again the information is largely collected by a process of self evaluation by the 
developer.  This assessment involves looking at the size, type and quality of 
the  house  type to  confirm it fits  with what was  agreed.  Construction  and 
marketing periods will also be assessed, as the timings of income and interest 
affect the cashflow of the project, which Scottish Homes also look at directly: 
"  we  will assess, for  monitoring purposes only, the  actual  cashflow for  the 
project" (ibid, Scottish Homes emphasis).  What this in effect means is that 
the  system is  potentially open to  abuse,  because  in the  assessment of grant 
clawback, no  account is taken of reduction in costs, only increases (ibid). The 
actual  cashflow  is  not  taken  into  account  in the  calculation.  Clawback is 
defined by Scottish Homes as  being activated by  'surplus income'  which is 279 
defined as "income accruing to the project from sales in excess of the level of 
sales receipts assumed at grant approval stage" (ibid).  It only takes account of 
sales  income,  not construction  costs.  Thus  clawback  does  not  really  take 
account of  genuine potential profitability, as it does not look at the real costs of 
the  project.  This  issue  is  discussed  in  detail  later  in  this  chapter,  as  it  is 
extremely important in any assessment of its effectiveness as  a mechanism to 
stimulate private sector investment in regeneration projects. 
4  GRO GRANT PERFORMANCE, 1990-1993, GLASGOW. 
This section summarises the performance of GRO Grant in Glasgow between 
1990  and  1993,  the  latest  year  for  which  comprehensive  information  is 
available for the scheme.  Figure 8.8  gives the outline figures. Fifteen projects 
were approved 1990-93, 11  of which were new build projects, while there were 
two  rehabilitation schemes  and  two  mixed developments  (a combination of 
rehabilitation and new build.  New build accounted for 369 units approved or 
completed by 1994,56% of  the total, mixed development for 125 units, 19% of 
the total and rehabilitation for 152 units, 25% of the totaL  The total approved 
grant was £8.3m, contributing towards a total construction cost of  £30.42m. Figure 8.8: GRO Grant - performance 1990-93, Glasgow 
New build 
Approvals  11 
Average size (units)  34 
Largest (units)  68 
Smallest (units)  10 
Total units  369 
Total cost (£m)  16.65 
Average cost*  £1.66 
Total grant  3.90 
Average  grantt  0.35 
(£m) 
Average grant (%)  23.60 
*Average cost per project 
taverage grant per project 
Mixed schemes 
2 
63 
91 
34 
125 
6.21 
£3.11 
2.06 
1.03 
33.10 
280 
Rehabilitation  All developments 
2  15 
90  44 
147  147 
32  32 
162  656 
7.56  30.42 
3.78  2.03 
2.39  8.35 
1.20  0.56 
31.80  27.45 
Source:  adapted from raw figures,  Scottish Homes  (1994),  GRO Grants for the provision of 
housingfor owner occupation, monitoring review, Appendix C 
As to their progress by November 1994 (the date the report was published) 6 of 
the  15  projects were  completed,  accounting  for  267  units,  41%  of the  total 
approvals by this date.  Four of  the projects, with a total of203 units, 30.9% of 
the Glasgow unit total, were located in Castlemilk, Glasgow's Scottish Office 
Partnership  area.  This  accounts  for  £3.23m of grant,  38.6%  of total  GRO 
expenditure in the city  1990-93.  A further  six projects,  accounting  for  346 
units, 52.7% of the city total were located in the other peripheral estates, at a 
total cost of £l4.84m.  Average grant levels were 20.9%.  The remaining five 
projects  approved  were  in the  inner  city  priority  areas.  These  were  much 
smaller, comprising 105 units in total,  16.3% of the GRO-assisted approvals. 
Cost and grant levels were £5.22m and 22.8% respectively.  Thus,  it can be 
seen that the  outer  estates,  particularly  Castlemilk,  were  the  main  focus  of 
GRO  expenditure.  83.6% of the approved units were located in these areas. 281 
This accounted for 85.5% of the approved grant, around £7.14m.  The average 
grant per unit was  £12,729,  in percentage terms  27.45%.  The highest grant 
average by development type was mixed development (33.1 %), while straight 
rehabilitation projects attracted grant rates of 31.8%.  New build had a much 
lower  figure  of  23.6%,  reflecting  its  lower  costs  in  comparison  with 
rehabilitation.  By project, the highest grant figure  attracted was 40.4% for a 
mixed development in Castlemilk, the lowest 12.9% for a mixed deVelopment 
in Pollok.  GRO has led to a significant growth in the construction of housing 
for owner occupation in AAls, levering in around £22.1m of actual or planned 
private sector expenditure to these areas. 
5  SURVEY ANALYSIS 
The first part of this section outlines how the survey was carried out and who 
was consulted.  This is followed by a discussion of the reasons why developers 
get involved with GRO  Grant funded  development.  Developer and Scottish 
Homes staff views about the GRO  regime are  then analysed, starting with a 
discussion  of the  competitive  selection  system.  Given  their  centrality,  the 
financial  aspects of the  grant regime  are  then given particular attention.  A 
closely linked issue, the way the grant is monitored, is then discussed.  In the 
concluding section these are drawn together with other issues. 
(i)  Survey justification 
Four key  developers  were  consulted  for  this  study  along  with seven public 
sector  officials.  Where  relevant,  the  findings  of a  series  of background 282 
interviews  carried  out  amongst  key  players  were  also  drawn  on.  The 
developers account for  a significant proportion of GRO  - aided development 
activity, both at the Scotland - wide (Figure 8.9) and the Glasgow scales.  Of 
the  15  schemes  approved  1990-93  in  Glasgow,  the  developers  consulted 
accounted for 5 of  these.  They were responsible for constructing 43% of units 
and  accounted  for  f4.1m  of grant,  48.7%  of the  total  approved.  Total 
investment in these projects was fI4.1m. 
Figure  8.9:  GRO  Grant  funded  activities  carried  out  by  development  companies 
consulted, 4/90 - 9/93 
Developer  SH Ranking  Projects  Units  GRO (£m) 
1  1  9  819  9.058 
2  2  10  721  7.784 
3  5  9  258  2.355 
4  8  3  224  1.608 
Total  ---- 31  2022  20.805 
Note: Rankmg IS by cash amounts ofGRO received 1990-1993 
Source:  (Scottish  Homes  (1994)  GRO  Grants  For  The  Provision  of Housing for  Owner 
Occupation, Monitoring Review Report p.  39) 
In relation to  other developers,  at the  Scottish level,  according  to  Scottish 
Homes, they came first,  second, fourth and eighth in terms of the amount of 
GRO  they  received  1990-93  (Scottish  Homes,  1994).  Those  companies 
consulted are  four of the nine who  received more than f1m GRO  assistance 
1990-93  (ibid).  They accounted for  29.2%  of all  GRO  funded projects and 
49.5% of units constructed under GRO,  suggesting that they carried out the 
larger scale GRO funded projects.  The four companies received 48.4% of all 283 
GRO  expenditures  1990-93.  Thus  a  reasonable  case  can be made that the 
respondents, all whom held very senior positions in the companies consulted, 
were in a position to speak authoritatively from a developer's viewpoint about 
the performance of GRO.  Further, if significant benefit is to be derived from 
the GRO regime, major developers will play a key  role.  The public sector 
interviewees all held senior positions either in Scottish Homes' Glasgow office 
or other regeneration agencies and projects in the city. 
(ii)  Reasons for becoming involved in GRO aided projects 
A number of reasons were advanced for  becoming involved in GRO funded 
projects.  All  the  developers  had  specific  divisions  within their  companies 
which dealt specifically with grant aided projects due to the specialised skills 
required and the longer timescales of  projects, an issue which will be discussed 
later  in  this  chapter.  Three  of the  four  development  companies  had  been 
involved with grant aided projects before GRO came into existence in 1990. 
Based  on  this  experience,  they  continued  their  involvement.  GRO  was 
basically an expansion of schemes that had been carried out on an ad hoc basis 
previously.  For the developers, this represented a business opportunity since 
previous schemes had met with success:  "there was a perceived strong push 
towards  encouraging home  ownership  on a  scale that was increasing and in 
areas that hadn't previously been targeted. It seemed to the board that the skills 
we had could assist in what Scottish Homes was trying to achieve.  So from a 
business  point of view  it  was  a  good  match"  (Organisation  A).  Another 284 
interviewee stated that "the city council pilot project was  successful for  the 
company and the board decided there was a future there" (Organisation B). 
F  or  all  the  developers,  GRO  represented  an  expansiOn  of development 
opportunity; "GRO Grant has allowed opportunities to take place where they 
wouldn't have happened before had the developer tried to  do  it on an  open 
market scenario"  (Organisation C).  The company for  which this respondent 
worked for had "not really been involved in Glasgow in any shape or form" 
(Organisation D).  GRO  - aided funding  has  come to  represent an important 
part of development activities; "currently we are looking at doing 400 houses 
in Glasgow, 200 of  them grant aided" (Organisation B); "about 25-30% of our 
business is grant-aided" (Organisation D).  To  an extent these companies are 
now tied in to working with Scottish Homes.  One developer took a broader 
view of the importance of GRO - aided projects to the company, viewing it as 
an important method of expanding the customer base for the group's housing: 
"in urban renewal about 75  - 80% of our purchasers are first time buyers.  If 
we don't have any first time buyers, we don't have any second time purchasers 
for folk that trade up later on.  So from that point of  view its very important to 
us" (Organisation D). 
A further reason for becoming involved was that urban renewal housing sells 
faster than normal private housing development, principally on price grounds, 
thus reducing  'locked-in'  capital;  "  we'll sell  two  to  four  a week in urban 
renewal  because  of prices,  whereas  in  private  development  you  sell  three-285 
quarters to one and a half a week. .  .it keeps your capital down" (Organisation 
D).  Capital lock up is further reduced by the fact that the site is provided free 
of charge by  Scottish Homes.  It can thus be seen that from the developers' 
perspective GRO represents a profitable opportunity for development and as a 
result of  this, they have become involved in it. 
From the  perspective  of Scottish  Homes  officials,  GRO  and  other  Scottish 
Homes spending generated interest from developers because of the decline in 
mainstream housing development in the recession:  "the developers have said 
to  us that investment by  Scottish Homes has  kept them in business ... .in the 
past,  20-30% of the house completions in Glasgow have been grant funded. 
last year that figure went up to around 50%.  That's because numbers overall 
have  come  down"  (Organisation E).  One  implication that  could  be  drawn 
from this according to this official is "that once the market picks up, they'll be 
off' (Organisation  E).  A  developer  agreed  this  was  possible:  "Its helped 
developers .... but my own view on that is that its only the way the market has 
been over the past few years .. .I think if  the market picks up, a lot of developers 
will pull out of GRO Grant.  The only ones that will stay in will be those that 
have  made  their  name  in  it"  (Organisation  D).  Another  Scottish  Homes 
official admitted it was likely some developers would pull out if the market 
improved, but not the major developers: "those companies that have a specific 
division are in this as a long term business.  They make profit out of it.  They 
are not going to walk away from that" (Organisation E). 286 
(iii)  Attitudes to competitions 
As discussed earlier in the chapter,  Scottish Homes favours the competitive 
selection of  developers in a two stage process.  Representatives of development 
companies interviewed for this study had severe reservations about the way the 
system operates.  The first problem highlighted by developers was the cost of 
making detailed applications at the second stage of the competition:  "we're 
talking about between £10,000 and £15,000 a time.  You lose four on the trot 
that's £60,000.  You've got to get that back off  the next job  .... Scottish Homes 
don't  recognise  that,  which  infuriates  us"  (Organisation  D).  Another 
developer stated that "you can't really go  into  a competition and arrive at a 
figure without a lot of information going into it.  Every developer has to  do 
that.  That's  costly"  (Organisation  B).  This  problem  is  acknowledged  by 
Scottish  Homes.  It was  the  main  reason  that  the  two  stage  competitive 
selection process was introduced, to reduce the number of developers incurring 
costs; "they (developers) have said to us that they don't mind being involved 
in the cost if  the odds of  them actually winning the competition are higher.  So 
if we have a shortlist of three, they'll put energy and money into trying to win 
it.  But if they're on a  shortlist of six,  then they're less  enthusiastic  about 
getting  involved  in projects"  (Organisation  E).  Scottish  Homes  have  to 
demonstrate  VFM  and  view  some  element  of competition  as  necessary: 
"we've  got  to  strike  a  balance  here  between  ensuring  VFM  and 
competitiveness and also trying to  reduce the amount of fees ... we think its a 
fair balance" (Organisation E).  Another senior public official agreed with this 
principle  in  relation  to  giving  grants  for  industrial  and  commercial 287 
development.  When discussing  an alternative approach to  development, the 
use of a preferred developer rather than competition, he admitted that the site 
might get developed quicker, "but once you get into it, the precepts of how we 
have  to  behave,  which  is  even  handed,  competitive,  demonstrate  value  for 
money  to  the  taxpayer,  militate  against"(Organisation  F).  Most  of the 
developers agreed with this; for example: "I accept there has to be an element 
of competition  when  you're  looking  for  public  money"  (Organisation  A): 
"knowing the strictures they work under its  difficult to  see how they can be 
improved" (Organisation B).  However, it is more the  wtry in which VFM is 
established rather than the principle that developers  have  a problem with as 
they are  incurring  costs that may not be  recoverable  if they fail  to  win the 
contract.  One developer cast doubt on the value of  having a two stage system: 
"in my opinion the first stage is a waste of time, because all they're asking is 
to confirm your interest in submitting" (Organisation D). 
A further issue for developers is the way in which competitions are assessed. 
The main groups of  criteria are cost (including levels of  grant), the selling price 
(if they  are  targeted  at  low  income  groups),  the  quality  of materials  and 
architectural  standards.  Developers  were  unhappy  about  how these  criteria 
were  applied:  "I think  its  been  devalued  in  that  there  are  some  notable 
examples of competitions where after the event the criteria have been changed; 
for example the tempering of  VFM criteria for quality criteria  ... the adjustment 
of criteria to fit political considerations  ... .its a free for all, it's very difficult to 
assess criteria."( Organisation A).  Another developer stated "what I've been 288 
told  in  Glasgow  is  that  its  not  necessarily  the  cheapest  GRO  that  wins" 
(Organisation  B).  There  is  confusion  among  developers  about  what  they 
require to succeed in competitions.  This is  exacerbated by a lack of accurate 
post competition reporting by Scottish Homes, and the local authority, where 
they are involved.  According to one developer "they tend to tell you what they 
think you want to hear, you know 'you were pretty close there' ... that's no help 
to us ... you've got to know where you got it right or wrong, otherwise, every 
job you're starting  from  scratch"  (Organisation  D).  According  to  Scottish 
Homes staff, the criteria vary between the stages of  the competition: "its more 
a  design  led  issue  at  the  beginning,  at  the  second  stage  it'll  be  cost  led" 
(Organisation E).  This indicates a communication problem between Scottish 
Homes and development partners.  The issue is  further confused by the grant 
level on offer when the agency seeks high quality housing.  A developer stated 
that "the competitions are not really effective now, because all we're doing is 
we're taking benefit out ofthe product to get the costs down to a level that the 
competitions have forced on us .. .it doesn't matter who builds them, they're all 
much of  a muchness" (Organisation C). 
From the above discussion it is  clear that there are significant problems with 
the competitive selection process.  Scottish Homes have to  demonstrate value 
for money.  In effect the costs of this are passed on to the developer.  Further, 
the assessment criteria are vague from a developer perspective and the levels of 
grant on offer sit uneasily with the stated commitment to quality.  The quality 
issue  is  discussed  in  more  detail  later  in  the  chapter.  The  contradictory 289 
statements discussed above  indicate the  confusion there  was  among the  key 
players. 
(iv)  Views on approval systems 
The  GRO  approval  system  was  outlined  III  detail  earlier  in  the  chapter. 
Guidance was published in an  attempt to  clear up  confusion over what was 
required of developers by Scottish Homes and vice versa.  A number of issues 
were raised by respondents concerning this system. 
A key part of the  negotiation process which has  proved problematic are  the 
legal  aspects  of development  agreements  between  the  public  and  private 
sectors.  These have slowed down the development process.  Two public sector 
officials highlighted this as a problem: "a lot of the negotiation we have with 
the private sector is not over the cost or design of schemes, but what the legal 
documentation  is ... .it  is  not  unknown  for  us  to  spend  something  like  six 
months with legal documents flying between our legal section and lawyers in 
the  private  sector"  (Organisation  E).  Another  official  managing  a  project 
involving a number of private sector developers, Scottish Homes and the LEe 
felt legal problems were a major obstruction to faster development: "we were 
trying to look at a tripartite agreement between the partners to see if we could 
simplify the process.  It was so complicated that we've abandoned it and gone 
back to separate documents" (Organisation G). 290 
The  legal  issue  is  central  to  the  problem  of standardising  the  application 
process.  A linked issue raised was the amount of,  and required format  for, 
information required by Scottish Homes before it would begin an assessment 
of eligibility.  Developers  had  difficulty  in  complying  with  these  due  to 
Scottish Homes requiring information in a standard fashion:  "they're trying to 
standardise  how  people  approach  development.  We  approach  it  in  a 
completely different way from  our competitors"  (Organisation D).  This can 
cause  delays,  due  to  the  reluctance  of developers  to  work the  way  Scottish 
Homes want them to.  A Scottish Homes official stated,  "we've tried to  get 
some  kind  of  standard  documentation.  Within  three  months  we  were 
discussing variations with individual developers"( Organisation E).  However, 
one  developer  argued  that  Scottish  Homes  are  not  as  rigid  as  the  above 
suggests: "It depends on how their spend is at the end of the year.  It depends 
on how desperately they want a particular site.  If you've got a site they want 
to  work, they will  suddenly find  a method which you have  never heard of; 
that's a worry for developers.  They say (Scottish Homes)  'that's it, we won't 
deviate'.  But  where  it  suits  them  they  can  certainly  bend  the  rules" 
(Organisation D).  The development community is close knit in the city: "they 
(Scottish  Homes)  don't  realise  that  developers  talk  to  each  other" 
(Organisation B).  Knowledge in this  network that this has happened in the 
past may undermine Scottish Homes' negotiating stance when trying to impose 
a standard system, as they themselves have bypassed it when it suits.  This may 
be  one  reason  why  developers  continue  to  seek  legal  and  procedural 291 
negotiations with Scottish Homes and why it has been so difficult to operate a 
standard system. 
One developer admitted that the process had exposed shortcomings in his own 
company:  "inevitably you'll  get  the  approval  within the  timescale  Scottish 
Homes have set.  If you take it from when we first lodged, we'll say 'you're 
taking  three  or  four  months  longer  than  you  should  have  done".  It then 
becomes a moot point as to who is to blame.  The fact that we've had to change 
things  suggests  we  haven't  been  as  competent  as  we  should  have  been" 
(Organisation A).  Another developer agreed:  "to be fair to  Scottish Homes, 
we've  changed  our  procedures  because  of them  and  its  improved  us" 
(Organisation D).  This respondent raised another important issue, that of co-
ordinating the operation of  two bureaucracies to attempt to get them to work in 
tandem.  The  internal  bureaucracy  of a  large  private  company  imposes 
demands  on its  employees as  does the public sector bureaucracy of Scottish 
Homes:  "we're very much a bureaucratic operation.  So  when the two  meet 
there are problems" (Organisation D).  In effect, company bureaucracy had to 
come into line with that of Scottish Homes for it to begin to access GRO funds. 
Questions were raised by developers  concerning the competence of Scottish 
Homes staff and the resources allocated to carry out development appraisal at 
the  pace  demanded  by them.  One  highlighted  that  a  key  problem  was  in 
financial  appraisal:  "the  district  offices  are  not  geared  to  deal  with  the 
application at the  speed which a commercial outlook requires .... they  have  a 292 
shortage of staff in the accounting  side;  only these people can deal  with the 
DCF  scenario  required  by  the  Scottish  Office.  The  time  taken  is  getting 
beyond a joke.  Invariably it goes through the technical appraisal reasonably 
well, but gets stuck when it gets to  the financial appraisal" (Organisation C). 
At the time of the interview this  developer had three  developments pending 
awaiting the outcome of  the financial appraisal. 
Lack of development experience in Scottish Homes was mentioned as a source 
of some problems;  "they've got to have a more realistic approach as  to  how 
developers work.  Half the problem is  that the development staff don't have 
development  experience"  (Organisation  D).  This  respondent  had  worked 
previously in the public sector before moving into  property development:  "I 
didn't have  the  development  experience  when  1 came  here  and  its  a  long 
learning  curve"  (Organisation  D).  Another  developer  agreed  this  lack  of 
experience  was  an  issue:  "they  have  set  themselves  up  without 
developers .... that's what they're lacking"  (Organisation B).  This highlights 
the issue, discussed in Chapter 6 of  this thesis, that the private sector may have 
more confidence in public sector agencies if they employed more staff with a 
private sector background. 
Another issue related to approval timescales is the level of delegated authority 
to  approve  grants.  One  developer  suggested  why  the  levels  of delegated 
authority in the approval system were at the current levels: "I don't think they 
trust us,  certainly in the  Scottish Office.  To  speed things up, the £500,  000 293 
bottom line  for  district level  approval  should  go  to  £750,  000  or a million. 
They've been doing it for six years.  Surely now Scottish Homes could do  it" 
(Organisation D).  Another developer felt this was not a major problem:  "by 
the time it reaches the Scottish Office, its gone through the local development 
support unit and we are pretty confident that if it passes that bit its going to go 
through the  Scottish Office.  It normally does  so  within a six to  eight week 
period unless there is  a specific principle of variance" (Organisation C).  For 
this respondent the key problem was the slowness of approvals at local level. 
A Scottish Homes official noted that the levels of  authority were there because 
GRO  is  a relatively new regime and that, as  with HAG,  which had a twenty 
year track record having been formerly administered by the SSHA and HCiS, 
more delegation would come with time:  "because its a new grant mechanism, 
it  will  take  time  to  build  up  the  confidence  of everyone  involved  in  that 
process;  our  expectation  is  that  we  will  get  increased  delegated  authority" 
(Organisation E). 
The issues discussed in this section and the preceding section on competitive 
selection  are  good  examples  of the  realities  of partnership  working  with  a 
disparate entity like the private sector. Public agencies and private companies 
seek  to  protect  their  interests  and  protracted  negotiation  results  before  a 
workable resolution is reached.  As this section has illustrated, it does not stop 
once  a workable arrangement is  reached;  there  is  continual  discussion from 
interest groups to have the system reformed in their interest.  Scottish Homes 
need a standard system to deal with the volume of applications at the required 294 
speed  while  ensunng  transparency,  while  the  developers  are  interested  III 
maximising their influence in their own interests. 
(v)  Perspectives on the financial aspects  of GRO and current 
monitoring systems 
The key  issue in the  assessment of the  effectiveness of the  GRO  regime  at 
stimulating  private  investment  in  depressed  or  non  existent  local  housing 
markets  is  the  cost to  the  public  purse  of generating that investment.  This 
involves assessing the level of grant offered within the IRR allowed, i.e.  up to 
30% or 40% in AAls at an IRR of 8-12%.  As discussed in detail earlier in the 
chapter, deficit finance is paid to  a level which in theory allows a profit of 8-
12%.  However,  the  monitoring of costs  is  expressed  in  terms  of potential 
powers rather than a definitive statement of actions that will  be taken.  This 
section looks at the opinions of  key actors in the process as to how this actually 
works,  beginning  with  a  discussion  on  the  necessity  for  subsidy.  Cost 
assessment,  clawback  and  grant  levels  are  dealt  with  together  as  far  as  is 
possible because they are closely interlinked. 
There was unanimity amongst respondents that the GRO system was necessary 
to stimulate private sector investment in housing in depressed local economies. 
For  example,  one  developer  stated  that  GRO  was  necessary  "because  the 
market wouldn't sustain the level of development;  you would never recover 
your development costs through the values of  the local market.  There has to be 
some way to  get around that"  (Organisation C).  Another developer agreed: 295 
"you'll need GRO Grant if you're building in these areas"( Organisation B). 
For another respondent,  the  scale  of the  subsidy that was  paid made  it  self 
evident that deficit financing  was  necessary:  "the average  public subsidy is 
probably around 20%.  That figure in itself, its 20% of development costs, just 
shows you that we're miles away from looking at that as a possibility on the 
open  market.. .. (without  grant) ... .it  doesn't  even  reach  the  risk  scenario" 
(Organisation B).  From a  Scottish Homes  perspective,  an  official  strongly 
defended the need for subsidy: "we've got specific examples of  marketing land 
and the private sector didn't bite.  Quite clearly they do need the subsidy.  The 
possibility that we're giving subsidy to people that don't actually need it is not 
on, especially as we've got three or four developments around the city which 
are having difficulty selling even after subsidy .... that suggests to me we've got 
it about right" (Organisation E).  Thus it can be seen that amongst key actors 
consulted  there  is  consensus  that  subsidy  is  essential.  However,  as  the 
discussion below illustrates, there is disagreement about the levels of subsidy 
offered within allowable rates of  return. 
One developer freely admitted that cashflows were manipulated to show higher 
levels of cost than were actually incurred:  "what you've got to  do  is  try and 
find other ways of  hiding the money.  That's the bottom line.  Every developer 
if  they're  honest  will  tell  you  that.  We  would  rather  be  up  front. 
Unfortunately it doesn't work that way" (Organisation D).  A Scottish Homes 
official agreed this occurred: "we're aware of  the fact that developers overstate 
their costs, but if  they do it's not by much" (Organisation E).  Cost assessment 296 
was done by comparing costs with other developers and contractors: "provided 
there's  no  major  variation,  we're  happy  to  take  the  costs  given  to  us  by 
developers.  We do test them against other costs" (Organisation E).  However, 
this does not allow for cost reductions after an application is accepted and the 
grant level  agreed,  or the  possibility that all  costs  submitted are  overstated. 
The  official  admitted  that  cost  reductions  were  possible:  "its only  perhaps 
through  economies  or  getting  deals  with  subcontractors  or  suppliers  that 
developers  will  reduce  their  costs  more  than  they  have  said  to  us" 
(Organisation E).  This would seem to be common commercial practice; i.e. to 
exert  constant  downward  pressure  on  costs  rather  than  work  at  a  set  level 
agreed in a proj ected cashflow. 
A further issue in this is that many of the development companies involved in 
GRO  are  large  companies  within  which  internal  contracts  are  placed.  A 
Scottish Homes official was also aware of  this: "there's also a profit element; a 
lot of  the developers use contracting arms; so there's an element of  profit in the 
contracting  arms,  an  element  of profit  for  the  developer  built  in  there 
somewhere"(Organisation E).  Again,  he  admitted  that  costs  were  largely 
taken  at  face  value:  "provided  the  costs  per  specification  item  can  stand 
comparison with other contractors we're OK with that" (Organisation E).  The 
following  statements give a further  insight into  this:  "our view is  that once 
we've approved  a  project,  costs  are  fixed  and  it's up  to  the  developer  to 
manage that process  ... the developer's got to  retain some of the risk. .. jt gives 
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manage the development process and reduce the level of risk"  (Organisation 
E).  This  statement  implies  an  acknowledgement,  as  stated  earlier  in  this 
section, that it is in the developers' interest to ensure that costs are reduced to 
minimise risk through efficient project management.  Another developer felt 
that  the  monitoring  system  was  adequate:  "Scottish Homes  are  monitoring 
costs.  We have to produce monthly evaluation statements for them.  They in 
tum have third parties to  validate that.  At the end of the project they have a 
rationalisation of costs against what they said it would cost" (Organisation A). 
However, the developer above who admitted concealing costs  agreed with this 
statement,  "every  three  months  we  put  in  an  evaluation  to  them  of the 
appointed QS and we get paid the grant accordingly" (Organisation D).  There 
is  monitoring of  the costs of  projects, but it does not seem to be robust enough 
to prevent overstatement of costs.  It is also not effective in terms of clawback, 
because as  discussed earlier in this chapter, the clawback calculation is made 
on the basis of increases in sales income, not cost reduction. 
This  issue  of the  weakness  of cost  assessment  procedures  is  given  further 
weight  by  the  following  statement  by  a  regeneration  project  manager 
concerning a housing  led development which had both Scottish Homes  and 
Scottish Enterprise Network funding:  "Scottish Homes do not audit costs.  SE 
and the LECs do  audit costs.  They both report to  the  Scottish Office.  We 
don't understand how Scottish Homes get away without auditing costs and the 
LECs have to ... .its astounding that they get away with it"  (Organisation G). 
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the LEe funded component: "in comes the LEe and they say 'we audit costs'. 
There's had to  be  a  very  delicate  mechanism put in  place  that  allows  this 
development  to  happen  within  internal  rates  of return  set  down  by  the 
Treasury.  Which means that we will audit costs, but our clawback, which is 
effectively  why  you  audit  them,  is  limited  to  a  ceiling  which  reflects  the 
amount of money we've put into  the  project.  If they  save money,  then we 
reduce  the  amount  of VIBRO  Grant  that  we  give  them  and  that  is  the 
compromise" (Organisation G).  In otherwords the amount of GRO  Grant is 
not  affected,  while  the  LEe  component,  VIBRO  (an  environmental 
improvement grant) is more rigorously assessed and thus for the project as  a 
whole, costs are in line with a justifiable amount of  grant. 
The implication from  this  is  that where there  is  purely  GRO  involved, that 
would not happen and clawback would bear less relation to actual profitability, 
because  there  is  no  rigorous  assessment  of costs  and  thus  rates  of return. 
Further evidence that this is the case is provided by the following quote from 
the same project director:  "when we actually employ a real clerk of works to 
stand over their shoulder to watch what they're doing and he reports to us that 
he doesn't like the way they're putting in a damp course or whatever, we get 
onto them and say you'll have to rebuild it: they're shocked because nobody's 
done that to them before  .... when we started to complain they didn't know how 
to  deal  with  it  and  we  had  to  go  up  to  managing  director  level.  These 
companies have reputations  and  if you start questioning the quality of their 
reputation  it  affects  them  not  just  locally,  it  affects  them  nationally" 299 
(Organisation  G).  From this  it  can  be  inferred  that  cutting  costs  and  thus 
increasing the rate of  return is common or it would not have been such an issue 
for the project.  A developer who had worked on the project agreed that it was 
the tightest regime his company had ever worked under:  "the brief was very, 
very tight.  It was  so  tight they actually told us  what the radius of the kerb 
blocks  should  be.  We've never  had  that  before"  (Organisation  D).  This 
further suggests that GRO monitoring  does not involve a detailed assessment 
of  costs. 
Further evidence of  the delicacy of  the situation regarding actual rates of  return 
is provided by the following  statement from  a developer:  "our concern as  a 
Federation of House Builders was that they were actually going to go back and 
revisit the sales profile and then work out the actual rate of return and adjust 
the grant accordingly.  The minute they do that, everyone will close the doors 
to  them"  (Organisation D).  According to  this  respondent,  the development 
companies  would not work  on  GRO  projects  for  the  returns  demanded  on 
paper by Scottish Homes.  Further, he stated "they (Scottish Homes) are trying 
to impose an 8 and  12% IRR.  That is  totally unrealistic.  If we went to  our 
board and showed an 8-12%, even an 18% return, we would not be allowed to 
invest in that.  The risk is far too great.  Our rate of return is a lot more than 
that  .. .if there  were  full  open book accounting,  we  would not be  here.  The 
returns are just not in it for us" (Organisation D).  Another developer stated: 
"if  we cannot meet the level of return that we need to stay in business there's 
no point in going in for these projects.  We're very, very close to that limit if 300 
not  over  it  at  the  present  time"  (Organisation  C).  Another  was  more 
pragmatic:  "there  is  an  element  of the  procedure  of GRO  Grant  which 
determines the rate of return which our shareholders have never been happy 
with,  but  to  me  that's  water  under  the  bridge"  (Organisation  A).  This 
respondent implied that his company had to work within the rules.  The others 
either  broke  the  rules  or  were  on  the  verge  of doing  so  or  withdrawing 
altogether. 
'Real' levels of subsidy have a maj or impact on assessment of  the effectiveness 
of GRO.  Taking  the  perspective  identified  in  this  section  that  developers 
understate their costs to gain a higher rate of  return on their investment than is 
'officially' stated (ie 8-12%), reduction in costs will inevitably affect the level 
of  the public contribution as a percentage of the total costs of  the project.  The 
hypothetical example below illustrates the effect when a developer cuts costs 
by 10% on the initially agreed value and the grant level remains constant. 
Stated key figures 
Total Cost of  Project 
Developer's stated contribution at time of  signing contract 
GRO contribution 
Level of GRO Grant subsidy 
Leverage ratio 
£ 1  million 
£800,000 
£200,000 
20% 
1:4 'Real' Key Figures following 10% cut in developer's costs 
'Real' total cost of  project 
'Real' developer contribution 
GRO Contribution 
'Real' level ofGRO Grant subsidy 
'Real' Leverage Ratio 
f920,000 
f720,000 
f200,000 
22% 
1:2.7 
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Assuming the measurement of value for money is based on the leverage ratio, 
then the project presents less value for money than is claimed if this happens. 
A further issue is the effect that this would have on the developer's profits, as 
is outlined below. 
Impact on profitability of 10% saving on costs 
Stated total cost plus profit 
Level of  profit (IRR of 8-12%) on stated project cost 
'Real' level of  profit based on 'actual' costs 
'Real' rate ofretum to developer based on 'actual' costs 
fl.08-fl.2m. 
f80-120,00 
fI60-240,000 
17-35% 
On these figures, if the value for money assessment was made in terms of the 
profitability of  the project to the developer, then it would not meet the terms of 
Treasury regulations.  These  hypothetical  calculations  illustrate the problem 
with the way GRO is assessed.  Any estimate of  the success or failure of  policy 
must take into account true costs.  Further, these figures suggest that, as higher 
subsidies  seem to  be  necessary,  that the  housing  markets  in these  areas  are 
weaker than the published figures suggest. 302 
An  argument  could  be  made  that  variations  m  costs,  grant  levels  and 
profitability  do  not  actually  matter  that  much,  given  that  a  set  amount  of 
housing for sale is constructed within a disadvantaged area at a percentage of 
the cost to the public purse than would be the case if all costs were borne by 
Scottish Homes.  However, this is really only tenable if the aim of policy is 
simply to  get the  houses built.  Scottish Homes'  long term aim is  to  create 
sustainable  local  housing  markets.  If subsidy  continues  to  be  essential  at 
higher  levels  than  the  already  high  'official'  level,  then  this  will  not  be 
achieved. 
A  further  concern  identified  is  the  amount  of grant  offered  for  the  quality 
expected by Scottish Homes.  Scottish Homes has a stated commitment to the 
quality of design and materials used in schemes funded by them.  However, 
there is  some evidence to  suggest that this is  not happening.  One  developer 
stated  that  "I think  they've  probably  changed  their  tune  now  about  high 
quality  ... they're  coming  into  the  real  world"  (Organisation  B).  Another 
developer  agreed  that  there  was  less  funding  available  and  that  quality 
suffered: "certainly they have to lift the level of funding they give to get back 
to  something  worthwhile.  Its  cheap  and  cheerful  at  the  moment" 
(Organisation  C).  The  reason  for  this  situation is  that  Scottish Homes  are 
pushing  for  an  average  grant  level  of 20%  of development  costs  for  GRO 
funded projects.  Grant paid at these lower amounts increases the level of risk 
for  the  developer.  In this  situation,  quality  is  likely  to  become  less  of a 303 
consideration,  especially when selling prices have to  be  kept compressed to 
meet  the  requirements  for  low  cost  homes  and  the  untested  nature  of the 
markets in which these houses are  selling are  taken into  consideration.  The 
competitive  selection  of schemes  has  also  had  an  impact  on  quality  as 
discussed  earlier in this  chapter,  as  developers  have  to  take  account  of the 
possibility that Scottish Homes may take the least cost option.  Against this is 
must be noted that as the section on competitions showed, it is not clear what 
criteria Scottish Homes give precedence to. 
Finally on this issue, how the level of grant was arrived at was of concern to 
one developer: " I think its just a question of 'we'll set it at that' and by doing 
so we will achieve value for money.  But they are very much in danger of not 
achieving  value  for  money.  The  product  is  perhaps  being  skimped  on" 
(Organisation C).  Another felt that Scottish Homes, under pressure from the 
Scottish Office and Treasury and, in accordance with its exit strategy, having, 
in its  opinion, begun to  resolve the identified market failure,  were  assuming 
that, because some projects in regeneration areas had been successful at higher 
grant  levels,  less  subsidy  was  now  required  to  provide  the  same  level  of 
quality:  "they're  trying  to  control  the  market  and  the  market  won't  be 
controlled"  (Organisation D).  It appears  that what has  happened is  that as 
grant levels have fallen,  quality has fallen.  A possible reason for this is that 
developers have less confidence than Scottish Homes that in some regeneration 
areas, higher quality and thus high cost housing (assuming diminishing grant 
levels)  will ever be  viable.  One  major developer stated:  "you will  not  sell 304 
housing  in  Castlemilk for  £75  000.  The  private  sector have  stated  this  to 
Scottish Homes"  (Organisation B).  Another developer agreed "if you want 
things  to  happen  quickly  within  existing  settlements .... then  there  must  be 
public subsidy" (Organisation A).  This appears to be a major problem for the 
policy in its  current form.  The  aim is  to  gradually decrease  funding  as  the 
market begins to  operate.  However, at this  stage, reductions in grant levels, 
according  to  respondents  in  this  survey,  appear  to  be  leading  to  quality 
reductions.  It may be that Scottish Homes and its funders are over optimistic 
about the impact of  the scheme to date. 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
All respondents agreed that the GRO Grant regime had successfully stimulated 
housing  investment  in  areas  where  it had  previously  been absent.  Around 
£22m  of private  sector  investment  was  generated  1990-93.  Thus  it  is 
contributing to urban regeneration based on the analysis that policy in the city 
is  currently  following,  i.e.  that it is  one  component of creating  a  'virtuous 
cycle' of  regeneration.  It  has begun to address the major market failure it seeks 
to resolve.  Development companies have become involved in the programme 
because it has opened up new markets that were previously either non existent 
or too high a risk to consider. 
There  are  issues  such  as  the  way  in which  developers  are  selected  which 
developers are not happy with.  There does not seem to be a way round this 
other than a major overhaul of VFM policy.  Two  respondents  suggested a 305 
competitive  tendering  system  much  like  any  other  public  sector  contract. 
Another suggestion was to  reform the HAG system (under which developers 
currently build under contract for  housing associations)  and combine it with 
GRO  to  allow housing  associations to  buy from  the  development company, 
while a tranche of identical housing was  sold on the  open market.  For the 
moment  however,  according  to  Scottish  Homes  staff interviewed,  current 
procedures  are  satisfactory  from  their  perspective  in  terms  of the  regIme 
meeting their responsibilities. 
Returning  to  the  financial  aspects  of the  policy,  which  are  key  in  any 
discussion of its success,  there are issues which this chapter has raised which 
question how successful this grant regime actually is  in terms of the scale of 
necessary public investment to  make it happen.  Together with demonstrating 
VFM, the level of public subsidy is  central to assessing the success or failure 
of  policy.  According to some respondents, whose views have been extensively 
documented  in  this  chapter,  it  is  not  possible  to  come  to  any  meaningful 
conclusions  as  to  the  level  of subsidy  required.  This  is  because  there  is 
insufficient monitoring of  the cost aspect of GRO Grant - funded projects to be 
able to state that developers do not under report their profits. According to the 
findings of this study,  this lack of monitoring has  led to developers making 
more than they say officially or producing a reduced quality of work to  meet 
the IRR restrictions.  This suggests two possible conclusions.  First,  that the 
developers could develop in these areas without, or with less, subsidy being 
paid,  at  a  lower  profit  margin  than  they  are  currently  achieving.  This  is 306 
unlikely because it did not happen when GRO was not available.  Against this 
it could be argued that there was no development in these areas because of the 
reluctance of  the local authority to release land to the private sector.  However, 
the key issue is that developers still feel that there is still a high degree of risk 
in GRO aided projects, particularly within the stated level of allowable return 
of 8-12%.  For developments to happen without GRO there would have to be a 
high profit ratio,  since the  risk would be  so  high.  This  implies that selling 
prices  would  be  very  high.  This  tends  to  discount  that  argument.  This 
suggestion is further undermined by the scale of the subsidy officially offered 
by Scottish Homes, i.e.  up  to 40%.  This alone suggests that non-grant aided 
housing  development  is  not  feasible  without  significant  public  sector 
investment.  Further evidence for  this is  that quality has begun to  decline as 
grant levels decline, because developers are not willing to take risks in these 
new markets. 
A more plausible conclusion is that under the current regime the levels of GRO 
available and the IRR are  simply not realistic  given the level of risk to  the 
developer.  Thus  the  developer  is  forced  to  conceal  costs  and  under report 
profits  to  make  the  return  demanded  by  the  company.  This  was  stated 
explicitly by one developer, implied by others and backed up by the statements 
of public  sector  officials.  The  implication  of this  is  that  more  subsidy  is 
necessary to further reduce risk or that a higher level of profitability should be 
allowed to  balance  risk with return.  Increased  profitability  can  be  achieved 
either by legitimately reducing costs or increasing selling prices. 307 
Only cost reduction would be  feasible  since the  aim is to produce low cost 
home ownership.  Further, the markets are untested for high cost housing and 
developers would be unlikely to  commit themselves to  such a level of risk. 
Thus  low  cost  housing  at  lower  grant  levels  would  be  of lower  quality. 
According to  what some respondents  stated this  is  what is  happening at the 
moment.  This discussion suggests that the local housing markets in these areas 
are much weaker than proponents suggests and that the policy is overstating its 
success in generating private sector investment at the leverage ratios claimed. 
Further, progressive cuts in GRO levels are likely to undermine the success the 
policy has achieved to date as poorer quality housing will limit the growth of 
the  market  and  thus  undermine  the  regime's  contribution  to  regeneration 
strategies.  The  current  system  also  lays  itself open to  question  as  to  why 
monitoring procedures are so lax.  More seriously,  it is open to allegations of 
fraudulence as currently constituted. 
The above are major problems.  It is not clear how the above can be overcome 
other than by increased investment by Scottish Homes and the Scottish Office 
to pursue their aim of promoting home ownership.  A further problem which 
must be addressed is the scale of the developments which GRO is applicable 
to.  Two respondents suggested that GRO was set up to address the problem of 
gap sites in local authoritylhousing association dominated areas, but was not 
able  to  cope  with  a  larger,  more  strategic  approach  involving  estate 
development  with  its  requirement  for  associated  infrastructural  investment 308 
such as roads, electricity, gas, sewerage etc.  This is because it is geared to site 
specific costs only.  This problem, because it increases risk for the developers 
if no  other  sources  of finance  are  forthcoming  from  the  public  sector,  has 
delayed progress on existing developments in the  city on peripheral  estates, 
where access is  a problem.  The system as  stands is suited, with all its major 
problems, to small sites, but is problematic at larger scales.  Thus it is always 
likely  to  be  limited  in  the  contribution  it  can  make  to  urban  regeneration 
strategies. 
Finally, this chapter has  illustrated the difficulties  of the reality of financial 
partnership  between  the  public  and  private  sectors.  At  each  stage  of the 
process, both sides indicated the problematic nature of  the system.  At its most 
basic,  the  issue  is  one  of resolving  differing  objectives  by  engaging  in  a 
process of continual negotiation and conflict resolution to attempt to come to a 
mutually  satisfactory  outcome.  Based on this  research,  it  appears  that this 
process  is  one  in  which,  because  of the  regulatory  system,  the  public  face 
presented and the internal reality are at variance. 309 
CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSIONS 310 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has investigated the impact of attempts to  stimulate private sector 
involvement and investment in the regeneration of disadvantaged areas in the 
city of Glasgow.  Firstly, the causes of persistent deprivation were discussed 
and  the  former  government's  approach  to  resolving  these  issues  based  on 
developing a 'private' ethos in the public sector and the application of a market 
failure rationale for intervention analysed. 
This  was  followed  by  a  reVIew  of historical  developments  which  have 
attempted to  generate private involvement and investment in the regeneration 
process  in the  USA  and  UK,  with  particular  reference  to  the  Scottish  and 
Glaswegian experience. The aim of this chapter was to place the analyses of 
the original fieldwork findings in their context.  A review of the performance 
of the Glasgow economy, the characteristics of disadvantaged areas in the city 
in the  period  leading  up  to  the  time  frame  of the  study  and  the  delivery 
structures for urban policy completed the contextual element of  the research. 
The  key  chapters  of the  thesis  (chapters  5  to  8)  analysed  the  main policy 
oriented  questions  the  research  addressed.  This  was  done  through  detailed 
investigation of the main aspects of involvement and investment which have 
occurred in the city in recent years. 
Firstly,  a survey of  key companies assessed the awareness of, and attitudes to, 
the  regeneration  process  in the  city's  business  community.  Secondly,  the 311 
impacts  of policies  intended  to  increase  private  sector  involvement  on  the 
programmes and organisational structures of regeneration agencies in Glasgow 
were  assessed.  Detailed analysis  of the  effect private  sector representation 
through the mechanism of board membership of regeneration companies has 
had on the way companies are organised and run was carried out. 
Thirdly,  attempts  to  stimulate  private  sector  investment  through  the 
mechanisms  of the  labour  market  by  working  to  develop  private  sector 
participation  in employment advocacy programmes were analysed.  Finally, 
the performance of  the only major scheme taken up by the private sector aimed 
at investment in property development in disadvantaged areas, development of 
housing  for  owner  occupation  through  the  GRO  regime,  was  assessed  in 
detail. This concluding chapter draws together the key findings of  the research. 
2.  THE RATIONALE FOR pruv  ATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION 
Chapter 2 considered the relevance of the dominant market failure rationale to 
the regeneration of depressed areas within the urban economy. It represents an 
attempt  to  bring  the  theoretical  perspective  closer  to  the  reality  of the 
development  process.  The  theory  argues  that  the  market  does  not  work 
perfectly.  There  are  failures  intrinsic  to  the  mechanism  which  impede  the 
efficient operation of the market.  Chapter 2 discussed these various issues in 
detail.  What is important is to emphasise that the approach only recommends 
public sector intervention when there is an identifiable market failure with the 
aim  of improving  the  efficient  operation  of the  economy.  This  causes 312 
problems  when the  policy  is  applied  to  the  issue  of regenerating  depressed 
areas of the urban economy.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis, 
these areas are ones in which many of the problems have been largely caused 
by  the  inefficient  operation  of  markets.  In  their  current  position  the 
populations of  these areas are unlikely to be well placed to benefit. 
The final part of Chapter 2 presented an alternative approach to understanding 
the  causes  of persistent  concentrations  of deprivation.  Social  and  economic 
forces,  such as  the growth of long term unemployment caused by structural 
change in the economy, the structure of  tax and benefit systems and changes in 
family structure have caused concentrations of disadvantage amongst groups in 
society.  For a variety of reasons these groups have become concentrated in 
spatial terms.  The factors that encourage these concentrations act to  reinforce 
one another and can act to lock areas into cycles of  decline. 
In the terminology  of cumulative  causation, the  aim has to  be to  break the 
cycle of decline in these areas.  Fundamentally, regeneration policy based on 
an acceptance  of this  must be redistributive.  The  market  oriented  approach 
pursued by successive governments cannot resolve these issues. The following 
sections of this concluding discussion assess whether, in the recent experience 
of the city of Glasgow, stimulating private sector involvement and investment 
in  a  policy  matrix  constructed  on  redistributive  premises  is  a  tenable 
proposition. 313 
3  THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
The  analysis  in  chapter  3  of the  policy  record  provided  a  number  of 
conclusions.  Firstly,  the  stimulation  of private  sector  involvement  and 
investment in the urban regeneration process has  a long history in the USA, 
while in the UK, the first real drive to  stimulate participation came only after 
1979.  Secondly, in the UK in the 1980s, there was a shift away from the social 
policies  of the  1960s  and  1970s  as  an  attempt was  made  to  refocus  urban 
policy  on  economic  opportunity.  This  drive  was  only  partially  successful. 
Since  the  late  1980s  there  has  been  a  shift back towards  addressing  urban 
problems,  leading  to  the  balanced  approach  now  being  attempted,  i.e. 
addressing both growth and redistributive issues. 
Thirdly, there is  a strong case to  support the contention that there  is  now a 
degree  of convergence  in UK and US  urban policy,  focused  around public-
private partnership, both organisationally and in resource terms.  Mechanisms 
such as Empowerment Zones,  SRB  initiatives and integrated local initiatives 
are the institutional manifestation of these attempts to  solve the problems of 
disadvantaged urban areas.  The private sector role is viewed as  critical to the 
success of these initiatives.  The city of Glasgow offers a policy history which 
is  effectively  an amalgam of these  approaches,  with  an early  concern with 
physical  regeneration  followed  by  engagement  with  the  private  sector  to 
exploit opportunities in the city, and moving into a more balanced approach in 
the  1990s,  attempting  to  work  to  continue  to  develop  opportunities  while 314 
working  to  stimulate  private  participation  m  the  regeneration  of  more 
disadvantaged areas. 
4  THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Chapter Four presented a detailed picture of the performance of the Glasgow 
economy which illustrated its weakness in the decade leading up to the period 
in which this  research was  carried out.  Manufacturing  collapse,  a  stagnant 
service sector and low levels of  entrepreneurship led to low levels of economic 
activity across the city.  These problems were concentrated in disadvantaged 
areas.  Local  initiatives were  set up  to  address  these  issues.  It was  in the 
context  of the  problems  of these  areas  that  this  research  assessed  the 
experience of  agencies attempting to  stimulating private sector participation in 
the regeneration process. The following discussion of the findings of the core 
chapters of  the thesis analyses these impacts. 
5  THE  BUSINESS  COMMUNITY'S  PERSPECTIVE  ON  THE 
URBAN REGENERATION PROCESS. 
Chapter 5 analysed the findings of a wide ranging survey carried out for this 
research of the attitudes  and awareness of the regeneration process  amongst 
key players in  the city's business community. Respondents were questioned 
on their awareness of  the agencies charged with delivering regeneration policy 
in the city,  knowledge of their activities about the nature of the regeneration 
process  and  their  attitudes  to  it.  Attitudes  towards  the  role  of the  private 315 
sector, levels of participation and the potential for increased participation were 
also investigated. 
Awareness of the existence and activities of the agencies in the city charged 
with delivering regeneration policy was low overall, suggesting that agencies 
need to  make  themselves  more  visible  as  a  first  step  to  developing  greater 
private sector knowledge of their activities.  The main findings of the survey 
were that, firstly,  in the main, respondents were supportive of the concept of 
holistic regeneration.  However, there was a lack of understanding as  whether 
or not the goals of policy could be achieved, due to  lack of awareness, lack of 
interest or clear understanding of the  actual goals of policy as  agencies had 
failed to articulate the goals clearly. 
Closely  linked  to  the  above  was  the  finding  that  all  the  components  of 
regeneration policy were viewed as important to greater or lesser degrees in the 
opinion  of the  sample.  Interestingly,  policies  which  were  geared  towards 
resolving  the  problems  of disadvantage  were  rated  as  more  important than 
those which were opportunity driven.  Respondents also felt in the main that 
the  private  sector  could  make  a  unique  contribution  to  the  delivery  of 
regeneration  policy,  principally  by  application  of  their  commercial  and 
business experience to  bring an alternative perspective to the issues.  Further, 
the majority of respondents argued that private sector participation was crucial 
for  successful regeneration,  due  to  the  extra financial  and  expertise resource 
that could be generated and the fact that regeneration policy cannot succeed in 316 
a vacuum without engaging with market institutions and mechanisms at some 
point. 
However, despite the acknowledgement that the issues are very important and 
that  the  private  sector  could  play  an  important  role,  the  great  majority  of 
respondents were not involved in any way in the regeneration process.  This is 
a key point: the problems are acknowledged as crucial, but it was not felt to be 
the role of the companies the respondents represented to do anything about it. 
This  antipathy  towards  involvement  was  further  illustrated  by  the  largely 
negative response to potential methods of stimulating increased private sector 
involvement and investment in the regeneration process. 
A further important point to note is that detailed statistical analysis carried out 
to  try  and  identify  any  differences  in  response  caused  by  the  different 
backgrounds of the companies, such as their size, sector, location of ownership 
and age revealed few statistically significant differences.  This suggests that, 
despite the fact that respondents came from different backgrounds, there does 
appear to be a 'private sector view' given the homogeneity of  opinion. 
In summary, what this survey illustrates well is the problems public agencies 
face if they are to attempt to stimulate greater private sector involvement and 
investment in the regeneration process.  Respondents have an awareness of the 
issues  and  their  importance,  but  are  either  unwilling  or  unable  to  become 
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6  INVOLVEMENT: IMPACTS ON STRATEGY, PROCESS AND 
STRUCTURE 
Chapter 6 assessed the actual impacts that private sector involvement through 
the mechanism of  non executive directorships had on the strategy, process and 
structure of eight  urban regeneration organisations  in the  city  of Glasgow. 
The findings were that private sector directors' reasons for becoming involved 
were  varied,  including  a  feeling  of social  responsibility,  opportunities  for 
personal development and the potential to access patronage and make financial 
gams.  Others  became  involved  by  chance.  The  average  amount  of time 
committed  was  around  two  days  per  month:  board  members  and  chief 
executives  felt  this  was  sufficient  and  that  to  have  more  involvement, 
particularly through board meetings would lead to the organisations becoming 
more bureaucratic.  Further, directors from a private sector background could 
not afford to commit more time. 
The core of chapter 6 discussed the strategic input of private sector directors. 
The key finding  was  that any  input private  sector directors  could have was 
heavily  circumscribed  by  the  political  and  environmental  context.  As 
stakeholders they had very little bargaining power as  the only resource they 
were committing was their own time.  Further, the strategic hierarchy is  still 
largely  informed  by  a  public  sector  cultural  mindset,  despite  the 
'entrepreneurial'  attitude  of many  of the  senior  officers  involved  in  these 318 
organisations.  Private  sector  directors  were  unfamiliar  with  this  operating 
environment.  The potential for private sector directors to  be  'visionaries'  in 
strategic terms  was  constrained by lack of knowledge  of the  complexity  of 
policy issues and the operational structures of the public sector as  well as the 
constraints on autonomous decision making the organisations have to  operate 
under.  There  was  some  evidence  of the  existence  of a  private  sector 
perspective  on  strategic  issues,  in  terms  of  a  focus  on  the  cost  and 
deliverability of programmes, but the overall outcome was one where, for the 
above reasons, tokenism dominated over practical contribution. 
Private  sector  directors'  impact  on  the  process  of delivering  programmes 
within the structures of the organisations was also limited.  Again the political 
and environmental strictures under which the companies operated necessarily 
limited the contribution that could be  made,  as  did the  problems  of lack of 
understanding  of the  issues,  time  to  commit  to  the  organisation  and  the 
predominance of a public sector culture in the companies.  However, within 
this, private sector directors  did have some positive inputs, particularly their 
ability  to  think  commercially  and  transmit  this  to  other  directors  of the 
organisation.  They also assisted senior officers to develop a more commercial 
orientation, particularly on financial and personnel issues. 
One of the most important contributions private sector directors made was to 
give the organisations a measure of independence from the funding agencies as 
they were not accountable to  them in the same way public sector officers or 319 
elected  officials  were.  Finally,  private  sector  representation  gave  the 
regeneration  organisations  routes  into  private  sector  business  networks  that 
they would not have had without involvement and also a measure of credibility 
with the private sector - an essential element of  co-operative working. 
In summary,  the impact of attempts to  develop private sector involvement in 
the  regeneration  process,  defined  as  participation  through  in  the  actual 
organisations charged with delivery, has had limited but, from the perspective 
of directors  and senior officers, positive effects on the  strategy, process  and 
structure of  the organisations. 
7  INVESTMENT THROUGH THE LABOUR MARKET 
Chapter 7 analysed the effect of policies aimed at  developing labour market 
linkages  between disadvantaged  areas  and  employers  through  employment 
advocacy  programmes.  These  attempt,  firstly,  to  develop  people's  abilities 
through  personal  development  and  vocational  training  until  they  reach  a 
situation where  they  are  in  a  position to  compete  effectively  in the  labour 
market.  Secondly, these programmes aim to  assist people to  access the job 
market by working closely with employers to encourage recruitment from their 
client base. 
The  findings  of the  chapter  were  mixed.  There  was  a  lack  of awareness 
amongst  the  companies  consulted  about  both  the  existence  and  available 320 
programmes of those agencies charged with implementing policy.  Although 
policies were rated as highly important by the business community, there was a 
lack  of support  for  the  suggestion that  training  and  employment  advocacy 
policies would encourage greater private sector investment in the regeneration 
process through the labour market. 
Discussion of cases  in which  partnership  working  was  developed provided 
important illustrations of the reality of attempting to  deliver policies such as 
these.  The  main  findings  from  this  section were  that there  was  a  need  to 
develop trust in the competence of both partners.  This was built up through 
communication.  To assist this, there was  a need for a clear articulation of the 
goals and objectives of both sides  in  terms  of what each expected from  the 
other and the hoped-for results.  The public agency had to be prepared to work 
flexibly  and at  pace  to  meet the demands  of the  employer and  consistently 
deliver on commitments to the employer. 
In  summary,  on  the  evidence  presented  here,  employment  advocacy 
programmes have had limited impacts in stimulating private sector investment 
in the regeneration process through labour market intervention.  Much of the 
explanation for this can be accounted for by the lack of awareness of agencies 
and  programmes  in  the  public  sector.  However,  the  survey  suggested  a 
reluctance to get involved on the part of  the private sector, which suggests such 
policies may only ever have an effect at the margins.  What such policies have 
done in the public sector, however, is cause change in the way some training, 321 
jobsearch and recruitment assistance programmes have been organised, with an 
emphasis on customisation,  pace of  delivery and flexibility. 
8  INVESTMENT THROUGH THE HOUSING MARKET 
Chapter 8 provided a detailed insight into the only major mechanism which has 
stimulated  private  sector  property  investment  in  the  regeneration  of 
disadvantaged  areas  of Glasgow:  the  GRO  Grant  deficit  finance  regime 
administered  by  Scottish  Homes.  The  research  found  that  the  regime  has 
begun to redress a major market failure,  namely the absence of local housing 
markets in economically depressed, social housing dominated areas of the city. 
In the  early  years  of its  operation,  1990-93,  the  scheme  stimulated  around 
£22m of private sector investment in depressed areas of  the city.  The low cost 
housing constructed was in most cases successfully sold on the open market, 
principally to first time buyers.  At this level of analysis the scheme appears to 
have been successful and has contributed to the holistic regeneration approach 
adopted by agencies in the city under the auspices of  the GRA. 
However, there are a number of  issues which cast doubt on whether the scheme 
has been as  successful in directly economic terms as  claimed by proponents. 
The key issue here is the level of deficit finance paid to developers.  Evidence 
assembled in Chapter 8 casts doubt on the actual, rather than official, level of 
support the companies involved in investing in GRO projects receive.  This is 
an extremely complex issue, but one which demands attention.  This research 
argued that it appears that developers may be being paid significantly more in 322 
subsidy  as  a  percentage  of total  costs  than  it  seems  at  first  sight,  because 
Scottish Homes' monitoring systems depend largely on self accounting.  The 
viability of the developments in value for money terms and the claims made 
about successfully stimulating housing markets in these areas must be called 
into  question.  Major subsidies  are  being  paid,  but such is  the  scale  of the 
market failure and the tightness of  the 'official' GRO regime that to make what 
they consider an adequate return, according to this research, developers appear 
to  have  concealed  costs  and thus  under-reported  profits to  Scottish Homes. 
This  means  that  any  assessment  of value  for  money  has  little  meaning. 
Further,  if  developers  are  in  reality  being  paid  over  30-40%  of  their 
construction costs to reduce risk to acceptable market levels, then the long term 
viability of  these local housing markets is at best questionable. 
In addition to the maj or questions raised by the above findings, Chapter 8 also 
illustrated  the  problems  that  arise  when  attempting  to  develop  financial 
partnerships  between  the  public  and  private  sectors,  when  the  policy  is 
intended  to  address  multiple  objectives:  profitability  for  the  developer  and 
construction of  private housing for sale in a disadvantaged area for the agency. 
The process  is  characterised by  a constant dialogue  of negotiation as  both 
sides attempt to  manipulate the system in their own interests.  The financial 
aspects discussed above are, in effect, the major manifestation of this process. 
The  research  also  identified  conflicts  over  procedures,  pace  of delivery  of 
decisions and the competence of staff on both sides to deliver. 323 
In  summary,  what  this  aspect  of the  research  found  was  that  property 
investment could be  stimulated in the  regeneration process to  a  degree,  but 
only at the expense of a lack of clarity of  the actual costs to the public purse of 
developments and a protracted, often hostile, negotiation process between the 
partners.  From the developers' perspective the key problems revolved around 
competence, procedures and resource levels, while from the public agency the 
key problem was the development of  trust between the partners. 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  foundations  of the  drive  through the  1980s  and the  1990s  to  stimulate 
private sector involvement and investment in the regeneration process provided 
only a partial view of  the realities of urban problems.  Both the analysis of  the 
problem and the solutions proposed to resolve it were coherent but partial and 
impractical in real world terms.  This research has focused on the impacts in 
Glasgow of one of the elements of this proposed solution to urban problems 
and has  found  major difficulties.  As  has been shown,  there  are  many very 
strong  arguments  which  explain  the  relatively  low  levels  of private  sector 
participation in the urban regeneration process.  This concluding section will 
attempt to  point to  possible  ways  forward  for  a  policy  approach based  on 
public  - private  sector  joint  co-operation  which  might  allow  both  for  an 
increase in the level of private sector participation and in the quality of the 
contribution.  There are  a series of practical steps which could be taken to 324 
avoid the pitfalls reported in this  research and  build on the positive aspects 
where they are present. 
In  the  past,  due  to  the  heavily  ideological  approach  taken  by  successive 
Conservative governments, policy pronouncements as  to the possible role the 
private sector could play were over-optimistic.  The idea that the private sector 
could solve the problems of disadvantaged urban areas was unrealistic as this 
research has shown. The essential point to be understood here is realism.  The 
private sector contribution should be to  provide advice where appropriate and 
act as  an investment partner where it is  financially  viable.  In this sense the 
private sector has to have a foot in both camps, acting as a provider of advice 
and a recipient of service. 
The  first  challenge  for  policy  makers  attempting  to  generate  private  sector 
participation is to raise awareness of their activities in the private sector.  The 
business  survey  and  other  elements  of the  research  reported  in  this  thesis 
highlighted the lack of awareness in the business community of what agencies 
do.  Raising awareness could have the twin impacts of potentially increasing 
the  size  of the  pool  of candidates  and  expertise  in  the  local  business 
community that the agency could tap in to, while also possibly increasing take 
up of services offered by the agency to businesses.  Through developing better 
awareness  agencies  could  begin to  run their  organisations  more  effectively 
with  a  greater  business  input,  while  working  towards  achieving  their 
development aims  by assisting local business  growth.  However, the  survey 325 
also showed that even with raised awareness in the business community, take 
up of services was affected greatly by economic conditions in the city. 
Perhaps  the  greatest  barrier  to  effective  private  sector  participation  m  the 
agencies analysed for this research is the structure of the urban regeneration 
system  in  Glasgow.  Strategic  priorities  are  largely  formed  in  a  top  down 
fashion.  This is clearly shown by the structure of the funding and monitoring 
systems put in place which ensure that effective autonomy at lower levels is 
highly circumscribed.  What this has meant for the local agencies in terms of 
strategy formulation is that strategy has to fit with that of  the agency higher up 
the  system  to  ensure  funding.  Private  sector representatives'  power is  very 
limited over this area of policy, even more so  than those representing public 
agencies because there is  very little private contribution in financial terms in 
these agencies.  Given the way the system is structured, this is  correct as  the 
strategic  hierarchy  is  the  only  real  accountability  mechanism.  However,  it 
limits the local role.  If  the aim of  policy is to constructively engage the private 
sector it may be that more local autonomy is  necessary.  How this would be 
achieved is unclear, but a more effective grounding in local communities with 
genuine partnership between public authorities, the private sector and the local 
population may assist this.  If it is felt that genuine private sector involvement 
would bring major gains  then the  structure would have to  be  reformed to 
enable this  process.  As  currently  structured,  it is  a major barrier to  private 
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The  research  has  also  highlighted  important  issues  in  the  management of 
private sector representatives that if addressed, could have positive effects on 
the contribution made.  In other words, the process within the current structures 
could be  improved to  increase  the  value  of the  private  sector  contribution. 
Urban regeneration agencies  need to  be  clear about  what they  expect  from 
people recruited into the organisation from the private sector.  A key part of 
this  is  realism.  Private sector representatives'  contributions are  likely to  be 
highly time limited.  A clear articulation by the  agency as  to  what they are 
looking for in terms of a contribution would greatly increase the likelihood of 
a worthwhile additional input from the private sector representative.  Given the 
inevitably constrained nature of the level of contribution that can realistically 
be  expected,  the  emphasis  must  be  on  maximising  the  quality  of that 
contribution when it is available.  Further, there must be a realistic appreciation 
by  the  agency  that,  in  the  main,  the  contribution  given  by  private  sector 
representatives should be additional to core management rather than essential 
to the effective running of the organisation.  In other words, the organisation 
should aim to already be running effectively without private sector input - this 
input should assist  it to  run more  effectively.  This  research has  shown that 
when  agencies  are  clear  about  what  their  needs  are,  private  sector 
representatives can make a positive contribution. 
While agencies have to be clear about what it is they expect from private sector 
representatives that become involved in their organisations in terms of clearly 
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they have become involved, that they are  capable of meeting the demands on 
them and that they are willing to commit the time and energy required to meet 
their allotted role.  Essentially this recommendation argues that the principle of 
voluntarism on which private sector participation in agencies is founded has to 
be clearly articulated into a functional role by both parties.  Otherwise, there 
is  a  no-win  situation  for  all  participants.  If agencies  and  private  sector 
representatives are not clear about what they want from participation, then it is 
unlikely  that  there  will  be  any  significant  contribution.  This  research  has 
shown this  to  be  the  case  in  several  of the  organisations  analysed  in  this 
research, while those in which there has been a clearer definition of  roles and a 
greater  commitment  to  maximising  the  contribution  have  generated  some 
benefits from private sector participation. 
In terms of stimulating private  sector investment in the  process through the 
labour market, agencies face major barriers.  Although the importance of the 
work they do  in this area is  recognised, the take up  of their services and the 
clients they  serve  has  been limited.  At a wider level,  the influence  labour 
market policies can have on the recruitment practices of employers is limited, 
because labour market conditions are beyond the control of local and city wide 
agencies.  Where, as has been the case in Glasgow in recent years, employers 
can draw on  a large pool of  unemployed people or people in low paid jobs, the 
role of public agencies is limited.  However, within this given situation, there 
are actions which can be taken to  improve the effectiveness of their policies. 
Programmes have to be tailored to the needs of the client, there must be clear 328 
channels  of communication and  an understanding  of the  responsibilities of 
both partners and an element of flexibility on the part of the agency.  Most 
importantly, agencies have to  deliver on their commitments.  In other words, 
there is a need for excellence in delivery. 
As  with the  issue  of attempting  to  generate  support through  labour market 
policy, an effective housing investment policy has  to  be transparent, flexible 
and deliver.  GRO  as  constituted in the  period of this  research was  neither 
flexible or transparent, while it  did deliver.  The issue of stimulating further 
investment in regeneration through the housing market is,  as this research has 
highlighted,  highly  problematic.  There  is  a  clear  need  for  increased 
transparency of  the process of approval of GRO Grants - the research revealed 
important  flaws  in  the  process.  These  could  be  addressed  by  either  more 
rigorous  assessment of what  developers  actually  spend  or  a  commitment to 
provide  what  is  effectively  the  actual  level  of subsidy  up  front  to  allow 
developers to  make the necessary profits. The latter would be a more honest 
approach and would also  show up  the  real  effectiveness of policy.  If higher 
subsidies are effectively necessary, then policy has to be seen as less successful 
than  claimed.  Housing  markets  in  the  areas  in  which  deficit  finance  was 
available  are  at  a very  early  stage  of development.  In  this  sense  it  is  not 
possible to  say  whether the  eventual  policy  goal  of creating  self sustaining 
housing markets in these areas is  likely to  occur.  Given the level of subsidy 
needed  to  finance  development  carried  out  to  date,  fully  functioning  local 329 
housing markets are unlikely.  The housing may act as an additional entry level 
resource at a city wide scale. 
Finally, what this research shows above all  is  that the effective resolution of 
the problems of disadvantaged areas  is  a very difficult goal to  achieve.  The 
involvement of the private sector in delivery structures and as  an investment 
partner could on this evidence be more effectively achieved than it has to date 
in the  City  of Glasgow.  However,  it  has  to  be  remembered that  policy to 
redress the problems of disadvantaged areas is  fundamentally a redistributive 
policy.  Private  participation  can  assist  more  effective  policy,  but 
fundamentally,  government must provide the finance  to  resolve these  issues. 
The final aim of policy has to be to place the residents and areas in a position 
to  compete equally.  In many ways, this is  untenable as  the dynamics of the 
market and society will always create winners and losers.  However, the aim of 
successful regeneration policy should be to try and ensure that the same people 
and areas do not lose out all the time.  The major role of the private sector in 
this process is  to  act as  an employer and an investor in projects which will 
eventually be self sustaining. This has to be the true goal of  urban policy. 330 
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APPENDIX 2: INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED Note: Job titles and positions held were current at time of interview 
Individuals involved in the urban regeneration process 
Agnes Samuel, chief executive, Glasgow Opportunities (2 interviews) 
Alan Lees, director, Gorbals Initiative 
Alan Lees, director, Govan Initiative 
357 
Alex  Robertson,  Area  Manager,  Glasgow  District,  Scottish  Homes  (2 
interviews) 
Anne Brookes, chief executive, CEDA (2 interviews) 
Bill Hughes, chief executive, GEDC (2 interviews) 
Brian McAleenan, chief executive, East End Partnership (2 interviews) 
Brian Morgan, Director, Castlemilk  Partnership (3  interviews) 
Charlie Shepherd, project manager, Gorbals Initiative Construction 
Employment Initiative 
Charlie Williamson, director, Gorbals Initiative 
Clare Lynn, training manager, Govan Initiative 
Clive Aranson, member, Castlemilk Business Support Group, representing 
McDonalds 
David  Nichol,  Chief  Information  Officer,  Development  Funding  Unit, 
(Glasgow), Scottish Homes 
David Peutherer, Assistant Chief Executive, Strathclyde Regional Council 
David Usher, Strategy Team, Scottish Enterprise 
Douglas Russell, Managing Director, Morrison Homes Fiona Ellis, Deputy Chief Executive, Castlemilk Economic Development 
Agency 
George Hall, Scottish Business in the Community 
Gordon Kennedy, Director, Corporate Development, Glasgow Development 
Agency 
Harry O'Donnell, Managing Director, Miller Partnerships 
lain Walker, Chairman, East End Partnership 
Jackie Forbes,  member, Castlemilk Business Support group, representing 
Miller Partnerships 
Jan Zadruzynski, director, Greater Easterhouse Development Company 
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Janice Roache,  Area Regeneration Directorate, Glasgow Development Agency 
Jim  Coleman, 
interviews) 
Urban  Regeneration  Divisional  Director,  Wimpey  (2 
Jim Tannock, Manager, Drumchapel Business Support Group 
John Campbell, chief executive, Glasgow North 
John Gallagher, chairman, CEDA (2 interviews) 
John Gilmore, director, Glasgow Opportunities 
John Jenkins,  District Manager, Scottish Homes 
John Kennedy, member, Castlemilk Business Support group, representing 
Scottish Nuclear 
John McDonagh, director Govan Initiative 
John Moorhouse, director, GEDC (3 interviews) 
John Thorburn, chairman, GEDC 
John Watson, chief executive, Gorbals Initiative (2 interviews) 359 
Linda Anderson, District Manager,Scottish Homes 
Martin Davidson, Director, Property and Environment, Glasgow Development 
Agency 
Mike Carey, Assistant Managing Director, Cruden Estates Ltd 
Mike Galloway, director, Crown Street  Regeneration Project 
Nan Campbell, training manager, Glasgow North Limited 
Peter Stott, Director, Partnerships Office, Strathclyde Regional Council 
Ron Cully, chief executive, Govan Initiative (2 interviews) 
Steve Inch, Director, Glasgow City Council Economic Regeneration Unit (2 
interviews) 
Steve McDonald, manager, Costco Ltd 
Stuart Gulliver, chief executive, Glasgow Development Agency (3 interviews) 
Sue Lindsay, board member, Govan Initiative 
Tom Harkins, Castlemilk Business Support Group manager 
Willie Docherty, Project Development Manager, Glasgow North Limited 
Companies consulted  for business survey 
Anderson Plant Ltd 
Ashbourne Holdings 
Babcock 
Barclay and Mathieson (Stockbrokers) 
Barr and Stroud 
Bodyshop International 
Bonnypack Ltd Bowie Castlebank 
Britannia Life Ltd 
CA Industrial 
CA Industrial Finance 
Central Building Contractors (Glasgow) Ltd 
City Site Estates 
Clyde Blowers pIc 
Clydeport Ltd 
Cmden Estates Ltd 
Cunningham and Shearer 
Cunninghame and Shearer (Holdings) Ltd 
Douglas Laing 
EFT Finance Ltd 
Ellis and MacDougall Lifts 
F  orthwright Holdings 
George Leslie and Co. Ltd 
George Leslie Ltd 
Grampian Holdings 
Gray Dunn and Co. 
Henry Boot 
Henry Brothers 
Howden 
Hunter and Clark Ltd 
Hussman Refrigeration 
360 Jarvis Potter 
John Dickie 
JW Filshill 
KB Refrigeration 
Kent Foods 
Levy McCallum 
MacGas 
Marblehead 
Matthew Algie and Co. 
McGhees Ltd 
McTaggart (Western Heritable) Holdings 
Morris and Spottiswood Ltd 
Morris Furniture 
Morrison Bowmore Distillers 
Norit (UK) 
Office Cleaning Services 
Peacock Salt Ltd 
Pegler and Loudon Ltd 
Reliable Vehicles Ltd 
Sanrnex 
Scott Stem Associates 
Scottish Opera 
Scottish Power 
Scottish Pride 
361 SECC Ltd 
Skylight International Ltd 
The Campbell Group 
Thorburn Holdings 
Walker Engineering Ltd 
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APPENDIX  3:  CHAPTER  5:  SOURCES  AND  METHOD  FOR 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 364 
The source used to target the sample was 'Metropolitan Glasgow - Glasgow's 
Top  200  Companies'  published  jointly  in  1995  by  Glasgow  Development 
Agency  and  Glasgow  City  Council.  This  guide  lists  the  city's  top  200 
companies ranked by number of employees, turnover and profitability.  Each 
company  was  initially  contacted  by  letter  informing  the  Chairman,  Chief 
Executive,  Managing  Director or other senior individual that they  would be 
contacted by telephone to request their participation in the study.  In the event, 
60 of  the 200 companies agreed to participate, giving a response rate of 30% of 
the initial target group.  The 60 telephone interviews were conducted between 
June and August  1996.  At first  sight,  a response rate  of 30%  appears  low. 
However,  two  key  mitigating  factors  must  be  taken  into  account  in  any 
rounded analysis of the validity of the survey.  Firstly, and most importantly, 
the  seniority of the  target group  made  it  almost inevitable that it would be 
difficult to gain consent for participation.  By definition, people operating at a 
senior level within companies tend to have hectic schedules - to get almost one 
third to  give up  some of their time (interviews lasted 30 minutes on average) 
could be seen as a good result when this is taken into account. 
A second linked point to note is that, when making first contact in carrying out 
the survey, a less senior person was often offered by the Managing Director, 
Chief Executive  or  Chairman.  This  was  refused  on the  grounds  discussed 
above  - the  views  of less  senior staff were  less  likely  to  coincide  with the 
'company view'.  Only those who were in a position to take an overview of 365 
company  policy  were  deemed  eligible.  To  have  accepted  less  semor 
individuals  as  respondents  would  have  sacrificed  quality  of response  for 
quantity.  This stringent selection necessarily limited the response rate:  if all 
those  offered  for  interview  by  targeted  companies  had  been  accepted,  the 
response rate would have been 45%:  30  companies passed on the request to 
less senior staff who were not in a position to usefully contribute and were thus 
not included in the survey analysis. 366 
APPENDIX 4:  CHAPTER 5: QUESTIONNAIRE STRUCTURE 367 
The questionnaire can be divided into sections: 
.,  background information about the responding company. 
«I  levels of knowledge of the current delivery structures for  progressing 
urban regeneration in the city and the key activities being pursued by 
these agencies. 
III  levels of  knowledge about the nature of  the urban regeneration process. 
III  attitudes  to,  and  levels  of involvement  in,  the  urban  regeneration 
process. 
•  the  potential  for  increasing  participation by  the  private  sector  in the 
urban regeneration process. 
The  rationale for  question selection is  discussed below.  A copy  of the full 
questionnaire used can be found in Appendix 5 of  the thesis. 
(aJ  Background Information 
Respondents were  asked their position in the  company,  the  location of the 
company's main premises in the city.  and its core business.  Next the turnover 
of the company in the most recent year (1995-96) and the number of people 
employed in the city by the company were requested.  This was followed by an 
enquiry about the  nature of the company's premises  in the city,  i.e.,  branch 
plant, single site or headquarters and where the company was owned, i.e.  in 
Glasgow, Scotland the UK or other forms of ownership such as a stock market 
listing  which  has  no  geographical  ties.  The  final  question  asked  when  the 
company was founded and how long it had been in the city.  The purpose of 368 
this section of  the questionnaire was to gain an insight into the nature, structure 
and scale of  the companies' operations. 
(b)  Levels of  Knowledge of  Current Delivery Structures 
The first  section of the questionnaire began the enquiry  by  investigating the 
awareness  of respondents  about the  range  of agencies  currently  involved in 
delivering regeneration policy in the city.  The intention of this was to  assess 
the profile of the various agencies in the business community.  Respondents 
were first asked if they had heard of the agencies concerned.  They were then 
asked if  they were aware of  the activities of  the various organisations.  Finally 
participants were questioned as to  whether they knew about the main policies 
these agencies were charged with delivering.  Each stage of questioning thus 
provided an estimate of the depth of awareness in the business community of 
the respective agencies. 
(c)  Knowledge about the Nature of  the Urban Regeneration Process 
In this  section of the  questionnaire,  respondents were asked three  questions. 
Firstly they were asked if they felt regeneration policy as currently constituted 
in the city has social, economic and physical/environmental aspects embedded 
within it.  The aim of this question was to assess awareness of the components 
of policy:  in  otherwords  to  assess  basic  knowledge  of the  nature  of the 
regeneration process.  This assessment was moved further forward into more 
detail by asking if  respondents saw a connection between these components of 
policy.  The intention was to gain an insight into whether the currently popular 369 
concept of  holistic regeneration had much support amongst the sample.  In this 
introductory section, a final enquiry was made asking respondents if they felt 
the current goals of  policy in the city were achievable,  to assess if, firstly, they 
knew what the goals of policy were and secondly if they felt that these goals 
were realisable.  Taken together, these three  questions provided insights into 
awareness  of the  components  and  goals  of policy.  They  also  provided  an 
initial indication of  the credibility of  policy in the view of  the sample. 
Once these initial awareness questions were asked, respondents were asked to 
give their views  on the  relative importance of fifteen policies, ranging from 
'problem-oriented'  issues  such  as  'training  unemployed  people'  and 
'encouraging  residents  of disadvantaged  areas  to  start  and  run  their  own 
companies' to 'opportunity-driven' policies such as 'improving and developing 
the  environment  of the  central  area  of the  city'  and  'helping  successful 
companies to develop and grow further'.  Respondents were asked to give their 
views on the importance on policy of  a scale of 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very 
important). The purpose of this line of questioning was to  assess the relative 
weightings  given  by  the  business  community  to  the  policies  which,  taken 
together,  make up  a cross  section of the  broad spread of actions  commonly 
asserted to be components of a holistic regeneration policy at both city wide 
and  local  area  level.  The  key  aim  was  to  assess  whether  the  respondents 
thought regeneration policy should be redistribution or growth-oriented.  This 
analysis was further developed by asking respondents what they thought was 
the most important element of  policy which should be targeted 370 
(d)  Attitudes to the Regeneration Process 
This  section of the  questionnaire  had  four  aims.  The  first  of these  was  to 
assess  whether  respondents  felt  private  sector  participation  could  make  a 
distinctive  contribution  to  the  regeneration  process.  This  is  a  commonly 
asserted  rationale  advanced  for  attempting  to  stimulate  involvement  by 
advocates as an aid to delivering successful regeneration.  Asking the business 
community themselves if they felt this to  be true provided important insights 
into their feelings on this.  A supplementary question probed further,  seeking 
to elicit the reasoning behind their answer. 
The above was followed up by asking a linked question: namely whether or not 
they  felt  that  private  sector  participation  was  key  to  success  in  delivering 
regeneration  policy.  Again,  the  background  to  this  is  that  advocates  of 
stimulating  private  sector  involvement  argue  this  is  a  critical  element  m 
achieving regeneration.  The survey sought to  assess if this was supported by 
the sample.  The reasons given for their answers were also investigated through 
a supplementary question. 
Following  questioning  as  to  the  necessity  and  nature  of private  sector 
participation in the regeneration process,  respondents were asked whether their 
companies  were  in  any  way  involved  in  the  process,  the  purpose  being  to 
assess the levels of involvement.  Where the respondent stated the company 
was  involved  in  the  process,  they  were  asked  about  the  nature  of their 371 
involvement.  Where no  participation was  reported,  respondents  were  asked 
why they were not involved, to assess possible barriers to stimulating increased 
involvement and investment. 
In summary, this important section of the questionnaire had four main aims: to 
assess opinions on the nature and necessity of private sector participation; to 
measure levels of involvement amongst the sample; to  understand reasons for 
non-participation and  finally  to  analyse the  form  participation took amongst 
those companies who were involved in the regeneration process. 
(e)  The Potential for Increased Participation 
Following on from the above section, respondents were presented with a range 
of policies which could potentially increase participation in the  regeneration 
process,  either  by  stimulating  more  involvement  in  the  delivery  of policy 
through organisational participation or attracting private sector investment into 
regeneration programmes.  Respondents were asked to rate possible options on 
a scale of 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important).  Participants were asked 
if  the following could stimulate more involvement: 
fII  a request by public agencies for companies to become involved. 
fII  the availability of  financial and staff resources. 
«II  the gaining of  more positive publicity for companies. 
It  if  there was an internal need in the company to develop staff through 
secondment. 
fII  the company would feel it was making a worthwhile contribution. 372 
On possible ways to stimulate increased investment, respondents were asked if 
the following options could lever in additional resources to the process from 
the private sector: 
•  providing  financial  incentives  or  property  development  III 
disadvantaged areas. 
•  providing  financial  incentives  for  comparnes  to  relocate  to  areas 
targeted for regeneration. 
•  provision of  secure premises with adequate local infrastructure. 
41  provision of financial  resources to  take on trainees from  regeneration 
areas. 
•  improvement of  the quality of  the local labour force to make them more 
attractive to employers. 
The rationale behind this section of  the questionnaire was to develop a series of 
insights into policies that have traditionally been viewed as  the key routes to 
stimulating  additional private  sector involvement and  investment.  The  aim 
was to  see  if,  in the  opinion of the  sample,  they represented tenable  policy 
options to enhance involvement and investment levels. 
(f)  Summary 
This appendix has outlined the structure of, and rationale for, the contents of 
the questionnaire used to  provide insights into  the  attitudes in the business 373 
community  towards  the  regeneration  process.  The  questionnaire  covered 
respondents' : 
CD  background information 
CD  levels of  knowledge of  current delivery structures in the city 
CD  knowledge about the nature of  the regeneration process 
CD  attitudes to the regeneration process 
CD  opinions on the potential for increased participation. 374 
APPENDIX 5 : BUSINESS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE A  Background information 
1  What is your position in the company? 
2  Where is the main factory/office located in the city? 
City Centre  1 
Regeneration Alliance Priority Area  2 
Other  3 
3  What is the company's main line of business? 
4  What is the company's turnover? 
5 
<10 
How many people does the company employ in the city? 
1 
10 - 49 
50 - 99 
100 - 499 
500 - 999 
>1000 
6  Is the company a 
single site operation? 
a branch of a larger company? 
a headquarters of a lager company 
7  Is the company 
owned within the city? 
Scottish owned? 
UK owned 
Other  __________________________  ___ 
8  When was the company founded? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
375 9  How long has the company been in Glasgow? 
10  Would you say urban regeneration is 
an economic policy 
a social policy 
a physical/environmental policy 
Yes  Don't Know 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
11  Is  there 
environmental 
a  connection  between  the  social,  economic 
aspects of the process? 
Yes  Don't Know 
1  2 
b)  Could you expand on this? 
12  Do you feel the current goals of policy are achievable? 
b)  Could you expand on this? 
Yes 
1 
Donut Know 
2 
376 
No 
3 
3 
3 
and 
No 
3 
No 
3 
13  Which of the following  are important in the urban regeneration 
process,  in your opinion? 
(i)  training unemployed people? Very Unimportant  Neutral 
1  2  3 
(ii)  assisting unemployed people to find jobs? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
(iii)  improving social housing? 
Neutral 
3 
Very Unimportant  Neutral 
123 
4 
4 
377 
Very important 
4  5 
Very important 
5 
Very important 
5 
(iv)  building new housing for owner occupation in areas of 
disadvantage? 
Very Unimportant  Neutral  Very important 
12345 
(v)  developing local services in areas of disadvantage? 
Very Unimportant  Neutral  Very important 
12345 
(vi)  assisting start up businesses and existing companies in areas of 
disadvantage? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
Very important 
5 
(vii)  providing quality premises in areas of disadvantage to encourage 
companies to relocate to them? 
Very Unimportant  Neutral 
123  4 
Very important 
5 
(viii)  improving roads and other transport services within and to areas 
of disadvantage? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
Very important 
5 
(ix)  helping existing successful companies in the city to develop and 
grow further? Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
378 
Very important 
5 
(x)  focusing on successful areas in the city and working to sustain 
their  success? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3 
(xi)  helping those in work develop their skills? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3 
4 
4 
Very important 
5 
Very important 
5 
(xii)  developing and improving the environment of the central area of 
the city? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
Very important 
5 
(xiii)  developing the transport and communications infrastructure of the 
city centre business district? 
Very Unimportant  Neutral 
123 
(xiv)  improving the health ofthe population? 
Very Unimportant 
1  2 
Neutral 
3 
(xv)  improving educational standards? 
Very Unimportant  Neutral 
123 
4 
4 
4 
Very important 
5 
Very important 
5 
Very important 
5 
14  Of  the above, what is the most important factor that the urban 
regeneration  policy makers should address? 379 
15  Do you feel that private sector representatives and companies can 
make a distinctive contribution to the regeneration process? 
Yes  Don't Know  No 
1  2  3 
b)  Could you expand on this? 
16  Do  you  feel  that  private  sector  participation  is  a  necessary 
prerequisite of successful urban regeneration? 
Yes  Don't Know  No 
3  1  2 
b)  Could you expand on this? 
17  Is  your  companies  directly  involved  in  urban  regeneration 
activities?  In this context, by 'urban regeneration', I  mean attempts to 
resolve  the  problems  of  depressed  areas  within  Glasgow  and  their 
populations. 
Yes 
1 
18  What form does/did this involvement take? 
Company employees sit on the board  1 
Secondment of staff to regeneration agencies  1 
BSG membership  1 
Sponsorship/association with regeneration  1 
Property investment  1 
Employing trainees from disadvantaged areas  1 
No 
2 
Most important 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 Encouraging residents to apply for jobs 
Purchase of goods from disadvantaged areas 
Other  ______________________  _ 
1 
1 
1 
7 
8 
9 
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19  Why  is  your  company  not  directly  involved  in  regeneration 
activities? 
Most important 
Have never been asked  1  1 
Not interested  1  2 
Not the place ofthe private sector to be involved  1  3 
Cannot spare staff resources  1  4 
No financial benefit to the company  1  5 
Would gain little publicity from involvement  1  6 
Private sector is never listened to  1  7 
Other  1  8 
20  How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
regeneration process? 
a)  Involvement 
i)  if  the company was asked 
Strongly agree  Neutral  Strongly Disagree 
123  4  5 
ii)  if the company could spare financial resources and staff time 
Strongly agree  Neutral  Strongly Disagree 
1  2  3  4  5 
iii)  if more positive PR was gained than is currently the case 
Strongly agree  Neutral  Strongly Disagree 
1  2  3  4  5 
iv)  if  there was a need to develop staff through secondment 
Strongly agree 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
Strongly Disagree 
5 
v)  if it was felt the company would have a positive influence 
Strongly agree  Neutral  Strongly Disagree 
1  2  3  4  5 381 
b)  Investment 
i)  if  there  was  provision  of  financial  incentives  for  property 
development in a regeneration area 
Strongly agree  Neutral 
123  4 
Strongly Disagree 
5 
ii)  if there were financial incentives to relocate to a regeneration area 
Strongly agree  Neutral  Strongly Disagree 
1  2  3  4  5 
iii)  if  there  were  available,  secure  premises  with  back  up 
infrastructure 
Strongly agree 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
Strongly Disagree 
5 
iv)  if  there  were  financial  incentives  to  take  on  trainees  from 
regeneration  areas 
Strongly agree 
1  2 
Neutral 
3  4 
Strongly Disagree 
5 
v)  if  quality  trainees/employees  were  available  to  recruit  in 
regeneration areas 
Strongly agree 
1 
21  Have you heard of: 
2 
Glasgow Development Agency 
Neutral 
3  4 
Glasgow City Council Economic Regeneration Unit 
Glasgow Opportunities 
Castlemilk Economic Development Agency 
Greater Easterhouse Development Company 
Govan Initiative 
Gorbals Initiative 
Glasgow North Limited 
Strongly Disagree 
5 
Yes  No 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
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East End Partnership  1  2 
Drumchapel Opportunities  1  2 
New Horizons (Pollok)  1  2 
Glasgow Regeneration Alliance  1  2 
13  Do  you  know  anything  about  the  activities  of  the  following 
agencies? 
(a)  Glasgow Development Agency 
Yes  No 
1  2 
Are they mainly concerned with 
Most important 
training  1  1 
housing  1  2 
environmental improvement  1  3 
employment access  1  4 
property development  1  5 
business start up  1  6 
helping companies grow  1  7 
Other  1  8 
(b)  Glasgow City Council Economic Regeneration Unit? 
Yes  No 
1  2 
Are they mainly concerned with 
Most important 
training  1  1 
housing  1  2 
environmental improvement  1  3 
employment access  1  4 
property development  1  5 
business start up  1  6 
helping companies grow  1  7 
Other  1  8 383 
(c)  Glasgow Opportunities? 
Yes  No 
1  2 
Are they mainly concerned with 
Most important 
training  1  1 
housing  1  2 
environmental improvement  1  3 
employment access  1  4 
property development  1  5 
business start up  1  6 
helping companies grow  1  7 
Other  1  8 
(  e)  Glasgow has eight local initiatives (i.e. Govan Initiative, 
Castlemilk Economic Development Agency, Glasgow North 
etc).  Do you know anything about the activities of these 
agencies? 
Are they mainly concerned with 
training 
housing 
environmental improvement 
employment access 
property development 
business start up 
helping companies grow 
Other 
Yes 
1 
Most important 
1  1 
1  2 
1  3 
1  4 
1  5 
1  6 
1  7 
1  8 
No 
2 (t))  Glasgow Regeneration Alliance? 
Yes 
1 
(i)  Do you know who the partners are in the Alliance? 
(ii)  Who are they? 
Glasgow Development Agency 
Glasgow City Council 
Strathclyde Regional Council 
Scottish Homes 
Yes 
1 
(iii)  Do you know what the aims of the Alliance are? 
END 
Yes 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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No 
2 
No 
2 
No 
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APPENDIX 6: DETAILED RESULTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
IN CHAPTER 5 AND SHORT COMMENTARY 386 
(i)  Introduction 
This  Appendix  presents  detailed  analysis  of the  chi  square  and  logistic 
regression analysis carried out on the data set.  The headings in bold identify 
the chapter section in which the analysis is  referred to.  The numbers for the 
figures follow the classification in the text. 
(ii) Chapter 5 (3) - Awareness of Current Delivery Structures 
Chi  square  tests  for  significance  of the  background  variables  of age  of 
company, number of employees, sector and location of ownership were carried 
out  to  assess  if the  background  variables  had  any  apparent  effect  on  the 
responses to the above awareness questions.  The results are presented below. 
As with previous chi square tests, recoded background variables were used as 
the size of sample invalidated tests carried out on the original data.  As Figure 
A6.1  shows, no significant differences emerged from the chi square analysis of 
responses to the question of awareness of Glasgow Development Agency, with 
p  values  ranging  from  0.23  to  3.9.  There  were  some  differences  which 
emerged,  however,  with companies  less  than 49  years  old and  those  in  the 
manufacturing and construction sectors reporting higher awareness as did those 
owned outwith Glasgow and companies with more than 100 employees. 387 
Figure A6.1: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of Glasgow 
Development Agency?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Yes  47.4  33.3  n=60 ,p=O.27 ,df=1 
No  52.6  66.7 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Yes  58.2  100  n=58 , p=3.9 , df=1 
No  41.8  0 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  33.9  100  n=59 , p=2.6 , df= 1 
No  66.1  0 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  54.5  100  n=58, p=3.9 , df=l 
No  45.5  0 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Figure A6.2 reports the results for the chi square tests carried out to  test for 
significant differences  in response  to  the  question of awareness  of the  City 
Council's  Economic  Regeneration  Unit.  Again,  no  significant  differences 
emerged,  with p  values  in the  range  0.23  to  3.5.  Differences  which  were 
apparent  were  that  companies  with  less  than  49  employees,  service  sector 
companies, those owned in Glasgow and those with less  than 99  employees 
were more aware of  the agency. 388 
Figure A6.2: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of Glasgow 
City Council Economic Regeneration Unit?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  58.2  44.4  n=58, p=1.2 , df=l 
No  41.8  55.6 
Services  ManufiCon  n, p, df 
Yes  57.1  22.2  n=60, p=1.7 , df=l 
No  42.9  77.8 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  34.1  27.8  n=59 , p=0.23 ,df=1 
No  65.9  72.2 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  60  33.3  n=58, p=3.5 , df=1 
No  40  66.7 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Chi  square  tests  on  the  responses  to  awareness  of Strathclyde  Business 
Development identified no  significant differences  (Figure  A6.3).  However, 
companies less  than 49  years  old,  service  sector companies, those owned in 
Glasgow and those with more than 100 employees were more aware ofSBD. 389 
Figure  A6.3:  Chi  square  test  results  for  response  to  question  'have  you  heard  of 
Strathclyde Business Development?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Yes  60  44.6  n=58 , p=1.2 , df=l 
No  40  55.4 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Yes  51.2  36.8  n=60, p=1.08 , df=l 
No  48.8  63.2 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  36.6  22.2  n=59, p=1.l8 ,df=l 
No  63.4  77.8 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  50  55.6  n=58, p=0.15 ,df=l 
No  50  44.4 
Notes: n=number a/responses, p=Pearson chz square value, d/=degrees a/freedom 
As Figure A6.4  shows, tests on awareness of Glasgow Opportunities showed 
no significant differences in the responses when the background variables were 
tested, with p values ranging from 0.31  to 6.8.  Companies aged less than 49 
years  and  those  in  the  service  sector  were  more  aware  of  Glasgow 
Opportunities, as were Glasgow owned companies and those with less than 99 
employees. 390 
Figure A6.4: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of Glasgow 
Opportunities?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Yes  62  12.5  n=58 , p=6.8 , df=l 
No  38  87.5 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Yes  48.1  37.5  n=60 ,p=0.31 , df=l 
No  51.9  62.5 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Yes  35.3  12.5  n=59 , p=1.6 , df=l 
No  64.7  87.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  54  37.5  n=58, p=0.75 , df=l 
No  46  62.5 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Figure A6.5  reports the results for chi  square tests for significant differences 
based on the background variables  on responses to  awareness of Castlemilk 
Economic  Development  Agency.  Age,  sector  and  location  of ownership 
produced no significant differences.  On the employment background variable, 
a significant difference was noted (p=O.Ol), with larger companies more aware 
of  the agency than those with less than 99 employees. Figure A6.5 : Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of 
Castlemilk Economic Development Agency?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Yes  50  61.5  n=58  p=O.77 , df=l 
No  50  38.5 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  58.1  34.5  n=60  p=0.34, df=l 
No  41.9  65.5 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  36.4  26.9  n=59  p=0.59, df=l 
No  63.6  73.1 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  51.5  52  n=58, p=O.Ol  , df=l 
No  48.5  48 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson ChI square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
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Chi  square  tests  for  significant  differences  to  the  response  to  the  Issue  of 
awareness  of Greater  Easterhouse  Development  Company  found  that  the 
background  variables  had  no  significant  differences,  with  p  values  ranging 
from 0.4 to 4.4.  However, older companies, those in the service sector, those 
owned in Glasgow and  companies  with more than  100  employees  reported 
higher awareness levels (FigureA6.6). 392 
Figure A6.6: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of Greater 
Easterhouse Development Company?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Yes  41.4  69  n=58, p=4A , df=l 
No  58.6  31 
Services  ManufiCon  n,p,df 
Yes  52.6  43.9  n=60, p=OAO , df=l 
No  47A  56.1 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  40  24.1  n=59 , p=1.7 , df=! 
No  60  75.9 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  26.3  35.0  n=58, p=OA5 , df=l 
No  73.7  65.0 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Figure A6.7  reports the results of chi square tests for significant differences in 
responses  to  the  question  'have  you  heard  of East  End  Partnership  Ltd?'. 
Again, no significant differences emerged, with p values of 0.4 to 4.6.  Older 
companies, those in the service sector, those owned in Glasgow and with more 
than 100 employees had higher awareness. 393 
Figure A6.7: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of East End 
Partnership Ltd?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  48.3  62.1  n=58 , p=l.l , df=l 
No  51.7  37.9 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  52.6  43.9  n=60, p=O.4O , df=l 
No  47.4  56.1 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  43.3  20.7  n=59 , p=3.4 , df=l 
No  56.7  79.3 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  22.2  61.2  n=58, p=4.6 ,df=l 
No  77.8  38.8 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson ChI square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
On the issue of awareness of Govan Initiative, on the background age,  sector 
and  ownership  variables,  no  significant  differences  emerged  from  the  chi 
square tests, but older companies, those in manufacturing and construction and 
those owned outside Glasgow were more aware of the agency.  However, on 
the  employment  size  background  variable,  a  significant  difference  was 
observed, with a p value of 0.04.  Companies with more than 100 employees 
were more aware of Govan Initiative than those with less than 99 employees 
(Figure A6.8). 394 
Figure A6.8: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of Govan 
Initiative LtdT 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  53.2  63.6  n=58, p=0.39 , df=1 
No  46.8  36.4 
Services  Manuf/Constructio  n, p, df 
n 
Yes  42.9  63.6  n=60, p=1.56 , df=1 
No  57.1  36.4 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  31.3  36.4  n=59, p=O.ll ,df=l 
No  68.8  63.6 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  51.1  54.5  n=58, p= 0.04, df=l 
No  48.9  45.5 
Notes: n=number of  responses, p=Pearson chi square value, df=degrees offreedom 
Figure A6.9 reports the results of chi square tests for significant differences in 
response  to  the  question  'have  you  heard  of the  Gorbals  Initiative?'.  No 
statistically significant results  emerged,  with p  values  ranging  from  0.30  to 
0.77.  Differences  which  did  emerge  were  that  younger  companies  and 
manufacturing  and  construction  companies  reported  more  awareness  as  did 
Glasgow owned companies and larger employers. 395 
Figure A6.9: Chi square test results for response to question'  have you heard of Gorbals 
Initiative?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  61.5  50.0  n=58, p=O.77 , df=l 
No  38.5  50.0 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  42.9  50.0  n=60, p=0.30 , df=1 
No  57.1  50.0 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Yes  37.0  28.1  n=59, p=0.53 , df=1 
No  63.0  71.9 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  46.2  56.3  n=58, p=0.59 , df=1 
No  53.8  43.8 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson chI square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
Chi  square  tests  for  significant  differences  in  the  background  variables  in 
response  to  the  question  of awareness  of Glasgow  North  Ltd  revealed  no 
statistically significant differences.  However,  older companies,  and those in 
the service sector were  more aware as  were  Glasgow owned companies and 
larger employers (Figure A6.1 0). Figure A6.10: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of 
Glasgow North Ltd?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
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Yes  47.1  58.5  n=58 , p=0.64 , df=l 
No  52.9  41.5 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  58.1  34.5  n=60 , p=3.35 , df=l 
No  41.9  65.5 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Yes  38.9  29.3  n=59 , p=0.53 , df=l 
No  61.1  70.7 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  38.9  57.5  n=58, p=1.7 ,df=l 
No  61.1  42.5 
Notes: n=number ojresponses, p=Pearson ChI square value, dj=degrees ojfreedom 
On the issue of awareness of  Drumchapel Opportunities, chi square tests on the 
background  variables  produced  no  statistically  significant  results  (Figure 
A6.11) with p values ranging from  0.09 to  1.34.  Companies established for 
more than 50 years, those in manufacturing and construction, those owned in 
Glasgow  and  those  with  less  than  99  employees  were  more  aware  of the 
agency. Figure A6.11: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of 
Drumchapel Opportunities Ltd?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  66.7  50.0  n=58, p=l.4, df=l 
No  33.3  50.0 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Yes  30.0  50.0  n=60, p=1.34, df=l 
No  70.0  50.0 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  26.3  35.0  n=59, p=0.45 , df=l 
No  73.7  65.0 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Yes  52.6  51.3  n=58,  p=0.09, df=l 
No  47.4  48.7 
Notes: n=number ojresponses, p=Pearson chi square value, dj=degrees ojfreedom 
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Figure  A6.12  reports  the  results  for  chi  square  tests  for  significance  of the 
background variables for variations in awareness of New Horizons.  The age, 
sector  and  employment  size  variables  produced  no  statistically  significant 
results.  However,  the  ownership  variable  (p=O.03)  showed that  companies 
owned outwith the city were statistically more likely to be aware of  the agency 
than those owned in Glasgow 398 
Figure A6.12: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of New 
Horizons?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  22.2  61.2  n=58 ,p=4.7 , df=l 
No  77.8  38.8 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  40.0  48.0  n=60, p=0.21, df=l 
No  60.0  52.0 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  30.0  32.7  n=59 , p=0.03 , df=l 
No  70.0  67.3 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  40.0  54.2  n=58, p=0.67 , df=l 
No  60.0  45.8 
Notes: n=number of  responses, p=Pearson chi square value, df=degrees offreedom 
The  final  chi  square  tests  on  the  impact  of the  background  variables  on 
awareness  of agencies  tested  for  significant  differences  in  response  to  the 
question  of awareness  of Glasgow  Regeneration  Alliance.  No  statistically 
significant  differences  emerged,  with  p  values  ranging  from  0.22  to  2.28 
However, there was some variation, with younger companies, manufacturing 
and  construction  companies,  those  owned  outside  Glasgow  and  larger 
companies more likely to be aware of  the Alliance (Figure A6.13). Figure A6.13: Chi square test results for response to question 'have you heard of the 
Glasgow Regeneration Alliance?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  77.8  51.0  n=58 , p=1.3 , df=! 
No  22.2  49.0 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  35.0  60.0  n=60, p=0.22 , df=l 
No  65.0  40.0 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Yes  20.0  34.7  n=59, p=0.83 , df=l 
No  80.0  65.3 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  30.0  56.3  n=58, p=2.28 ,df=l 
No  70.0  43.8 
Notes: n=number o/responses, p=Pearson chi square value, d/=degrees o/freedom 
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Following the methodology of  the analysis of the impact of  the background of 
respondents  on their responses  to  the  question  of potential  ways  in  which 
greater private sector involvement and investment could be stimulated in the 
urban regeneration process, a series of logistic regression analyses were run on 
the responses to the 'awareness' questions reported in this section, looking at 
the four background variables together rather than separately as  was done in 
the  previous  chi  square  analysis.  Four  significant  results  were  found  from 
significance tests in the thirteen logistic regression analyses run. 400 
Figure  A6.14  shows  that  the  analysis  on  the  influence  of the  contextual 
variables revealed no  significant results on the issue of awareness of Glasgow 
Development Agency. 
Figure A6.14: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Glasgow Development Agency?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.92  1.1  0.51 
Employment Size  10.3  111.7  0.93 
Location of  2.62  34.6  0.93 
ownership 
Age of  Company  10.21  108.7  0.93 
Constant  -56.69  356.4  0.87 
Figure  A6.15  shows  that  the  sector  variable  was  a  significant  predictor of 
awareness  of Glasgow  City  Council  Economic  Regeneration  Unit.,  with 
manufacturing and construction companies more aware of  the agency. 401 
Figure A6.15: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Glasgow City Council Economic Regeneration 
Unit?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  1.7  0.69  0.01 
Employment Size  1.1  0.68  0.09 
Location of  0.10  0.18  0.58 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.32  0.65  0.62 
Constant  -6.1  2.04  0.03 
Logistic  regressIOn  analysis  on  awareness  of  Strathclyde  Business 
Development found that the background variables were not good predictors of 
response, with no significant results obtained (Figure A6.16). Figure A6.16: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Strathclyde Business Development?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.45  0.60  0.45 
Employment Size  -0.53  0.63  0.40 
Location of  0.19  0.17  0.27 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.73  0.63  0.24 
Constant  2.49  1.57  0.11 
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Age  of company  was  revealed  as  a  significant  predictor  of response  to 
awareness of Glasgow Opportunities, with younger companies more likely to 
be aware of the agency.  None of the other three background variables were 
useful predictors of  response (Figure A6.17). Figure A6.17: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Glasgow Opportunities?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.45  0.86  0.60 
Employment Size  0.06  0.88  0.94 
Location of  0.35  0.29  0.22 
ownership 
Age of  Company  2.4  1.15  0.04 
Constant  -8.0  3.06  0.09 
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Logistic regression analysis of the  influence  of the  background variables  on 
response to  the question of awareness of Castlemilk Economic Development 
Agency found no significant results (Figure A6.18). 404 
Figure A6.18: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Castlemilk Economic Development Agency?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.07  0.54  0.90 
Employment Size  0.04  0.56  0.94 
Location of  0.12  0.15  0.42 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.44  0.57  0.44 
Constant  0.01  1.36  0.99 
On the issue of awareness of Greater Easterhouse Development Company, the 
background variables were revealed  as  poor predictors of response,  with no 
significant results obtained (Figure A6.19). Figure A6.19: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Greater Easterhouse Development 
Company?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.05  0.56  0.93 
Employment Size  -0.22  0.58  0.70 
Location of  0.22  0.15  0.15 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -1.1  0.59  0.06 
Constant  1.03  1.4  0.46 
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Figure A6.20 shows that on the issue of awareness of Govan Initiative, tests of 
the predictive power of the  contextual variables  found  no  significant results 
(Figure 5.64). Figure A6.20: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Govan Initiative Ltd?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.81  0.70  0.24 
Employment Size  -0.03  0.72  0.96 
Location of  -0.02  0.18  0.91 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.45  0.73  0.54 
Constant  0.51  l.67  0.76 
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As with the previous three logistic regression analyses,  Figure A6.21  shows 
that no significant results were obtained, with none of  the background variables 
acting as  a significant predictor of response to the issue of awareness of the 
Gorbals Initiative. Figure A6.21: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Gorbals Initiative Ltd?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.29  0.55  0.60 
Employment Size  -0.70  0.59  0.23 
Location of  0.14  0.14  0.33 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.62  0.59  0.29 
Constant  0.34  1.37  0.81 
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The background variables also did not act as  a good predictor of response to 
awareness of Glasgow North, with no significant results found (Figure A6.22). Figure A6.22: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Glasgow North Ltd?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.02  0.60  0.98 
Employment Size  -0.87  0.63  0.17 
Location of  0.14  0.15  0.37 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.92  0.62  0.74 
Constant  2.04  1.5  0.18 
408 
The sector background variable was a significant predictor of response as was 
the location of ownership of the company, with service sector and Glasgow 
owned companies more likely to be aware of the East End Partnership (Figure 
A6.23). Figure A6.23: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of East End Partnership Ltd?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  1.13  0.59  0.05 
Employment Size  0.14  0.61  0.82 
Location of  0.32  0.16  0.04 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.87  0.62  0.16 
Constant  -1.81  1.48  0.22 
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Figure A6.24  below shows that none of the background variables produced 
significant results for awareness of  Drumchapel Opportunities. 
Figure A6.24: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of Drumchapel Opportunities Ltd?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.58  0.59  0.38 
Employment Size  -0.31  0.62  0.62 
Location of  -0.12  0.16  0.46 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.87  0.64  0.17 
Constant  -0.34  1.47  0.81 410 
As  with  the  previOUS  analyses,  none  of the  contextual  variables  acted  as 
significant predictors of response to the issue of awareness of New Horizons 
(Figure A6.25). 
Figure A6.25: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of New Horizons' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.72  0.80  0.36 
Employment Size  -0.46  0.82  0.56 
Location of  0.03  0.20  0.88 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -1.6  0.88  0.07 
Constant  5.9  2.38  0.01 
The final  set of logistic regression results found two  significant results, with 
employment size and age of company, emerging as significant predictors, with 
older companies and manufacturing and construction companies more likely to 
be aware of  the Alliance (Figure A6.26). Figure A6.26: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'have you heard of the Glasgow Regeneration Alliance?' 
Beta  Standard Errors  Significance 
Sector  -0.20  0.82  0.81 
Employment Size  -2.2  0.95  0.02 
Location of  -0.23  0.24  0.34 
ownership 
Age of  Company  2.06  0.95  0.03 
Constant  3.61  2.45  0.14 
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(iii) Chapter S (Si) Can the private sector make a positive contribution to 
the regeneration process? 
Chi square tests produced no statistically significant results, with 'p' values on 
the  tests  ranging  from  0.3  to  1.5.  There  was  some  variation  between  the 
background variables in terms of  their response to the queries, but this was not 
sufficiently  great to  produce  statistically  significant values.  However,  some 
variation did emerge; older companies had a higher positive response to  the 
statement,  as  did  manufacturing  and  construction  companies,  those  owned 
outside Glasgow and those with more than 100 employees (Figure A6.27). 412 
Figure A6.27: Chi square test results for response to question: 'do you feel private sector 
representatives  and  companies  can  make  a  distinctive  contribution  to  the  urban 
regeneration process? 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Can make a  75  80.8  n=58, p=0.275, df=l 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Cannot make a  25  19.2 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Services  Mannf/Con  n, p, df 
Can make a  71.4  84.4  n=60, p=1.50, df=1 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Cannot make a  28.6  15.6 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Can make a  73.7  80.0  n=59, p=0.30, df=1 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Cannot make a  26.3  20.0 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Can make a  73.3  85.7  n=58, p=1.35, df=l 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Cannot make a  26.7  14.3 
distinctive 
contribution (%) 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson chi square value, df= degrees of  freedom. 413 
Logistic  regression analysis  revealed that none  of the  background  variables 
were effective as  a significant predictor, as  none of the  'significance' values 
fell below 0.05, i.e. within the 95% confidence level (Figure A6.28). 
Figure A6.28 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'do you feel private sector representatives and companies can 
make a distinctive contribution to the urban regeneration process?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.51  0.67  0.44 
Employment Size  -0.83  0.72  0.25 
Location of  -0.09  0.17  0.57 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.71  0.70  0.72 
Constant  0.88  1.6  0.57 
(iv) Chapter S (Siii) Is private sector involvement necessary for successful 
regeneration? 
Chi  square  test results  revealed  that  the  location  of ownership  background 
variable  revealed  a  statistically  significant  difference.  None  of the  other 
variables produced a significant result (Figure A6.29). 414 
Figure A6.29: Chi square test results for response to question: 'Do you feel that private 
sector participation is a necessary prerequisite of successful urban regeneration?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Necessary (%)  75.0  61.5  n=58, p=1.2, df=l 
Not necessary (%)  0  38.5 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Necessary (%)  75.0  65.6  n=60, p=0.63, df=l 
Not necessary (%)  25.0  34.4 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Necessary (%)  68.4  70.0  n=59, p=0.02, df=l 
Not necessary (%)  31.6  30.0 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Necessary (%)  70.0  67.9  n=60, p=0.63, df=l 
Not necessary (%)  30.0  32.1 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson chi square value, df= degrees offreedom. 
As previously, logistic regression analysis was carried out.  Again, none of  the 
independent variables produced a significant value  (Figure A6.30),  meaning 
that these variables do not act as good predictors of response to the question of 
whether or not the private  sector can make  a distinctive  contribution to  the 
regeneration process. Figure A6.30: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'do you feel private sector representatives and companies can 
make a distinctive contribution to the urban regeneration process?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.51  0.59  0.39 
Employment Size  0.14  0.61  0.81 
Location of  0.02  0.15  0.91 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.63  0.61  0.30 
Constant  -2.2  1.5  1.14 
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(v)  Chapter S (Sin) Levels of involvement in the regeneration process 
Although no  statistically significant results  were  obtained on the  chi  square 
tests, the cross tabulation produced some variation: companies established less 
than  50  years  were  more  likely  to  be  involved  as  were  manufacturing  and 
construction  companies,  companies  owned  outside  the  city  and  those  with 
more than 100 employees (Figure A6.31). 416 
Figure A6.31: Chi square test results for response to question: 'is your company directly 
involved in urban regeneration activities?' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Yes  25.0  19.2  n=58, p=0.28 , df=1 
No  75.0  80.8 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Yes  17.9  25  n=60, p=0.45 , df=1 
No  82.1  75 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Yes  15.8  25.0  n=59, p=0.64 , df=l 
No  84.2  75.0 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Yes  16.7  28.6  n=58, p=O 1.18, df= 1 
No  83.3  71.4 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson ChI square value, df= degrees of freedom. 
Logistic  regresslOn  analysis  was  carried  out  to  assess  the  strength  of the 
background variables as predictors of the response to the question of whether 
or not the respondents were involved in the urban regeneration process.  The 
analysis did not produce any significant results as shown in Figure A6.32. Figure A6.32: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'is your company directly involved in urban regeneration 
activities?' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.48  0.66  0.47 
Employment Size  -0.88  0.70  0.21 
Location of  -0.17  0.19  0.36 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.70  0.70  0.32 
Constant  3.98  l.82  0.10 
(v)  Chapter 5 (Siv) Options for Stimulating Increased Involvement 
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On  all  five  options,  no  statistically  significant  difference  was  observed. 
Although no  statistically significant results were obtained in response to  the 
statement:  'How might  companies  become  involved/more  involved  in  the 
urban  regeneration  process?  - if the  company  was  asked'  ,  with  p  values 
ranging from 0.94 to  3.1, there were differences in response (Figure A6.33). 
Older companies were more positive as  were manufacturing and construction 
companies.  Companies owned outside Glasgow and those with less than 100 
employees were also  more positive. 418 
Figure A6.33: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if the company was 
asked' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  43.8  53.8  n=58 , p=0.94 , df=2 
Neutral  21.9  23.1 
Disagree  34.4  23.1 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Agree  46.4  50.0  n=60 , p=1.6 , df=2 
Neutral  28.6  15.6 
Disagree  25.0  34.4 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Agree  36.8  55.0  n=59 , p=2.1  , df=2 
Neutral  31.6  17.5 
Disagree  31.6  27.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  53.3  46.4  n=58 , p=3.17 , df=2 
Neutral  13.3  32.1 
Disagree  33.3  21.4 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson ChI square value, df= degrees of freedom. 
Again,  in  response  to  the  statement:  'How  might  companIes  become 
involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if the company 
could spare the financial resources and staff time' , despite the lack of statistical 
significance (p values ranged from 0.38 to 4.1) the cross tabulation identified 
some differences in response, with older companies reporting a higher positive 419 
figure as did manufacturing and construction companies, those owned outside 
Glasgow and those with more than 100 employees (Figure A6.34). 
Figure A6.34: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - ifthe company 
could spare the financial resources and staff time' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Agree  43.8  69.2  n=58 , p=4.l , df=2 
Neutral  28.1  19.2 
Disagree  28.1  11.5 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Agree  50.0  56.3  n=59 , p=0.38 , df=2 
Neutral  25.0  25.0 
Disagree  25.0  18.8 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Agree  42.1  60.0  n=59 ,p=L67 ,df=2 
Neutral  31.6  22.5 
Disagree  26.3  17.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Agree  46.7  64.3  n=58 , p=1.85 , df~2 
Neutral  30.0  21.4 
Disagree  23.3  14.3 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson chi square value, df= degrees offreedom. 
On the option 'how might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if more positive PR was gained than is currently 420 
the case', no  statistically significant p values were recorded (Figure  A6.35). 
However,  some  variations  were  apparent.  Younger  companies  answered 
positively at a higher rate than older, as  did  manufacturing and construction 
companies, those with ownership external to Glasgow and larger employers. 
Figure A6.35: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if more positive PR 
was gained than is currently the case' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  34.4  30.8  n=58, p=1.97, df=2 
Neutral  18.8  34.6 
Disagree  46.9  34.6 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Agree  26.3  35.0  n=,60 p=0.82, df=2 
Neutral  21.1  30.0 
Disagree  52.6  35.0 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Agree  28.6  34.4  n=59, p=1.67, df=2 
Neutral  32.1  21.9 
Disagree  39.3  43.8 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Agree  26.7  39.3  n=58, p=1.49, df~2 
Neutral  26.7  28.6 
Disagree  46.7  32.1 
Notes: n= number a/respondents, p= Pearson chi square value,  d/~ degrees a/freedom. 421 
As Figure A6.36 shows, chi square tests on the response to the question of a 
need  for  secondment  possibly  stimulating  more  involvement  in  the 
regeneration process again found no statistically significant differences.  Some 
differences in response did emerge, however, with older companies having a 
higher response  rate  than  younger  companies,  manufacturing  more  positive 
than services, externally owned companies more positive than Glasgow owned 
companies and companies with more than  100  employees more positive than 
those with less than 100. 
Figure A6.36: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if there was a need 
to develop staff through secondment' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  18.8  46.2  n=59, p=0.57, df=2 
Neutral  37.5  11.5 
Disagree  43.8  42.3 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Agree  28.6  31.3  n=60, p=4.7, df=2 
Neutral  39.3  15.6 
Disagree  32.1  53.1 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Agree  52.6  62.5  n=59, p=0.57, df=2 
Neutral  21.1  15.0 
Disagree  26.3  22.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  30  32.1  n=58, p=4.7, df=2 
Neutral  20  32.1 
Disagree  50  35.7 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson chi square value, df= degrees offreedoffi. 422 
As Figure A6.37 shows, chi square tests on  responses to the statement: 'How 
might companies become  involved/more  involved  in the  urban regeneration 
process? - if it was felt the company would have a positive influence' revealed 
no  statistically significant results with p values of 0.57 to  2.7 recorded.  As 
with the previous responses there were some variations, with a higher positive 
response from older companies, those on the manufacturing and construction 
sector,  those  owned  out  with  Glasgow  and  those  with  more  than  100 
employees. 
Figure A6.37: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if it was felt the 
company would have a positive influence' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Agree  53.1  69.2  n=58, p=1.57, df=2 
Neutral  18.8  11.5 
Disagree  28.1  19.2 
Services  Manuf/CoD  n, p, df 
Agree  53.6  62.5  n=60, p=2.7, df=2 
Neutral  25.0  9.4 
Disagree  21.4  28.1 
Glasgow Owned  Other  D, p, df 
Agree  47.4  62.5  n=59, p=0.57, df=2 
Neutral  21.1  15.0 
Disagree  26.3  22.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  36.7  85.7  n=58, p=1.49, df=2 
Neutral  16.7  7.1 
Disagree  46.7  7.1 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson chi square value, df= degrees of freedom. 423 
To further test the impact of the background of respondents on their responses 
to these important questions, a series of logistic regression analyses were run 
looking at the four background variables together rather than separately as was 
done in the chi square analysis above.  In the main, no significant results were 
obtained, with only one  significant result found from  20  significance tests in 
the five regression analyses run.  Figure A6.38  shows that the response to  the 
question 'how might companies become involved/more involved in the urban 
regeneration  process?  - if the  company  was  asked'  showed  no  significant 
results. 
Figure A6.38: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - ifthe company was asked' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.63  0.62  0.31 
Employment Size  0.60  0.63  0.35 
Location of  0.08  0.16  0.63 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.30  0.64  0.64 
Constant  0.34  1.30  0.82 424 
As with the analysis on the previous question, logistic regression produced no 
significant results on response to the question 'How might companies become 
involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if the company 
could spare the financial resources and staff time' (Figure A6.39). 
Figure A6.39: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - ifthe company could spare the financial resources and 
staff time' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  -0.28  0.70  0.68 
Employment Size  -0.40  0.73  0.59 
Location of  -0.15  0.18  0.40 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.85  0.77  0.27 
Constant  1.25  1.70  0.46 
Figure A6.40 shows that on the issue of more positive PR stimulating more 
involvement, logistic regression analysis showed that the background variables 
did not act as a significant predictor of  response. 425 
Figure A6.40: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if more positive PR was gained than is currently the case' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.36  0.57  0.52 
Employment Size  -0.63  0.59  0.28 
Location of  -0.20  0.15  0.18 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.25  0.59  0.67 
Constant  1.04  1.4  0.46 
Logistic regression analysis to test the relevance of  the background variables as 
predictors of response to the question of  a need for secondment encouraging 
more involvement found no significant results (Figure A6.41). 426 
Figure A6.41: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - ifthere was a need to develop staff through secondment' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.89  0.56  0.11 
Employment Size  -0.73  0.59  0.21 
Location of  -0.07  0.15  0.61 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.90  0.59  0.88 
Constant  -~AO  1.37  0.77 
Figure  A6.42  shows  that  on  three  of the  four  significance  tests  on  the 
regression analysis, no significant results were found on three of the four tests. 
However, the employment size test found a significant result with a value of 
0.01, suggesting that size of company was a significant predictor of response, 
with larger companies more likely to give a positive response to the question of 
companies  having  a positive  influence  on  the  regeneration  process  making 
them more likely to be involved. 427 
Figure A6.42: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if it was felt the company would have a positive influence' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.68  0.72  0.35 
Employment Size  -2.19  0.87  0.01 
Location of  -0.12  0.18  0.54 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.19  0.73  0.80 
Constant  0.82  1.68  0.63 
(vi) Chapter 5 (5v) Options for  Stimulating Increased Investment 
Chi  square  analysis  of the  responses  revealed  no  statistically  significant 
results.  As  with  previous  chi  square  tests,  recoded  variables  were  used  to 
obtain valid chi  square tests.  On the  option  'how might companies  become 
involved/more  involved  in  the  urban  regeneration  process?  - if there  was 
provision of financial  incentives for property development in  a regeneration 
area', p values ranged from 0.4 to 8.6 for the background variables.  However, 
there were some variations, with older companies, those in the service sector, 
companies owned outside Glasgow and those with more than 100  employees 
more likely to answer positively (Figure A6.43). 428 
Figure A6.43: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if there was 
provision of financial incentives for property development in  a regeneration area' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  37.5  57.7  n=58, p=2.5, df=2 
Neutral  21.9  11.5 
Disagree  40.6  30.8 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Agree  53.6  40.6  n=60, p=2.3, df=2 
Neutral  21.4  15.6 
Disagree  25.0  43.8 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Agree  47.4  62.5  n=59, p=O.4, df=2 
Neutral  21.1  15.0 
Disagree  26.3  22.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n,p,df 
Agree  43.3  53.7  n=58, p=8.6, df=2 
Neutral  6.7  28.6 
Disagree  50.0  17.9 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson ChI square value, df= degrees of  freedom. 
Chi square tests found no statistically significant differences in responses to the 
statement  'how might companies become involved/more involved in the urban 
regeneration  process?  - if there  were  financial  incentives  to  relocate  to  a 
regeneration area' (Figure A6.44).  Some variations were observed, with older 429 
companIes,  servlce  sector companies,  Glasgow owned  companies  and  those 
with less than 100 employees showing higher positive response rates. 
Figure A6.44: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if there were 
financial incentives to relocate to a regeneration area' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  28.1  46.2  nSS=, p=3.4, df=2 
Neutral  21.9  26.9 
Disagree  SO.O  26.9 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Agree  39.3  37.S  n=60, p=LlS, df=2 
Neutral  2S.6  IS.S 
Disagree  32.1  43.S 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Agree  47.4  30.0  n=S9, p=5.3, df=2 
Neutral  42.1  30.0 
Disagree  10.5  40.0 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  n=5S, p=S.7, df=2 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson ChI square value, df= degrees offreedom. 
Figure A6.45 shows that high p values, ranging from 4.9 to  8.4, were obtained 
from the chi square tests carried out on the responses to the statement:  'How 430 
might companies become  involved/more  involved  in the  urban regeneration 
process? - ifthere were available, secure premises with back up infrastructure'. 
Variations which the cross-tabulations did show up were that older companies, 
manufacturing and construction companies, those owned in Glasgow and those 
with more than 100 employees responded to the statement more positively. 
Figure A6.45: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if there were 
available, secure premises with back up infrastructure' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n,p,df 
Agree  21.9  53.8  n=58, p=8.4,  df~2 
Neutral  46.9  15.4 
Disagree  3l.3  30.8 
Services  Manuf/Con  n,p,df 
Agree  35.7  37.5  n=60, p=5.4, df=2 
Neutral  46.4  21.9 
Disagree  17.9  40.6 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n, p, df 
Agree  52.6  50.0  n=59 , p=4.9 , df=2 
Neutral  42.1  22.5 
Disagree  5.3  27.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  20.0  53.6  n-58, p-7.l1, df~2 
Neutral  40.0  25.0 
Disagree  40.0  21.4 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson chi square value, df= degrees of freedom. 431 
On  the  response  to  the  statement;  'How  might  companIes  become 
involved/more  involved  in  the  urban  regeneration  process?  - if there  were 
financial incentives to take on trainees from regeneration areas' chi square tests 
yielded no statistically significant results, with p values ranging from  0.16 to 
5.4  (Figure  A6.46).  Observable  variations  within  the  data  showed  that 
companies  which  were  less  than  49  years  old,  service  sector  companies, 
Glasgow owned companies and those with more than 100 employees providing 
a higher positive response. 432 
Figure A6.46: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if there were 
financial incentives to take on trainees from regeneration areas' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  53.1  50.0  n=58, p=0.16, df=2 
Neutral  28.1  26.9 
Disagree  18.8  23.1 
Services  Manof/Con  n, p, df 
Agree  60.7  43.8  n=60, p=5.4, df=2 
Neutral  32.1  25.0 
Disagree  7.1  31.3 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Agree  52.6  50.0  n=59, p=4.8, df=2 
Neutral  42.1  22.5 
Disagree  5.3  27.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  50.0  53.6  n=58, p=1.26, df=2 
Neutral  33.3  21.4 
Disagree  16.7  25.0 
Notes: n= number of  respondents, p= Pearson ChI square value, df= degrees of freedom. 
The final set of chi square tests looking at the possible significance of the four 
background variables on the response to the statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if quality 
trainees  were  available  to  recruit  in  regeneration  areas'  again  produced  no 
statistically  significant results  with p  values  of 1.6  to  8.8  recorded  (Figure 433 
A6.47).  On  company  age  there  was  very  little  response  difference,  while 
service  companies  produced  a  higher  positive  response  as  did  compames 
owned outwith Glasgow and those with more than 100 employees. 
Figure A6.47: Chi square test results for response to statement: 'How might companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if quality trainees 
were available to recruit in regeneration areas' 
0-49 years  50 years+  n, p, df 
Agree  46.9  46.2  n=58, p=3.6, df=2 
Neutral  40.6  23.1 
Disagree  12.5  30.8 
Services  Manuf/Con  n, p, df 
Agree  57.1  37.5  n=60, p=8.8, df=2 
Neutral  39.3  28.1 
Disagree  3.6  34.4 
Glasgow Owned  Other  n,p,df 
Agree  36.8  50.0  n-59, p-2.2, df~2 
Neutral  47.4  27.5 
Disagree  15.8  22.5 
<99 employees  >100 employees  n, p, df 
Agree  40  53.6  n-58, p-1.58, df=2 
Neutral  40  25.0 
Disagree  20  21.4 
Notes: n= number oJrespondents, p= Pearson chi square value,  dJ~ degrees oJfreedom 434 
As with the responses given on the 'involvement' options,  the impact of the 
background of  respondents on their responses to the question of  potential ways 
in which greater private sector investment could be  stimulated in the  urban 
regeneration process, a series of logistic regression analyses were run, looking 
at the four background variables together rather than separately as was done in 
the previous chi square analysis. Three significant results were found from 20 
significance  tests  in the  five  logistic regression  analyses  run.  Figure A6.48 
shows that on the  question of financial  incentives for  property development 
possibly  stimulating  more  involvement,  none  of the  background  variables 
acted as a significant predictor of  response. 
Figure A6.48 : Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if there was provision of financial incentives for property 
development in  a regeneration area' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  l.32  0.66  0.44 
Employment Size  -1.79  0.69  0.09 
Location of  0.30  0.16  0.86 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.88  0.66  0.89 
Constant  -0.36  1.48  0.81 435 
Logistic regression analysis of response to the question of financial incentives 
to relocate to regeneration areas found no significant results (Figure A6.49). 
Figure A6.49: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if there were financial incentives to relocate to a 
regeneration area' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  0.79  0.59  0.18 
Employment Size  -0.68  0.59  0.25 
Location of  0.12  0.16  0.44 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.84  0.61  0.17 
Constant  0.65  1.42  0.96 
Figure A6.50 shows that the logistic regression analysis of  the influence of the 
background  variables  on  response  found  that  location  of ownership  was  a 
significant  predictor  of response  to  the  question  'how  might  companies 
become involved/more involved in the urban regeneration process? - if there 
were  available,  secure  premises  with back up  infrastructure', with Glasgow 
owned companies more likely to respond positively. Figure A6.50: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - ifthere were available, secure premises with back up 
infrastructure' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  1.2  0.67  0.06 
Employment Size  -1.1  0.69  0.09 
Location of  0.46  0.21  0.03 
ownership 
Age of  Company  0.17  0.69  0.08 
Constant  -3.1  1.78  0.08 
436 
Figure A6.51  shows that the logistic regression analysis found that on three of 
the four tests on whether financial incentives would encourage more uptake of 
trainees,  no  significant  results  emerged.  However,  the  sector  background 
variable did produce a significant result, with service sector companies more 
likely to respond positively. 437 
Figure  A6.51:  Results  of Logistic  Regression  Analysis  of Background  Variables  on 
Response  to  Question:  'How might companies  become  involved/more  involved  in  the 
urban regeneration process? - if there were financial incentives to take on trainees from 
regeneration areas' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  1.90  0.88  0.02 
Employment Size  0.77  0.79  0.33 
Location of  0.54  0.29  0.06 
ownership 
Age of  Company  -0.56  0.76  0.94 
Constant  7.97  2.77  0.04 
In the logistic regression analysis of response to the question of availability of 
quality trainees/employees as an incentive to stimulate more investment in the 
regeneration  process,  the  sector  variable  produced  a  significant  result  with 
service companies more likely to respond positively (Figure A6.52). 438 
Figure A6.52: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis of Background Variables on 
Response to Question: 'How might companies become involved/more involved in the 
urban regeneration process? - if quality trainees were available to recruit in regeneration 
areas' 
Beta  Standard Error  Significance 
Sector  2.8  1.11  0.01 
Employment Size  -0.34  0.79  0.67 
Location of  0.09  0.21  0.68 
ownership 
Age of  Company  1.37  0.80  0.09 
Constant  -8.03  2.79  0.04 439 
APPENDIX 7:  EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT Interview: Senior Officer, Glasgow Development Agency 
Date: 7/2/95 
Interview length 60 minutes 
440 
Note: Names have been removed to ensure confidentiality.  Interviewer's 
contributions are in bold. 
Do you think the need to generate and retain private sector involvement 
both in organisational terms and investment terms has affected the sorts 
of things agencies do? Do you see it as radically different now to the sorts 
of projects you were involved in your SDA days? 
No, I don't see it as radically different.  Off  the top of  my head, I think that the 
private sector played a role  in the  urban regeneration process  in two  ways. 
One;  as  an investor in projects  and  secondly  as  a  volunteer in the  process. 
They have either sat on boards or been advisers to  groups or in some cases 
have chaired and led groups.  This is  part of enlightened self interest if you 
like, or at worst, and at best, genuine concern and there is  no  doubt as far as 
some of the private sector involvement is  concerned that they have made a 
good contribution.  Some have made less of a contribution, some have been 
rather  transparent.  But  I  think  broadly  though  those  were  the  kinds  of 
involvement  that  were  involved  before  and  those  are  still  the  kinds  of 
involvement now.  I would say that when we talk about private investment, 441 
overwhelmingly it  is  physical  development,  and  then again  overwhelmingly 
housing. 
Would you say that over the past ten, fifteen years we have seen  more of a 
shift in the rhetorical emphasis of policy rather than a major actual shift? 
Well, I've already said I don't think: there has been much change.  Unless you 
can give me a steer that might take me  off in a different direction, I haven't 
noticed  the difference.  I mean, if you go way back to the early 80s, we were 
trying  to  get  the  private  sector  involved  as  investors,  looking  for  the 
preconditions that were required to  get them involved, and also  getting them 
involved in the process as well, rather than just at arms length in the belief that 
they  would  encourage  other  investors  into  the  area.  I  don't think:  it  has 
changed.  Have I missed something? 
No, that's been the general attitude people have come up with. 
I mean, I think: there have been great exhortations.  The famous one was where 
Heseltine took up all these guys from financial institutions and really tried to 
say,  look, you're businessmen, you get involved in the cities  and the cities' 
problems.  He identified people and they went round.  We  had them here.  I 
was involved with a subgroup,  but nothing happened. 442 
Do  you  feel  that's because they'll only  become  involved  in investment 
terms when there's a return? 
Well.  it's ideologically  driven,  you know,  what  lies  behind that  is  that the 
public  sector  are  hopeless,  they  don't  understand  how  these  things  work, 
they're bureaucrats,  that's one strand in the thing.  A sort of denigration of  the 
public sector.  Secondly, and this is not just in this country, I've heard it in the 
States as  well, guys stand up at conferences and extolling the virtues of why 
don't we run Philadelphia like Disney? The guy got howled down, which was 
very interesting.  But he gave this great exposition of  what a wonderful concept 
Disneyland is  and how clean it is  and how lovely it is  and why don't those 
same  principles  apply  and  why  don't  we  get  Disney  to  run  Philadelphia, 
basically.  It  was  as  superficial  as  that  at  that  extreme.  So  that's  what 
underpinned this pressure.  Also a feeling that businessmen would understand. 
It's a false premise.  I think urban regeneration and you can argue about what 
that means  and  I  have  views  about  what  that  is,  as  I  would  say  and  I've 
probably said to  you before,  it's a public  good  and  the  private  sector don't 
really know.  They are very good at identifying their interests, they are very 
good in terms of project management.  They will run a good project.  They are 
capable  of running  a  good  project.  But  responding  to  the  needs  and 
requirements ofthe city; that's not what they're good at. 
When you get private sector interests involved in a  project, from your 
experience in Glasgow is  it an equal relationship between the public and 443 
private sectors?  Are you  chasing the private sector or are the  private 
sector chasing you? 
I think for example, if you mean by urban regeneration you mean hard pressed 
areas of  the city where the market is not necessarily forthcoming.  I mean if for 
example you take the prime area of Glasgow on the whole it tends to look after 
itself.  Space becomes available, or they take out an office block and redevelop 
it or demolish it an build another one or whatever, there's a good two hundred 
year record of  values and what's happening in there.  The market on the whole 
is quite well informed, its not exactly a perfect market, but people know about 
yields, and they know that these things tend to follow cyclical form and if  they 
can start it now they might hit the peak in three years time and hit yields.  Now 
over the  last ten to  fifteen  years  I think projects  in  secondary  and tertiary 
markets  - there's no  such thing  as  secondary and  tertiary  markets,  I've just 
invented it - but I like the idea  of there being prime markets , prime property 
markets, which there are and there's a lot of research about that, but if you go 
further down there should be things like secondary and tertiary markets.  At the 
bottom end there's the  tertiary  market - we'd be  talking  about  commercial 
development in Castlemilk, for example, and I'm not quite sure what would be 
a secondary market, but where the market is not proven and there's not enough 
to  go  at,  for  example secondary market might well  be  low cost housing  on 
brown field sites which is reasonably close into the city centre.  Now, generally 
that market's been proven, if you do the product right, if you don't overbuild, 
there is  a market.  Now that's been established as  a marketplace.  Therefore, 444 
you are getting the private sector prepared to come in and do that because it's 
been demonstrated that if you get the product right and so on then it will sell. 
Now that doesn't mean to  say  that there  aren't risks  associated with it  and 
some of  those risks you probably have to share with the public sector.  Like it's 
a crappy site and you need to clear it or sort out some underground conditions 
or some bad ground conditions and so on.  Well on the whole, by and large the 
housing  market  in  the  secondary  areas  is  proven.  The  housing  market  in 
tertiary areas like Castlemilk and Drumchapel say,  are  a little more difficult. 
There  is  no  tradition  of,  it's not  a  mixed  area,  it's  99%  council  flats  and 
therefore establishing value which is tradeable in these areas  is  a little more 
risky,  but  it's  happening,  slower.  You  begin  to  see  that  and  therefore 
increasingly we will, the public sector, not necessarily this organisation, will 
share some of  that risk, but at a particular part of  the market which is low cost, 
first owners or whatever, but low cost owner occupation.  If you broaden that 
out to  industrial and commercial, even more difficult.  In secondary markets, 
industrial,  yes  ,  you  could  probably  do  that  - small  workshop  kind  of 
developments, again dependent on the  product,  but there is  proven demand. 
Again, if  you move into tertiary markets, it is extremely difficult.  Why should 
people want to set up in Easterhouse or Drumchapel? 
So  basically  would you say the more difficult the project, the more the 
public sector has to invest? 445 
Yes.  I think that an interesting one by the way - it's something I was talking 
about ten years ago, this notion of prime markets and secondary markets and 
tertiary markets.  I don't think anyone has tried to identifY what they are.  They 
are not necessarily geographical.  Prime is geographical.  There's no  getting 
away from it and it is  defined.  Lines run along streets.  This is  where Jones 
Lang  Wootton  and  Richard  Ellis  trade  information  about.  They  know what 
rentals are passing in these places.  There are high levels of  information.  When 
you move  to  secondary,  you  get a  different kind  of investor.  The  kind of 
investors in this place (the city centre) are Hong Kong land, distant people who 
invest  in this  as  part  of a  portfolio.  That's  what  they're  m  - it's prime. 
Whereas  different  players,  different  kinds  of products,  as  you  move  into 
secondary and tertiary. 
I  think what you're saying is  that you don't need to do much about the 
prime area, the city centre, but its the secondary and tertiary things that 
you're working in. 
Yes.  It would  inevitably have  to  be.  You  do  things  in the  public  realm, 
pedestrianisation, lighting, security or whatever, but really that's the setting for 
private investment. 
Do you think there is a commitment in the city business community (if you 
can talk of such a thing) towards the aims of urban regeneration? 446 
I don't think you would get any  businessman in the  city who  would not  be 
quite strong civically.  They want to see a prosperous Glasgow.  But there is a 
nice  cleavage  between,  and  obviously the  general  prosperity of Glasgow  is 
going  to  be  good  for  business  anyway,  so  there  is  that.. .. enlightened  self 
interest, but I wouldn't want to be cynical about that motive.  I think that 300 
people  turned  up  on  January  10  when  we  actually  launched  'Corporate 
Metropolitan Glasgow', which is the top 200 firms.  The aim was to  give an 
uplifting  message  for  95,  and  people  genuinely  wanted  to  hear  something. 
Yes, I think there is a lot of  goodwill, but don't mistake it for a project.  That's 
the unit of account in the private sector, whether you're doing 30, 000 square 
feet of small workshops or whatever, the analysis is the same, you do the cash 
flow,  this is  going to  cost £x million to  build,  we're going to  build them in 
blocks of 1000, rentals passing and so  on,  we'd look at  a void level for  18 
months,  we'll get them marketed  .... we  have  to  borrow money  at this  level 
because the Royal Bank's not going to  do this, we have to  part with equity in 
order to do it, they'll only give us 50% in loans .... we've got a shortage and our 
gap funding is something like £400 000, they come to us and say we'd like to 
do  this  scheme,  you have  a  look  at  the  figures,  we  need to  make  18%  on 
this .... because we've got to pay the bank, we're taking the risk, we need £400 
000 out of  this £5million project to make it work and we say well, ifI say well, 
playing on the first set of motives, you know you think well of the city but I 
mean it's not going to  do  well for the city if you're going to  do  it at a loss, 
profit drives the system, and that's the system we live in. 447 
Do you feel that that's where a lot of the misconceptions about what the 
private  sector  can  do  in  government  have  come  from  - that  division 
between goodwill on the one hand and investment in actual projects on the 
other - there's a tendency to group them together  ... that is  involvement = 
investment  ... .in the attitudes of government, in their policy statements at 
least, there is  a view that the private sector will come forward and solve 
the problem? 
We  live in  a time  and we  have  done  for  the  last  15  years .... when I  was  at 
University  which  was  30  years  ago,  I  had  a  professor.. .. he  used  to  teach 
philosophy  .... he used to talk about democracy and freedom and all these kind 
of things .... he  used to  talk  about  the  boo  hurrah  words  as  he  used  to  call 
them  .... freedom is a hurrah word  ... people actually don't like freedom .... you say 
do  what you like and they finish up  doing nothing  .... there are a lot of studies 
where  people  actually  feel  rather  comfortable  living  in  a  rather  rigid 
regime  ... democracy, wonderful, wonderful,  private sector - hurrah,  that's it, it 
doesn't matter, public sector, boo.  There's not a lot of thought given to it.  In 
America they went through this in the 1970s (Robin Boyle) with I think a very 
strong Economic  Development Administration,  which was  set  up  by  Carter 
which got wiped away, the guy that was from the Ford Motor Company, they 
brought this guy in, to  'spearhead the cities and turn the cities round'.  Boyle 
had some wonderful quotations, he said 'we don't know anything about this', 
it's been one of  the big eye openers in my life, was to see that the Ford Motor 
Company had nothing to  offer.  He  actually  says  it like this.  It's amazing 448 
because that whole thing hadn't really happened here, it was published in about 
1979-80.  This  whole  thing  hadn't  happened  in  Britain.  I  think  though 
generally, I don't want to be too cynical, but you have to address these things 
from public and private sector.  It's got to  be a public sector lead  ... you've got 
to recognise the strengths in any partnership, where those strengths lie, because 
we  need their money.  We  can't go  around  building  houses,  we  can't go 
around building factories, if I can get these guys to do £Sm worth, and it costs 
me £400  000, that's a good deal.  Because in the past,  I would have had to 
build the whole lot.  And I don't have to manage it, put people on to collecting 
rents.  That's the  way  it  should  be.  My  money  goes  further,  I  get  more 
product,  and that's got to  be right.  And on the  whole that's become a bit 
easier over the piece.  It's not because the private sector have suddenly been 
won over by city building as a new mission, but because they recognise market 
opportunities.  I  don't get  Hong  Kong  Land  corning  in to  me  and  saying 
they've got a  £400 000 shortfall, it's a different operator in these areas.  They 
tend to be smaller developers, certainly Scottish, almost overwhelmingly West 
of Scotland and they corne in together. 
Do developers come to you with proposals or do you go  out and look for 
developers for sites?  What's the balance? 
Both.  It's difficult to know.  In places like Castlemilk and Drumchapel, yes, 
you've got to go round.  I'm not saying they're going to play hard to get,  but 
in the tertiary markets, you have to go and woo them a bit and you have to talk 449 
about market prospects, you made it happen over the road why can't it happen 
here? You'll talk about a scheme, a project and so  on.  The closer you get to 
prime the less wooing you have to do.  So its a mixture.  Development X, for 
example, we put two packages together and asked for interest to be expressed 
and were bowled over.  I think there were about twenty companies and then we 
spoke to each of  them individually and gave them the briefing material and got 
11  submissions for the first site of 130 houses.  Then we rattled it down to four 
and ran a straight competition.  So that was overwhelming at a bad time in the 
market, so I can't totally explain that, but the critical thing about development 
X will be phase two, how that goes.  Phase 1 yes but Phase 2 will be the tester. 
I'm quite interested in that project.  It is  seen as a difficult area, close to 
the  city  centre and  obviously  a  lot  of housing  expenditure.  Also  the 
amount of private investment that they've managed to get very quickly is 
impressive.  What's your perspective on it? 
Well, we could have got the area developed a lot faster.  We could have just 
acquired the land, for someone to make the bold move of going in there and 
take out the 8 pubs, the land was all levelled there and what causes the problem 
in Glasgow, particularly in the inner city,  8 or 9 pubs all  stuck at the end of 
plots, and these very rich booze companies, going back to your earlier position, 
why don't they say we understand what you're trying to  do  here so  you just 
knock  it  down.  Like  hell.  They  either  want  direct  compensation,  and/or 
they'll be looking for an alternative site, either within the new development or 450 
elsewhere  in  the  city  for  extinguishment.  They  have  companies  to  run. 
Capitalism  doesn't  necessarily  work,  and  when  did  it  ever?  That's  an 
ideological opinion and you and I don't need to debate it.  There are still other 
people out there who feel if that's it then that must be right.  So  we went in 
heroically, cleared the site and tried to assemble plots.  For better of for worse 
we  involved  the  public.  We  haven't  tried  to  set  up  a  surrogate  urban 
development corporation,  I  could have cleared the  sites,  and  then said  OK, 
make me an offer for the site.  Wimpey, Barratt, come in, best offer, bang, get 
them up.  These guys wouldn't blink at making an offer for the site.  And then 
they build.  We  could have walloped them up in no  time.  Must faster than 
we've done here.  we tried to  say something about the overall design of the 
development and we had a competition for that, we involved the residents in 
there  and so  on,  we  tried to  say  something  about the  quality  of individual 
developments, in terms of  finish and in terms of  mix, and one or two other bits 
and pieces that relate to involving the local people in the process and so on. 
That's more time consuming.  Democracy's great, but it slows you up. 
Do you think that as a result of the process you've gone through that the 
development will be better? 
Well it bloody better be.  We keep calling it 'careful urban renewal', it's sort of 
a glossy brochure type phrase, but we've taken more care there than we have 
done with others.  I'm a development agent, I'm judged on what we do, unlike 
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also I'm smaller, my whole organisation is  half the  size of Glasgow District 
Planning Department alone.  So  let's get these things  right you know.  If I 
don't do things and make things happen that would not have happened were I 
not here, then I lose, and therefore this militates against the process to a degree. 
Process  and  democracy  are  about  local  authorities,  getting  things  done  are 
about development agencies.  You can't have the two polar opposites, but from 
mid point we've got to lean towards action which causes conflict. 
Do you think that it possible to involve the private sector in the sorts of 
projects that don't just involve property? Is it possible to get them to do 
the things, training, counselling, business development etc, that you as  a 
development agency do? 
In any regeneration process there is physical development, people development 
and business development.  Those are the three things.  I think ... .in terms of 
people development, again you're talking  about the private  sector taking  on 
people from hard-pressed areas, that kind of stuff, and yes some are better than 
others, we've done specific projects with companies to  target local people for 
jobs.  You can't actually say .... again if you were  a manufacturing  company 
then their existence depends on how they perform and their profitability.  If 
there were a bunch of duffers all around the factory gates, then you can't enter 
into a deal like that because they'll say well, the public sector recruited these 
people for us and now we're going down the tubes.  It's just a farce.  It would 
never  happen  like  that.  Some  companies  will  work  with  you,  so  we  get 452 
someone involved in stirring up the local labour market, we'll say what kind of 
people are you looking for,  what kind of skills, let's try and find them locally, 
let's have a shot at that, you interview them, you decide.  It can be no  more 
than that.  Or wee can say for certain things that if  you can identify a skills gap 
we will try and run a programme to  get these people up to speed.  But its us 
bending  over backwards to  try  and  do  that.  Anything else  is just a bonus. 
Companies are in business to  do  well,  and they're not there to  solve social 
problems.  That's why I'm there.  Whenever were building societies set up to 
solve the housing problem? They weren't.  Why do  we expect the guy in the 
Halifax  and  the  Abbey  National  to  solve  Britain's  housing  problems?  It's 
ridiculous. 
So you're very much dependent on the employer in these situations? 
Yes.  Sainsbury's have been very positive  .... Safeway have been positive and 
have worked with us.  We've had a good response from them.  They tend to be 
bigger employers.  Smaller firms  its much more  specialised.  Construction-
they'll vary.  Some are good at it, some are good at the lip service.  The track 
record is not high.  It depends very much on the individual and the time they 
are prepared to spend. 
How do you actually assess, returning to your £5million project, value for 
money?  Is  it  always  a  judgement  on  the  part  of your  agency?  Is 
everything you do in the grey area, for example a sound project in the city 453 
centre is not going to need money, if it's something that's never going to 
happen then you're not going to give money to it anyway, so basically it's 
always  going to  be in that grey area between the two.  Would you say 
when you give grants that that's how you operate or would you say you 
can make more concrete assessments? 
I understand what you mean.  What you're implying is that there is a nice piece 
of calculus you can do  in  the private  sector that would tell you ,no  bother, 
whether  or not you're going  to  make  a  decent  return  on  your money  as  a 
private investor.  That is not the case.  (example of Alhambra House.  They're 
going to knock that down.  A developer has acquired the site ands that's going 
to happen.  They're going to build a £12m development there.  Now we're not 
involved  in that  at  all.  The  developer  has  talked  to  the  banks,  done  the 
arithmetic, talked about making estimates of  what rentals are passing.  You use 
your judgement - this  guy's  track  record  in  spotting  them,  quality  of the 
figures,  quality of the  understanding,  quality of the  location and  so  on.  So 
there's grey areas in that - that is not a precise science).  When we get involved 
in something we are not, and we try to structure our negotiations and our views 
according to  commercial precept and  according to  commercial principle, but 
not according  to  commercial  return.  So  that what we  would look for  in a 
project has to  do with mainly the economic impact on an area, the number of 
jobs in the project, quality of those jobs, these kinds of factors.  But if  we were 
to  put £400 000 into a £Sm project, which represented a reasonable return on 
the project, let me say it was 18%, and we thought that was reasonable for a 30 454 
000 square foot workshop development in the East End of Glasgow - the risk 
varies, the lower the risk the lower the take-out - if  we said well that's a sort of 
high risk,  18-20% looks  OK.  We  can always  fall  out over that.  Anything 
above 18%,  we would take a portion so we do  share in the uplift.  We would 
have c1awback provisions within the deal which would allow us to share in any 
overage. 
Does that happen very often in your experience? 
Yes.  It's got to be there.  In the case of sale, we'll put one set of...in the event 
of  sale in a five year period  ... we will get x% of  the value above a certain leveL 
If it's a continuous thing or a rental thing, we will take overage on that.  All 
our deals are done on that basis, so that in the event of a sale or in the event of 
a higher performance, we share. 
Some people might say that, when you get a situation where you have a 
profit sharing arrangement or whatever, shows that you didn't need the 
money in the first place. 
No, no, I don't think these people can have their cake and eat it.  It was our 
judgement and the developer's judgement that he'd only make 18%, which was 
sufficient.  In the event they made 25%.  He wins, we win.  But at least we get 
a share of it.  It's not as if all of  it goes into his arse pocket and if  he sells it, as 
a going, as a fully let, proposition we share in that as welL  So that is not a very 455 
strong argument.  Guys go  out of business, developers go  out of business as 
you well know, taking risks.  They put it up  and they can't let it.  He's spent 
£4.6m, I've spent £400 000.  It is  there,  somebody will buy that, not at five 
million, they'll buy at three million because they'll push the rentals down.  As 
far as I'm concerned, I've got an asset in the East End.  It doesn't matter to me. 
So for you, the assessment is not just the actual building, but what it does 
for the area that surrounds it. 
Well, the way I would see it,  if I put £400 000 into that, I would say, this is 
going to create 70 jobs, 40 of  which would not have happened otherwise.  Now 
that's a difficult calculation, but there are ways of satisfying ourselves that that 
is  the win.  So  what I am  saying is  my £400  000  gets  me  30  net jobs of a 
certain quality, so much a head that's not bad value.  That's the way we would 
do it. 
Finally, what are the key steps to increasing private sector involvement 
and investment in a city like Glasgow? What can you do as a development 
agency? 
Well, without breaking any of the rules, you know instead of giving him £400 
000 you give him £800 000, you'd have people falling over themselves, but if 
you're not breaking any of the precepts of how one operates.  How do  we get 
the private sector to be more involved - well I mean I think you take some of 456 
the risk out, you try and spot opportunities, I mean the private sector on the 
whole are pretty good at spotting opportunities because that's what they spend 
all their life on.  There may well be opportunities that they don't readily look at 
that we can identify and we can promote.  We'll say, have you thought of  this? 
We can do some market research, saying that  well you could have a raft of  ten 
projects of opportunities which fit  my agenda an and may not fit  his agenda, 
the private sector's agenda or her agenda, and you could present those to the 
market and say we'd be interested if you want to work these up.  You know, 
we think that the rentals here will be so and so or the values here will be so and 
so,  we  think there  is  a  market  here,  this  could  be  established,  this  is  the 
background.  So  there  is  an  informational  thing  here,  which  relates  to 
opportunities, market research, identifying.  Secondly, I think there is, and I'm 
talking explicitly here of physical works,  cutting out some of  the uncertainties 
as far as sites are concerned.  In the city for example you can get a block like 
this might be  in four  or five  different ownerships.  That's a big pain in the 
neck.  The guy's got to acquire this interest, and he's negotiating like that guy 
in the ransom strip that just owns the comer, you know he's got a little kiosk 
there and he wants £200 000 for it - it's worth ten bob, but he knows that the 
guy needs it to  assemble - so  there's ransom strips in there.  So  the costs of 
holding land are high.  Because while you're doing that negotiating, trying to 
move all the ones on so you can go  wallop, it's Wednesday afternoon, here's 
your money, here's your money, now piss off.  It's a very difficult process, 
what actually  happens  is  that you get two  thirds  of the  site,  and you can't 
negotiate for the other one third.  So acquisition of land in multiple ownership, 457 
which is a city problem, is  something we could do.  And land treatment, we 
could  do.  So  there  are  informational  and  supply  side  kinds  of...front  end 
investment, it's front end investment, and that takes a big pain out ofthe  ... pain 
and  time,  but also  holding  costs.  The  costs  of holding  land  and  buildings 
before you can get on to developing are quite high for building projects in a 
city.  If  you're in East Kilbride, you don't have to worry about it because its a 
farmer - he's got a whole damn filed there, if you do  the deal with him then 
you've got it.  But I mean, all this pepper-potted around.  From the demand 
side, I suppose we could come up with potential people as distinct from saying 
we estimate the demand to be 80 000 sq ft and we're only asking you to do 30 
000 - if you find tenants for them.  Finally we could actually build the bloody 
thing  for  them.  I think the  process  is  about  O-level  economics.  Its  about 
information, people don't have information in secondary and tertiary markets. 
Jones  Lang  don't  know  about  these  things,  they  specialise  in  these  (city 
centre).  You go along to your friendly agent and they don't have records that 
go  back.  They don't know who the players are  in this area, as  well as  they 
know about prime.  Sot here's a lack of information on the returns you can 
make in secondary and tertiary areas.  there's more risk to  it.  So  there's an 
informational and opportunity pointing up, which we have done and secondly 
there is getting the land together in  a complicated ownership pattern.  Some 
people, there  was  a guy  from  CooperslLybrand came  in here  and  said why 
don't you involve the private sector earlier.  Your (SG) posture seems to  be 
there's  a  problem  site,  we  will  acquire  it,  clear  it  and  it's  ready  for 
development.  Why don't you go  to as  developer, and say, that's a site we'd 458 
like to see some commercial development on, go  away and come to us with a 
proposition,  which  includes  clearing  all  the  land,  and  acquiring  it  and  the 
holding costs and so on. 
Is that something that you think you should do? 
Well,  in order to  do  that,  there's arguments  on  both  sides, if someone  was 
prepared to  come in and do  that,  we'd speak to them.  Our understanding is 
that they like life easy.  If somebody wants me the developer and is prepared to 
layout the red carpet, then I'm going to be that much more interested.  That's 
what we've always worked on, particularly in those more difficult areas.  What 
I get if  I own the land, I've got it in a unified ownership, I've got it in and I've 
cleared all the shit out and then I say there it is then I can get six competing 
bids for that deVelopment which I can judge either in terms of price or quality 
or whatever.  What I would need to do is just do a deal with you as a developer 
on the site because I haven't got my time to  waste here.  Why should I go  in 
competition - I've got about two million quids worth of clearance work here, 
we've been nine months negotiating getting hold of  this site, and I don't know 
you guys are backing me.  So in a sense I'm signing a blank cheque, because if 
I  go  in  and  start  negotiating  and  the  figures  are  getting  telephone  book 
numbers, forget it.  It's going to cost two million to get that site and I thought a 
million.  I've got one guy - why him?  I suppose I could hold a competition 
earlier and say, look, I'm interested in you four guys doing that development 
on the  site,  are  you  interested  in  competing?  I'm not  sure  that they'd be 459 
terribly excited about that.  I think there  is  a feeling  that if you want it to 
happen, you get in and acquire and put it together.  I think, but I haven't got  a 
closed mind on that. 
Does that approach not also open you up to more risk? 
Well, I've got to be even - handed.  If I've got a pal  in the building industry, 
how come he's getting five  contracts?  This  notion in capitalism and  in  the 
private sector that they like competition and thrive on it.  Do  they hell - they 
spend all their lives ... as soon as you get a bunch of guys together they want to 
operate in restraint of competition  ... who  wants to  compete  ... no  one wants to 
compete if  you can have a decent well paid life ... why should they? Now if!  put 
four guys on to a difficult site I don't think they would go for it.. .. there's other 
things ... nobody's desperate to  want to  do  that.  Involving the  private sector 
earlier would mean that you're actually giving someone pole position.  Now 
they'd like that, but then that opens me up to .... how do I choose that.. .. how do I 
know I'm getting the best value  .... because you've got me over a barrel now 
(the developer).  Look well you told me, I think I can do this site; acquire it for 
£1.25m, development costs is another £2m, which is £3.5m say to put together, 
even though I've got that the site's only worth £lm, so  you owe me £2.5m. 
That arithmetic's OK, but how do I know that that's the best deal? And I don't. 
And then I can't say, oh that's a crap deal, I can't go with that, I'm going to 
give it to him.  Wait a minute, I'm way down on the negotiation on this - I'm 
not letting some other guy come in and take over from my figures as I've been 460 
negotiating with these other guys.  it sounds a nice principle, but once you get 
into it,  to  obey the other precepts of how we  have to  behave, which is  even 
handed, competitive, value for money for the taxpayer, militate against.. .. which 
the private sector would love of course .... they're not bothered about that,  but 
the public sector has to be. 
END 